WTO框架下的农业补贴纪律
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摘要
由于农业政策掺入了政治、社会，乃至文化等非经济目标，农业部门的国际贸易政策问题要比任何其他经济部门都复杂。无论是GATT1947，还是东京回合《补贴守则》，均未能有效解决农业问题。政府一方面继续补贴农产品的生产和出口，另一方面通过进口壁垒保护国内市场。“农业”和“补贴”两个词在国际贸易中如影相随。乌拉圭回合《农业协定》在汲取GATT几十年经验的基础上，在《补贴与反补贴措施协定》(下称《补贴协定》)之外，为农业量身定做了一套独特的补贴纪律，规范国内支持和出口补贴的使用。尽管《农业协定》首次将农产品贸易纳入多边体制，是农产品国际贸易史上的一大进步；但《农业协定》只是为农业补贴纪律建立了一个框架，协定规定的农产品出口补贴和国内支持纪律，由于削减力度、协定条款起草等多方面的原因，存在诸多缺憾，削弱了纪律的有效性。建立公平的、以市场为导向的农产品贸易体制，需要进行根本性改革。
本文在回顾GATT／WTO框架下农业补贴谈判与多边纪律演化过程的基础上，分析了WTO现有规则对农业补贴的规范、多哈回合农业补贴谈判可能的成果、农业在将来WTO多边贸易体制下的地位，以及WTO框架下有关中国的农业补贴问题。本论文共分为导言、正文和结语三个部分，共计28万余字。
第一章为GATT／WTO框架下农业补贴谈判与多边纪律演化。本章详细介绍了GATT／WTO农业补贴谈判史，评述了GATT时期农业补贴纪律。在内容上，本章首先探讨了GATT缔约方／WTO成员将农业政策纳入多边贸易谈判的动因和谈判削减农业补贴的复杂性；继而分析了GATT时期农业补贴多边谈判以及GATT时期农业补贴纪律；最后介绍了WTO新一轮农业谈判的进展和焦点。本章内容表明，GATT时期未能制定有效的纪律，约束并削减农业补贴；乌拉圭回合《农业协定》对成员农业政策的影响也非常有限，其积极意义在于为规范农业补贴提供了一个框架，为继续农产品贸易改革进程提供了基础。当前多哈回合谈判就是根本性改革进程中的一步。
第二章为WTO框架下一般补贴纪律。本章以《补贴协定》和争端解决实践为基础，研究和分析WTO一般补贴规则包涵的基本概念和基本纪律，即“补贴”概念的定义、WTO争端解决实践中“补贴”的确定、禁止性补贴和可诉补贴纪律。《补贴协定》普遍适用于包括农产品在内的所有产品，并且，除了直接适用之外，《补贴协定》还构成解释《农业协定》下未界定概念的重要解释依据和背景。本章研究表明，WTO争端解决实践倾向于严格解释补贴纪律，在“财政资助”、“公共机构”及“间接补贴”等概念的解释方面有明显体现。多年来几乎处于闲置状态的《补贴协定》可诉补贴条款，在最近的案件中开始使用。《农业协定》“和平条款”终止适用后，《补贴协定》可诉补贴纪律对解决成员农业补贴争端将发挥更大的作用。
第三章为《农业协定》出口补贴纪律。本章采取了从《农业协定》出口补贴纪律的基本概念到出口补贴纪律的基本结构，再到出口补贴纪律具体内容的思路，依次论述了下列五个部分：《农业协定》下“出口补贴”的概念、出口补贴纪律的结构、出口补贴的削减、出口补贴承诺的反规避纪律，以及三种“隐蔽”的农产品出口补贴。多哈回合有关农产品出口补贴谈判的进展散见于本章相关部分的论述中。本章研究表明，《农业协定》出口补贴纪律存在以下问题：其一，《农业协定》和《补贴协定》下“出口补贴”的概念与范围有所不同，前者宽泛于后者；现行《农业协定》规范的出口补贴，基本上局限于由纳税人供资的直接出口补贴，对于具有类似补贴效果的出口实践，《农业协定》的纪律非常有限。其二，《农业协定》出口补贴纪律的结构较为特殊，区分具体出口补贴措施的类型和接受出口补贴的农产品或产品组类型，适用不同的出口补贴纪律；然而，WTO争端解决实践中的解释模糊了《农业协定》特别设计的出口补贴纪律结构，导致具体案件中农产品出口补贴纪律适用上的不确定；其三，《农业协定》虽然在强化出口补贴规则的同时，规定了数量上的承诺水平，但从实施效果来看，由于制度上的缺陷和成员的任意解释，导致出口补贴削减承诺遭到规避。多哈回合农业谈判若取得成功，有望强化农产品出口补贴纪律，在某一确定日期前，取消对农产品提供的出口补贴。
第四章为《农业协定》国内支持纪律。本章的基本内容包括国内支持纪律的基本概念、国内支持措施的分类、国内支持的衡量、国内支持纪律的实施和多哈回合国内支持纪律的谈判。本章研究表明，《农业协定》国内支持纪律松弛，未能有效约束扭曲农业生产和贸易的国内支持措施，对成员农业政策的影响很小。虽然《农业协定》国内支持纪律可借助于WTO争端解决机制获得有效实施，但在乌拉圭回合制定国内支持纪律的时候，某些缔约方(主要指欧共体和美国)通过操纵国内支持纪律的整体结构、基期的选择、综合支持量的计算方法等，实际降低了国内支持纪律本身的有效性。在多哈回合农业谈判中，国内支持削减的程度是成员难以达成一致的核心问题。
第五章为WTO农业补贴规则之间的关系及其在WTO农业补贴争端中的适用。WTO农业补贴纪律包含在下列三个协定中：GATT1994、《农业协定》和《补贴协定》。本章主要论述了三个方面的内容：WTO农业补贴争端中GATT1994的适用；《补贴协定》与《农业协定》的适用，以及“和平条款”终止适用对WTO农业补贴纪律的影响。依据WTO争端解决实践中发展出来的方法，GATT1994、《农业协定》与《补贴协定》应同时、累积和协调地适用于农业补贴争端。本章研究表明，WTO争端解决中适用《农业协定》与《补贴协定》的方法，导致在某些情形下，适用于农产品的补贴纪律比非农产品补贴纪律更为严格，这与《补贴协定》谈判者的初衷不符。“和平条款”的终止适用对农产品出口补贴和各类国内支持措施有不同的影响。本章的最后部分区分了五种情形，逐一分析“和平条款”终止适用后，具体农业补贴措施适用的纪律。最为突出的影响是，“和平条款”终止适用后，《补贴协定》可诉补贴条款为起诉发达成员维持的巨额农业补贴提供了重要途径。
第六章探讨了WTO农业补贴纪律的若干制度性问题，分别为《农业协定》补贴纪律的实施、WTO框架下农业补贴纪律的双重规范与未来、WTO争端解决与多边贸易谈判的关系，以及WTO诉讼对美国农业政策的新挑战。本章研究表明，关于农业补贴纪律的实施，目前最为突出的问题是成员通报与监督方面的欠缺，直接结果是难以知晓成员是否违反了农业补贴纪律，也使农业补贴谈判缺乏公共可得的信息。在WTO框架下，农业补贴受到《农业协定》和《补贴协定》两套补贴纪律的约束和规范。尽管“和平条款”终止适用后，农业补贴纪律向适用于所有产品的WTO统一补贴体制方向迈进了一步，但由于《补贴协定》和《农业协定》本身在总体规范方法、结构和所用概念等方面的差异，在现有框架下，尚不太可能将农业补贴纪律完全融合到WTO一般纪律当中。巴西等成员对美国和欧共体提起的两起农业补贴案件，配合了多哈回合农业谈判进程。争端解决报告对WTO农业补贴纪律的解释与适用，使WTO争端解决与多边贸易谈判在WTO农业补贴纪律发展中的关系受到关注。激进的争端解决报告虽然有利于强化农产品补贴纪律，但可能会损害成员内部对多边贸易体制的政治支持。继美国——陆地棉补贴案之后，值美国2002年农业法到期之际，加拿大又对美国玉米及其它农产品补贴及其他国内支持提出指控，试图影响美国2007年新农业法。本章最后一节介绍并分析了本案对美国农业补贴政策的挑战。
本文结语部分特别论及中国与WTO农业补贴纪律，包括三个方面的内容，即中国“入世”农业补贴承诺及实施、2004年后中国农业支持与补贴政策评述，以及国外农业补贴对我国农业部门的影响与对策。受财力所限，即便2004年后我国加大了农业支持和补贴力度，国内支持总体水平仍然远低于WTO允许的上限；虽然有成员密切关注我国农产品出口补贴的使用情况，但目前为止，尚无此方面正式指控。对我国而言，目前更为重要的是如何应对美国等发达成员大量补贴进口农产品对国内农业和农民造成的损害性影响；如何通过多哈回合农业谈判，改变当前农业补贴规则不平衡的状况。本文结尾尝试提出了若干初步建议，以抛砖引玉。
National agricultural policies usually carry political, social or even culturalvalues and objectives, which causes more problems for international trade policy inagriculture sector than any other area of economic endeavor. GATT1947 and theTokyo Round Subsidies Code had been unsuccessful in dealing with the problem.Governments continued to subsidize production and exports of agriculural productswhile protecting home markets from import competition. Based on dozens of years ofGATT experience, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) speciallydesigns a unique system governing the use of agricultural subsidies, which coexistswith Agreement on Subsidies and Counervailing Measures (SCM). Although URAAis a great achievement in the history of international trade in agricultural products forbringing agriculture into the multilateral trading system, URAA only provids aframework for disciplines on agriculural susbsidies. Current disciplines onagricultural subsidies have many disappointments due to the degree of reduction ofagricultural subsidies, drafting of the document and various other reasons, thusweakens the effectiveness of the disciplines. Fundamental reform is needed toestablish "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system".
Based on the evolutionary process of disciplines on agricultural subsidies, thisdissertation addresses the regulation of agricultural subsidies under current WTO rules, possible results of Doha negotiations, future status of agricultural subsidiesunder the WTO trading system, as well as some issues concerning China. Thisdissertation is composed of three parts: introduction, the text and epilogue, about280,000 words in total.
The first chapter addresses negotiations on agricultural subsidies and evolutionof multilateral disciplines in the GATT/WTO framework. This chapter presents adetailed introduction on negotiating history of GATT/WTO disciplines on agriculturalsubsidies and comments on relevant texts and practices in the GATT era. This chapterprobes into the following issues in turn: the reasons for GATT contracting parties orWTO Members to negotiate domestic agricultural policies at the GATT/WTO forumand the complexity of negotiating reduction of agricultural subsidies; GATTnegotiations on agricultural subsidies and relevant provisions in GATT1947 and theTokyo Round Subsidies Code; then finally the progress and focus of ongoing Dohanegotiations on agriculture. Research of this chapter shows that GATT failed toimpose effective disciplines on the reduction of agricultural subsidies, and URAAactually only has limited impact on Members' agricultural policies. Nevertheless,URAA provides a framework for regulating agricultural subsidies and a basis forcontinuing reform process. The ongoing Doha Round negotiations are one step ofsuch fundamental reform process.
The second chapter addresses WTO general disciplines on subsidies. Based onthe text of SCM and disputes settlement practices, this chapter is devoted to theresearch on basic concepts and mechanisms of WTO general subsidies disciplines,such as the concept of "subsidy", disciplines on prohibited and actionable subsidies,and interpretation thereof developed in WTO practices. SCM applies to all products,including agricultural products. Moreover, SCM provides an important context for theinterpretation of undefined concepts in URAA. Research of this chapter shows thatWTO dispute settlement practice tends to apply subsidies disciplines strictly, whichcan be clearly observed in the interpretations of "financial contribution", "public body" and "indirect subsidies", etc. SCM actionable provisions, which for many yearshave nearly been at the idle condition, began to be used in recent cases. Actionableprovisions may be used more frequently to sue agricultural subsidies after the expiryof "Peace Clause".
The third chapter addresses URAA disciplines on agricultural export subsidiesfrom basic concepts to basic structure of disciplines, then to specific aspects thereof.This chapter is composed of the following five aspects: the concept of "exportsubsidies" under URAA, the structure of disciplines on export subsidies, reduction ofexport subsidies, prevention of circumvention of export subsidy commitments, andthree types of "disguised" agricultural export subsidies. Based on the research of thischapter, the following aspects on URAA export subsidies disciplines shall be paidmore attention: Firstly, the concept of "export subsidies" under URAA and SCM arenot identical; the scope of the former is broader than that of the latter. Currentdisciplines are limited to export subsidies financed by taxpayers; provisions on exportpractices with similar effects are quite scarce. Secondly, URAA adopts a uniquestructure in dealing with export subsidies, which distinguishes types of exportsubsidies and agricultural products receiving export subsidies. Such distinctions arequite important for the design of URAA export subsidies disciplines. However, WTOdispute settlement practice blurs those distinctions, which gives rise to uncertainties inthe application of WTO rules. Finally, although URAA sets quantitative commitmentlevels on export subsidies while strengthens rules at the same time, reductioncommitments are to some extent circumvented on account of systematic defects andabusive unilateral interpretations by WTO members. Results of Doha negotiations, ifsuccessfully concluded, might eliminate agricultural export subsidies eventually.
The fourth chapter addresses URAA disciplines on domestic support, includingbasic concepts, classification of domestic support measures, measurement of domesticsupport, implementation of domestic support disciplines, and Doha negotiations ondomestic support. Research of this chapter indicates that URAA disciplines on domestic support are too relaxed to restrain distorting domestic support measureseffectively. Although disciplines can be effectively implemented by resorting to WTOdispute settlement mechanism, the disciplines themselves are less effective against themanipulation of base period and calculation method of AMS, circumvention ofcommitments by changing the form of support measures, etc. Reduction of domesticsupport is one of the key issues in the ongoing Doha negotiations.
The fifth chapter presents an analysis on the relationship among WTO rules onagricultural subsidies, i.e. GATT1994, URAA and SCM, and the application of thoserules in WTO disputes. This chapter elaborates the following three issues: theapplication of GATT1994 in WTO disputes on agricultural subsidies, the applicationof URAA and SCM, and the impact of the expiry of "Peace Clause" on WTOdisciplines on agricultural subsidies. Based on WTO dispute settlement reports, it isclear that GATT1994, URAA and SCM shall be interpreted harmoniously and appliedsimultaneously and cumulatively. Research of this chapter finds that the simultaneousand cumulative application of URAA and SCM may impose stricter disciplines onagricultural products than those on industrial products, which is inconsistent with theoriginal purpose of URAA negotiators. The expiry of "Peace Clause" influencesagricultural export subsidies and domestic support measures in different ways. Themost prominent influence is that SCM actionable provisions may serve as animportant legal basis to sue immense amount of agricultural subsidies maintained bydeveloped Members.
