中国煤电冲突机理及解决途径研究
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摘要
中国煤炭行业和电力行业自1993年实行煤炭价格改革以来,双方在电煤交易环节就一直存在着冲突,冲突主要体现为电煤交易价格之争。已有许多学者基于博弈的视角来研究煤电冲突并提出相应的政策建议,本文则是基于系统动力学视角来研究煤电冲突,重点研究中国煤炭市场为什么会呈现波动性,这是本文的创新之所在。
本文通过建立系统动力学模型,研究发现,煤炭市场供求波动有两方面的原因:一方面来自煤炭供应系统的内部结构,主要是煤矿投资者作出投资决策后,要历经很长的延迟煤炭产量才会发生相应的变动,这就好比库存管理系统中的订货提前期,另外就是占煤炭总产量30%以上的乡镇煤矿,对煤炭价格非常敏感,这就增大煤炭供应总量波动的可能性;另一方面就是煤炭供应系统外部的原因,主要是占煤炭总需求一半以上的电力用煤需求由于宏观经济波动和用电的季节性而存在波动,然后就是外部政策,比如对待小煤矿的政策,鼓励或关停,给煤炭供应系统带来的波动。本文还运用系统动力学理论中计算延迟的办法,计算出煤炭波动周期大致为7年,与历史统计数据完全一致。这个波动周期是相当长的,正因为此,政府调节煤炭供求平衡来解决煤电冲突才颇有难度,这也是煤电冲突与一般供应链两相邻节点企业之间冲突不同的地方。
本文在分析了中国煤炭市场波动的原因之后,提出了六个解决途径,包括:一缩短煤炭生产提前期,二控制乡镇煤矿占煤炭总产量的比重,三减少电力需求波动的影响,四尽量减少外部政策给煤炭供求带来波动,五大力发展煤炭进出口贸易,在国内煤炭供求不平衡时,通过进出口来平衡国内煤炭供求,六是鼓励煤、电双方签定长期合同来平滑煤炭价格波动。同时也对这六个解决途径分别提出了一些政策建议。
China has witnessed a persistent conflict between the coal industry and electricity industry,mainly in the form of price fighting,ever since 1993 when the coal industry established a marketing reform.Scholars have made much research into this problem with many policy options given.However,most of them used Game Theory to study this problem,In the paper,the author studied coal-electricity conflict from the perspective of System Dynamics,and was focused on the oscillations and long cycle in the coal market,which was a good supplement to the former research.
It was found in the paper that there were several causes for the oscillations of coal market:both endogenous and exogenous.The long delay existing in the coal supply system,mainly construction time of coal capacity,was found to be one of the endogenous causes for the oscillations.Another endogenous cause could be the town-owned coal mines,which accounted for more than 30%of the total coal production,and which was very sensitive to coal price.The exogenous causes for the oscillations fell into two categories:first,the oscillations in the coal demand,and the uncertainty rising from governmental policies.Also looked into was the cycle of coal market,which was found to be 7 years.This replicated the historical data,and was also why it was so difficult for the government to balance coal supply and demand in order to solve coal-electricity conflict since it was really a big cycle.
Several policy options were recommended to the government in order to relieve or remove coal-electricity conflict.First,it was suggested that the government reduce the lead time of coal production.Second,effect can be made to control the percentage that town-owned mines account for of the total coal production.Third,attention can be paid to smoothing electricity demand for a smooth coal demand.Forth,it was recommended that the government steer those town-owned coal mines in a reasonable way so as to reduce and control the large swing of coal supply by them.Fifth, government can work to promote the development of coal import and export.Finally, it was recommended that coal enterprise and electricity enterprise sign long-term contract to smooth the oscillations in the coal price.
