财政体制变迁与经济增长
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摘要
自改革开放以来,中国经济持续高速增长近30年,是全球经济增长最快的国家,并且这种趋势仍将继续。中国的迅猛发展赢得了世界的尊重和赞美,国际经济学界称中国增长奇迹为所谓的“中国之谜”,中国的增长模式和内在规律已成为世界经济学的最大论题之一。对中国过去发展经验的成功总结,对于指导中国以后的改革无疑具有非同寻常的意义,对于发展中国家借鉴中国经验以实现发展目标也无疑具有非常重要的意义。
在改革前,中国的资本、劳动、技术进步和人力资本等资源禀赋并不具备经济起飞的基本要求。在中国发展的过程中,制度改革改善了资源配置的效率和激发了经济主体的动力,在实现经济增长的过程中起了决定性的制度促进作用。制度对经济发展的重要性已成为国际经济学界的基本共识,但对于不同的制度的形成机制及如何作用于经济的认识还很不够,对中国经验的认识也是如此。
财政体制改革,作为经济体制改革和政治体制改革的结合点,是最为重要的一项改革。在中国特殊的经济、制度、文化背景下,根据改革的经验,最重要的可能不是“做对价格”(getting prices right),因为在市场不完备的时候,根本就不可能存在正确的价格;更重要的可能是“做对激励”(getting incentivesright),因为激励机制是经济发展中更为深刻的主题,价格机制不过是激励机制的一种方式而已。财政体制正是做对激励的典型重要改革,但我们目前对财政体制如何作用于经济,特别是中国特殊的制度背景下的作用机制的研究还远远不够。
西方财政分权理论以联邦制的发达国家为研究样本,我国的情况与之有很大的不同:(1)西方地方政府的约束和压力来自居民的“用手投票”和“用脚投票”,而我国地方政府的约束和压力主要来自上级政府的政绩考核;(2)西方地方政府的施政目标是提供地方公共品,而我国地方政府的主要目标是经济增长和财政收入的最大化;(3)西方地方政府拥有独立的财政收支安排权力,我国财政体制的决定权在中央,地方政府在其框架范围内行动;(4)西方地方政府的行政和经济权力有限,我国地方政府掌握强大的行政和经济资源。
本文以财政体制改革与经济增长的关系作为研究对象,深入探讨具体的经济环境和制度条件下,财政体制对地方政府的激励从而实现经济增长的过程。地方政府面对中央政府设定的财政分配体制,为了经济增长和财政收入目标的最大化,地方必然充分利用所掌握的政治、行政、经济资源扶持和资助能实现其经济目标的产业和增长模式的快速发展。本文深入分析了每一次财政体制改革对地方政府的利益的影响和效应,地方政府追求自身目标引发的行为方式转变和目标实现机制,从而深入探究财税体制促进经济增长的制度根源。基于前面的研究,提出了财税体制和政策改革的原则性建议,以便在今后的改革中更好的规范和调整政府间关系和资源配置方式,更好的引导和发挥地方政府推动经济增长的动力。本文主要包括六个部分。
第一部分,导论。说明了本论文的研究背景和意义,对国内外关于财政分权和中国财政体制改革的重要研究进行了梳理和综述。研究发现,财政分权与经济增长在时间的演化上并不存在简单的单调关系。单纯的财政分权而没有相适应的政治、经济环境的配合,不仅未必能促进经济增长,反而有可能走向事情的反面。对于财政体制与经济增长的关系,需要结合具体的经济制度环境、市场经济发育程度、地方政府促进经济增长的行为机制等方面进行研究,才能得出建设性且有益的研究结论。最后,提出了本文的研究框架和方法,总结了本研究的创新和不足之处。
第二部分,理论基础和研究前提。本部分对财政体制、财政体制变迁、财政分权和集权的概念进行了辨析,着重指出本文研究的财政体制是指狭义的财政体制,即中央政府与地方各级政府之间财权与财力的划分及其矛盾处理。介绍了本文研究的理论基础:公共选择理论和激励机制理论。
财政体制的利益相关方——中央和地方政府,有着不同的经济目标和行为。中央政府在追求经济发展的过程中,在集权与分权之中平衡,在追求经济发展的目标下努力使控制力最大化;中央政府拥有政治优势,可以通过体制改革和加强监管实现目标。
我国“用手投票”机制和“用脚投票”机制很弱,地方政府官员的升迁是基于经济发展(尤其是GDP)的相对绩效考核机制,地方官员的目标人格化为地方政府的目标,使得地方政府的目标表现为经济快速增长和财政收入增加,行为越来越呈现商业性的趋向,这种为增长而竞争的激励成为推动经济增长的动力源泉。同时,由于我国的社会主义性质,很多重要的资源都以公有的名义掌握在地方政府手里,地方政府拥有强大的资源和政治动员能力,使得其推动经济增长成为可能。这种财政分权化的进程是理解中国经济改革成功的关键所在(Qian etal.,1995)。
