消费者驱动的制销供应链联盟产品安全责任研究
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摘要
本文考虑了一个由制造商、分销商和消费者所构成的供应链模型,其中制造商分为履行安全责任较好(g类)和履行安全责任较差(b类)两类。从企业社会责任的一个方面——产品安全性能对消费者偏好的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对消费者驱动的制销供应链联盟产品安全责任进行了研究。研究显示:制销供应链联盟较好地履行安全责任,能够改善供应链的整体绩效。具体结果如下。
首先,本文建立了基于消费者安全偏好的制销供应链联盟的利润协调模型,在一次性博弈模型中确定了利润分配因子β的取值范围并进行了数字分析,在重复性博弈模型中通过比较收益的大小来讨论制销双方是否联盟;并在此基础上讨论了基于利润分配的安全责任协调机制。结果表明:(1)在两类制销供应链中,联盟定价都是制销双方一次性博弈的唯一纳什均衡结果,且在制销双方商定的利润分配因子β的取值范围内双方联盟后所得的利润均高于联盟之前,在两类制销供应链中,制造商与分销商坚持联盟定价对双方的长期利润都是最优的。(2)制造商和分销商在确定利润分配因子β的具体取值时一定要考虑对履行安全责任成本的补偿,同时可按利润分配因子β的比例来对应分担由于安全责任风险给供应链系统造成的利润损失。
其次,本文对制销联盟履行安全责任的消费者驱动进行了研究。研究内容包括:消费者驱动的制销供应链联盟安全责任决策;制销供应链联盟安全责任的消费者压力研究。结果显示:(1)g类制销联盟较好地履行安全责任,能提高消费者对g类产品的支付意愿,从而获得较高的利润,这将对g类制销联盟进一步较好地履行安全责任产生激励驱动;若g类制销联盟未能较好地履行安全责任,消费者会用抵制购买的惩罚方式来驱动其较好地履行安全责任。(2)在目标制销联盟满足消费者组织要求时的净利润不小于目标制销联盟不满足消费者组织要求时的净利润的条件下,目标制销联盟将选择满足消费者组织的要求;当制销联盟选择斗争所获得的收益大于其斗争所需成本时,g类制销联盟和b类制销联盟都会选择斗争,即两类制销联盟斗争的意愿取决于他们的期望利润。
再次,本文研究了消费者驱动的制销联盟的产品安全责任策略。研究的主要内容有:分析市场失灵与制销联盟安全责任的关系;分析制销联盟产品安全责任与竞争力的关系;分析基于利润分配的制销联盟安全责任策略。结果显示:(1)从短期来看,在某些情况下制销联盟履行安全责任,可能会导致其利益受损。但从长期来看,制销联盟较好地履行安全责任能够增强其竞争力。(2)制造商可以通过对利润分配因子β的选择,确定产品的批发价格,从而实现利润的分配,如果分销商有不满,制造商可以通过调节β的值,进行适当让利,实现对分销商的有效激励。(3)供应链上游g类制造商能否较好地履行安全责任,经安全责任差异化产品,并将这种差异化信号传递给消费者,通过影响消费者的安全偏好来最终影响消费者的选择购买,是实现上游制造商、中游分销商和下游消费者帕累托(Pareto)最优的关键。
最后,基于消费者的驱动,本文研究了非对称信息下制销联盟安全信号传递原理。结果显示:(1)在安全信息不对称的条件下,g类制销联盟发出令b类制销联盟难以模仿的安全信息,可以使产品在安全责任上差异化,消费者能够根据产品的安全信息做出正确的选择。(2)g类制销联盟采取积极安全信号传递策略,可以塑造良好的社会形象和提高期望利润,尽管信号成本很高,可g类制销联盟一旦被消费者选中其收益也较大。总之,g类制销联盟向消费者传递强度适中的安全信号,既可以使市场出现理想的分离均衡,进而解决b类产品驱逐g类产品的问题;又可以塑造良好的社会形象,增加期望利润,进而增强g类产品的竞争力。
This dissertation deals with a supply chain model which consists of manufacturers, distributors and consumers, the manufacturer being divided into two categories g and b , category g does better in fulfilling safety responsibilities , category b does not so well. From one aspect of the corporate social responsibility—consumers’preferences influenced by the product safety performance, the dissertation, based on game theory, does research on the product safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance driven by consumers. The research shows that: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance fulfilling the safety responsibility better can improve the supply chain’s integrated performance.The specific results as follows.
Firstly, this dissertation constructs a model of profit coordination model of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance based on consumers’preferences to product safety. In the one-time game model, the value range ofβis determined and its digital analysis is done; in repeated game model, the discussion of profit comparison decides whether the two sides get aligned; with the forgoing information, the safety responsibility coordination mechanism based on profit distribution is discussed. The results show that:(1)In the two categories of manufacturer-retailer supply chains, the consulting pricing is the only result of Nash equilibrium in one-game model, and the value of profit distribution factorβis within the range of the agreed, the profits gained after alliance surpass those before alliance. Both manufactures and distributors adheres to unified price is optimal to the long-term profits of both sides.(2)When determining the exact value ofβ, manufactures and distributors should take into consideration the compensation to fulfill the safety responsibility, and distribute the shares of loss caused by product safety risk according to the ratio of profit distribution factorβ.