本文通过建立系统动力学模型,研究发现,煤炭市场供求波动有两方面的原因:一方面来自煤炭供应系统的内部结构,主要是煤矿投资者作出投资决策后,要历经很长的延迟煤炭产量才会发生相应的变动,这就好比库存管理系统中的订货提前期,另外就是占煤炭总产量30%以上的乡镇煤矿,对煤炭价格非常敏感,这就增大煤炭供应总量波动的可能性;另一方面就是煤炭供应系统外部的原因,主要是占煤炭总需求一半以上的电力用煤需求由于宏观经济波动和用电的季节性而存在波动,然后就是外部政策,比如对待小煤矿的政策,鼓励或关停,给煤炭供应系统带来的波动。本文还运用系统动力学理论中计算延迟的办法,计算出煤炭波动周期大致为7年,与历史统计数据完全一致。这个波动周期是相当长的,正因为此,政府调节煤炭供求平衡来解决煤电冲突才颇有难度,这也是煤电冲突与一般供应链两相邻节点企业之间冲突不同的地方。
本文在分析了中国煤炭市场波动的原因之后,提出了六个解决途径,包括:一缩短煤炭生产提前期,二控制乡镇煤矿占煤炭总产量的比重,三减少电力需求波动的影响,四尽量减少外部政策给煤炭供求带来波动,五大力发展煤炭进出口贸易,在国内煤炭供求不平衡时,通过进出口来平衡国内煤炭供求,六是鼓励煤、电双方签定长期合同来平滑煤炭价格波动。同时也对这六个解决途径分别提出了一些政策建议。
China has witnessed a persistent conflict between the coal industry and electricity industry,mainly in the form of price fighting,ever since 1993 when the coal industry established a marketing reform.Scholars have made much research into this problem with many policy options given.However,most of them used Game Theory to study this problem,In the paper,the author studied coal-electricity conflict from the perspective of System Dynamics,and was focused on the oscillations and long cycle in the coal market,which was a good supplement to the former research.
It was found in the paper that there were several causes for the oscillations of coal market:both endogenous and exogenous.The long delay existing in the coal supply system,mainly construction time of coal capacity,was found to be one of the endogenous causes for the oscillations.Another endogenous cause could be the town-owned coal mines,which accounted for more than 30%of the total coal production,and which was very sensitive to coal price.The exogenous causes for the oscillations fell into two categories:first,the oscillations in the coal demand,and the uncertainty rising from governmental policies.Also looked into was the cycle of coal market,which was found to be 7 years.This replicated the historical data,and was also why it was so difficult for the government to balance coal supply and demand in order to solve coal-electricity conflict since it was really a big cycle.
Several policy options were recommended to the government in order to relieve or remove coal-electricity conflict.First,it was suggested that the government reduce the lead time of coal production.Second,effect can be made to control the percentage that town-owned mines account for of the total coal production.Third,attention can be paid to smoothing electricity demand for a smooth coal demand.Forth,it was recommended that the government steer those town-owned coal mines in a reasonable way so as to reduce and control the large swing of coal supply by them.Fifth, government can work to promote the development of coal import and export.Finally, it was recommended that coal enterprise and electricity enterprise sign long-term contract to smooth the oscillations in the coal price.
引文
[1][美]丹尼斯·舍伍德(2007).系统思考.北京,机械工业出版社.
[2]《中国统计年鉴》(各年).
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[4]Cachon,G.P.and M.A.Lariviere(2005)."Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:Strengths and Limitations." Management Science 55(1):30-44.
[5]Cardarelli,D.P.,R.Agarwal,et al.(1998)."Organization Pitfalls of Reengineering " Information Systems Management 15(2):34-39.
[6]Ford,A.(2002)."Boom and Bust in Power Plant Construction:Lessons from the California Electricity Crisis." Journal of Industry,Competition and Trade(2):59-74.
[7]Joskow,P.L.(1985)."Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts:The Case of Coal-burning Electric Plants." Journal of Law,Economics and Organization:33.
[8]Joskow,P.L.and R.Schmalensee(1983).Markets for Power:An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation.Cambridge,The MIT Press.
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[11]于立宏,郁义鸿(2006).“需求波动下的煤电纵向关系安排与政府规制.”管理世界(4):73-86.
[12]中国工商时报(2004).“全国电荒造成惨重损失 大缺电3分天灾7分人祸.”
[13]中国地质大学精品课程(2006).“勘探阶段与勘探周期.”
[14]中国能源信息网(2009).“中国改善能源结构核电最佳.”
[15]中国煤炭工业网(2009).“煤炭行业:6年一个完整周期 重点合同煤仍有提价可能.”
[16]中国煤炭信息网(2009).“2009年煤炭行业供大于求面临下行格局.”
[17]中国电力报.
[18]中国证券报(1998).“煤炭行业:挑战与机遇并存.”
[19]白世贞,朱晓燕(2007).“基于委托代理的供应链道德风险激励机制研究.”物流技术26(10):75-77.
[20]白福全(2009).关于中国煤电冲突的访谈.泰州,国电集团泰州火电厂燃煤部.
[21]朱成章(2003).“谈谈煤电联营.”山西能源与节能(4):2-4.
[22]朱智洺,贾楠(2008).“供应链联盟内部利益冲突分析.”商场现代化(526):113-114.
[23]李旭(2009).社会系统动力学.上海,复旦大学出版社.
[24]李兵(2004).““矫正”煤电错位——专访南方电网公司副总经理赵建国.”法人(9).
[25]汪云甲,杨.敏.,侯杰(2000).“放顶煤开采采出量与采出率计算精度的探讨.”中国矿业大学学报29(6):576-580.