第三部分,我国财政体制的改革历程。本部分详细介绍了30年的财政体制改革,对从1979年到1993年间尝试的多种形式的财政包干制和1994年后实行的分税制的改革背景、内容进行了分析和探讨,特别是根据经济发展和市场形成的阶段特点,研究了财政收支分配与资源配置和经济发展的关系,指出不断调整中央与地方之间的分配关系,适应了我国经济快速发展变化的需要,发挥了中央宏观调控有效性和地方积极性。
第四部分,财政包干制与经济增长。80年代,整个社会处于短缺经济,劳动生产率低,商品市场辐射范围小,财政体制决定了地方政府能从自行投资工业企业中获得财政收入增加和经济增长的好处,地方政府动员各种资源办工业企业的行为丰富了市场,促进了经济增长。但是,随着生产发展和劳动生产率的提高,各地重复投资的矛盾开始显现,地方政府出于狭隘的地方利益采取了市场分割和保护主义的政策,财政包干开始阻碍经济发展。
对于20世纪80年代的财政包干制,本文以边际分成率作为反映财政分权度的指标,通过检验,发现财政分权对经济增长起到了显著的作用,这与财政分权能够提高经济效率的假设是一致的。同时我们还发现投资增长、农村改革、非国有部门的发展是推动中国经济增长的关键因素,地方政府对经济的推动正是通过推动偏向性的投资来实现的。
第五部分,分税制与经济增长。1994年的分税制改变了中央和地方政府财政收入的分配方式,引起了地方政府的行为方式和支出的偏向发生了变化。地方政府自主投资办工业企业的冲动大大降低,对工业发展由追求“所有”改为追求“所在”,各地方大力推动“招商引资”。地方政府促进经济增长的重点转向“城市化”建设,以保证土地财政和地方主体税种的优先增长,同时以“城市化”带动“工业化”,实现经济增长目标。目前,“城市化”发展过快与地方政府的急功近利,累积了一系列的政治、经济和社会问题。
对于分税制改革以后的财政分权,设计了四个指标,从不同的角度分析了中国分税制改革前后的财政分权与经济增长之间的关系。对23个地区1986-1992年和1994-2007年的对比研究发现,分税制改革显著地改善了财政分权对经济增长的影响,1994年后财政分权与经济增长的系数显著正;引入虚拟变量,相应的回归支持我国财政分权与经济增长的关系存在显著的跨时差异。
第六部分,结论、建议与展望。本部分简要总结了各部分的研究结论,指出我国财政体制的改革适应了我国经济社会快速发展的需要,在其他体制改革的配合下,发挥了激励地方政府的作用。改革30年经济发展的轨迹,财政体制的制度决定特征非常明显和清晰。
财政体制改革的顺利推行,固然有政治优势方面的原因,更重要的是体制改革实施的是增量改革,符合了激励机制设计的“参与约束”和“激励相容约束”,保证了地方利益,减少了体制改革的阻力。地方政府拥有强大的政治和经济控制力,是其在经济发展中发挥重要作用的原因,也是理解中国式财政分权和地方政府作用的关键。
现行的财政分权体制,地方政府组织收入最大的激励来自“城市化”的相关税种和土地收入,发展到目前,已导致一系列政治、经济和社会问题。如果不改变目前的财政分享体制,地方政府没有动力改变目前的经济增长模式,单纯依靠监管的加强难以从根本上解决问题。文章提出了分税制改革的原则性建议和需注意的问题,并且提出需进一步研究的问题。
Since the reform and opening-up, China's economic growth sustained nearly 30 years. China is one of the world's fastest growing economy, and this trend will continue. The rapid development of China won the world's respect and praise, international economics says China's growth is the so-called "China miracle", the mystery of China's growth model and the inherent law has become the world's largest theme of economics. the successful experience of the reforms in China undoubtedly have guiding significance for next reform, and also is very important for developing countries to realize the target of development.
