第三方物流合作中的激励约束机制分析
|
摘要
第三方物流被称为企业的“第三利润源”，对优化资源配置、提高经济运作效率具有重要意义。虽然我国的物流业已经进入快速发展的时期，但是第三方物流合作仍停留在一个较低的水平上，其中第三方物流合同管理水平较低是造成物流合作不能顺利进行的一个重要原因。论文针对这个问题对合作的制约因素、合同管理、契约激励机制设计以及合作决策进行了论证和分析。
首先，论文分析了市场发展水平、非对称信息以及法律、信用环境等宏观因素对我国第三方物流发展的制约，阐述了如何克服这些不利影响、建立一个利于第三方物流发展的环境。
其次，文章重点对第三方物流合作中的服务定价方式(报酬函数)进行了深入的分析。在事先假定的前提下，根据市场机制和价格机制，引入了行业的平均值作为服务定价的基本标准，对报酬中的惩罚函数进行了考察；并以博弈论为基础，应用委托-代理理论以及机制设计理论分析了第三方物流合作中激励约束机制的建立和双方的博弈过程，分析了参与约束和激励相容约束在合作中对需求方、第三方物流服务供应商的效用以及合作整体效用的影响；完成上述分析之后，论文依据重复博弈原理，分析了合作双方在长期合作中的博弈过程及均衡状态，阐述了根据环境条件的变化，对合同进行不断的优化和调整的必要性和方法。分析结果证明，只有建立起同时满足参与约束和激励相容约束的契约，双方才能实现合作的均衡。在合作的均衡状态下，第三方受到有效约束，得到正常利润，需求方得到所需水平的服务，合作整体效用达到假设条件下的最大值，双方之间的关系是稳定的。
最后，论文从需求方的角度出发，对第三方物流合作的决策过程做了简要的介绍，并且强调了决策以及合作中经常出现的问题。
The Third Party Logistics (3PL or TPL) plays a significant role in the optimization of resources allocation and the enhancement of the economic operation as "the third source of profit". Although logistics industry in China has enter a period of rapid development, the level of third party cooperation is low, and the inefficient management of the 3PL contract is one of the most important causes.
In this paper we deal with the problem of incentive-restriction mechanism design and the validity of the contract management and other factors, which influence the success or failure of the cooperation.
First, such influential factors as the level of industry development, asymmetry information, and the disadvantageous law system and credit circumstance are enumerated. Then some suggestions are put forward to overcome the forenamed handicaps and optimize the 3PL cooperation.
Afterwards, the paying- function in the cooperation is analyzed. Under the hypotheses set beforehand, the paper takes the average value of the industry as paying criterion base on the market and price mechanism. The punishing function is introduced in this stage too. Then the Principal -Agent mode of the 3PL cooperation is set up, and the building of Incentive -Restriction mechanism(including Participation Constraint and Incentive-Compatibility Constraint) and its influence on the utilities of both sides and the whole are proved. After that the equilibrium and adjustment of the contract in long-term cooperation is discussed with the application of Repeated-Gaming theory. It's proved that with such mechanism, the demander achieves his business goal and optimal profit, and the service supplier receives his expectation of revenue. At the same time, the integral utility reaches the maximum.
Finally, the paper makes a brief introduction of the decision-making process of outsourcing and also the contracting and implements phases from the standpoint of
the service demander. Besides, in this part, the author emphasizes the details which the demander should pay great intention to.