The sixth chapter inquires into several systematic problems with WTOdisciplines on agricultural subsidies, i.e. the implementation of URAA subsidiesdisciplines, WTO dual systems applying to agricultural subsidies and the future status,the tension between WTO dispute settlement and multilateral trade negotiations, thenewly brought WTO litigation by Canada against U.S. (WT/DS357) and itschallenges to U.S. agriculture policies. Research of this chapter indicates theWeakness of URAA notification and surveillance mechanism, the divergence of URAA and SCM in the approaches to discipline subsidies, and proposes to attachappropriate importance to WTO dispute settlement versus WTO political andmultilateral negotiations. Too rigid dispute settlement reports might underminedomestic political support for the multilateral trading system. This chapter alsopresents an analysis on the new agricultural subsidies case, which may have someimportance influence on the draft of U.S. new farm bill and the ongoing Dohaagriculture negotiations.
The epilogue of this dissertation deals with the impacts of WTO agriculturalsubsidies disciplines on China, covering the following three aspects, i.e. China's WTOcommitments on agricultural subsidies and implementation thereof, review on China'snew farm policies after the year of 2004, impacts of subsidized imported agriculturalProducts on China's agricultural sector and countermeasures. Taking into account ofChina's current agricultural policies and comparing with China's implementation ofrelevant WTO commitments, the last issue is much more urgent. At the end of thischapter, this author proposes several preliminary suggestions on how to tackle theadverse effects caused by the dumping of subsidized imported agricultural products.
本文在回顾GATT／WTO框架下农业补贴谈判与多边纪律演化过程的基础上，分析了WTO现有规则对农业补贴的规范、多哈回合农业补贴谈判可能的成果、农业在将来WTO多边贸易体制下的地位，以及WTO框架下有关中国的农业补贴问题。本论文共分为导言、正文和结语三个部分，共计28万余字。
第一章为GATT／WTO框架下农业补贴谈判与多边纪律演化。本章详细介绍了GATT／WTO农业补贴谈判史，评述了GATT时期农业补贴纪律。在内容上，本章首先探讨了GATT缔约方／WTO成员将农业政策纳入多边贸易谈判的动因和谈判削减农业补贴的复杂性；继而分析了GATT时期农业补贴多边谈判以及GATT时期农业补贴纪律；最后介绍了WTO新一轮农业谈判的进展和焦点。本章内容表明，GATT时期未能制定有效的纪律，约束并削减农业补贴；乌拉圭回合《农业协定》对成员农业政策的影响也非常有限，其积极意义在于为规范农业补贴提供了一个框架，为继续农产品贸易改革进程提供了基础。当前多哈回合谈判就是根本性改革进程中的一步。
第二章为WTO框架下一般补贴纪律。本章以《补贴协定》和争端解决实践为基础，研究和分析WTO一般补贴规则包涵的基本概念和基本纪律，即“补贴”概念的定义、WTO争端解决实践中“补贴”的确定、禁止性补贴和可诉补贴纪律。《补贴协定》普遍适用于包括农产品在内的所有产品，并且，除了直接适用之外，《补贴协定》还构成解释《农业协定》下未界定概念的重要解释依据和背景。本章研究表明，WTO争端解决实践倾向于严格解释补贴纪律，在“财政资助”、“公共机构”及“间接补贴”等概念的解释方面有明显体现。多年来几乎处于闲置状态的《补贴协定》可诉补贴条款，在最近的案件中开始使用。《农业协定》“和平条款”终止适用后，《补贴协定》可诉补贴纪律对解决成员农业补贴争端将发挥更大的作用。
第三章为《农业协定》出口补贴纪律。本章采取了从《农业协定》出口补贴纪律的基本概念到出口补贴纪律的基本结构，再到出口补贴纪律具体内容的思路，依次论述了下列五个部分：《农业协定》下“出口补贴”的概念、出口补贴纪律的结构、出口补贴的削减、出口补贴承诺的反规避纪律，以及三种“隐蔽”的农产品出口补贴。多哈回合有关农产品出口补贴谈判的进展散见于本章相关部分的论述中。本章研究表明，《农业协定》出口补贴纪律存在以下问题：其一，《农业协定》和《补贴协定》下“出口补贴”的概念与范围有所不同，前者宽泛于后者；现行《农业协定》规范的出口补贴，基本上局限于由纳税人供资的直接出口补贴，对于具有类似补贴效果的出口实践，《农业协定》的纪律非常有限。其二，《农业协定》出口补贴纪律的结构较为特殊，区分具体出口补贴措施的类型和接受出口补贴的农产品或产品组类型，适用不同的出口补贴纪律；然而，WTO争端解决实践中的解释模糊了《农业协定》特别设计的出口补贴纪律结构，导致具体案件中农产品出口补贴纪律适用上的不确定；其三，《农业协定》虽然在强化出口补贴规则的同时，规定了数量上的承诺水平，但从实施效果来看，由于制度上的缺陷和成员的任意解释，导致出口补贴削减承诺遭到规避。多哈回合农业谈判若取得成功，有望强化农产品出口补贴纪律，在某一确定日期前，取消对农产品提供的出口补贴。
第四章为《农业协定》国内支持纪律。本章的基本内容包括国内支持纪律的基本概念、国内支持措施的分类、国内支持的衡量、国内支持纪律的实施和多哈回合国内支持纪律的谈判。本章研究表明，《农业协定》国内支持纪律松弛，未能有效约束扭曲农业生产和贸易的国内支持措施，对成员农业政策的影响很小。虽然《农业协定》国内支持纪律可借助于WTO争端解决机制获得有效实施，但在乌拉圭回合制定国内支持纪律的时候，某些缔约方(主要指欧共体和美国)通过操纵国内支持纪律的整体结构、基期的选择、综合支持量的计算方法等，实际降低了国内支持纪律本身的有效性。在多哈回合农业谈判中，国内支持削减的程度是成员难以达成一致的核心问题。
第五章为WTO农业补贴规则之间的关系及其在WTO农业补贴争端中的适用。WTO农业补贴纪律包含在下列三个协定中：GATT1994、《农业协定》和《补贴协定》。本章主要论述了三个方面的内容：WTO农业补贴争端中GATT1994的适用；《补贴协定》与《农业协定》的适用，以及“和平条款”终止适用对WTO农业补贴纪律的影响。依据WTO争端解决实践中发展出来的方法，GATT1994、《农业协定》与《补贴协定》应同时、累积和协调地适用于农业补贴争端。本章研究表明，WTO争端解决中适用《农业协定》与《补贴协定》的方法，导致在某些情形下，适用于农产品的补贴纪律比非农产品补贴纪律更为严格，这与《补贴协定》谈判者的初衷不符。“和平条款”的终止适用对农产品出口补贴和各类国内支持措施有不同的影响。本章的最后部分区分了五种情形，逐一分析“和平条款”终止适用后，具体农业补贴措施适用的纪律。最为突出的影响是，“和平条款”终止适用后，《补贴协定》可诉补贴条款为起诉发达成员维持的巨额农业补贴提供了重要途径。
第六章探讨了WTO农业补贴纪律的若干制度性问题，分别为《农业协定》补贴纪律的实施、WTO框架下农业补贴纪律的双重规范与未来、WTO争端解决与多边贸易谈判的关系，以及WTO诉讼对美国农业政策的新挑战。本章研究表明，关于农业补贴纪律的实施，目前最为突出的问题是成员通报与监督方面的欠缺，直接结果是难以知晓成员是否违反了农业补贴纪律，也使农业补贴谈判缺乏公共可得的信息。在WTO框架下，农业补贴受到《农业协定》和《补贴协定》两套补贴纪律的约束和规范。尽管“和平条款”终止适用后，农业补贴纪律向适用于所有产品的WTO统一补贴体制方向迈进了一步，但由于《补贴协定》和《农业协定》本身在总体规范方法、结构和所用概念等方面的差异，在现有框架下，尚不太可能将农业补贴纪律完全融合到WTO一般纪律当中。巴西等成员对美国和欧共体提起的两起农业补贴案件，配合了多哈回合农业谈判进程。争端解决报告对WTO农业补贴纪律的解释与适用，使WTO争端解决与多边贸易谈判在WTO农业补贴纪律发展中的关系受到关注。激进的争端解决报告虽然有利于强化农产品补贴纪律，但可能会损害成员内部对多边贸易体制的政治支持。继美国——陆地棉补贴案之后，值美国2002年农业法到期之际，加拿大又对美国玉米及其它农产品补贴及其他国内支持提出指控，试图影响美国2007年新农业法。本章最后一节介绍并分析了本案对美国农业补贴政策的挑战。
本文结语部分特别论及中国与WTO农业补贴纪律，包括三个方面的内容，即中国“入世”农业补贴承诺及实施、2004年后中国农业支持与补贴政策评述，以及国外农业补贴对我国农业部门的影响与对策。受财力所限，即便2004年后我国加大了农业支持和补贴力度，国内支持总体水平仍然远低于WTO允许的上限；虽然有成员密切关注我国农产品出口补贴的使用情况，但目前为止，尚无此方面正式指控。对我国而言，目前更为重要的是如何应对美国等发达成员大量补贴进口农产品对国内农业和农民造成的损害性影响；如何通过多哈回合农业谈判，改变当前农业补贴规则不平衡的状况。本文结尾尝试提出了若干初步建议，以抛砖引玉。
National agricultural policies usually carry political, social or even culturalvalues and objectives, which causes more problems for international trade policy inagriculture sector than any other area of economic endeavor. GATT1947 and theTokyo Round Subsidies Code had been unsuccessful in dealing with the problem.Governments continued to subsidize production and exports of agriculural productswhile protecting home markets from import competition. Based on dozens of years ofGATT experience, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) speciallydesigns a unique system governing the use of agricultural subsidies, which coexistswith Agreement on Subsidies and Counervailing Measures (SCM). Although URAAis a great achievement in the history of international trade in agricultural products forbringing agriculture into the multilateral trading system, URAA only provids aframework for disciplines on agriculural susbsidies. Current disciplines onagricultural subsidies have many disappointments due to the degree of reduction ofagricultural subsidies, drafting of the document and various other reasons, thusweakens the effectiveness of the disciplines. Fundamental reform is needed toestablish "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system".
Based on the evolutionary process of disciplines on agricultural subsidies, thisdissertation addresses the regulation of agricultural subsidies under current WTO rules, possible results of Doha negotiations, future status of agricultural subsidiesunder the WTO trading system, as well as some issues concerning China. Thisdissertation is composed of three parts: introduction, the text and epilogue, about280,000 words in total.
The first chapter addresses negotiations on agricultural subsidies and evolutionof multilateral disciplines in the GATT/WTO framework. This chapter presents adetailed introduction on negotiating history of GATT/WTO disciplines on agriculturalsubsidies and comments on relevant texts and practices in the GATT era. This chapterprobes into the following issues in turn: the reasons for GATT contracting parties orWTO Members to negotiate domestic agricultural policies at the GATT/WTO forumand the complexity of negotiating reduction of agricultural subsidies; GATTnegotiations on agricultural subsidies and relevant provisions in GATT1947 and theTokyo Round Subsidies Code; then finally the progress and focus of ongoing Dohanegotiations on agriculture. Research of this chapter shows that GATT failed toimpose effective disciplines on the reduction of agricultural subsidies, and URAAactually only has limited impact on Members' agricultural policies. Nevertheless,URAA provides a framework for regulating agricultural subsidies and a basis forcontinuing reform process. The ongoing Doha Round negotiations are one step ofsuch fundamental reform process.
The second chapter addresses WTO general disciplines on subsidies. Based onthe text of SCM and disputes settlement practices, this chapter is devoted to theresearch on basic concepts and mechanisms of WTO general subsidies disciplines,such as the concept of "subsidy", disciplines on prohibited and actionable subsidies,and interpretation thereof developed in WTO practices. SCM applies to all products,including agricultural products. Moreover, SCM provides an important context for theinterpretation of undefined concepts in URAA. Research of this chapter shows thatWTO dispute settlement practice tends to apply subsidies disciplines strictly, whichcan be clearly observed in the interpretations of "financial contribution", "public body" and "indirect subsidies", etc. SCM actionable provisions, which for many yearshave nearly been at the idle condition, began to be used in recent cases. Actionableprovisions may be used more frequently to sue agricultural subsidies after the expiryof "Peace Clause".
The third chapter addresses URAA disciplines on agricultural export subsidiesfrom basic concepts to basic structure of disciplines, then to specific aspects thereof.This chapter is composed of the following five aspects: the concept of "exportsubsidies" under URAA, the structure of disciplines on export subsidies, reduction ofexport subsidies, prevention of circumvention of export subsidy commitments, andthree types of "disguised" agricultural export subsidies. Based on the research of thischapter, the following aspects on URAA export subsidies disciplines shall be paidmore attention: Firstly, the concept of "export subsidies" under URAA and SCM arenot identical; the scope of the former is broader than that of the latter. Currentdisciplines are limited to export subsidies financed by taxpayers; provisions on exportpractices with similar effects are quite scarce. Secondly, URAA adopts a uniquestructure in dealing with export subsidies, which distinguishes types of exportsubsidies and agricultural products receiving export subsidies. Such distinctions arequite important for the design of URAA export subsidies disciplines. However, WTOdispute settlement practice blurs those distinctions, which gives rise to uncertainties inthe application of WTO rules. Finally, although URAA sets quantitative commitmentlevels on export subsidies while strengthens rules at the same time, reductioncommitments are to some extent circumvented on account of systematic defects andabusive unilateral interpretations by WTO members. Results of Doha negotiations, ifsuccessfully concluded, might eliminate agricultural export subsidies eventually.
The fourth chapter addresses URAA disciplines on domestic support, includingbasic concepts, classification of domestic support measures, measurement of domesticsupport, implementation of domestic support disciplines, and Doha negotiations ondomestic support. Research of this chapter indicates that URAA disciplines on domestic support are too relaxed to restrain distorting domestic support measureseffectively. Although disciplines can be effectively implemented by resorting to WTOdispute settlement mechanism, the disciplines themselves are less effective against themanipulation of base period and calculation method of AMS, circumvention ofcommitments by changing the form of support measures, etc. Reduction of domesticsupport is one of the key issues in the ongoing Doha negotiations.
The fifth chapter presents an analysis on the relationship among WTO rules onagricultural subsidies, i.e. GATT1994, URAA and SCM, and the application of thoserules in WTO disputes. This chapter elaborates the following three issues: theapplication of GATT1994 in WTO disputes on agricultural subsidies, the applicationof URAA and SCM, and the impact of the expiry of "Peace Clause" on WTOdisciplines on agricultural subsidies. Based on WTO dispute settlement reports, it isclear that GATT1994, URAA and SCM shall be interpreted harmoniously and appliedsimultaneously and cumulatively. Research of this chapter finds that the simultaneousand cumulative application of URAA and SCM may impose stricter disciplines onagricultural products than those on industrial products, which is inconsistent with theoriginal purpose of URAA negotiators. The expiry of "Peace Clause" influencesagricultural export subsidies and domestic support measures in different ways. Themost prominent influence is that SCM actionable provisions may serve as animportant legal basis to sue immense amount of agricultural subsidies maintained bydeveloped Members.