China's capital, labor, technological progress and human capital did not meet the basic requirements of economic take-off. In the process of China's reform , system reform improved the efficiency of resource allocation and stimulate the economy, played a decisive role in economic growth . The importance of the system in economic development has reach unanimity in the international economic circle, but the knowledge for mechanism of different system formation and role is not enough, so did china.
The reform of fiscal system, as link point of the economic system reform and the reform of the political system, is the most important reform. In the special background of economy, system and culture, according to the experience of reform, the most important may not do " getting prices right ", because the market is incomplete, there wouldn't be right prices, More important is likely to be " getting incentives right ," because incentive mechanism is the subject of economic development , and the price mechanism only is one of incentive mechanism . Financial system is typical for system incentives , but it is not enough for institutional mechanism to economic growth , especially in the special background .
Western theory of fiscal decentralization takes federalism in developed countries as research samples, the situation in China is very different from western country: (1) the constraint and pressure of Western local governments come from "vote" and "voting with their feet" of residents, and the local governments in China mainly face the constraint and the examinational of superior government,; (2) the policy goal of Western local governments is to provide local public goods, and the local governments in China's main target is the economic growth and the financial revenue maximization, (3) western local governments have independent finances power; China's financial system arrangement of power is in the central and local governments take action in its frame range (4) economic power of west local government administration is limited, China's local government master powerful administration and economic resources.
Take the relationship of financial system reform and economic growth as the research object, the paper probes into encourgement of fiscal system to local government for realize economic growth under concrete condition of economic environment and system . Facing financial allocation system, in order to achieve economic growth and to maximize the revenue , local governments will make full use of political and administrative and economic resources to support industry and economic growth mode which help to achieve the goal of economic growth. This paper analyses effect of every fiscal reform to the benefit of the local government, behavior change and mechanisms to local government and effect caused by the pursuit of their goals and objectives behavior change and mechanisms to pursue of their goals ,probing system cause of fiscal system to promote economic growth. Based on the front analysis, the paper puts forward the principle and policy Suggestions to norm and adjust the relations between the governments and the resource allocation, better guiding local governments to promote economic growth. This paper includes six parts.
Chapter 1, the introduction. This paper explains the background and significance of research, and important research reviews about fiscal decentralization at home and abroad , and China's fiscal system reform reviews. Research found that fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the evolution of time does not exist simple relationship. Purely fiscal decentralization and not adapt to the political and economic environment, not only can promote the economic growth, but may have something to the opposite. For financial system and economic growth, it needs to connect with the conrete economic system and the development of the market economy environment, behavior mechanism of local governments to promote economic growth etc, can get constructive and beneficial research results. Finally, the paper puts forward the framework and methods of this study, summarized innovation and the deficiencies .
Chapter 2, Basic theories and research premise. This part define the concept of the fiscal system and fiscal system changes , fiscal decentralization and centralization. The paper pointed out emphatically the financial system refers to the special financial system, namely, the central government and the local governments at various levels and the division between financial resources and the contradiction. This paper introduces the basic theory : public choice theory and incentive mechanism theory.
The the central and local governments, have different economic goals and behavior. The central government in the pursuit of economic development in the process of centralization and decentralization, maximize control in pursuit of economic development. The central government has political advantage, can achieve goals through reform and strengthen supervision.
Our "vote" mechanism and "voting with their feet" mechanism is very weak, the promotion of the local government officials is based on economic growth.. Target of local officials become the goal of local government. At the same time, because of our country's socialist nature, local government has strong ability of resource and the political mobilization, make its economic growth. This fiscal decentralization process is the key to successful China's economic reforms .
Chapter 3, reform process of China's fiscal system. This section introduce in detail the financial system reform in 30 years, from 1979 to 1993 to various forms of fiscal responsibility system and 1994 tax reform of the background, content were analyzed and discussed based on the economic development, especially the characteristics and market research, the stage of budgetary revenues and expenditures and resource allocation and economic development, points out the relationship between the central government and the local constantly adjust and adapt to China's rapid economic development needs, played a central macro-control effectiveness and incentive local government.