首先，论文分析了市场发展水平、非对称信息以及法律、信用环境等宏观因素对我国第三方物流发展的制约，阐述了如何克服这些不利影响、建立一个利于第三方物流发展的环境。
其次，文章重点对第三方物流合作中的服务定价方式(报酬函数)进行了深入的分析。在事先假定的前提下，根据市场机制和价格机制，引入了行业的平均值作为服务定价的基本标准，对报酬中的惩罚函数进行了考察；并以博弈论为基础，应用委托-代理理论以及机制设计理论分析了第三方物流合作中激励约束机制的建立和双方的博弈过程，分析了参与约束和激励相容约束在合作中对需求方、第三方物流服务供应商的效用以及合作整体效用的影响；完成上述分析之后，论文依据重复博弈原理，分析了合作双方在长期合作中的博弈过程及均衡状态，阐述了根据环境条件的变化，对合同进行不断的优化和调整的必要性和方法。分析结果证明，只有建立起同时满足参与约束和激励相容约束的契约，双方才能实现合作的均衡。在合作的均衡状态下，第三方受到有效约束，得到正常利润，需求方得到所需水平的服务，合作整体效用达到假设条件下的最大值，双方之间的关系是稳定的。
最后，论文从需求方的角度出发，对第三方物流合作的决策过程做了简要的介绍，并且强调了决策以及合作中经常出现的问题。
The Third Party Logistics (3PL or TPL) plays a significant role in the optimization of resources allocation and the enhancement of the economic operation as "the third source of profit". Although logistics industry in China has enter a period of rapid development, the level of third party cooperation is low, and the inefficient management of the 3PL contract is one of the most important causes.
In this paper we deal with the problem of incentive-restriction mechanism design and the validity of the contract management and other factors, which influence the success or failure of the cooperation.
First, such influential factors as the level of industry development, asymmetry information, and the disadvantageous law system and credit circumstance are enumerated. Then some suggestions are put forward to overcome the forenamed handicaps and optimize the 3PL cooperation.
Afterwards, the paying- function in the cooperation is analyzed. Under the hypotheses set beforehand, the paper takes the average value of the industry as paying criterion base on the market and price mechanism. The punishing function is introduced in this stage too. Then the Principal -Agent mode of the 3PL cooperation is set up, and the building of Incentive -Restriction mechanism(including Participation Constraint and Incentive-Compatibility Constraint) and its influence on the utilities of both sides and the whole are proved. After that the equilibrium and adjustment of the contract in long-term cooperation is discussed with the application of Repeated-Gaming theory. It's proved that with such mechanism, the demander achieves his business goal and optimal profit, and the service supplier receives his expectation of revenue. At the same time, the integral utility reaches the maximum.
Finally, the paper makes a brief introduction of the decision-making process of outsourcing and also the contracting and implements phases from the standpoint of
the service demander. Besides, in this part, the author emphasizes the details which the demander should pay great intention to.
引文
[1] 骆温平．第三方物流理论、操作与案例[M] ．2001．上海社会科学院出版社：373—390
[2] 中田信哉著，陶庭义译．物流·配送[M] ．深圳：海天出版社[M]．2001．7
[3] 郝聚民．第三方物流[M] ．成都：四川人民出版社，2002．9
[4] 夏晓东．企业物流管理[M]．成都：四川人民出版社．2002：
[5] 徐文静．物流战略规划与模式[M] ．机械工业出版社．2002．3(2)