[26]谷昱(2006).“对国有大型煤炭企业资本运营实现途径的思考.”财经纵横(5):66-67.
[27]阮晓琴,叶勇(2007).电力集团签有量无价合同.上海证券报.
[28]周敏,张生武(2007).“政府、煤炭和电力三方博弈分析.”煤炭经济研究(4):33-34.
[29]徐炜旋,梁钟荣(2008).““五大电力”抱团拒签.”21世纪经济报道.
[30]涂暄(2004).我国洁净煤技术产业化现状及对策(一),中国煤焦数字交易市场——信息中心.
[31]商业日报(2008).“电价不上涨 电企真会亏损吗”.
[32]章剑锋.(2008).“观察:电力企业是真亏损还是假亏损?.”
[33]舒圣祥(2006).发改委发布电力亏损报告:一张涨价的王牌.中国青年报.
[34]鼎砥投资论坛(2009).“煤炭股分析.”
[35]熊寿群(2005).“国有煤炭企业煤炭开采项目投资决策管理的探讨.”煤炭企业管理(10):51-52.
[36]潘伟尔(2003).“中国需要适当数量的小煤矿.”中国能源25(8):10-17.
[37]潘伟尔(2005).“谁来对我国上万亿元的煤炭基本建设需求进行投资.”经济研究参考(17).
[38]魏一鸣,范英,韩智勇,吴刚等(2006).中国能源报告(2006).北京,科学出版社.
[39]刘劲松(2007).中国煤电产业关系研究.南昌,江西人民出版社.
[40]华道(2004).“电力紧缺催化煤炭投资.”中国投资(1):92-93.
[41]叶春(2008).“完善我国煤电产业链的对策.”经济研究参考(48):4-8.
[42]叶春(2008).“重构煤电产业链对策.”广西电业(7):5-9.
[43]吕洪雁(2007).“国有及国有控股煤炭企业集团内部资本市场运行效率研究.”(3):28-30.
[44]国土资源局(2009).采矿许可证办理 阳朔县人民政府.
[45]国家煤炭网(2008).“煤炭资源保有储量按利用情况分类.”
[46]国家电力信息网.
[47]孙海英(2008).“我国煤电价格机制形成煤电矛盾冲突原因分析.”山西煤炭管理干部学院学报(4):7-9.
[48]张春国,朱.(2003).“国有重点煤炭企业资金紧张的原因及其对策.”煤炭技术22(9):7-8.
[49]杨敏英(2006).“以“煤制油”项目为例论我国投资管理体制改革.”煤炭经济研究(4):42-43.
[50]赵忠江(2005).“煤电之争五大焦点.”能源需求侧管理(5):82-85.
[51]赵国梁(2003).“电煤基地建设“瓶颈”亟待打破.”
[52]赵晓丽(2008).电煤供应链合作与冲突机理研究.哈尔滨,哈尔滨工业大学出版社.
[53]钟笑寒(2006).“煤矿安全与煤炭产量:初步研究.”
[54]钱永坤(2005).煤炭工业经济实证研究.北京,煤炭工业出版社.
[55]陈剑(2004).“电煤之争的背后.”时代潮(16).
[56]黄佐钘,邵汝军(2007).“中国煤炭产量预测.”工业技术经济26(5):101-106.
[57]黄盛初(2005).2005中国煤炭发展报告.北京,煤炭工业出版社.
[2]《中国统计年鉴》(各年).
[3]Arango,S.A.(2006).Essays on Commodity Cycles Based on Xxpanded Cobweb Experiments of Electricity Markets.Social Science Faculty,University of Bergen.
[4]Cachon,G.P.and M.A.Lariviere(2005)."Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:Strengths and Limitations." Management Science 55(1):30-44.
[5]Cardarelli,D.P.,R.Agarwal,et al.(1998)."Organization Pitfalls of Reengineering " Information Systems Management 15(2):34-39.
[6]Ford,A.(2002)."Boom and Bust in Power Plant Construction:Lessons from the California Electricity Crisis." Journal of Industry,Competition and Trade(2):59-74.
[7]Joskow,P.L.(1985)."Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts:The Case of Coal-burning Electric Plants." Journal of Law,Economics and Organization:33.
[8]Joskow,P.L.and R.Schmalensee(1983).Markets for Power:An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation.Cambridge,The MIT Press.
[9]Sterman,J.D.(2000).Business Dynamics:Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World
[10]于立宏(2007).中国煤电产业链纵向安排与经济规制研究.上海,复旦大学出版社.
