生鲜农产品零售商与物流服务商的协调合同研究
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摘要
随着社会经济的发展,人们生活水平的日益提高,对生鲜农产品的需求也越来越大。但是由于国内生鲜农产品在流通过程中物流设施设备陈旧,物流运作管理水平低下,现有的物流合同激励机制不完善等问题,使得生鲜农产品流通过程中物流成本居高不下的同时生鲜农产品的损耗也是巨大的。鉴于此,本文拟从生鲜农产品流通过程中零售商与物流服务商的物流合同出发,研究物流服务商的保鲜努力水平对其自身与零售商的利润水平与订货策略,以及对产品新鲜度水平的影响。
首先,阐述了相关的基本概念,介绍了物流合同设计中需要利用的委托代理理论,并就生鲜农产品库存控制过程中借鉴的变质库存理论做了总结。
其次,针对物流服务商对生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平会影响销售量与产品价格的问题,分析了零售商与物流服务商在分散式决策与集中式决策两种模式下双方各自的利润水平与系统总的利润水平。通过比较发现,集中式下的利润水平高于分散式决策下的利润水平;而且集中式下的产品新鲜度水平明显高于分散式下的水平;集中式决策下零售商还可以以较低的价格销售产品,获取更多的市场占有量。并设计一种成本分担与收益共享模型来协调零售商与物流服务商的利润分配问题。
再次,针对零售商与物流服务商的物流合同中物流服务商提供的保鲜努力水平不可观测下,应该如何设计有效的物流合同,来优化零售商的利润水平的同时优化物流服务商的成本问题。利用委托代理理论,设计一种线性合同,并分析了多种参数对物流服务商的保鲜努力水平的影响。结果表明,该合同能有效地协调双方的利润水平。
最后,针对物流服务商的保鲜努力水平会对零售商的订货策略产生影响展开了分析。比较了在分散式与集中式两种模式下,零售商的订货策略及物流服务商的保鲜努力水平。通过算例分析发现,集中式下系统的利润水平明显高于分散式时的水平,而且生鲜农产品的新鲜度水平也比分散式下高,利用收益共享合同可以有效的协调双方的利益。
With the development of the social economy, people’s living standard is improving and the demand for fresh agricultural products is also growing. However, in the circulation process of the domestic fresh agricultural products, the logistics facilities and equipments are obsolete, the logistics operation management is poor and the existing logistics contract incentive mechanism is not perfect, which make the logistics cost of the fresh agricultural products keep high and simultaneously make the loss be great. In view of that, this paper will begin with the logistics contract between retailer and the logistics service provider in the circulation process of fresh agricultural products, and research the effect that the decision-making action of the logistics service provider makes on the profile level of itself and retailer and the freshness level of product.
Firstly, the relevant basic concepts are stated, the principal-agent theory that is used in designing the logistics contract is introduced, and the deteriorating inventory theory that is referenced in the inventory control process of fresh agricultural products is summarized.
Secondly, aiming at the question that the effort level of the logistics service provider to keep the fresh agricultural product to be fresh would impact the sales volume and the product price, the several profit level and systematic profit level between retailer and the logistics service provider in the two modes of decentralized decisions and centralized decisions are analyzed. By comparing the two profit level, it is found that the profit level in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; the freshness of product in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; the retailer could sell goods with lower price in centralized decisions and obtain more market share. Then a cost and revenue sharing models is designed to coordinate the profit distribution problem between retailer and the logistics service provider.
Thirdly, aiming at the problem that how to design effective logistics contract to optimize both the profit level of retailer and the cost of the logistics service provider under the condition that the freshness effort level the logistics service provider provides is unobservable. Using the principal-agent theory, a linear contract is designed and the effect that several parameters make on the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider is analyzed. The conclusion shows that this contract can coordinate their profit level effectively.