[6] 现代物流管理课题组．物流成本管理[M] ．广州：广东经济出版社．2002．10：4-8；210-214
[7] 牛鱼龙．第三方物流：模式与运作[M] ：深圳海天出版社，2003
[8] 江超群，董威．现代物流运营管理[M]．广州：广东经济出版社．2003，3
[9] 霍红．第三方物流企业经营与管理[M]．北京：中国物资出版社，2003
[10] Susanne Hertz, Monica Alfredsson. Strategic development of third party logistics providers. Industrial Marketing Management [J]32. 2003
[11] Dennis W. Krumwiede, Chwen Sheu. A model for reverse logistics entry by third-party providers. The International Journal of Management Science[J]. 2002(30)
[12] Tage Skjoett-Larsen. Third party logistics — from an interorganizational point of view. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management [J]. 2000, 30(2)
[13] Dan Andersson, Andreas norrman, procurement of logistics services — a minutes work or a multi-year project?. European Journal of Purchasing& Supply management.2002, 8
[14] Light, Elizabeth. 3PL: Where it's at, where it's going and why. NZ Business[J] .2001.4
[15] Robert C Lieb, Stephen Kendrick. The year 2002 survey: CEO perspectives on the current status and future prospects of the third-party logistics industry in the United States. Transportation Journal [J]. 2003.4
[16] Brian J Gibson, Robert Lorin Cook. Hiring practices in US third-party logistics firms. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management [J]. 2001(31)
[17] M.S. Sohail, A.S. Sohal. The use of third party logistics services: a Malaysian perspective. Technovation [J]23.2003
[18] Peter van Laarhoven, Magnus Berglund, Melvyn Peters. Third-party logistics in Europe - five years later. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management [J]. 2000. 5
[19] Amrik S Sohal, Robert Millen, Simon Moss. A comparison of the use of third-party logistics services by Australian firms between 1995-1999. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. 2002.(32)
[20] Bardi,E.J.,Tracy,M.,1991.transportation outsourcing: A survey of US practices. International Journal of Physical and Logistics Management [J]. 21(3)
[21] John R.Grout. A model of incentive contracts for just-in-time delivery. European Journal of Operational Research[J]. 1996(96)
[22] Alexis H.Kunz, Dieter Pfaff. Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the hypothetical, construct of intrinsic motivation. Accounting, Organizations and Society [J] .2002(27)
[23] 马新安，张列平，田澎．供应链中的信息共享激励：动态模型．中国管理科学[J]．
2001，9(1)
[24] 马新安，张列平，田澎．供应链管理中的契约设计．工业工程与管理[J]．2001，3
[25] 马新安，张列平，冯芸．供应链合作伙伴关系与合作伙伴选择．工业工程与管理[J]．2000，4
[26] Gardner, John Thomas. Logistics partnerships: an exploration of form and influencing factors leading to a normative model of partnership building. DAI-B 62/04, 2001.10: 119
[27] Sc Ward,Cnchapman. Evaluating Fixed Price Incentive Contracts. Omega [J]. 1995(1)
[28] Abdulaziz A. Bubshait. Incentive/disincentive contracts and its effects on industrial projects. International Journal of Project Management[J]. 2003 (21)