Chapter 4, fiscal responsibility system and economic growth. In the 1980s, the whole society is shortage economy, low labor productivity, commodity market radiation, local government decided to invest in industrial enterprises to obtain financial income increase and economic growth, the benefits of local government mobilized all kinds of resources industrial enterprise behavior of market and promote the abundant economic growth. However, with the development of production and labor productivity improvement, repeated investment to the contradiction, the local government adopted the policy of local market segmentation and protectionism, financial measure-taking began to hinder economic development.
In the 1980s, marginal rate the fiscal responsibility system as the index reflects the degree of fiscal decentralization, through the test, fiscal decentralization of economic growth that played a significant role, and fiscal decentralization can improve economic efficiency is consistent with the hypothesis. At the same time, we also found that investment growth, rural reform, and promote the development of the non-state sector is the key factor in the growth of China's economy, the local government to promote economy by promoting partiality investment.
Chapter 5, Tax-sharing system and economic growth. The 1994 tax reform changes fiscal income distribution in central and local government, cause local government behavior and spending tends to have changed. Local government greatly reduce the impulse of industrial development from pursuing "all" to pursue "place", each place vigorously promote "attracting investments". Local government to promote economic growth point to "urbanization construction" to ensure fiscal and tax increase. At present, development of urbanization and the local government beheavior accumulated a series of political, economic and social problems.
Refer to the reform of Tax-sharing system , we design four indexes from different angles and analyzed relations between the fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Research found that the tax reform significantly improve fiscal decentralization effect on economic growth, 1994 fiscal decentralization and economic growth is the coefficient, Introducing virtual variable, the corresponding regression support significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.
Chapter 6, Conclusion, suggestion and prospect. This section summarizes briefly the study conclusion, points out that the reform of the fiscal system in China meet the needs of the rapid development of economic society. In 30 years of economic development, the system decides the features obvious and clear.
The smooth implementation of the fiscal system reform, there is a political advantage reasons, more important is to reform the incremental reform, the design of incentive mechanism of "participation" and "incentive compatible constraint", guarantee the constraints, reduced the resistance. Local government has a strong political and economic control, plays an important role in its economic growth in China, but also is the key of understanding the role of local government.
In the current fiscal decentralization system, the biggest encouragement of local government come from tax land income related to "the urbanization". At present, it has led to a series of political, economic and social problems. If you don't change the present financial sharing system of local government, it has no power to change the current economic growth mode, and strengthening supervision solely isn't solve the problem. Article puts forward the principle of tax reform Suggestions and attention problems, and put forward the problems need to be studied further.