The sixth chapter inquires into several systematic problems with WTOdisciplines on agricultural subsidies, i.e. the implementation of URAA subsidiesdisciplines, WTO dual systems applying to agricultural subsidies and the future status,the tension between WTO dispute settlement and multilateral trade negotiations, thenewly brought WTO litigation by Canada against U.S. (WT/DS357) and itschallenges to U.S. agriculture policies. Research of this chapter indicates theWeakness of URAA notification and surveillance mechanism, the divergence of URAA and SCM in the approaches to discipline subsidies, and proposes to attachappropriate importance to WTO dispute settlement versus WTO political andmultilateral negotiations. Too rigid dispute settlement reports might underminedomestic political support for the multilateral trading system. This chapter alsopresents an analysis on the new agricultural subsidies case, which may have someimportance influence on the draft of U.S. new farm bill and the ongoing Dohaagriculture negotiations.
The epilogue of this dissertation deals with the impacts of WTO agriculturalsubsidies disciplines on China, covering the following three aspects, i.e. China's WTOcommitments on agricultural subsidies and implementation thereof, review on China'snew farm policies after the year of 2004, impacts of subsidized imported agriculturalProducts on China's agricultural sector and countermeasures. Taking into account ofChina's current agricultural policies and comparing with China's implementation ofrelevant WTO commitments, the last issue is much more urgent. At the end of thischapter, this author proposes several preliminary suggestions on how to tackle theadverse effects caused by the dumping of subsidized imported agricultural products.
引文
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.5, footnote23.
2 为本文写作目的，除特别区分“国内支持”、“国内补贴”等概念外，“农业补贴”包含了《农业协定》下的“国内支持”和“出口补贴”两部分。
1 据经济学家Kym Anderson预测，如果多哈回合将贸易壁垒的一半予以自由化，那么以2005年纯现价计算，全球长期收益将超过220亿美元。如果完全取消贸易壁垒，65％的经济增长将来自于农业和粮食部门。换句话说，即便是乌拉圭回合之后，补贴和关税政策仍然严重扭曲了农业部门。Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006, pp. 149-195.由于补贴对价格有抑制作用，进口粮食的发展中国家将从取消农业补贴中受益还是受到损害，有诸多争论。虽然一些人认为农业补贴将粮食价格维持在较低水平上，有利于发展中国家，但另一些人认为，世界上绝大多数最贫困的人口生活在粮食净出口国，总的来说，取消农业补贴倾向于使穷人获益。尽管发展中国家强调农业补贴问题，但事实上所有WTO成员都能从补贴政策自由化和消除扭曲中获得收益。经济学家的分析还显示农业贸易自由化对发达国家带来的收益要多于发展中国家。
2 以对农业提供巨额补贴和支持的美国为例，美国农、林、渔等部门就业人数只占总就业人口的0.7％，农业年产值只占美国国内生产总值的约1％。唐勇：《如果你要吃饭，农业就很重要》，原载《环球时报》2007年1月19日第17版，http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/14549/531004651.html，(访问日期：2007年2月2日)。
3 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36(6), 2002, p. 1089.以美国对棉花提供的补贴为例，美国棉花补贴计划每年导致贝宁、布基纳法索、马里和其他国家损失数百万美元的出口收入。在2002-2003年度，美国棉花补贴对巴基纳法索造成的出口损失预计超过该年美国对该国提供的外国援助。再例如贝宁，补贴导致的出口损失超过外国援助的一半。在美国棉花补贴争端中，贝宁是争端第三方。调查表明，在贝宁，95％的乡村居民每日生活费低于1美元，棉花价格下跌了40％，导致棉花种植者的收入降低了21％。这反过来导致贝宁大约33万人低于贫困线。由于在最近若干年中，棉花世界价格下跌了不止40％，数据表明美国补贴政策在很大程度上导致了贝宁和其他Ⅲ口棉花的最不发达国家的经济萧条。从贝宁的情形看，补贴政策可通过扭曲价格，损害其他国家与其有竞争关系的生产者，背离自由贸易。有关数据和资料参见：Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006, pp.149-195.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.1.
2 国际乐施会(Oxfam International)是国际发展及救援的非政府组织，1942年，由Canon Theodore Richard Milford在英国牛津成立，原名为“Oxford Committee for Famine Relief”，目的是在二战中向被同盟国封锁的、德国纳粹占领的希腊运送食粮到。1963年，加拿大成立了第一家海外分会。1965年起改以电报地址OXFAM作为名称。参见：http://www.oxfam.org.hk/public/contents/article?ha=&wc=O&hb=&hc=&;revision％5fid=22613&item％5fid=1178，(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
3 Oxfam International, Truth or Consequences: Why the EU and the USA must reform their subsidies, or pay the price, Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp81_truth.pdf, September 12, 2006.
1 例如：J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969; Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1990.
2 在2000年之后，尤其是近一、两年来，国外有关WTO农业补贴纪律的法律研究明显增多。例如：Bernard O'Connor ed., Agriculture in WTO Law, Cameron May, 2005; Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Oxford University Press, 2006; Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002; Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002; Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the State of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002; Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149; Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System" at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003.另外，还有一些法律著作以相当大的篇幅论述了农业补帖问题。例如：Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006; Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer eds., The World Trade Organization: Legal Economic and PoliticalAnalysis, Springer, 2005. 具体参见本文外文参考文献。
1 例如赵维田著：《世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度》，吉林人民出版社2000年版；程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版：龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版；农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版；蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版；秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版2003年版；袁东明 任晶晶编著：《中国加入WTO法律文件解读》(农业篇)，地震出版社2002年版；吴小鹏编著：《国外的农业出口补贴》，中国社会出版社2006年版等。
1 WTO, Trade Statistics (2003)。转引自Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride towards the Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System' at The WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003, p.490.
2 The WTO Secretariat, Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.51.
3 Thomas C. Beiede, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36 (6), 2002, p.1090.
4 东京回合《补贴守则》具体内容参见本章第二节。
5 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC, 20 September 1986.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. 1993, p.133.
2 20世纪70年代是国际农产品贸易少有的黄金时期，受一系列因素的影响，市场出现了罕见的产销两旺。虽然市场形势减轻了国内农业政策的压力，主要发达国家反而提高了农业支持水平，以进一步刺激农业生产。到了80年代，受世界经济衰退和宏观经济不稳定的影响，世界农产品消费量增长趋缓，农产品价格下跌。但与此同时，在技术进步和政府农业支持的推动下，发达国家的农业生产却持续不断地扩大。当不断增长的产量遭遇日益萎缩的需求，发达国家的农业政策便不可避免地陷入了内忧外患之中。龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第114-115页。
3 Robert Wolfe, Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime, Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 73.转引自龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第115页。
4 欧元是埃居的后继货币。在1993年12月31日之前，使用的是埃居，从2000年1月起启动欧元。但埃居和欧元的内在价佰相等。欧洲央行规定，1欧元等于1埃居。
5 Christopher Ritson & David Harvey, The Common Agricultural Policy, CAB International, 1997, p. 55.转引自龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第115页。
6 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.28.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.133.
2 K.A.Ingersent, A.J.Rayner and R.C.Hine eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp.1-3.
3 Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc.G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
4 《WTO香港会议农业谈判难在何处?》，来源：《新京报》，http://news.sohu.com/20051214/n240962143.shtml，(访问日期：2006年9月10日)。
1 Jim Monke, "Farm Commodity Programs: Direct Payment, Counter-Cyclical Payment, and Marketing Loans", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL21779, Updated December 13, 2004, www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS21779.pdf, September 9, 2006, pp.5-6. 例如，美国世界上最大的玉米生产国和出口国。美国占有世界玉米产量的40％，出口量的60％。但美国玉米在世界市场上的成功，只是凭借美国农业部提供的巨额补贴才成为可能。如果没有这些补贴，美国一大部分玉米生产都没有利润。按照美国农业部的统计，在2005之前五年中，每个种植玉米的农民每种植一亩玉米就要损失230美元，整个玉米部门损失达到200亿美元。然而，政府提供的补贴远远弥补了损失，在同一时期达到250亿美元。如果没有补贴，美国的玉米生产和出口量都会降低，世界玉米价格也会更高。经济分析表明，假若不提供销售信贷和反周期支付，2004年美国玉米产量将下降15％，不存在出口，世界价格上升比率超过7％。参见Daniel Sumner, "Boxed in: Conflicts Between US Farm Policies and WTO Obligations", Appendix 1, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6816, September 10, 2006; Oxfam International, "Truth or Consequences: Why the EU and the USA Must Reform Their Subsidies, or Pay the Price", Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp81_truth.pdf, September 12, 2006.
2 T. Josling and S. Tangermann, "Production and Export Subsidies in Agriculture: Lessons from GATT and WTO Disputes Involving the US and the EC", in The WTO and Agriculture, Kym Anderson and Tim Josling eds., Volume Ⅱ, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005, p.232.
1 K.A.Ingersent, A.J.Rayner and R.C.Hine eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, St. Martin's Press, 1994 pp.1-3.
2 Konrad Von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", International Institute for Sustainable Development, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf September.18, 2006, p.25.
3 《素帕猜：农业是多哈回合谈判的发动机》，2005年12月12日，http://www.ccatp.com/news/news051212_1.htm，(访问日期：2006年9月6日)。
4 关于GATT／WTO体制下农业补贴特殊安排的具体原因和发展演化，参见本文第六章第一节。赵维田先生的著作曾将各国政府农业保护有理的种种论调概括为：“自给自足，安全所系”、“农产品价格需要稳定”和“田园风光作为文化遗产”等。赵维田著：《世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度》，吉林人民出版社2000年版，第246-247页。
1 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 18, 2006.
2 这些成员提出的提桑依次为：WTO Doc．G/AG/NG/W/90；G/AG/NG/W/91；G/AG/NG/W/94；G/AG/NG/W/96；G/AG/NG/W/98；G/AG/NG/W/101；G/AG/NG/W/103；G/AG/NG/W/135；G/AG/NG/W/140．
3 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Sept. 18, 2006.
4 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
1 Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.11.
2 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.99.
3 成员对谈判主要问题的侧重点也有不同认识。一些成员认为《农业协定》第20条的授权包含了三个方面：出口补贴、国内支持和市场准入。在适当的情况下，考虑非贸易关注和给予发展中国家的特殊和差别待遇。其他成员认为非贸易关注、给予发展中国家的特殊和差别待遇以及“三大支柱”构成五个独立的问题。但所幸目前为止没有对谈判进度产生影响。WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Sept. 18, 2006.
4 Joseph A. McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal Economic and Political Analysis, Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p.218.
5 Konrad Von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", International Institute for Sustainable Development, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade cancun research paper.pdf, September.18, 2006, p.23.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations ", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.220.
2 《日本经济新闻》：古德雷特表明美国对农业谈判的最终立场，2006．6．15。转引自刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》，2006年第11期，第5页。
3 Joseph Stiglitz, "Reasons behind the Demise of the Doha Development Round", Taipei Times, http://taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/08/15/2003323304, October 1, 2006.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.387.
5 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36(6), 2002. p.90.
1 Celso Amodm, "The New Dynamic in World Trade is Multipolar", Published in the Financial Times on 4 August 2004, http://www.brazil.org.uk/newsandmedia/ar20040804.html, October 1, 2006.
2 Giovanni Anania, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, pp.539-574.
3 美国1933年的五个农业法案开创了对农业实施保护的先河。参见Miguel Antonio Figueroa, "The GATT and Agriculture: the Past, Present and the Future", 5-FALL Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 93, 1995.
4 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36 (6), 2002, p.90.
5 Celso Amorim, "The new dynamic in world trade is multipolar", http://www.brazil.org.uk/newsandmedia/ar20040804.html, February2, 2007.
6 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006, pp.190-191.
7 在讨论建立国际贸易组织的过程中，曾要求绝对禁止所有形式的非关税措施，并一概禁止出口补贴。唯 一的例外是在贸易支付发生危机时，授权使用数量限制。但在农业方面，若干国家要求特别对待。美国和英国都提出需要借助数量限制措施保护国内市场免受世界价格的影响。1946年美国起草和提交的《国际贸易组织宪章草案》禁止导致出口价格低于国内价格的所有出口补贴，但对长期供给过度的产品提供的出口补贴除外。按照美国农业计划，出口受到补贴的绝大多数产品都属于这一例外类别。参见Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1990, pp.15-18. 关于农业在GATT／WTO体制下的特殊安排，参见本文第六章第一节。
1 GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Updated 6th Edition, 1995, p.411. GATT第16．1条规定：“如任何缔约方给予或维持任何补贴，包括任何形式的收入或价格支持，以直接或间接增加自其领土出口的任何产品或减少向其领土进口的任何产品的方式实施，则该缔约方应将该补贴的范围和性质、该补贴对自其领土出口、向其领土进口的受影响产品的数量所产生的预计影响以及使该补贴成为必要的情况向缔约方全体做出书面通知。在确定任何此类补贴对其他任何缔约方的利益造成或威胁造成严重侵害的任何情况下，应请求给予何关补贴的缔约方应与其他有关缔约方或缔约方全体讨论限制该补贴的可能性。”
1 在智利与澳大利亚之间的硫酸铵补贴案中，尽管澳大利亚政府没有将维持补贴的情况通知缔约方全体，但该案工作组认为智利政府没有因为澳大利亚政府没有通知缔约方全体而受到损害。在澳大利亚当局决定停止对硝酸钠提供补贴前，智利政府有机会与其讨论。澳大利亚政府与智利政府已经讨论了限制补贴影响的可能性，并且也已经与缔约方全体讨论了该问题。Working Party Report on Austrialian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950, BISD Ⅱ/188, para.10.
2 然而，1961年“补贴小组”的一份有关GATT第16条的报告认为既没有必要，也不可能对“补贴”做出协商一致的解释。而且，专家小组认为，在实践中，“补贴”一词缺乏界定没有影响到第16条的适用。Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987, p.49.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law oflnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.104.
4 GATT1947第16．3条规定，“因此，缔约方应寻求避免对初级产品的出口使用补贴。但是，如一缔约方直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，并以增加自其领土出口的任何初级产品的形式实施，则该补贴的实施不得使该缔约方在该产品的世界出口贸易中占有不公平的份额，同时应考虑前一代表期内该缔约方在该产品贸易中所占份额及可能已经影响或正在影响该产品贸易的特殊因素。”
1 GATT第16．4条规定：“此外，自1958年1月1日或其后可能的尽早日期起，缔约方应停止对除初级产品外的任何产品的出口直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，此种补贴可使此种产品的出口价格低于向国内市场同类产品购买者收取的可比价格。在1957年12月31日之前，任何缔约方不得通过采用新的补贴或扩大现有补贴范围，使任何此类补贴的范围超过1955年1月1日实施的范围。”
2 Melakn Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.107.
3 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.135.