[29] Yoon K. Choi, Larry J. Merville.Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts. Economics Letters[J]. 1995(47)
[30] David S.Bizer, Peter M.Demarzo. Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents can save, borrow,and default[J]. Journal of Financial lntermediation.1999.8
[31] Sarit Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Artificial Intelligence [J].1996
[32] 侯光明，甘仞初．隐蔽行为的约束机制研究．北京理工大学学报[J]．1999．2
[33] 杨治宇，马士华．供应链企业间的委托代理问题研究．计算机集成制造系统[J] ．2001．1
[34] 王丽娟．供应链企业间的委托代理问题及道德风险的防范．商业研究[J] ．2003．9
[35] 杨永恒，王永贵，尹琪．浅析第三方物流的战略动机及其选择模型．外国经济与管理[J] ．2003．4
[36] 田国强．．经济机制理论：信息效率与激励机制设计．经济学[J]．2003．1
[37] 田宇．无资产型TPL提供者顾客服务政策制订研究．物流技术[J]．2002．12
[38] 田宇．物流服务供应链构建中的供应商选择研究．系统工程理论与实践[J] ．2003．5
[39] 刘志学，许泽勇．基于非对称信息理论的第三方物流合作博弈分析．中国管理科学[J]．2003．11(5)
[40] 曹均华，黄智猛，吴开兵，俞自由．关于激励机制问题的研究．系统工程理论方法应用[J] ．2000．1
[41] 罗峰，苗维亚．增强团队内部合作的博弈论分析．现代管理科学[J] ．2003．10：
[42] 邵祖峰，潘祥杰．企业战略联盟有效实施的博弈分析．科技进步与对策[J]．2002．6
[43] Bowersox, D.,The strategic benefits of logistics alliances. Logistics Management[J]. 1990.8
[44] 简兆权，李垣．战略联盟的形成机制——非零和合作博弈．科技与科学技术管理[J] ．1998(9)
[45] 张薇．从合作博弈看企业战略中的竞争与合作．．经济论坛[J]．2003．7
[46] 戴勇．虚拟物流企业联盟的组建与结构探讨．交通运输系统工程与信息[J] ．2003．2(1)
[47] 戴勇．基于AHP的DEA分析基础上的虚拟物流企业联盟伙伴选择．系统工程[J] ．2002．5(3)
[48] 王蔷．论战略联盟中的相互信任问题(上)．外国经济与管理[J]．2000．4
[49] 王蔷．论战略联盟中的相互信任问题(下)．外国经济与管理[J]．2000．5
[50] 张缨．中国转型期企业间经济活动“低信任”违约现象的社会学解释．安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版)[J]．2001．3
[51] 黄颖，王勉．构建社会诚信环境的探讨．江汉石油学院学报(社科版)[J] ，2003．12(4)
[52] 王微．现代信息技术革命与物流产业的发展趋势．物流技术[J] ．2003．1
[53] 王晓春．诚信缺失的经济学分析．科技进步与对策[J] ．2003．12
[54] 林钧跃．失信惩罚机制的设计和维护．经济社会体制比较[J]．2002．3
[55] 郑绍濂，骆品亮．分成制与相对绩效评价机制及其效率研究．管理科学学报[J]．1998．1
[56] 王焰．物流服务绩效标准及评估．物流技术[J]．2002(1)
[57] 朱俊，刘任葵．第三方物流服务的顾客满意度研究。物流技术[J] ．2003(5)
[58] Remko I. van Hock. The contribution of performance measurement to the expansion of third party logistics alliances in the supply chain. International Journal of Operations & Production [J]. 2001
[59] 赵道致，张文慧．招投标中的激励机制设计．现代财经[J]．2002．11
[60] 周二华，陈荣秋．多企业联盟的博弈分析．华中理工大学学报[J] ．1999．8
[61] Lim, Wei Shi, Lemons Market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers, European Journal of Operational Research, 2000, 125(3)
[62] Chen F.Y, Hum S.H., Sun J, Analysis of third-party warehousing contracts with commitments, European Journal of Operational Research, 2001, 131(3)
[63] 张树义，赵冬梅，李强．论企业战略联盟分配机制设计．郑州工业大学学报[J]2001．12
[64] 潘天群．赏罚机制的建立与博弈结构的调整．华南师范大学学报(社会科学版)[J] ．2000．12
[65] 陈菊红，汪应洛，孙林岩．虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究．运筹与管理
[J]．2002．2(1)
[66] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学[M] ．上海人民出版社．1996．8：273-281；397-542
[67] 龙军生．供应链管理系列讲座之四——供应链中的战略联盟．物流技术与应用[J]．2003，3：66—69
www. china-logisticsnet. com
www. 156net. com
www. 56net. com
www. e3356. com/
www.56zg.com
56king. tongtu. net.