在改革前,中国的资本、劳动、技术进步和人力资本等资源禀赋并不具备经济起飞的基本要求。在中国发展的过程中,制度改革改善了资源配置的效率和激发了经济主体的动力,在实现经济增长的过程中起了决定性的制度促进作用。制度对经济发展的重要性已成为国际经济学界的基本共识,但对于不同的制度的形成机制及如何作用于经济的认识还很不够,对中国经验的认识也是如此。
财政体制改革,作为经济体制改革和政治体制改革的结合点,是最为重要的一项改革。在中国特殊的经济、制度、文化背景下,根据改革的经验,最重要的可能不是“做对价格”(getting prices right),因为在市场不完备的时候,根本就不可能存在正确的价格;更重要的可能是“做对激励”(getting incentivesright),因为激励机制是经济发展中更为深刻的主题,价格机制不过是激励机制的一种方式而已。财政体制正是做对激励的典型重要改革,但我们目前对财政体制如何作用于经济,特别是中国特殊的制度背景下的作用机制的研究还远远不够。
西方财政分权理论以联邦制的发达国家为研究样本,我国的情况与之有很大的不同:(1)西方地方政府的约束和压力来自居民的“用手投票”和“用脚投票”,而我国地方政府的约束和压力主要来自上级政府的政绩考核;(2)西方地方政府的施政目标是提供地方公共品,而我国地方政府的主要目标是经济增长和财政收入的最大化;(3)西方地方政府拥有独立的财政收支安排权力,我国财政体制的决定权在中央,地方政府在其框架范围内行动;(4)西方地方政府的行政和经济权力有限,我国地方政府掌握强大的行政和经济资源。
本文以财政体制改革与经济增长的关系作为研究对象,深入探讨具体的经济环境和制度条件下,财政体制对地方政府的激励从而实现经济增长的过程。地方政府面对中央政府设定的财政分配体制,为了经济增长和财政收入目标的最大化,地方必然充分利用所掌握的政治、行政、经济资源扶持和资助能实现其经济目标的产业和增长模式的快速发展。本文深入分析了每一次财政体制改革对地方政府的利益的影响和效应,地方政府追求自身目标引发的行为方式转变和目标实现机制,从而深入探究财税体制促进经济增长的制度根源。基于前面的研究,提出了财税体制和政策改革的原则性建议,以便在今后的改革中更好的规范和调整政府间关系和资源配置方式,更好的引导和发挥地方政府推动经济增长的动力。本文主要包括六个部分。
第一部分,导论。说明了本论文的研究背景和意义,对国内外关于财政分权和中国财政体制改革的重要研究进行了梳理和综述。研究发现,财政分权与经济增长在时间的演化上并不存在简单的单调关系。单纯的财政分权而没有相适应的政治、经济环境的配合,不仅未必能促进经济增长,反而有可能走向事情的反面。对于财政体制与经济增长的关系,需要结合具体的经济制度环境、市场经济发育程度、地方政府促进经济增长的行为机制等方面进行研究,才能得出建设性且有益的研究结论。最后,提出了本文的研究框架和方法,总结了本研究的创新和不足之处。
第二部分,理论基础和研究前提。本部分对财政体制、财政体制变迁、财政分权和集权的概念进行了辨析,着重指出本文研究的财政体制是指狭义的财政体制,即中央政府与地方各级政府之间财权与财力的划分及其矛盾处理。介绍了本文研究的理论基础:公共选择理论和激励机制理论。
财政体制的利益相关方——中央和地方政府,有着不同的经济目标和行为。中央政府在追求经济发展的过程中,在集权与分权之中平衡,在追求经济发展的目标下努力使控制力最大化;中央政府拥有政治优势,可以通过体制改革和加强监管实现目标。
我国“用手投票”机制和“用脚投票”机制很弱,地方政府官员的升迁是基于经济发展(尤其是GDP)的相对绩效考核机制,地方官员的目标人格化为地方政府的目标,使得地方政府的目标表现为经济快速增长和财政收入增加,行为越来越呈现商业性的趋向,这种为增长而竞争的激励成为推动经济增长的动力源泉。同时,由于我国的社会主义性质,很多重要的资源都以公有的名义掌握在地方政府手里,地方政府拥有强大的资源和政治动员能力,使得其推动经济增长成为可能。这种财政分权化的进程是理解中国经济改革成功的关键所在(Qian etal.,1995)。
第三部分,我国财政体制的改革历程。本部分详细介绍了30年的财政体制改革,对从1979年到1993年间尝试的多种形式的财政包干制和1994年后实行的分税制的改革背景、内容进行了分析和探讨,特别是根据经济发展和市场形成的阶段特点,研究了财政收支分配与资源配置和经济发展的关系,指出不断调整中央与地方之间的分配关系,适应了我国经济快速发展变化的需要,发挥了中央宏观调控有效性和地方积极性。
第四部分,财政包干制与经济增长。80年代,整个社会处于短缺经济,劳动生产率低,商品市场辐射范围小,财政体制决定了地方政府能从自行投资工业企业中获得财政收入增加和经济增长的好处,地方政府动员各种资源办工业企业的行为丰富了市场,促进了经济增长。但是,随着生产发展和劳动生产率的提高,各地重复投资的矛盾开始显现,地方政府出于狭隘的地方利益采取了市场分割和保护主义的政策,财政包干开始阻碍经济发展。
对于20世纪80年代的财政包干制,本文以边际分成率作为反映财政分权度的指标,通过检验,发现财政分权对经济增长起到了显著的作用,这与财政分权能够提高经济效率的假设是一致的。同时我们还发现投资增长、农村改革、非国有部门的发展是推动中国经济增长的关键因素,地方政府对经济的推动正是通过推动偏向性的投资来实现的。
第五部分,分税制与经济增长。1994年的分税制改变了中央和地方政府财政收入的分配方式,引起了地方政府的行为方式和支出的偏向发生了变化。地方政府自主投资办工业企业的冲动大大降低,对工业发展由追求“所有”改为追求“所在”,各地方大力推动“招商引资”。地方政府促进经济增长的重点转向“城市化”建设,以保证土地财政和地方主体税种的优先增长,同时以“城市化”带动“工业化”,实现经济增长目标。目前,“城市化”发展过快与地方政府的急功近利,累积了一系列的政治、经济和社会问题。
对于分税制改革以后的财政分权,设计了四个指标,从不同的角度分析了中国分税制改革前后的财政分权与经济增长之间的关系。对23个地区1986-1992年和1994-2007年的对比研究发现,分税制改革显著地改善了财政分权对经济增长的影响,1994年后财政分权与经济增长的系数显著正;引入虚拟变量,相应的回归支持我国财政分权与经济增长的关系存在显著的跨时差异。
第六部分,结论、建议与展望。本部分简要总结了各部分的研究结论,指出我国财政体制的改革适应了我国经济社会快速发展的需要,在其他体制改革的配合下,发挥了激励地方政府的作用。改革30年经济发展的轨迹,财政体制的制度决定特征非常明显和清晰。
财政体制改革的顺利推行,固然有政治优势方面的原因,更重要的是体制改革实施的是增量改革,符合了激励机制设计的“参与约束”和“激励相容约束”,保证了地方利益,减少了体制改革的阻力。地方政府拥有强大的政治和经济控制力,是其在经济发展中发挥重要作用的原因,也是理解中国式财政分权和地方政府作用的关键。
现行的财政分权体制,地方政府组织收入最大的激励来自“城市化”的相关税种和土地收入,发展到目前,已导致一系列政治、经济和社会问题。如果不改变目前的财政分享体制,地方政府没有动力改变目前的经济增长模式,单纯依靠监管的加强难以从根本上解决问题。文章提出了分税制改革的原则性建议和需注意的问题,并且提出需进一步研究的问题。
Since the reform and opening-up, China's economic growth sustained nearly 30 years. China is one of the world's fastest growing economy, and this trend will continue. The rapid development of China won the world's respect and praise, international economics says China's growth is the so-called "China miracle", the mystery of China's growth model and the inherent law has become the world's largest theme of economics. the successful experience of the reforms in China undoubtedly have guiding significance for next reform, and also is very important for developing countries to realize the target of development.