4 参见GATT附件Ⅰ“注释和补充规定”对GATT第16条B节的解释。
5 GATT Panel Report on France-Wheat Exports, adopted on 21 November 1958, L/924, BISD 7S/46.
6 United States-Request for Consultation under Ariticle ⅩⅫ:1 on European Communities-Export Refunds for Wheat Flour, GATT Doc. L/5014, 8 August 1980.
7 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Wheat Flour Subsidies, SCM/42, 21 March 1983, unadopted, para.2.3.
1 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Pasta Subsidies, SCM/43, 19 May 1983, unadopted, para.4.2.
2 《哈瓦那宪章》第28(1)条规定，“如任何成员提供任何形式的补贴，直接或间接地维持或增加自其领土任何初级产品的出口，则该补贴的实施不能维持或增加该成员在该产品世界贸易中的公平份额。”转引自：Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.115.
3 参见GATT附件Ⅰ“注释和补充规定”对GATT第16．3条的解释。
4 GATT Panel Report on France-Wheat Exports, adopted on 21 November 1958, L/924, BISD 7S/46, paras.15-19.
5 Report of Working Party on Article ⅩⅫ:2 Consultations on United States Export Subsidy on Unmanufactured Tobacco, L/2925, 20 November 1967, paras. 21-22..
1 GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290.
2 GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290, para.4.17.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.115-119.
4 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p. 136.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.107.
6 “如一缔约方认为，由于下列原因，它在本协定项下直接或间接获得的利益正在丧失或减损，或本协定 任何目标的实现正在受到阻碍，(a) 另一缔约方未能履行其在本协定项下的义务，或 (b) 另一缔约方实施任何措施，无论该措施是否与本协定的规定产生抵触，或 (c) 存在任何其他情况，则该缔约方为使该事项得到满意的调整，可向其认为有关的另一缔约方提出书面交涉或建议。任何被接洽的缔约方应积极考虑对其提出的交涉或建议。”
1 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86, para.144.
2 Report of Review Working Party Ⅲ on Barriers to Trade Other Than Restrictions on Tariffs, L/334, 1 March 1955, para.13.
3 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.333.
1 Working Party Report on Austrialian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950, BISD Ⅱ/188, para.12; GATT, Analyticallndex: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Updated 6th Edition, 1995, p.611.
2 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86, paras.147-148.
3 依据《补贴守则》第8．3条(b)项，缔约方应当寻求避免通过使用任何补贴，使另一缔约方在总协定下直接或间接获得的利益丧失或减损。(b)项脚注24规定，总协定项下直接或问接产生的利益包括在总协定第2条下产生的关税减让约束的利益。但其用词为包括(include)，故并非排他性列举。
1 Joseph A. McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Patrick EJ. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, pp.195-196.
2 英文全称："The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles Ⅵ, ⅩⅥ, and ⅩⅩⅢ of the GATT".
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.134.东京回合《补贴守则》只有24个缔约方，并且只对损害进口国市场的补贴规定了纪律。与《补贴守则》相比，乌拉圭回合《补贴协定》还对下列两种情形规定了纪律，即进口替代(限制向补贴提供国的进口)和第三国市场取代或阻碍。
1 《补贴守则》第9条所附脚注29。
2 《补贴守则》第10．2(b)条规定，“超过世界出口贸易公平份额”应当包括考虑到世界市场的变化，缔约方提供的出口补贴导致取代另一缔约方出口的任何情形。但是，美国的上述提议与“取代”标准到底有多大的差异，令人怀疑。
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law oflnternational Trade in Agricuhural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 140.
4 GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290, para.4.17.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law oflnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.143.
1 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Wheat Flour Subsidies, SCM/42, 21 March 1983, unadopted, paras. 5.5-5.3.对于本案专家组的结论部分，存在两种观点，一种观点赞同认为确实“公平份额”标准有内在固有的困难：但另一种观点认为本案专家组主观上实践该条的立法意图。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.145.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.369-370.
3 Elements of the Negotiating Framework, Submission by the European Community, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/31, November 27, 1989, p.1.
1 Piece Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EU Law, Cameron May, 1999, p212.
2 例如：GATT Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅰ, SCM/83, 3 June 1987, unadopted, BISD 34S/194; GATT Panel Report on US-Non-Rubber Footwear, SCM/94, adopted on 13 June 1995, BISD 42S/208; GATT Panel Report on Canada-Manufacturing Beef CVD, SCM/85, 13 Ocotober 1987, unadopted; GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86; GATT Panel Report on US-Canadian Pork, DS7/R, adopted on 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30; GATT Panel Report on Canada-Grain Corn, SCM/140 and Corr.1, adopted on 26 March 1992, BISD 38S/411; GAFF Panel Report on US-Wine and Grape Products, SCM/71, adopted on 28 April 1992, BISD 39S/436; GATT Panel Report on US-Norwegian Salmon CVD, SCM/153, adopted on 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/576; GATT Panel Report on Brazil-EEC Milk, SCM/179, adopted on 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/467; GATT Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅰ, SCM/185, 15 November 1994, unadopted. GATT Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅱ, SCM/162, 19 February 1993.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.370.
4 20世纪80年代初期提起的农产品补贴争端有：澳大利亚与欧共体之间有关欧共体食糖出口补贴的纠纷、美国和欧共体之间有关欧共体罐装桃、罐装梨和葡萄干国内补贴的纠纷等等。
5 Ministerial Declaration, GATT Doc. L/5424, adopted on 29 November 1982, pp.11-12.
1 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp.92-93.
2 GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future: The Leutwiler Report (1987), at 9. 转引自Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.170.
3 GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future: The Leutwiler Report (1987), at 44. 转引自 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.170.
1 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC, Declaration of 20 September 1986, p.6.
2 Timothy E. Josling, Stefan Tangermann & T. K. Wadey, Agriculture in the GATT, ST. Martin's Press, 1996, p.140.
3 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.172.
4 United States Prooosal for Negotiations on Agriculture. GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGS/W/14, 7 July 1987.
5 美国初始谈判立场遭到其他谈判方的反对。有些国家认为美国是在建议农产品贸易应当比制造业和服务业更为自由化。例如，日本虽然认为国际农产品贸易危机基本上是由过度生产和出口竞争造成的，因而支持取消出口补贴，但却反对美国的其他绝大多数提议。日本认为农业应当与其他部门区别对待，美国的提案过于雄心勃勃。John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.96.
6 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 96.凯恩斯集团由农产品出口国组成，在1987年10月份的联合提案中，凯恩斯集团表示，农业补贴方面的长期目标是制定GATT规则和纪律，禁止使用所有的补贴和影响农产品贸易的其他政府支持措施。Cairns Group Proposal to the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/21, 26 October 1987, para.11.但根据凯恩斯集团的方案，农业政策改革应分三个步骤进行：(1)将出口补贴、国内支持和进口限制冻结在现有的水平，阻止其进一步增长，并通过短期的补贴削减和市场准入措施改善农产品贸易状况：(2)根据总体支持削减目标，通过减让表的方式逐步削减和消除 贸易扭曲措施；(3)通过谈判创设新的多边规则，将农产品贸易完全纳入GATT纪律的有效约束之下，具体包括禁止所有GATT未明确认可的进口限制，取消所有豁免，约束并削减所有农产品关税，以及禁止所有影响农产品贸易的补贴和政府支持措施。龚宇著：((WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第118页。
1 在20世纪80年代末和90年代初，共同农业政策效率低下已经很明显。欧共体承认需要改革，但是希望在国内背景下改革，而不是放在乌拉圭回合中。共同农业政策使用出口补贴处理剩余生产，因此，共同农业政策，尤其是其中包含的出口补贴成分，被主要粮食出口国视为当时世界农业面临的很多问题的根源。因此，共同农业政策成为很多国家提案的对象。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A NegotiatingHistory (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.178.
2 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.179.
3 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.99.
4 Mid-Term Agreement on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN/TNC/11, 21 April 1989, paras5-6.
1 具体参见：Mid-Term Agreement on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN/TNC/11, 21 April 1989, para.7.
2 例如，美国认为消除世界农产品市场的扭曲和限制，就必然要求取消农业出口补贴。在农业协定中期审议之后，美国再次提出要在10年内取消出口补贴。欧共体也再次提出了之前的“重新平衡”的观点和综合支持量(AMS)，谈判为削减确定一个总体目标，但每一缔约方可自由决定达到目标的方法，灵活地削减国内支持和出口补贴。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.209.
3 Framework Agreement on Agriculture Reform Program: Draft Text by the Chairman, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170, 11 July 1990, para.18.
4 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第131页。
5 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991.
6 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products:From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.210.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.4.
2 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.16.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade inAgricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.212.
4 J. Hillman, "The US Perspective", in K. Ingersent, A. Rayner, and R. Hine eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, St. Martin's Press, 1994, p.51.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, pp.173-175; John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.203.
6 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.203.
1 Proposal of the European Commnity for Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/20, 26 October 1987; Global Proposal of the European Community on the Long-term Objectives for the Multilateral Negotiation of Agricultural Questions, GATr Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/145, 19 December 1989.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade inAgricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer La.w International, 2002, p.289.
3 因此，主要农产品出口国都认为欧共体的提案背离了谈判的总体目标。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.179.
4 Framework Agreement on Agriculture Reform Program: Draft Text by the Chairman, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170, 11 July 1990, paras.2-11.
5 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System:A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.206.
6 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.208.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p. 35. 该微量支持水平最终反映在乌拉圭回合《农业协定》第6．4条(a)项和(b)项中。
2 这类措施包括欧共体的补偿支付和美国的差额补贴。参见：Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.4;
3 这意味着只要满足综合支持总量的削减承诺，成员可以自由地上调或下调提供给特定产品的支持水平。
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.393; Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.4.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.16.
6 Joseph A. McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and PoliticalAnalysis, Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p189.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.6.
2 关于国内支持措施的经济理论和影响，参见：Cliff Stevenson and Ilaria Filippi, "Distorting the Truth? The Economics of Domestic Farm Subsidies", International Trade Law & Regulation, 10(3), 2004, pp.50-58.
3 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.6.
4 参见《农业协定》序言。
1 Joseph A. McMahon, "The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and PoliticalAnalysis, Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p.228.
2 在实施期内，共同农业政策是欧盟财政最大的一项支出(占全部的42％)。由于欧共体农民已经依赖大量的补贴，改革是一个争议非常大的内部政策。U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, "World Trade Organization: Early Decisions Are Vital to Progress in Ongoing Negotiations ", Report to Congressional Requesters 13, Sept. 2000, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-879, October 2, 2006.
3 Matthew Newell, "Cotton, U.S. Domestic Policy, and Trade Wars: The Future of Agricultural Negotiations ", 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 301, 2005, p.306.
1 《农业协定》第20条认识到，改革的进程正在继续，并且，继续改革进程的谈判应当在实施期结束前一年启动。谈判的目标是继续推进重大改革，以实质性地削减农业支持和保护。
2 1999年在西雅图召开的部长级会议未能发起新一轮淡判，主要的失败原因被认为是缺乏充分的准备和有效的谈判框架，很多发展中国家无法有意义地参与谈判。
3 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7 and 8 February 2000, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/53, 15 March 2000.
4 有学者认为，多哈回合农业谈判的授权是雄心勃勃的，服务业补贴的谈判是非常不确定的，一般补贴规则的谈判是非常适中的。Konrad von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", IISD Paper, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf, October 5, 2006.
5 有关成员对出口补贴和国内支持关键问题的立场等具体问题，参见本文第三章和第四章。
6 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Septermber 9, 2006.
1 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Septermber 9, 2006.
1 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 26, 2006.
2 有关补贴的谈判，分散在农业委员会、规则委员会和服务贸易理事会中。渔业补贴谈判在规则谈判组中，但单独谈判。
1 Draft Ministral Declaration, Fourth Session, Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, para.13.
2 Draft Ministral Declaration, Fourth Session, Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, para.13.
3 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberation——Uruguay, Doha and Beyond", Journal of Word Trade 36(6), 2002, pp.1089-1110.
4 孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第3-4页。
5 Negotiations on Agriculture: "Overview, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/AG/6, 18 December 2002.
6 Negotiations on Agriculture First Draft of Modalitiesfor the Further Commitments, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, WTO Doc.TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003.
1 Summary Report on the Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/AG/R/7, 24 March 2003.例如，新西兰要求谈判遵守和捍卫多哈授权。多哈授权是牵扯到未来世界贸易和世界经济的、广泛的政治承诺。新西兰和凯恩斯集团不希望看到部长们在多哈达成的广泛的政治性授权，由于少数发达的农业保护主义者的撺掇而被日内瓦的委员会官员改写。尤其是这些国家在过去50年中从工业品贸易自由状态中获得利益。虽然改革的过程不容易，但是世界上其他地方的农业生产者也很不容易。无论他们的生产效率多高，不管他们多依赖农业，都被迫与北半球发达国家的国库进行竞争。哥伦比亚认为草案在削减国内支持方面尤其不够充分。中国要求主席的第二稿模式应当在取消出口补贴、规范和削减出口信贷以及实质性削减国内支持方面做出更大程度的规定。欧共体则强调包括市场准入、国内支持、出口竞争、特殊和差别待遇、非贸易关注内在的所有领域的平衡，以及可行性。
2 Negotiations on Agriculture First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments Revision, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003.
3 Negotiations on Agriculture, Stuart Harbinson, WTO Doe. TN/AG/10, 7 July 2003, para.8.
4 Agriculture Modalities: Deadline Missed, Eyes Now on Cancun, 7 Bridges-Weekly Trade News Digest, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-04-02/story1.htm, September 22, 2006.
5 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where WeAre Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agrie_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 22, 2006.
6 EU-US Joint Text on Agriculture, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/anania/WTO/EU-US％20joint％20text％20on％20agriculture％20(Aug％2013,％2003).PDF, September 22, 2006.
1 Agriculture: Real Negotiations Start as EC, US Table Joint Moralities Text, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Volume 7, Number 28, Aug. 21, 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-08-21/story2.htm, September 22, 2006.
2 Agriculture-Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, E1 Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(03)/W/6, September 4, 2003.
3 孙振字主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第4页。
4 Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev. 2, Annex A, 13 September, 2003.
5 Preparations for the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference: Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Second Revision, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev. 2, 13 September 2003, para.4.
6 Patrick A. Messerlin, "Agriculture in the Doha Agenda", prepared for World Bank Roundtable on Policy Research in Preparation for the 5th WTO Ministerial 1, http://www.econ.worldbank.org/files/25198_wps3009.pdf, October 22, 2006.
7 Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad & Mali, WTO Doc. TN/AG/GEN/4, 16 May 2003.