[2] 中田信哉著，陶庭义译．物流·配送[M] ．深圳：海天出版社[M]．2001．7
[3] 郝聚民．第三方物流[M] ．成都：四川人民出版社，2002．9
[4] 夏晓东．企业物流管理[M]．成都：四川人民出版社．2002：
[5] 徐文静．物流战略规划与模式[M] ．机械工业出版社．2002．3(2)
[6] 现代物流管理课题组．物流成本管理[M] ．广州：广东经济出版社．2002．10：4-8；210-214
[7] 牛鱼龙．第三方物流：模式与运作[M] ：深圳海天出版社，2003
[8] 江超群，董威．现代物流运营管理[M]．广州：广东经济出版社．2003，3
[9] 霍红．第三方物流企业经营与管理[M]．北京：中国物资出版社，2003
[10] Susanne Hertz, Monica Alfredsson. Strategic development of third party logistics providers. Industrial Marketing Management [J]32. 2003
[11] Dennis W. Krumwiede, Chwen Sheu. A model for reverse logistics entry by third-party providers. The International Journal of Management Science[J]. 2002(30)
[12] Tage Skjoett-Larsen. Third party logistics — from an interorganizational point of view. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management [J]. 2000, 30(2)
[13] Dan Andersson, Andreas norrman, procurement of logistics services — a minutes work or a multi-year project?. European Journal of Purchasing& Supply management.2002, 8
[14] Light, Elizabeth. 3PL: Where it's at, where it's going and why. NZ Business[J] .2001.4
[15] Robert C Lieb, Stephen Kendrick. The year 2002 survey: CEO perspectives on the current status and future prospects of the third-party logistics industry in the United States. Transportation Journal [J]. 2003.4
[16] Brian J Gibson, Robert Lorin Cook. Hiring practices in US third-party logistics firms. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management [J]. 2001(31)
[17] M.S. Sohail, A.S. Sohal. The use of third party logistics services: a Malaysian perspective. Technovation [J]23.2003
[18] Peter van Laarhoven, Magnus Berglund, Melvyn Peters. Third-party logistics in Europe - five years later. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management [J]. 2000. 5
[19] Amrik S Sohal, Robert Millen, Simon Moss. A comparison of the use of third-party logistics services by Australian firms between 1995-1999. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. 2002.(32)
[20] Bardi,E.J.,Tracy,M.,1991.transportation outsourcing: A survey of US practices. International Journal of Physical and Logistics Management [J]. 21(3)
[21] John R.Grout. A model of incentive contracts for just-in-time delivery. European Journal of Operational Research[J]. 1996(96)
[22] Alexis H.Kunz, Dieter Pfaff. Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the hypothetical, construct of intrinsic motivation. Accounting, Organizations and Society [J] .2002(27)
[23] 马新安，张列平，田澎．供应链中的信息共享激励：动态模型．中国管理科学[J]．
2001，9(1)
[24] 马新安，张列平，田澎．供应链管理中的契约设计．工业工程与管理[J]．2001，3
[25] 马新安，张列平，冯芸．供应链合作伙伴关系与合作伙伴选择．工业工程与管理[J]．2000，4
[26] Gardner, John Thomas. Logistics partnerships: an exploration of form and influencing factors leading to a normative model of partnership building. DAI-B 62/04, 2001.10: 119
[27] Sc Ward,Cnchapman. Evaluating Fixed Price Incentive Contracts. Omega [J]. 1995(1)