China's capital, labor, technological progress and human capital did not meet the basic requirements of economic take-off. In the process of China's reform , system reform improved the efficiency of resource allocation and stimulate the economy, played a decisive role in economic growth . The importance of the system in economic development has reach unanimity in the international economic circle, but the knowledge for mechanism of different system formation and role is not enough, so did china.
The reform of fiscal system, as link point of the economic system reform and the reform of the political system, is the most important reform. In the special background of economy, system and culture, according to the experience of reform, the most important may not do " getting prices right ", because the market is incomplete, there wouldn't be right prices, More important is likely to be " getting incentives right ," because incentive mechanism is the subject of economic development , and the price mechanism only is one of incentive mechanism . Financial system is typical for system incentives , but it is not enough for institutional mechanism to economic growth , especially in the special background .
Western theory of fiscal decentralization takes federalism in developed countries as research samples, the situation in China is very different from western country: (1) the constraint and pressure of Western local governments come from "vote" and "voting with their feet" of residents, and the local governments in China mainly face the constraint and the examinational of superior government,; (2) the policy goal of Western local governments is to provide local public goods, and the local governments in China's main target is the economic growth and the financial revenue maximization, (3) western local governments have independent finances power; China's financial system arrangement of power is in the central and local governments take action in its frame range (4) economic power of west local government administration is limited, China's local government master powerful administration and economic resources.
Take the relationship of financial system reform and economic growth as the research object, the paper probes into encourgement of fiscal system to local government for realize economic growth under concrete condition of economic environment and system . Facing financial allocation system, in order to achieve economic growth and to maximize the revenue , local governments will make full use of political and administrative and economic resources to support industry and economic growth mode which help to achieve the goal of economic growth. This paper analyses effect of every fiscal reform to the benefit of the local government, behavior change and mechanisms to local government and effect caused by the pursuit of their goals and objectives behavior change and mechanisms to pursue of their goals ,probing system cause of fiscal system to promote economic growth. Based on the front analysis, the paper puts forward the principle and policy Suggestions to norm and adjust the relations between the governments and the resource allocation, better guiding local governments to promote economic growth. This paper includes six parts.