1 孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第32页。
2 孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第5页。例如，2004年1月11日，美国谈判代表Zoellick写信给WTO各部长，建议集中于农业、工业品和服务关键领域。5月9日，欧盟委员Pascal Lamy和Frans Fischler写信表示如果其他成员愿意在欧盟关注的某些问题上做出让步，欧盟也愿意做出一些让步，包括谈判确定一个取消出口补贴的最后日期，放弃四个“新加坡”议题当中的三个议题，只剩下争议比较少的贸易便利化。WTO总干事素帕猜参加了几乎所有的贸易部长集会，并对发展中国家给予特别关注。这些会议包括2004年5月初在塞内加尔首都达喀尔召开的最不发达国家贸易部长会议、5月13-14日在巴黎召开的OECD部长会议、5月底在卢旺达首都基加利召开的非洲联盟贸易部长会议等。参见：WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where tire Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 23, 2006.
3 例如，多米尼加共和国谈判代表对七年前发达成员要求发展中和最不发达成员让步，七年后仍然要求他们让步表示愤慨，对多哈回合是“发展的回合”提出质疑，认为发达成员只考虑自己的利益，不接受发展中成员的意见。发达成员要求发展中成员降低关税，可自己却维持水平很高的国内补贴，编出“新蓝箱”、“敏感产品”之类的新名词，对发展中成员不公平、不公正。参见彭汉英：《倾听最激烈的“反对者之声”——WTO总理事会七月会议纪实》，载《中国海关》2004年第10期，第39页。
1 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc.WT/L/579, 2 August 2004.
2 Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, p.542.
3 Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, pp.539-574.
4 Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, Annex A, 2 August 2004, paras.13-15.
1 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, p.3.该文认为，鉴于可能提出的各种理由、发达成员的实力和财政力量，多哈许下的诺言可能会遭遇挫败。
2 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, pp.3-4.; 卢先堃：《表面文章一大篇：农业框架协议对欧盟国内支持的影响》，载《WTO经济导刊》2005年第1期，第69页。
3 另外，协议还明确规定了“灵活性”，如果被用于将政治敏感产品排除在将来协议之外，将在相当大地程度上限制协议的范围。Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, pp.539-574.
4 参见孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年，第30-32页：Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, Annex A, 2 August 2004, para.47.
1 Agriculture Negotiations: Status Report Ⅱ Looking Forward to the Hong Kong Ministerial, Assessment by the Chairman, WTO Doc. TN/AG/19, 1 August 2005, para.4.
2 Agriculture Negotiations: Status Report Ⅱ Looking Forward to the Hong Kong Ministerial, Assessment by the Chairman, WTO Doe. TN/AG/19, 1 August 2005, paras.5-10
1 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.6.
2 《夜以继日 谋求一致——关于第一次修改后的香港部长级会议宣言草案》，2005年12月30日，载中国贸易救济信息网，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsId=400540000197,(访问日期：2006年10月8日)。
3 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5
1 刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易安组织动态与研究》2006年11期，第1-3页。
2 WTO News, "Talks Suspended: 'Today There Are Only Losers", 24 Jul. 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july_e.htm, October 20, 2006; DG Lamy: "Time Out Needed to Review Options and Positions", http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_24july06_e.htm, July 30, 2006.
3 刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2006年11期，第1-3页。
4 WTO News: "Lamy: 'We Have Resumed Negotiations Fully across the Board '", February 7, 2007, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/gc_dg_star_7feb07_e.htm February 30, 2007.
1 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006, p.187.
2 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause ': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006, pp.187-188.
3 Speeches, Articles and Interviews, http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/discursos/discurso_detalheoasp?ID_DISCURSO=2604, March 20, 2007.
1 依据GATT第16．2条，出口补贴应解释为“对产品的出口所给予的补贴”。
2 Report of the Working Party on Subsidies, GATT Doc. L/1381, November 1960, para.5.
3 Panel on Subsidies: Report on the Operation of the Provisions of Article ⅩⅥ, GATT Doc.L/1442, 19 April 1961, para.23.
4 GATT, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Report by the Director-General of GATT, 1979.转引自Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History(1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.815.
5 Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/8, May 2, 1975.
6 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.133.
1 参见1979年《补贴守则》第9．2条。
2 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.836; Problems in the Area of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/3, 17 March 1987.
3 Trade Policies for a Better Future, The "Leutwiler Report", the GATT and the Uruguay Round (1987).转引自Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.835.
4 G. Depayer and R. Petriccione, "Definition of Subsidy", in Subsidies and International Trade: A European Lawyers'Perspective, Jacques H. J. Bourgeo ed., Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston, 1991, p.67.
1 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EULaw, Cameron May, 1999, pp.210-217.
2 《补贴协定》对一成员应对其他成员提供的补贴规定了两种程序：第一种程序(Track 1)规定，当进口补贴产品对进口国产业造成实质性损害时，可对补贴进口产品单方面采取反补贴措施：第二种程序(Track 2)是多边行动，根据WTO的授权，采取反措施(Countermeasures)。Pierre Didier, WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law, Cameron May, 1999, pp.208-209.
3 Draft Guidelines for the Application of the Concept of Specificity in the Calculation of the Amount of A Subsidy other than an Export Subsidy, GATT Doc. SCM/W/89, 25 April 1985.
4 Problems in the Area of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, GAFF Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/3, 17 March 1987, para.1.
1 Checklist of Issues for Negotiations, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/9/Rev.4, 12 December 1988, pp.10-12.
2 Submission by the European Community, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/36, 2 February 1990, pp.4-5.
3 Elements of the Negotiating Framework, Submission by the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/39, 27 September 1990, p.2.
4 《补贴协定》第1条规定：“1．1 就本协定而言，如出现下列情况应视为存在补贴：(a)(1) 在一成员(本协定中称“政府”)领土内，存在由政府或任何公共机构提供的财政资助，即如果：(ⅰ) 涉及资金的直接转移(如赠款、贷款和投股)、潜在的资金或债务的直接转移(如贷款担保)的政府做法；(ⅱ) 放弃或未征收在其他情况下应征收的政府税收(如税收抵免之类的财政鼓励)~1；(ⅲ) 政府提供除一般基础设施外的货物或服务，或购买货物；(ⅵ) 政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(ⅰ)至(ⅲ)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别；或 (a)(2) 存在GATT 1994第16条意义上的任何形式的收入或价格支持；及 (b) 则因此而授予一项利益。1．2 如按第1款定义的补贴依照第2条的规定属专向性补贴，则此种补贴应符合第二部分或符合第三部分或第五部分的规定。”
5 第16条第1款规定“如任何缔约方给予或维持任何补贴，包括任何形式的收入或价格支持，以直接或间接增加自其领土出口的任何产品或减少向其领土进口的任何产品的方式实施……在确定任何此类补贴对其 他任何缔约方的利益造成或威胁造成严重侵害的任何情况下，应请求，给予有关补贴的缔约方应与其他有关缔约方或缔约方全体讨论限制该补贴的可能性。”
1 参见GATT1947第16．2条。
2 参见GATT1947第16．3条。
3 Rivers & Greenwald, "The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences", 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus, 1979, p.1466.
4 《补贴守则》序言第四段规定：“认识到本协定所强调的应当是补贴的影响，并且在评估补贴之影响的时候，应当适当考虑到所涉缔约方的国内经济情况和国际经济金融关系。”第五段规定：“意图确保补贴的使用不会对本协定其他缔约方的利益造成不利影响或损害，反补贴措施不会不正当地阻碍国际贸易，以及在经协商同意的国际权利义务框架内为受到补贴不利影响的生产者提供可获得的救济。”
5 参见《补贴守则》第8．1条。
6 J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, p.369.
7 《补贴守则》第9条和第10条。
8 参见《补贴守则》第11条。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.384.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.306.
3 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EULaw, Cameron May, 1999, pp.210-211.
4 J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations, 2nd ed., The MIT Press, 1997, p.280.'
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.306.
6 Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N.D.L.Rev.691, 2003; Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause(Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture)Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp. 340-341.关于国内支持与国内补贴关系的进一步探讨，参见本文第四章第一节。
1 J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, p.369.
2 参见GATT1947附件Ⅰ第16条B节的注释。
3 如面粉、通心粉等。具体参见本文第一章第二节。
4 《农业协定》第2条“产品范围”规定，“本协定适用于本协定附件1中所列产品，下称农产品。”
5 《农业协定》第1(b)条。
6 参见《农业协定》附件3“国内支持：综合支持量的计算”第7段。该段规定，“综合支持量的计算应尽可能接近该有关基本农产品的第一销售点。针对农产品加工者的措施应包括在内，只要此类措施可使基本农产品的生产者获益。”
1 即究竟适用《农业协定》，还是《补贴协定》。关于《补贴协定》与《农业协定》的适用关系，详见本文第五章。
2 Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/26, 29 October 1975, pp.6-9.
3 Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/7(MIN), 9 December 1988, pp.18-20.
4 Communication form the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20,15 June 1988, p.4.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.855.
1 John R. Magnus, "The Evils of A Long Peace: Legal Consequences of WTO 'Peace Clause'Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation Over Farm Subsidies ", Presented to the Global Business Dialogue, Washington. DC, December. 4, 2003. http://www.tradewinsllc.net/publi/Peace Clause GBD 12 03.pdf, November 7, 2006, p.7.事实上，由于牵扯到《补贴协定》和《农业协定》的适用关系，农产品领域中被禁止的补贴的范围非常复杂。具体参见本文第三章和第五章相关内容。
2 有学者批评“补贴”定义本身用语的古怪和不合语法为曰后的争端埋下了种子。参见John R. Magnus, "World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: Is This the 'Retrenchment Round'?"Joumal of World Trade 38(6), 2004, p.986.
3 Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.65.
4 即：“政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(ⅰ)至(ⅲ)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别。”
1 Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.73.
2 本案专家组认为，“财政资助”、“利益”和“专向性”是《补贴协定》的三大要素。如果认为“财政资助”指的是政府行动的影响而非性质，就背离了协定本身，《补贴协定》的适用范围变成由“利益”和“专向性”两个因素主宰。Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.8.38.
3 Panel Report, U.S. -Export Restraints, WT/DS194/R, paras.8.28-8.29.
4 例如，第1．1(a)(1)条列举的三项“财政资助”形式，既包括金钱形式的资源转移，也包括实物或服务形式的资源转移；既包括积极行为导致的资源转移，也包括消极行为导致的资源转移。即便是基础设施，也强调只有一般性的基础设施才不被视为“财政资助”。
5 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.10.
6 在韩国——商用船舶案中，申诉方欧共体认为韩国进出口银行法第18条提供了贷款和贷款担保，而贷款和贷款担保属于《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条所指的资金的直接转移。被申诉方韩国否认欧共体的指称，认为韩国进出口银行没有参与“政府做法”。“政府做法”指的是行使政府权力，也即管理权力和征税。仅当一机构履行“通常应属于政府”的职能和“与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别的做法”时，才构成“政府做法”。在该案中，韩国进出口银行设立的目的是满足工业或商业性质的需要，也即增加市场融资便利，在以市场为导向的基础上与其他公共或私营机构进行竞争。进出口银行提供的预付款还款保证和装运前贷款计划等融资便利，属于传统银行能力，履行的是通常由银行而不是政府履行的职能。但专家组不接受韩国的观点。专家组认为，第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条“政府做法”描述的是行为的作出者，而非行为的性质。“政府做法”包含了政府或公共机构的所有行为，“政府做法”一词并不限制该条的适用范围。如果“政府做法”起到了韩国所主张的过滤功能，该词也应当被包含在第(ⅱ)、(ⅲ)分段中，但第(ⅲ)分段并无此规定。Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.25-6.31.
7 《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条列举的“资金的直接转移”形式有赠款、贷款、投股和贷款担保。专家组认为，就“交易媒介”而言，上述形式均涉及金钱的转移，而非实物转移(如货物或服务)。该案与公司重组有关的交易都具有与第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条列举的交易相同的性质。其中，降低利息和利息延期与新的贷款相似，利息／债务免除与现金赠款类似。所有这些交易都构成《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条所指的资金的直接转移。债转股作为债务免除和投股两者的结合，当然也属于资金的直接转移。Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.411-6.413.
1 Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ,WT/DS257/R,para.7.24.虽然该案只涉及“货物”，但可类推适用于服务。
2 该案中，争端双方对未砍伐的木材是否构成《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条所指的“货物”发生争议。加拿大认为，“货物”应当指“可交易”的产品，可进口或出口；而未砍伐木材是生长在土地上的树木，并非《补贴协定》第1．1条意义上的“货物”。在上诉程序中，加拿大又援引了《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条、《补贴协定》第五部分及GATT1994条款，说明“货物”一词应当是有实际或潜在关税分类的可交易事物。但专家组认为，“货物”的一般含义是指“金钱之外的有形或动产”。专家组还援引了《布莱克法律辞典》，认为“货物”包括“可与不动产分离的、可指明的事物”，而未砍伐树木即属于可与不动产分离的可指明物体。专家组认为，《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条的上下文以及第1条的目的也表明应当对“货物”一词进行广义解释，最后认定，《补贴协定》，第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条的上下文没有限制“货物”一词的含义，美国商务部裁定加拿大各省通过立木计划，向收获者提供未砍伐木材，从而以提供货物的形式提供了财政资助。在上诉程序中，上诉机构赞同专家组对《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条“货物”一词的解释，并认为加拿大的解释削弱了《补贴协定》的目的和宗旨。上诉机构认为，根据《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条条文、上下文，或者协定的目的和宗旨，不能将未砍伐的树木等有形事物排除在“货物”一词的范围之外。Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/R, paras.7.19o7.30; Appellate Body Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/AB/R, paras.57-67.
3 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, pp.10-11.
4 本案涉及美国国内岁入法(Internal Revenue Code)第921-927节及有关措施对外国销售公司(Foreign Sales Corporation，FSC)的特殊税收待遇。美国实行全球征税体制，美国公司和居民就其在全世界的所得纳税，但如收入是在国外获得并且已在国外纳税，为避免双重征税，美国公司将获得税收抵免。外国公司或自然人来自美国境内的收入，美国征收所得税，但来自境外的收入，美国通常不征税，除非该收入与在美国境内从事的贸易或商业活动有实质性的联系。但该法对与FSC有关的所得征税作出了特别规定。所谓FSC，是在符合条件的外国或美国关税领土之外的领地上设立、组织和维持的，符合美国国内岁入法第921-927节的公司。FSC的外贸毛收入可以免税。外贸毛收入指FSC来源于特定交易的收入，通常涉及供销售和租赁的出口财产。FSC必须满足一定的外国存在要求。如，FSC必须在美国关税领土之外设有办公场所，而且设备必须足以开展FSC的业务。在纳税年度，公司的管理必须发生在国外，并且与交易相关的经济活动必须发生在美国境外。FSC外贸收入中的部分被视为与美国境内的贸易或商业不存在实质性的联系，从而免税；FSC分配的股息可以从股东应税收入中扣除；在特定情形下，有关符合条件的合作社拥有的FSC销售农产品或畜产品的所有外贸收入均为可免税的外贸收入。对于关联人出售给FSC的出口财产，收入可通过三种方法之一分配到FSC：一种方法是按FSC和关联人(美国母公司)之间的实际交易价格，根据岁入法第482节的标准转移定价规定做调整；另外两种方法是“行政定价”规则，FSC和它们的母公司可在它们之间分配收入。FSC必须或者自己履行，或者支付与出口交易相关的特定经济活动。依据法律，为了获得部分免税，采纳行政定价规则的FSC必须履行、支付所有与出口交易有关的分配活动，或缔结合同。这些 活动包括推介、磋商或缔结合同，至少其中一项活动必须发生在美国境外。关于本案事实背景，参见：Panel Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/R, paras.2.1-2.8.