Secondly, the dissertation studies the consumers driving of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances fulfilling safety responsibilities. It includes: the decision-making of consumer-driven supply chain in safety responsibilities; the consumer pressure in safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances. The results show that:(1)category g fulfill the safety responsibilities better, can work up consumers’desire to buy g products, gain more profits, and thus boost the incentive of category g to cement their safety responsibility performance; if category g fails to fulfill the safety responsibility, consumers will refuse to buy g products to drive category g into good safety responsibilities.(2)Under the circumstances that the expect profits gained by target manufacturer-retailer alliances when they satisfy the requirements of consumers are no less than when not, the target manufacturer-retailer alliances will choose to satisfy consumers’requirements. When profits gained from competition are more than competition cost, both sides will choose to compete, which means the desire to compete is determined by their expectation of profits.
Thirdly, the dissertation studies the strategies of safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances driven by consumers. It includes: the relationship between market failure and safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply alliance; the relationship between safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances and competition ability; safety responsibility strategies based on profit distribution. The results show that:(1)In short term, at some times the safety responsibility may lead up to profit loss. But in the long run, fulfilling the safety responsibility better can strengthen the manufacturer-retailer alliance’s competition ability.(2)Manufacturers can distribute profits by allotting profit distribution factorβ, and then decide the whole-sale price. If distributors don’t agree, manufacturers can adjust the value ofβ, and give away some profits as the incentive to distributors.(3) All in all, in the upstream of the supply chain, whether manufacturers g can well implement safety responsibilities, divide products of different scales by safety responsibilities, transport the difference signal to the consumers, and then determines consumers’purchase, is the key to realize the Pareto optimization upper stream manufacturers, middle-stream distributors and down-stream consumers.
Finally, based on the driven of consumers, the dissertation studies the theory of signaling of manufacturer-retailer alliances under asymmetrical safety information. The result show:(1)under asymmetrical information, category g manufacturer-retailer alliance sends out a signal that category b can’t replicate, which can differentiate products in safety responsibility, so consumers can make the right choice according to the safety information.(2)category g manufacturer-retailer alliance can build a good social image and bring up expected profits by actively sending signals of safety. Though the signaling cost is high, once category g manufacturer-retailer alliance is chosen by consumers,a large sum of profits is gained.To sum up,if category g manufacturer-retailer alliance sends out a fairly moderate safety signal to consumers, a desirable divide of market is realized, and solve the problem that products b may repel g products, a good social image is built, profits rise, and competitive power of g manufacturer-retailer alliance is also strengthened.
首先,本文建立了基于消费者安全偏好的制销供应链联盟的利润协调模型,在一次性博弈模型中确定了利润分配因子β的取值范围并进行了数字分析,在重复性博弈模型中通过比较收益的大小来讨论制销双方是否联盟;并在此基础上讨论了基于利润分配的安全责任协调机制。结果表明:(1)在两类制销供应链中,联盟定价都是制销双方一次性博弈的唯一纳什均衡结果,且在制销双方商定的利润分配因子β的取值范围内双方联盟后所得的利润均高于联盟之前,在两类制销供应链中,制造商与分销商坚持联盟定价对双方的长期利润都是最优的。(2)制造商和分销商在确定利润分配因子β的具体取值时一定要考虑对履行安全责任成本的补偿,同时可按利润分配因子β的比例来对应分担由于安全责任风险给供应链系统造成的利润损失。
其次,本文对制销联盟履行安全责任的消费者驱动进行了研究。研究内容包括:消费者驱动的制销供应链联盟安全责任决策;制销供应链联盟安全责任的消费者压力研究。结果显示:(1)g类制销联盟较好地履行安全责任,能提高消费者对g类产品的支付意愿,从而获得较高的利润,这将对g类制销联盟进一步较好地履行安全责任产生激励驱动;若g类制销联盟未能较好地履行安全责任,消费者会用抵制购买的惩罚方式来驱动其较好地履行安全责任。(2)在目标制销联盟满足消费者组织要求时的净利润不小于目标制销联盟不满足消费者组织要求时的净利润的条件下,目标制销联盟将选择满足消费者组织的要求;当制销联盟选择斗争所获得的收益大于其斗争所需成本时,g类制销联盟和b类制销联盟都会选择斗争,即两类制销联盟斗争的意愿取决于他们的期望利润。
再次,本文研究了消费者驱动的制销联盟的产品安全责任策略。研究的主要内容有:分析市场失灵与制销联盟安全责任的关系;分析制销联盟产品安全责任与竞争力的关系;分析基于利润分配的制销联盟安全责任策略。结果显示:(1)从短期来看,在某些情况下制销联盟履行安全责任,可能会导致其利益受损。但从长期来看,制销联盟较好地履行安全责任能够增强其竞争力。(2)制造商可以通过对利润分配因子β的选择,确定产品的批发价格,从而实现利润的分配,如果分销商有不满,制造商可以通过调节β的值,进行适当让利,实现对分销商的有效激励。(3)供应链上游g类制造商能否较好地履行安全责任,经安全责任差异化产品,并将这种差异化信号传递给消费者,通过影响消费者的安全偏好来最终影响消费者的选择购买,是实现上游制造商、中游分销商和下游消费者帕累托(Pareto)最优的关键。
最后,基于消费者的驱动,本文研究了非对称信息下制销联盟安全信号传递原理。结果显示:(1)在安全信息不对称的条件下,g类制销联盟发出令b类制销联盟难以模仿的安全信息,可以使产品在安全责任上差异化,消费者能够根据产品的安全信息做出正确的选择。(2)g类制销联盟采取积极安全信号传递策略,可以塑造良好的社会形象和提高期望利润,尽管信号成本很高,可g类制销联盟一旦被消费者选中其收益也较大。总之,g类制销联盟向消费者传递强度适中的安全信号,既可以使市场出现理想的分离均衡,进而解决b类产品驱逐g类产品的问题;又可以塑造良好的社会形象,增加期望利润,进而增强g类产品的竞争力。
This dissertation deals with a supply chain model which consists of manufacturers, distributors and consumers, the manufacturer being divided into two categories g and b , category g does better in fulfilling safety responsibilities , category b does not so well. From one aspect of the corporate social responsibility—consumers’preferences influenced by the product safety performance, the dissertation, based on game theory, does research on the product safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance driven by consumers. The research shows that: manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance fulfilling the safety responsibility better can improve the supply chain’s integrated performance.The specific results as follows.