Chapter 1, the introduction. This paper explains the background and significance of research, and important research reviews about fiscal decentralization at home and abroad , and China's fiscal system reform reviews. Research found that fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the evolution of time does not exist simple relationship. Purely fiscal decentralization and not adapt to the political and economic environment, not only can promote the economic growth, but may have something to the opposite. For financial system and economic growth, it needs to connect with the conrete economic system and the development of the market economy environment, behavior mechanism of local governments to promote economic growth etc, can get constructive and beneficial research results. Finally, the paper puts forward the framework and methods of this study, summarized innovation and the deficiencies .
Chapter 2, Basic theories and research premise. This part define the concept of the fiscal system and fiscal system changes , fiscal decentralization and centralization. The paper pointed out emphatically the financial system refers to the special financial system, namely, the central government and the local governments at various levels and the division between financial resources and the contradiction. This paper introduces the basic theory : public choice theory and incentive mechanism theory.
The the central and local governments, have different economic goals and behavior. The central government in the pursuit of economic development in the process of centralization and decentralization, maximize control in pursuit of economic development. The central government has political advantage, can achieve goals through reform and strengthen supervision.
Our "vote" mechanism and "voting with their feet" mechanism is very weak, the promotion of the local government officials is based on economic growth.. Target of local officials become the goal of local government. At the same time, because of our country's socialist nature, local government has strong ability of resource and the political mobilization, make its economic growth. This fiscal decentralization process is the key to successful China's economic reforms .
Chapter 3, reform process of China's fiscal system. This section introduce in detail the financial system reform in 30 years, from 1979 to 1993 to various forms of fiscal responsibility system and 1994 tax reform of the background, content were analyzed and discussed based on the economic development, especially the characteristics and market research, the stage of budgetary revenues and expenditures and resource allocation and economic development, points out the relationship between the central government and the local constantly adjust and adapt to China's rapid economic development needs, played a central macro-control effectiveness and incentive local government.
Chapter 4, fiscal responsibility system and economic growth. In the 1980s, the whole society is shortage economy, low labor productivity, commodity market radiation, local government decided to invest in industrial enterprises to obtain financial income increase and economic growth, the benefits of local government mobilized all kinds of resources industrial enterprise behavior of market and promote the abundant economic growth. However, with the development of production and labor productivity improvement, repeated investment to the contradiction, the local government adopted the policy of local market segmentation and protectionism, financial measure-taking began to hinder economic development.
In the 1980s, marginal rate the fiscal responsibility system as the index reflects the degree of fiscal decentralization, through the test, fiscal decentralization of economic growth that played a significant role, and fiscal decentralization can improve economic efficiency is consistent with the hypothesis. At the same time, we also found that investment growth, rural reform, and promote the development of the non-state sector is the key factor in the growth of China's economy, the local government to promote economy by promoting partiality investment.
Chapter 5, Tax-sharing system and economic growth. The 1994 tax reform changes fiscal income distribution in central and local government, cause local government behavior and spending tends to have changed. Local government greatly reduce the impulse of industrial development from pursuing "all" to pursue "place", each place vigorously promote "attracting investments". Local government to promote economic growth point to "urbanization construction" to ensure fiscal and tax increase. At present, development of urbanization and the local government beheavior accumulated a series of political, economic and social problems.
Refer to the reform of Tax-sharing system , we design four indexes from different angles and analyzed relations between the fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Research found that the tax reform significantly improve fiscal decentralization effect on economic growth, 1994 fiscal decentralization and economic growth is the coefficient, Introducing virtual variable, the corresponding regression support significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.
Chapter 6, Conclusion, suggestion and prospect. This section summarizes briefly the study conclusion, points out that the reform of the fiscal system in China meet the needs of the rapid development of economic society. In 30 years of economic development, the system decides the features obvious and clear.
The smooth implementation of the fiscal system reform, there is a political advantage reasons, more important is to reform the incremental reform, the design of incentive mechanism of "participation" and "incentive compatible constraint", guarantee the constraints, reduced the resistance. Local government has a strong political and economic control, plays an important role in its economic growth in China, but also is the key of understanding the role of local government.
In the current fiscal decentralization system, the biggest encouragement of local government come from tax land income related to "the urbanization". At present, it has led to a series of political, economic and social problems. If you don't change the present financial sharing system of local government, it has no power to change the current economic growth mode, and strengthening supervision solely isn't solve the problem. Article puts forward the principle of tax reform Suggestions and attention problems, and put forward the problems need to be studied further.
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