1 Panel Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.98.
2 上诉机构报告认为，在本案中，“but for”标准可以适用，是因为本案提供了一个很好的比较基础，从而可以确定“若无”被异议的措施，FSC的外国收入所得税将如何确定。然而，协定没有做这样的规定，而且“but for”标准尤其令人怀疑：一方面，各国税制复杂多变，可能存在多种税制；另一方面，可能为了规避这一标准，而设计出另外一种税收体制，从而使得不存在普遍适用的规则。因此，上诉机构认为，即便“but for”标准适用于本案，在其他案件中也许并不适用。Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R,para.91.
3 在DSU第21．5条上诉程序中，上诉机构报告指出，如果存在税制“一般”规则之“例外”的情形，可适用“若不是”标准，审查如果没有争议中的措施，那么收入的财税待遇如何。但由于国内税制复杂多变，常常难以区分税收“一般”适用的规则和该“一般”规则的例外。因此，专家组应比较“可合理比较的收入”间的财税待遇，以决定与争议中的收入相比，争议措施是否涉及到“在其他情况下应征收的”税收。笼统的说，应当是类似收入之间的比较。例如，销售收入就不能和雇佣收入比较。在DSU第21．5条上诉程序中，上诉机构不仅要分析措施所涉及的国内来源收入和外国来源收入，还要分析争议措施下的外国来源收入的征税方式是否与其他外国来源收入征税方式相同，即与争议措施类似的收入是否征税，如该收入征税而系争收入免税，则为政府放弃本应征收的税收。上诉机构在运用该方法后裁定，一般情况下，美国居民境外所得只对境外缴纳税收部分进行有限度的税收抵扣，但符合ETI境外所得，美国居民可选择按国内税法规定的税收抵扣，还是按照ETI规定的境外所得免税，根据后者计算的税款可能低于国内税法规定的税款。因此，与类似情况下的收入相比，同样的收入征收的税收不一样，故构成《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅱ))条下的补贴，即“放弃在其他情况下应征收的税收”。Appellate Body Report on US-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS 108/AB/RW, paras.91-106.
4 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.13.
1 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.10.
2 WTO Dispute: Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273.
3 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.6.32.
4 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.37-6.38.
5 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.44-6.45.
1 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.6.55.
2 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.50-6.54.
1 Paulette Vander Schueren, Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence of Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation, Vol. 11, No.6, 2005, p.198.
2 Julia Ya Qin, "WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)-A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol", Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.7, Issue 4, 2004, p.875.
3 美国——出口限制案中，专家组指出，第1．1(a)1(ⅳ)条的目的是防止政府通过私营实休，规避第(ⅰ)-(ⅲ)项措施的纪律。在内容上，第(ⅳ)项涵盖的措施与第(ⅰ)-(ⅲ)项等同。因此，前三项与第四项 的差异在于行为的主体，而非行为的性质。Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS267/R, para.8.53.
1 Panel Report on US-Export Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.8.29.
2 Panel Report on US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, parao7.33.
3 Panel Report on EC-Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, WT/DS299/R, para.7.35.
1 Panel Report on US- Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, paras.106-116.
2 关于两个DRAMs案中专家组和上诉机构对“委托”或“指示”认定的评析，参见WorldTradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC) on EC- DRAMs Countervailing Measrues (panel);U.S. -DRAMs CVD Investigation (panel); U.S. - DRAMs CVD Investigation (AB), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/.
1 WTO Negotiations concerning the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Proposal by the European Communities, WTO Doc.TN/RL/W/30, 21 November 2002.
2 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
3 参见加拿大——关于影响民用飞机出口措施的纠纷案(WT／DS70)。在该案中，作为被申诉方的加拿大采取了一系列措施，包括成立专门的公司或组织一些项目，促进加拿大国内飞机制造业的发展。巴西对这些措施提出指控。在专家组确定加拿大向国产飞机产业提供补贴的具体项目是否构成《补贴协定》下的“补贴”时，双方对于这些资助是否授予了“利益”有不同看法。加拿大认为，当一个公共机构提供的财政资助造成了政府的开支，同时又为接受者提供了比市场可以提供的更多的好处，这才授予了利益。巴西则认为，不管是《补贴协定》第1条，还是《补贴协定》的目的与宗旨，都没有提出要把“政府开支”作为一个标准。该案专家组认为，要确定财政资助是否授予了“利益”，就要看财政资助是否使接受者处于比没有接受资助时更有利的地位，衡量的标准是市场。无论政府是否有开支，只要由政府或公共机构提供的“财政资助”给接受者带来了比市场条件下更优越的条件，就授予了“利益”，从而构成了《补贴协定》第1条所指的“补贴”。在上诉程序中，上诉机构也认为，市场是一个适当的比较基准，因为通过确定接受者获得“财政资助”的条件是否优于在市场上可获得的条件，可以确定“财政资助”潜在的贸易扭曲影响。概括而言，该案专家组和上诉机构报告均表明，应从接受者是否获得比市场更为优越的条件的角度确定是否存在利益，而非以政府开支为标准。这在WTO法理中已经成为一项比较稳固的原则。Panel Report on Canada - Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, paras. 9.111-9. 120; Appellate Body Repoa on Canada - Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, paras.149-1611．当然，以市场作为比较的基准，在具体的案件中仍然会产生各种争端，争端各方会提出对己有利的市场基准，用以判断是否授予了利益。从WTO争端解决实践来看，专家组或上诉机构在做出裁决时会考虑到各方面的因素，如时间、贷款担保状况等。专家组或上诉机构会根据提供的信息，对被提议的市场基准做出采纳与否的判断。在采纳的情形下，将依据这些被提供的信息，对市场基准进行必要的调整。若争端方不提供相关信息，专家组或上诉机构将拒绝采纳被提议的市场基准。同时，WTO既往报告已经表明，专家组倾向于不考虑公共机构或政府所有的实体的相关数据作为判定是否授予了利益的市场基准。参见韩国——商用船舶案专家组有关“利益”的阐述。
4 如欧共体——DRAMs反补贴措施案(WT／DS299)的相关论述。该案澄清了应当以接受者所获利益计算补贴的金额，而非财政资助提供者的开支。在该案中，在计算补贴的金额时，申诉方欧共体认为，由于补贴接受者Hynix的财政状况已经到了任何明智的私营投资者都不会对公司提供资金的地步，因此，被指控 的补贴计划不管其条款和条件为何，均应被视为赠款。但专家组不接受欧共体的观点。专家组认为贷款、贷款担保和债转股对接受者的价值，与赠款相比是不同的：前者或者使接受者负有债务，或者会冲淡现有股东的所有权请求。有关利益的分析应当主要从接受者的角度，而非财政资助提供者的角度。从这个角度上说，欧共体计算利益金额的出发点是资金提供者获偿的期望，是错误的。利益问题与财政资助提供者的成本开支无关，是关于对接受者提供的利益。简而言之，在计算补贴的金额时，调查机关应该扣除补贴接受者为获得利益而实际支付的费用，这样所得到的补贴金额才是接受者所获利益。Panel Repog on EC-DRAMs Countervailing Measrues, WT/DS299/R, para.7.211-7.215．美国——软立木Ⅳ案中，专家组和上诉机构报告对《补贴协定》第14条(d)项下衡量利益的基准的选择也有新的阐述，并引发了争议和批评。参见Raulette "Vander Schueren and Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence on Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation, 11(6), 2005, 197-204, pp.200-201.
1 参见美国——对原产于英国的部分热轧铅铋钢产品征收反补贴税案(WT／DS138)。该案中，经过反补贴调查后，美国对从联合工程钢材有限公司(United Engineering Steel Limited，UES)进口的热轧铅铋钢板材征收反补贴税。但自1995年起，UES已经不复存在。UES是1986年英国国有钢铁公司(BSC)和另一家公司合资组建的公司，1988年BSC私有化，英国钢铁股份有限公司(British Steel plc，BSplc)继承了BSC的权利义务，成为UES两个投资者之一；1995年，BSplc购买了另一个投资者的股份，UES成为BSplc的独资子公司；随后它更名为英国工程钢材公司(British Steel Engineering Steels，BSES)。该案所涉及的补贴是1977—78年度和1985—86年度英国政府向BSC的资金注入。美国商务部将这笔投入看作不会重复发生的补贴，根据钢铁工业生产资料使用年限，将其平均分配到18年。美国商务部认为，对BSC的资金注入先是转到了UES，然后又惠及BSES。美国商务部把英国政府对BSC的补贴看作对UES的补贴，随后又看作对BSES的补贴。在年度复审中，商务部认为UES(BSES)继续从英国政府对BSE的补贴中受益。美国商务部提出，BSC、UES、BSplc／BSES都是相同的公司，对BSC的补贴就是对其他公司的补贴，因此无需确认UES、BSplc／BSES得到了利益。但认定Bsplc和BSES是否继续受到补贴，不能简单地以BSC受到补贴来推理，而应当证明在BSC私有化时Bsplc并没有支付市场价，而是从中得到了比市场条件优惠的利益。利益不是抽象的，也不是给予某个产品的，必须有接受补贴的受益者。该案专家组认为，在私有化过程中，BSC的资产有偿转让给了BSplc，在企业转让时，UES和BSPLC／BSES以正常的市场价格支付了所有的生产性资产、商誉等，从而认定UES或BSPLC／BSES未获得授予BSC的“财政资助”的“利益”。上诉机构报告也维持了这一结论。本案对于分析国有企业原来获得的补贴，在私有化后是否可能被后继公司继承，具有很强的实践意义。参见该案专家组和上诉机构报告有关内容及朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2004年版，第549-563页。
2 GATT Panel Report on US-Canada Pork, DS7/R, adopted on 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30, para.4.9.
3 Panel Report on US- Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS/138/R, footnote. 69.
1 Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS/138/R, para. 6.70; Appellate Body Report on US-Lead and Bismuth H, WT/DS138/AB/R, para.62.本案具体案情，参见前文脚注。
2 Panel Report on US - Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/R, para.7.91.
3 GATT1994第6.3条规定：在任何缔约方领土的任何产品进口至另一缔约方领土时所征收的反补贴税，金额不得超过对此种产品在原产国或出口国制造、生产或出口时所直接或间接给予的津贴或补贴的估计金额，包括对一特定产品的运输所给予的任何特殊补贴。“反补贴税”一词应理解为目的为抵消对制造、生产或出口所直接或间接给予的任何津贴或补贴而征收的一种特别税。
1 Benefit Pass-through, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/7, 14 July 2004.
1 Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc.TN/RL/W/193, 16 November 2005.
2 Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Canada, WTO Doc.TN/RL/GEN/86, 17 November 2005.
3 《补贴协定》第1.2条规定，“如按第1款定义的补贴依照第2条的规定属专向性补贴，则此种补贴应符合第二部分或符合第三部分或第五部分的规定。”
4 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006. pp.129-130.
5 《补贴协定》第2.1条(a)项规定，“如授予机关或其运作所根据的立法将补贴的获得明确限于某些企业，则此种补贴应属专向性补贴。”
1 《补贴协定》第2.1条(b)项规定，“如授予机关或其运作所根据的立法制定适用于获得补贴资格和补贴数量的客观标准或条件，则不存在专向性，只要该资格为自动的，且此类标准和条件得到严格遵守。标准或条件必须在法律、法规或其他官方文件中明确说明，以便能够进行核实。”
2 《补贴协定》第2.1条(c)项规定，“如尽管因为适用(a)项和(b)项规定的原则而表现为非专向性补贴，但是有理由认为补贴可能事实上属专向性补贴，则可考虑其他因素。此类因素为：有限数量的某些企业使用补贴计划、某些企业主要使用补贴、给予某些企业不成比例的大量补贴以及授予机关在作出给予补贴的决定时行使决定权的方式。在适用本项时，应考虑授予机关管辖范围内经济活动的多样性程度，及已经实施补贴计划的持续时间。”
3 《补贴协定》第2.2条规定，“限于授予机关管辖范围内指定地理区域的某些企业的补贴属专向性补贴。各方理解，就本协定而言，不得将有资格的各级政府所采取的确定或改变普遍适用的税率的行动被视为专向性补贴。”
4 《补贴协定》第2.3条规定，“任何属第3条规定范围内的补贴应被视为专向性补贴。”此处“第3条”，是《补贴协定》下关于禁止性补贴的规定。
5 Paul Waer & Edwin Vermulst, "ECAnti-subsidy Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round: a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing", Journal of World Trade 33(3), 1999, p.19.
6 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.107.
7 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.111.
8 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.8.121.
1 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, paras.7.119-7.121.
2 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1142.
3 Gustavo E. Luengo Hemandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp.132-137.
4 Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/112, 6 June 2003.
1 即：(1)只有数量非常有限的企业利用了补贴计划，也即在200家合格的企业中只有6家利用了计划；(2)Hyundai集团公司不成比例地利用了补贴计划；(3)总补贴金额的41％被不成比例地提供给了Hynix。另外，欧共体还指出，韩国内有些处于类似困难境地的企业也在抱怨缺乏透明度和资格标准。这些批评表明欧共体考虑到了批准企业参与KDB债券计划过程中行使自由裁量权的方式。See，
2 该项规定的相关措辞为“such factors are：……”。参见Gustavo E. Luengo Hemandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.139.
3 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.108.
4 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.113.
5 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.123.
6 Specificity, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/6, 14 July 2004.
7 Specificity, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/191, 16 November 2005.
8 Paulette Vander Schueren, Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence of Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation, Vol. 11, No.6, 2005, p.203.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.174.
2 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer Boston, 1993, p.886.
3 关于GATT1994第16.3条，参见第一章第二节。本节只介绍GATT和WTO下的一般补贴纪律。
1 Raj Bhala, Modern GATT Law: A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, p.893.
2 GaTT1994第16.2条规定，“各缔约方认识到，一缔约方对任何产品的出口所给予的补贴，可能对其他进口和出口缔约方造成有害影响，可能对它们的正常商业利益造成不适当的干扰，并可阻碍本协定目标的实现。”
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.107-108.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para.166.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para.167.