[11]于立宏,郁义鸿(2006).“需求波动下的煤电纵向关系安排与政府规制.”管理世界(4):73-86.
[12]中国工商时报(2004).“全国电荒造成惨重损失 大缺电3分天灾7分人祸.”
[13]中国地质大学精品课程(2006).“勘探阶段与勘探周期.”
[14]中国能源信息网(2009).“中国改善能源结构核电最佳.”
[15]中国煤炭工业网(2009).“煤炭行业:6年一个完整周期 重点合同煤仍有提价可能.”
[16]中国煤炭信息网(2009).“2009年煤炭行业供大于求面临下行格局.”
[17]中国电力报.
[18]中国证券报(1998).“煤炭行业:挑战与机遇并存.”
[19]白世贞,朱晓燕(2007).“基于委托代理的供应链道德风险激励机制研究.”物流技术26(10):75-77.
[20]白福全(2009).关于中国煤电冲突的访谈.泰州,国电集团泰州火电厂燃煤部.
[21]朱成章(2003).“谈谈煤电联营.”山西能源与节能(4):2-4.
[22]朱智洺,贾楠(2008).“供应链联盟内部利益冲突分析.”商场现代化(526):113-114.
[23]李旭(2009).社会系统动力学.上海,复旦大学出版社.
[24]李兵(2004).““矫正”煤电错位——专访南方电网公司副总经理赵建国.”法人(9).
[25]汪云甲,杨.敏.,侯杰(2000).“放顶煤开采采出量与采出率计算精度的探讨.”中国矿业大学学报29(6):576-580.
[26]谷昱(2006).“对国有大型煤炭企业资本运营实现途径的思考.”财经纵横(5):66-67.
[27]阮晓琴,叶勇(2007).电力集团签有量无价合同.上海证券报.
[28]周敏,张生武(2007).“政府、煤炭和电力三方博弈分析.”煤炭经济研究(4):33-34.
[29]徐炜旋,梁钟荣(2008).““五大电力”抱团拒签.”21世纪经济报道.
[30]涂暄(2004).我国洁净煤技术产业化现状及对策(一),中国煤焦数字交易市场——信息中心.
[31]商业日报(2008).“电价不上涨 电企真会亏损吗”.
[32]章剑锋.(2008).“观察:电力企业是真亏损还是假亏损?.”
[33]舒圣祥(2006).发改委发布电力亏损报告:一张涨价的王牌.中国青年报.
[34]鼎砥投资论坛(2009).“煤炭股分析.”
[35]熊寿群(2005).“国有煤炭企业煤炭开采项目投资决策管理的探讨.”煤炭企业管理(10):51-52.
[36]潘伟尔(2003).“中国需要适当数量的小煤矿.”中国能源25(8):10-17.
[37]潘伟尔(2005).“谁来对我国上万亿元的煤炭基本建设需求进行投资.”经济研究参考(17).
[38]魏一鸣,范英,韩智勇,吴刚等(2006).中国能源报告(2006).北京,科学出版社.
[39]刘劲松(2007).中国煤电产业关系研究.南昌,江西人民出版社.
[40]华道(2004).“电力紧缺催化煤炭投资.”中国投资(1):92-93.
[41]叶春(2008).“完善我国煤电产业链的对策.”经济研究参考(48):4-8.
[42]叶春(2008).“重构煤电产业链对策.”广西电业(7):5-9.
[43]吕洪雁(2007).“国有及国有控股煤炭企业集团内部资本市场运行效率研究.”(3):28-30.
[44]国土资源局(2009).采矿许可证办理 阳朔县人民政府.
[45]国家煤炭网(2008).“煤炭资源保有储量按利用情况分类.”
[46]国家电力信息网.
[47]孙海英(2008).“我国煤电价格机制形成煤电矛盾冲突原因分析.”山西煤炭管理干部学院学报(4):7-9.
[48]张春国,朱.(2003).“国有重点煤炭企业资金紧张的原因及其对策.”煤炭技术22(9):7-8.
[49]杨敏英(2006).“以“煤制油”项目为例论我国投资管理体制改革.”煤炭经济研究(4):42-43.
[50]赵忠江(2005).“煤电之争五大焦点.”能源需求侧管理(5):82-85.
[51]赵国梁(2003).“电煤基地建设“瓶颈”亟待打破.”
[52]赵晓丽(2008).电煤供应链合作与冲突机理研究.哈尔滨,哈尔滨工业大学出版社.
[53]钟笑寒(2006).“煤矿安全与煤炭产量:初步研究.”
[54]钱永坤(2005).煤炭工业经济实证研究.北京,煤炭工业出版社.
[55]陈剑(2004).“电煤之争的背后.”时代潮(16).
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