[28] Abdulaziz A. Bubshait. Incentive/disincentive contracts and its effects on industrial projects. International Journal of Project Management[J]. 2003 (21)
[29] Yoon K. Choi, Larry J. Merville.Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts. Economics Letters[J]. 1995(47)
[30] David S.Bizer, Peter M.Demarzo. Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents can save, borrow,and default[J]. Journal of Financial lntermediation.1999.8
[31] Sarit Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Artificial Intelligence [J].1996
[32] 侯光明，甘仞初．隐蔽行为的约束机制研究．北京理工大学学报[J]．1999．2
[33] 杨治宇，马士华．供应链企业间的委托代理问题研究．计算机集成制造系统[J] ．2001．1
[34] 王丽娟．供应链企业间的委托代理问题及道德风险的防范．商业研究[J] ．2003．9
[35] 杨永恒，王永贵，尹琪．浅析第三方物流的战略动机及其选择模型．外国经济与管理[J] ．2003．4
[36] 田国强．．经济机制理论：信息效率与激励机制设计．经济学[J]．2003．1
[37] 田宇．无资产型TPL提供者顾客服务政策制订研究．物流技术[J]．2002．12
[38] 田宇．物流服务供应链构建中的供应商选择研究．系统工程理论与实践[J] ．2003．5
[39] 刘志学，许泽勇．基于非对称信息理论的第三方物流合作博弈分析．中国管理科学[J]．2003．11(5)
[40] 曹均华，黄智猛，吴开兵，俞自由．关于激励机制问题的研究．系统工程理论方法应用[J] ．2000．1
[41] 罗峰，苗维亚．增强团队内部合作的博弈论分析．现代管理科学[J] ．2003．10：
[42] 邵祖峰，潘祥杰．企业战略联盟有效实施的博弈分析．科技进步与对策[J]．2002．6
[43] Bowersox, D.,The strategic benefits of logistics alliances. Logistics Management[J]. 1990.8
[44] 简兆权，李垣．战略联盟的形成机制——非零和合作博弈．科技与科学技术管理[J] ．1998(9)
[45] 张薇．从合作博弈看企业战略中的竞争与合作．．经济论坛[J]．2003．7
[46] 戴勇．虚拟物流企业联盟的组建与结构探讨．交通运输系统工程与信息[J] ．2003．2(1)
[47] 戴勇．基于AHP的DEA分析基础上的虚拟物流企业联盟伙伴选择．系统工程[J] ．2002．5(3)
[48] 王蔷．论战略联盟中的相互信任问题(上)．外国经济与管理[J]．2000．4
[49] 王蔷．论战略联盟中的相互信任问题(下)．外国经济与管理[J]．2000．5
[50] 张缨．中国转型期企业间经济活动“低信任”违约现象的社会学解释．安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版)[J]．2001．3
[51] 黄颖，王勉．构建社会诚信环境的探讨．江汉石油学院学报(社科版)[J] ，2003．12(4)
[52] 王微．现代信息技术革命与物流产业的发展趋势．物流技术[J] ．2003．1
[53] 王晓春．诚信缺失的经济学分析．科技进步与对策[J] ．2003．12
[54] 林钧跃．失信惩罚机制的设计和维护．经济社会体制比较[J]．2002．3
[55] 郑绍濂，骆品亮．分成制与相对绩效评价机制及其效率研究．管理科学学报[J]．1998．1
[56] 王焰．物流服务绩效标准及评估．物流技术[J]．2002(1)
[57] 朱俊，刘任葵．第三方物流服务的顾客满意度研究。物流技术[J] ．2003(5)
[58] Remko I. van Hock. The contribution of performance measurement to the expansion of third party logistics alliances in the supply chain. International Journal of Operations & Production [J]. 2001
[59] 赵道致，张文慧．招投标中的激励机制设计．现代财经[J]．2002．11
[60] 周二华，陈荣秋．多企业联盟的博弈分析．华中理工大学学报[J] ．1999．8
[61] Lim, Wei Shi, Lemons Market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers, European Journal of Operational Research, 2000, 125(3)
[62] Chen F.Y, Hum S.H., Sun J, Analysis of third-party warehousing contracts with commitments, European Journal of Operational Research, 2001, 131(3)
[63] 张树义，赵冬梅，李强．论企业战略联盟分配机制设计．郑州工业大学学报[J]2001．12
[64] 潘天群．赏罚机制的建立与博弈结构的调整．华南师范大学学报(社会科学版)[J] ．2000．12
[65] 陈菊红，汪应洛，孙林岩．虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究．运筹与管理
[J]．2002．2(1)
[66] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学[M] ．上海人民出版社．1996．8：273-281；397-542
[67] 龙军生．供应链管理系列讲座之四——供应链中的战略联盟．物流技术与应用[J]．2003，3：66—69
www. china-logisticsnet. com
www. 156net. com
www. 56net. com
www. e3356. com/
www.56zg.com
56king. tongtu. net.