2 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.179.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.178.
4 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, paras.10.184, 10.186, 10.191.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.193.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, para.100.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R,para. 167.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R,para. 167.需要强调的是，认定一项补贴是出口补贴，并不需要出口实绩是补贴的唯一条件，可以是若干条件之一。
4 Panel Report onAustralia - Leather, WT/DS126/R, para.9.54.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, paras.169-172.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para.173．在澳大利亚皮革案中，专家组报告指出，《补贴协定》脚注4第二句话“不排除在禁止性补贴审查中考虑某一公司从事出口的事实，或者公司的出口水平。它仅仅禁止以向从事出口的公司提供补贴作为认定禁止性补贴的唯一原因。”Panel Report on Australia -Leather, WT/DS126/R, para.9.66.
3 “1960年宣言”于1962年生效。Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006,p.6.
4 参见东京回合《补贴守则》第9.2条及附件。
5 在乌拉圭回合谈判中，曾有谈判方主张为穷尽性列举，遭到美国和欧共体的反对。
1 对于“出口补贴例示清单”列举的各项出口补贴的使用，已经有若干WTO争端解决案件涉及。详细内容参见Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, pp.27-35.
2 Panel Report on Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/R, paras.6.30-6.31．再例如在韩国——商用船舶案(WT／DS273)中，专家组认定，依据“出口补贴例示清单”(j)项，如果申诉方证实另一成员的出口信贷担保计划不能弥补长期营业成本和损失，就足以裁定整个计划构成禁止性出口补贴，而不需要进行协定第1条和第3条下的分析。
3 (j)项规定，“政府(或政府控制的特殊机构)提供的出口信贷担保或保险汁划、针对出口产品成本增加或外汇风险计划的保险或担保计划，保险费率不足以弥补长期营业成本和计划的亏损。”
1 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GAIT Uruguay RoundA Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer Boston, 1993, p.886.
2 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.35.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.221.
4 GATT Panel Report on Italy - Agricultural Machinery, L/833, adopted on 23 October 1958, BISD7S/60, p.64, para. 12.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, paras.139-143.
1 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.35.
2 Panel Report on Indonesia - Automobiles, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, and WT/DS64/R, paras.14.33-14.39.
3 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.157.
4 还可参见：Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.215.
5 GATT1994第3.8(b)条规定，“本条的规定不阻止仅给予国内生产者的补贴的支付，包括自以与本条规定相一致的方式实施的国内税费所得收入中产生的对国内生产者的支付和政府购买国产品所实行的补贴。”本案专家组认为，这意味着如果补贴只给予产品的国内生产者而不给予外国生产者，就不会与第3.4条不符。专家组认为，TDM法规是欧盟授权成员国采取援助，对制造集装箱运货船、油轮、化学品运输船和液化天然气运输船提供直接援助的法律基础。这种国家援助只有某些种类的船舶的国内生产者才能获得，而外国生产者不能获得，这正是第3.4(b)条所指的不同待遇，因此与第3条并无不符。专家组最终认为，既然依据TDM支付的补贴属于第3.8(b)条的适用范围，那么就不能因将TDM视为一项规章制度，认定与GATT1994第3.4条不符。Panel Report on EC - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS301/R, paras7.62-7.75.
1 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.157.
2 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78,19 March 2003; Negotiating Group on Rules, Expanding the Prohibited "Red Light" Subsidy Category, Paper from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006.
3 Subsidies, Submission of the European Communities, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006.
4 General Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Submission from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/85, 30 April 2003.
5 Further Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Submission from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/139, 18 July 2003; Prohibited Export Subsidies, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/22, 19 October 2004; Prohibited Export Subsidies, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/34, 23 March 2005; Prohibited Export Subsidies, Paper from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/80, 16 November 2005.
6 De Facto Export Contingency, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/88, 18 November 2005.
7 WTO Negotiations concerning the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Proposal by the European Communities, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/30, 21 November 2002.
1 Proposals on Implementation Related lssues and Concerns, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures/Anti-DumpingAgreement, Submission by India, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/4, 25 April 2002.
2 Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/1, 15 April 2002.加拿大本身的国内市场狭小。
3 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EULaw, Cameron May, 1999, p.208.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.103.
5 第16.4条要求停止对除初级产品外的任何产品提供补贴，导致产品的出口价格低于向国内市场同类产品购买者收取的可比价格。但是这一禁止性规定不适用于国内补贴，而且也未对国内补贴规定任何行动。如果国内补贴对另一缔约方的利益造成实质损害，涉案的缔约方只负有讨论“限制该补贴的可能性”的义务。
6 GATT第6条和第16条在对待生产补贴等国内补贴方面有差异。依据第6条，可以对国内补贴采取反补贴措施，助长了缔约方单边征收反补贴税。
1 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EU Law, Cameron May, 1999, p.211.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.369.
3 Article 13.4: "If, as a result of its review, the Committee concludes that an export subsidy is being granted in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement or that a subsidv is being granted or maintained in such a manner as to cause injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice, it shall make such recommendations to the parties as may be appropriate to resolve the issue and, in the event the recommendations are not followed, it may authorize such countermeasures as may be appropriate, taking into account the degree and nature of the adverse effects found to exist, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Part Ⅵ."此处与an export subsidy"并列使用"a subsidy"，应认为后者包括除出口补贴之外的其他补贴形式。
1 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.166.
2 《补贴守则》第8.3条规定，缔约方承认应当避免因使用任何补贴造成下列影响：(a)损害另一缔约方的国内产业：(b)使其他缔约方在总协定项下直接或间接获得的利益丧失或减损：或(c)对另一缔约方的利益造成严重侵害。第8.4条规定，“证明丧失或减损，或严重侵害所需的对另一缔约方利益的不利影响，可产生于；(a)接受补贴进口产品在进口缔约方国内市场的影响；(b)补贴的影响在于在补贴提供国市场中取代或阻碍同类产品的进口；(c)接受补贴出口产品的影响在于在第三国市场上取代另一缔约方同类产品的出口。”
1 本项是为对国内产业受到补贴进口产品损害的国家的反补贴调查提供一种选择。Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies - The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, p.34.
2 本文不涉及成员单方采取的反补贴措施，故略去不提。
3 有关“非违反之诉”，参见本文第一章第二节。
4 GATT Panel Report on EC - Sugar Exports (Brazil), L/5011, adopted 10 November 1980; GATT Panel Report on EC- Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted 6 November 1979.
1 GATT Panel Report on EC - Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted 6 November 1979, p.32.
2 GATT Panel Report on EC - Sugar Exports (Brazil), L/5011, adopted 10 November 1980, p.30.
3 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
1 Communication from the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/1, March 16, 1987; Communication from the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, June 15, 1988; Communication from New Zealand, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/2, March 16, 1987.
2 Communication from the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, June 15, 1988.
3 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002,p.324．但也有观点认为，在某些情况下，不利影响标准可能更易于证明，尤其是确定严重侵害的存在。任何影响产品生产的国内补贴，都会在其境内市场或第三国市场上取代或阻碍同类产品的进口或出口。例如，一成员为促进使用环保燃料，向某些生产者提供补贴。假定补贴事实上有利于燃料的国内生产者，在该成员市场上取代了同类产品的进口。Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.178.
1 参见《补贴协定》第6.2条。
2 持反对立场的成员有：多米尼加共和国、马来西亚、巴基斯坦、印度、新西兰等。马来西亚认为，除非发展中成员的某些关注得到满足，否则不支持延长适用。巴勒斯坦的观点与马来西亚类似。泰国认为，尚缺乏适用第6.1条的实践。原因或者是这一条款没有用处，或者是条款本身不充分，导致成员无法适用。如果是前者，应当废弃；如果是后者，除非发展中成员关注的问题得到解决，否则保留这些临时适用的条款也没有用处。Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/24, 26 April 2000.
3 如瑞士建议延长4年到5年，此后再对临时适用的条款进行审查。这些成员认为，目前适用第6.1条的经验太少，而该条款又对保持协定的平衡起到了某种作用，对所有成员都具有某些价值。中国香港也支持在一定期限内延长适用，从而有时间考虑发展中成员关注的问题。Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/24, 26 April 2000.
1 有的成员表示支持，如加拿大、日本、波兰、塞浦路斯、韩国、土耳其、捷克、欧共体、瑞士、美国、斯洛文尼亚；但也有多个成员表示反对，如马来西亚、墨西哥、巴拿马、巴基斯坦、印度、埃及、印度尼西亚、泰国、阿根廷等等。马来西亚表示愿意遵守总理事会主席的决定，宁愿遵循善意和适当克制，而不愿意对第6.1条、第8条、第9条给予任何延期。巴拿马认为，第31条没有授权委员会同意任何延期，对协定作出修改，应当是部长级会议，或在部长级会议休会的时候，总理事会的权力。巴基斯坦也认为，委员会没有授权临时延长适用第31条临时适用的各条款。Minutes of the Special Meeting Held on 20 December 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/22, 17 February 2000.
2 Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Coutnervailing Measures, communication form Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/112, 6 June 2003.
3 参见Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1184-7.1187;韩国——商用船舶案专家组也报告指出，在解释《补贴协定》第6.3条时，仍然可以考虑《补贴协定》第6.1条。Panel Report on Korea - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.7.583.
4 对于上述四种情形，在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，专家组澄清，第6.3条“可能”(may)一词不要求证明第6.3条列举之外的因素，第6.3条列举的要素本身可导致或构成严重侵害。当第6.3条列举的一种或多种情况存在时，即可认定产生严重侵害。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1370-7.1382.
1 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp.172-173.
2 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, para14.211.
1 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, paras 14.212-14.217.
2 《补贴协定》第6.4条规定，“就第3款(b)项而言，对出口产品的取代或阻碍，在遵守第7款规定的前提下，应包括已被证明存在不利于未受补贴的同类产品相对市场份额变化的任何情况(经过一段足以证明有关产品明确市场发展趋势的适当代表期后，在通常情况下，该代表期应至少为1年)。‘相对市场份额变化’应包括下列任何一种情况：(a)补贴产品的市场份额增加；(b)补贴产品的市场份额保持不变，但如果不存在该补贴，市场份额则会降低；(c)补贴产品的市场份额降低，但速度低于不存在该补贴的情况。”
3 《补贴协定》第6.5条规定，“就第3款(c)项而言，价格削低应包括通过对供应同一市场的补贴产品与未受补贴产品的价格进行比较所表明的此类价格削低的任何情况。此种比较应在同一贸易水平上和可比的时间内进行，同时适当考虑影响价格可比性的任何其他因素。但是，如不可能进行此类直接比较，则可依据出口单价证明存在价格削低。”
4 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, paras. 14.246-14.256.
1 Panel Report on Korea - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para. 7.553; also see, Panel Report on US - Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, at footnote 1333.
2 Paulette Vander Schueren and Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence on Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments ", International Trade Law and Regulation", Vol.11, No.6, 2005, p.202
3 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1277-7.1313.
4 Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.406; Panel Report on Korea - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.7.566.
5 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1238-7.1244; Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.309-409.
6 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, para.14.254
1 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1317-7.1334.
2 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1427-7.1464.
3 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.177.
4 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, ppo177.但美国——陆地棉补贴案仍然涉及第6.3条(d)款的解释与适用。关于(d)项与GATT1994第16.3条的关系，参见：Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges", Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003, po386.
5 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.9, No. 1, 2006, po181.
1 Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.437; Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1344.
2 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1358-7.1364.
3 参见《补贴协定》第15.5条。Paulette Vander Schueren and Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence on Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation", Vol.11, No.6, 2005, p.202.
4 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO: A Brief Overview", CRS Report for Congress, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21. 2006.
1 Daniel Bodansky, "United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton", 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 852, 2005, pp.860-862.
2 参见：Stephen J. Powell, Andrew Schmitz, "The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlemen System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture", 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 287, 2005; Jason G. Buhi, "Serious Prejudice: The Decline and Fall of A Agricultural Subsidies After The World Trade Organization's Upland Cotton Decision", 24 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 237, 2005.
3 例如：美国——棉花补贴案(WT／DS267)中，将所有的补贴措施视为一个补贴来考虑其影响，即是否造成了“严重侵害”。并且，已经终止适用的措施也在专家组的职权范围之内。
4 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
5 Improved Disciplines under theAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/112, 6 June 2003．另外，加拿大还提出，《补贴协定》附件四采纳政府开支方法计算《补贴协定》第6.1(a)条总从价补贴额，存在固有的困难。建议在计算从价补贴总额时，以接受者所获利益的方法取代政府开支方法等。Serious Prejudice, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/14, 15 September 2004.
1 Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/81, 16 November 2005.
2 Further Proposal on Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/113, 21 April 2006.
3 Comments and Views from Australia on Canada's Submission on Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/135, 14 July 2003.
4 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
1 Serious Prejudice, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/14, 15 September 2004.加拿大关于第7条的提议遭到巴西反对。Proposed Amendments to Certain Provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/112, 21 April 2006.
2 Further Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on theAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/139, 18 July 2003.
3 巴西认为，第6.3条应当更为准确地涵盖世界市场上农业补贴的贸易扭曲影响，世界出口市场份额不仅对于指明严重侵害很重要，对于衡量补贴在国际市场上的不利影响也很重要。另外，补贴造成的不利影响不仅与提供补贴成员市场份额的增加有关，还应包括市场份额的维持。为了精确地观测补贴在世界出口市场的影响，应当分析维持市场份额的能力。为此，做出上述建议。Further Proposal on Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc.TN/RL/GEN/113, 21 April 2006.
4 Further Proposal on Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/113, 21 April 2006.
1 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, p.4.本文作者是农业政策和贸易顾问，巴西农业生产与贸易部前秘书长。
2 Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges", Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003, p388.
3 GATT1994和《补贴协定》提供了五种途径，分别是：《补贴协定》第3条与农业出口补贴、GATT第23.1(b)条“非违反之诉”、根据GATT1994和《补贴协定》单边征收反补贴税、GATT1994第16.3条和《补贴协定》第5条和第6条可诉补贴纪律。Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges", Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003, pp.376-389.
1 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.150, footnote 702.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT194 7 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.214.
3 DSu第3.2条规定：“WTO争端解决体制在为多边贸易体制提供可靠性和可预测性方面是一个重要因素。各成员认识到该体制适于保护各成员在适用协定项下的权利和义务，及依照解释国际公法的惯例澄清这些协定的现有规定。”
1 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, Para.4.126.
2 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, Para.4.129.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.134.在本案中，加拿大曾经以涉案措施不构成补贴为由，进行抗辩。但申诉方认为，涉案措施构成《农业协定》第9.1条列举的出口补贴，一旦符合第9.1条规定的相关标准，就无需满足其它的条件。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.215.
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.4.144-4.152.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, Para.4.144.