Finally, the effect that the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider makes on the ordering policy of retailer is analyzed. The ordering policy of retailer and the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider are comparing in two modes of decentralized decisions and centralized decisions. By analyzing the calculating example, it is found that the systematic profit level in centralized decisions is evidently higher than that in decentralized decisions; the freshness level of the fresh agricultural product in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; and both benefits can be effectively coordinated by using the revenue sharing contract.
首先,阐述了相关的基本概念,介绍了物流合同设计中需要利用的委托代理理论,并就生鲜农产品库存控制过程中借鉴的变质库存理论做了总结。
其次,针对物流服务商对生鲜农产品的保鲜努力水平会影响销售量与产品价格的问题,分析了零售商与物流服务商在分散式决策与集中式决策两种模式下双方各自的利润水平与系统总的利润水平。通过比较发现,集中式下的利润水平高于分散式决策下的利润水平;而且集中式下的产品新鲜度水平明显高于分散式下的水平;集中式决策下零售商还可以以较低的价格销售产品,获取更多的市场占有量。并设计一种成本分担与收益共享模型来协调零售商与物流服务商的利润分配问题。
再次,针对零售商与物流服务商的物流合同中物流服务商提供的保鲜努力水平不可观测下,应该如何设计有效的物流合同,来优化零售商的利润水平的同时优化物流服务商的成本问题。利用委托代理理论,设计一种线性合同,并分析了多种参数对物流服务商的保鲜努力水平的影响。结果表明,该合同能有效地协调双方的利润水平。
最后,针对物流服务商的保鲜努力水平会对零售商的订货策略产生影响展开了分析。比较了在分散式与集中式两种模式下,零售商的订货策略及物流服务商的保鲜努力水平。通过算例分析发现,集中式下系统的利润水平明显高于分散式时的水平,而且生鲜农产品的新鲜度水平也比分散式下高,利用收益共享合同可以有效的协调双方的利益。
With the development of the social economy, people’s living standard is improving and the demand for fresh agricultural products is also growing. However, in the circulation process of the domestic fresh agricultural products, the logistics facilities and equipments are obsolete, the logistics operation management is poor and the existing logistics contract incentive mechanism is not perfect, which make the logistics cost of the fresh agricultural products keep high and simultaneously make the loss be great. In view of that, this paper will begin with the logistics contract between retailer and the logistics service provider in the circulation process of fresh agricultural products, and research the effect that the decision-making action of the logistics service provider makes on the profile level of itself and retailer and the freshness level of product.
Firstly, the relevant basic concepts are stated, the principal-agent theory that is used in designing the logistics contract is introduced, and the deteriorating inventory theory that is referenced in the inventory control process of fresh agricultural products is summarized.
Secondly, aiming at the question that the effort level of the logistics service provider to keep the fresh agricultural product to be fresh would impact the sales volume and the product price, the several profit level and systematic profit level between retailer and the logistics service provider in the two modes of decentralized decisions and centralized decisions are analyzed. By comparing the two profit level, it is found that the profit level in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; the freshness of product in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; the retailer could sell goods with lower price in centralized decisions and obtain more market share. Then a cost and revenue sharing models is designed to coordinate the profit distribution problem between retailer and the logistics service provider.
Thirdly, aiming at the problem that how to design effective logistics contract to optimize both the profit level of retailer and the cost of the logistics service provider under the condition that the freshness effort level the logistics service provider provides is unobservable. Using the principal-agent theory, a linear contract is designed and the effect that several parameters make on the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider is analyzed. The conclusion shows that this contract can coordinate their profit level effectively.
Finally, the effect that the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider makes on the ordering policy of retailer is analyzed. The ordering policy of retailer and the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider are comparing in two modes of decentralized decisions and centralized decisions. By analyzing the calculating example, it is found that the systematic profit level in centralized decisions is evidently higher than that in decentralized decisions; the freshness level of the fresh agricultural product in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; and both benefits can be effectively coordinated by using the revenue sharing contract.
引文
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