Firstly, this dissertation constructs a model of profit coordination model of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance based on consumers’preferences to product safety. In the one-time game model, the value range ofβis determined and its digital analysis is done; in repeated game model, the discussion of profit comparison decides whether the two sides get aligned; with the forgoing information, the safety responsibility coordination mechanism based on profit distribution is discussed. The results show that:(1)In the two categories of manufacturer-retailer supply chains, the consulting pricing is the only result of Nash equilibrium in one-game model, and the value of profit distribution factorβis within the range of the agreed, the profits gained after alliance surpass those before alliance. Both manufactures and distributors adheres to unified price is optimal to the long-term profits of both sides.(2)When determining the exact value ofβ, manufactures and distributors should take into consideration the compensation to fulfill the safety responsibility, and distribute the shares of loss caused by product safety risk according to the ratio of profit distribution factorβ.
Secondly, the dissertation studies the consumers driving of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances fulfilling safety responsibilities. It includes: the decision-making of consumer-driven supply chain in safety responsibilities; the consumer pressure in safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances. The results show that:(1)category g fulfill the safety responsibilities better, can work up consumers’desire to buy g products, gain more profits, and thus boost the incentive of category g to cement their safety responsibility performance; if category g fails to fulfill the safety responsibility, consumers will refuse to buy g products to drive category g into good safety responsibilities.(2)Under the circumstances that the expect profits gained by target manufacturer-retailer alliances when they satisfy the requirements of consumers are no less than when not, the target manufacturer-retailer alliances will choose to satisfy consumers’requirements. When profits gained from competition are more than competition cost, both sides will choose to compete, which means the desire to compete is determined by their expectation of profits.
Thirdly, the dissertation studies the strategies of safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances driven by consumers. It includes: the relationship between market failure and safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply alliance; the relationship between safety responsibilities in manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliances and competition ability; safety responsibility strategies based on profit distribution. The results show that:(1)In short term, at some times the safety responsibility may lead up to profit loss. But in the long run, fulfilling the safety responsibility better can strengthen the manufacturer-retailer alliance’s competition ability.(2)Manufacturers can distribute profits by allotting profit distribution factorβ, and then decide the whole-sale price. If distributors don’t agree, manufacturers can adjust the value ofβ, and give away some profits as the incentive to distributors.(3) All in all, in the upstream of the supply chain, whether manufacturers g can well implement safety responsibilities, divide products of different scales by safety responsibilities, transport the difference signal to the consumers, and then determines consumers’purchase, is the key to realize the Pareto optimization upper stream manufacturers, middle-stream distributors and down-stream consumers.
Finally, based on the driven of consumers, the dissertation studies the theory of signaling of manufacturer-retailer alliances under asymmetrical safety information. The result show:(1)under asymmetrical information, category g manufacturer-retailer alliance sends out a signal that category b can’t replicate, which can differentiate products in safety responsibility, so consumers can make the right choice according to the safety information.(2)category g manufacturer-retailer alliance can build a good social image and bring up expected profits by actively sending signals of safety. Though the signaling cost is high, once category g manufacturer-retailer alliance is chosen by consumers,a large sum of profits is gained.To sum up,if category g manufacturer-retailer alliance sends out a fairly moderate safety signal to consumers, a desirable divide of market is realized, and solve the problem that products b may repel g products, a good social image is built, profits rise, and competitive power of g manufacturer-retailer alliance is also strengthened.
引文
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30本章主要依据《消费者驱动的制销供应链联盟安全信号传递》这篇文章改写而成[108]。