6 Appellate Body Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut. WT/DS22/AB/R, p.14.
7 在该案中，申诉方新西兰认为，在解释《农业协定》下“出口补贴”概念时，可作为参照的包括《补贴 协定》、GATT1947以及GATT时期的实践。美国则强调《农业协定》中“补贴”一词，应当在其背景下进行解释。《补贴协定》中的“补贴”定义与解释《农业协定》下同一词语相关，但《农业协定》下“补贴”概念并不只由《补贴协定》第1条界定，或者优先于《农业协定》本身的相关条款。在该案中，专家组没有特别考虑《农业协定》下“补贴”一词应具有什么含义，而是直接审查争议措施是否符合《农业协定》第9.1条(a)、(c)两项列举。
1 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.150.
2 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006.
3 PanelReportonUS-FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.141;Appellate Body Report on US-FSC (Article 21.5-EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, para.192; Appellate Body Report on United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.571.
1 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.31.
2 Panel Report on US-FSC，WT／DS108／R，para．7．150．但专家组报告随即指出，一般来说，除非《农业协定》有相反规定，一项措施如果具备《补贴协定》的“补贴”概念，也构成《农业协定》所指的“补贴”。
3 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.132.
4 例如《农业协定》第9.1条(c)段列举的出口补贴，具体参见本节下文。
1 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103, 113/R, para.4.127.
2 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103, 113/R, para.7.38．与第9.1(c)条“对农产品的出口”("on the export")不同，第9.1(a)条的用词与《补贴协定》第3.1(a)条相同，即“视出口实绩”("contingent on export performance")。在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，专家组和上诉机构认定，根据(2002年农业安全和农村投资法案》提供给陆地棉出口商的使用者销售支付(step 2)，构成《农业协定》第9.1(a)条和《补贴·协定》第3.1(a)条下的“视出口实绩”。该案有关“视出口实绩”的推理颇为值得关注。Panel Report on United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras. 7.697-7.748; Appellate Body Report on United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.582.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.221.
2 在该案原专家组程序中，申诉方认为加拿大根据特别牛奶分类计划第5(d)、(e)两项提供的牛奶，涉及《农业协定》第9.1(a)条下的出口补贴。加拿大政府机构，即CDC和省销售委员会，以低于当前国内牛奶价格，向加工商／出口商提供的特别分类计划下5(d)和(e)两项牛奶。Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.7.35-7.37.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.44.
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.43.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.44.
6 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.88.
7 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.90.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.87.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.91.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.92.
4 即所谓“由生产者供资的出口补贴”("producer-financed export subsidies")。在GAIT时期，该问题已经引起过关注和讨论。Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras. 4.146-4.149.
5 在本案原专家组程序中，争端各方对政府资金未直接介入第5类(d)和(e)两组无异议。加拿大政府和代理机构都没有以较高的国内价格购买牛奶，然后为出口的目的，以造成亏损的低价格出售，由政府资金弥补成本。争端各方都承认，只有牛奶生产商对用于出口目的的牛奶销售出资。加拿大不否认政府也参与了特别牛奶分类计划，但提出政府的作用是监督其建立和有效运转；而美国和新西兰则提出，如果没有政府的参与，根本不可能建立这样一个机制。Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, paras. 7.64-7.66.
1 专家组在解释"provide"一词的通常含义时，援引了《牛津简明英语辞典》。“Provide”一词有下列含义：“1，预知：2，由于某一可能的事件，采取适当措施，作充分准备；……4，(在某事之前)准备、预备，或安排；5，为某一特定目的作必要的准备或装备：提供或供应某物；6，……使可获得；生产、提供”。Panel Report on Canada-Dairy，WT／DS103／R，WT／DS／113／R，para．7．65．
2 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.67.
3 第5类中前3组属于“配额内牛奶"(in-quota)，这些牛奶的全部销售收入都进入一个总帐户(special class pooling)，然后由各省的牛奶销售委员会分配给牛奶生产者。对第5类中后两组出口奶制品的补助也从这一总帐户中支出的。第5类(d)牛奶每年出口量由CMSMC确定，出口商向CDC提出申请，CDC发给批准证书，出口商据此购买用于生产出口奶制品的牛奶，批准证书须标明计划生产的奶制品种类。第5类(e)牛奶出口有两种情况：第一种情况是CDC根据国内市场牛奶供应情况启动的“消除过剩计划”。CDC无需经过省销售委员会的同意，可直接与出口奶制品生产商签订销售合同，CDC或者直接购买奶制品向其他国家出口，或者向出口奶制品生产商颁发批准证书，生产商从某个省份低价购买牛奶，再自行出口奶制品。第二种情况是，加工者与外国签订了奶制品出口协议之后，向CDC申请购买第5类(e)牛奶，CDC颁发批准证书，加工者向某个省份的销售委员会购买牛奶。在这种情况下，CDC也可以直接买下加工成的奶制品，自行出口。参见朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2000年版，第347页。
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.74.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.81-86.
1 省牛奶销售协会根据联邦和省立法设立和运作，对各省之间，以及联邦政府通过CDC授权的对外贸易行使权力，另外还包括省当局授予的权力。Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.76.
2 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.78．专家组还强调加拿大政府对绝大多数(如果不是全部)委员会的活动有最终的控制和监督权，可界定、批准修改委员会的授权和职能。
3 Appellate Body Report, Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.97.
4 如下文所述，第9.1(c)条要求在政府措施和支付的融资之间存在可以证明的联系；第9.1(a)条将重点放在政府介入涉案措施的程度。但对于这两个标准只是在文字表述上有所不同，还是有实质上的差别，并不明显。
5 《补贴协定》第1.1(a)(ⅳ)条规定，“政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(ⅰ)至(ⅲ)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别”。关于本条款“委托”与“指示”在WTO争端解决实践中的解释与运用，参见本文第二章第二节。
1 “商业上可获得的”的措辞指在选择国产品和进口产品方面无限制，仅取决于商业考虑。
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.221.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS 113/AB/RW, para.76.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, WT/DS103/AB/R/Corr.1, WT/DS 113/AB/R/Corr. 1, paras.107-108.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, para.112; Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.73.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.24.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.33.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.44.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.148.
5 Appellate Body Report on EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.254.
1 Appellate Body Report, Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, pare. 97.
2 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras. 127-128.
3 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para. 132.
4 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para. 113; Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy(Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ),, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.130.
5 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras. 113-115; Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 -New Zealand and USⅡ)，WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, palas.130-134．但事实上，笼统地说政府行动和为支付提供融资之间所需联系的确切性质是非常困难的。政府总是为追求各种目标进行各种管制。See, Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, para.114.
6 Appellate Body Report on EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.244.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.222.
2 Panel Report on EC- Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, pare. 7.275.
3 在该案中，食糖生产者可自由决定是否生产C类食糖，但一旦生产，就必须出口，除非一直延续到来年作为配额食糖。
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS103/AB/RW/2, WT/DS 113/AB/RW/2, para.95.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Dairy (Article 21.5 —New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW/2, WT/DS113/AB/RW/2, para.128.
1 Panel Report on US - FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.154.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras.130-131.
1 “出口补贴例示清单”(c)段规定：“政府提供或授权的对出口装运货物征收的内部运输和货运费用，条件优于给予国内装运货物的条件。”
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.230.
3 Geoffrey S. Becker and Charles E. Hanrahan, "Trade Remedies and Agriculture", CRS Report for Congress, RL31296, February 22, 2002, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, October 21, 2006.
4 尤其是反补贴调查中上游补贴的利益传递(Benefit Pass-through)。如GAIT时期的US-Canadian Pork案专家组报告。在该案中，专家组认为，生猪和猪肉在加拿大是两个遵循正常交易原则的独立产业，提供给生猪生产者的补贴只有导致猪肉生产者对生猪支付的价格低于对其他可获得商业供应来源的生猪支付的价格水平，才能被视为对猪肉的生产给予了补贴。除非提供给生猪生产的补贴产生了价格影响，否则不能认为加拿大猪肉生产者接受了补贴。参见：GATT Panel Repog on US-Canadian Pork, DS7/R, adopted on 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30, para.4.9.WTO成立后，比较典型的案件还有涉及私有化前的补贴问题US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ(WT／DS138)案，以及美国——软木材Ⅳ(WT／DS257)。具体参见本文第二章第二节。
5 在当前多哈回合谈判中，有多个成员的提案涉及上游补贴的利益传递问题。参见：Benefit Pass-through, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc.TN/RL/GEN/7, 14 July 2004; Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/86, 17 November 2005; Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/193, 16 November 2005.
6 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.214-230.
1 详细内容参见本文第六章第三节。
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.219.
3 Appellate Body Report on US- Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.615 & para.626.
4 Panel Report on US- Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.799.
1 美国——陆地棉补贴案专家组和上诉机构分析农产品出口信贷担保纪律的方法，遭到了一些批评。批评者认为，专家组和上诉机构的解释，出乎了谈判者的意料，尤其是美国。Marc Benitah, "U.S. Agricultural Export Credits after the WTO Cotton Ruling: The Law of Unintended Consequences", Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 6(2), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/benitahexportcredits.pdf, November 2, 2006.
2 第9.1条列举了6项受《农业协定》项下削减承诺约束的出口补贴类型，分别是：(a)直接出口补贴，包括实物支付；(b)政府或其代理机构以低于国内市场价格的价格，出口非商业性农产品库存；(c)依靠政府措施供资的出口支付(无论是否涉及自公共帐户的支出)，包括由对产品征税的收入供资的支付；(d)为减少出口农产品的营销成本而提供的补贴，包括处理、升级和其它加工成本，以及国际运输成本和运费；(e)政府提供或授权的出口装运货物的国内运费，其条件优于国内装运货物；(f)视出口产品所含农产品的情况而对该农产品提供的补贴。
1 即《农业协定》第9.1条列举的出口补贴。
2 Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, Annex 8, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, para.7.
3 《模式协定》第12段规定，不得对农产品或产品组的出口提供或重新提供基期内没有提供的补贴。此处没有区分《模式协定》附件7(即《农业协定》第9.1条)列举的出口补贴与没有列举的出口补贴，因此，一般认为，指所有形式的出口补贴。但具体的削减承诺只涉及第9.1条列举的出口补贴，也即《模式协定》附件7列举的出口补贴。The Modalities Agreement, GATT Doc. MTN. GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, para.12.
4 这22类农产品或产品组包括：小麦和面粉、谷粒、大米、油籽、植物油、豆饼、食糖、黄油和乳脂肪、脱脂奶粉、奶酪、其他奶制品、牛肉、猪肉、家禽肉、羔羊肉、活动物、鸡蛋、葡萄酒、水果、蔬菜、烟草和棉花。The Modalities Agreement, Annex 8, GATT Doc. MTN. GNG/MA/W/24, para.7, 20 December 1993.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.243.
6 参见《农业协定》第9.2条。
1 关于农产品出口补贴的削减，参见本章第三节。
2 The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.pdf, February 3, 2007, p.19.
3 也即没有承担削减承诺的农产品。
1 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri(Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, November 21, 2006.
2 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006. "第9.1条列举之外 的出口补贴，只受《农业协定》反规避纪律的约束。在《农业协定》下，这些类型的出口补贴本身不被禁止，不管接受补贴的农产品是否是减让表列明的农产品。”
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.237-240; Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law Intemational, 2006, pp.228-229．后文倾向于认为，根据《农业协定》和《补贴协定》第3.1(a)条，禁止对没有列入减让表的农产品提供出口补贴。
2 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp.227-228.
3 如美国——外国销售公司案、美国——陆地棉补贴案等专家组和上诉机构报告。具体参见本章第四节。
4 Appellate Body Report on US - FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.143.
5 具体参见本章第四节。
1 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.137
2 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.137.
3 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, paras.7.138-7.139.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.147.
1 关于《模式协定》的效力及与《农业协定》的关系，参见：Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Integration of Agriculture into WTO Disciplines", in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, pp.27-37; Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.246.
2 参见《维也纳条约法公约》第32条。
3 The Modalities Agreement, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, paras.11-12.
4 但在满足《模式协定》附件8第5段(c)项和(d)项条件的情形下，预算支出和数量承诺的削减也可在1991-1992年相应平均水平的基础上进行。也即以1990-1991取代1986-1990，作为基期水平。
1 《模式协定》附件8第5(a)段的规定："5. (a) By the conclusion of the implementation period, each participant shall reduce: (ⅰ) the quantities of each agricultural product or group of products specified in this Annex benefiting from export subsidies by 21 percent from the base period level; and (ⅱ) its budgetary outlays for export subsidies for each agricultural product or group of products specified in this Annex by 36 percent from the base period level."
2 假若用符号来表示，设定“自实施期开始起至所涉年份止，此类补贴的预算支出累计数额”为A，“完 全符合该成员减让表列明的相关年度支出承诺水平所产生的累计数额”为B，“此类预算支出基期水平”为C，给定年度之前相关年度预算支出承诺之和为D，给定年度之前相关年度该成员出口补贴实际预算支出之和为E，在符合《农业协定》第9.2(b)条(ⅰ)段条件的前提下，给定年度补贴的预算支出最高额为F，给定年度该成员出口补贴的预算支出承诺水平为G，则相关关系如下：A应当小于或等于“B+C×3％”。假若此处的累计数额为成员减让表列明的相关年度预算支持水平之和，则相当于允许成员“储蓄”给定年度之前年度中没有使用的额度，以做将来年度应急的储备；假若此处的累计数额为相关年度中成员实际预算支出的累计数额，则相当于不允许成员“储蓄”给定年度之前年度中没有使用的额度。按照前一种理解，A(E+F) 应当小于或等于“B(D+G)+c×3％”：按照第二种理解，A(E+F)应当小于或等于“B(E+G)+C×3％”。比如，假设A成员对某农产品提供出口补贴的基期平均预算支出水平为100个单位，在基期内每年削减基期水平的6％，实施期结束时应削减至64个单位。也就是说，从1995年到2000年，每年的预算支出水平分别为94、88、82、76、70和64。在1995年和1996年两个年度，该农产品的生产和营销状况比较好，因此，在上述两个年度，成员出口补贴的预算支出只使用了50个单位。但到了1997年，该农产品的世界价格低迷，A成员被迫超出该年度预算支出水平，对出口补贴提供更多的资金。此处提出的问题就是：A成员可否使用1995-1996年度没有使用的预算支出?1997年可以提供的预算支出的最高金额为多少?假若按照第一种理解计算，根据上文的公式，1997年A成员可以提供的预算支出的最高金额F=(94+88)+82+100×3％-(50+50)=167个单位。假若按照第二种理解计算，根据上述公式，1997年A成员可以提供的预算支出的最高金额F=(94+88)+82++100×3％-(94+88)=85个单位。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.268-271.
1 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 26-27June 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/11, 28 July 1997.
2 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-26 September 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/12, para.7, 31 October 1997.
3 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 26-27 June 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/11, 28 July 1997.
4 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-26 September 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/12, 31 October 1997, para.8.
1 各成员的具体观点参见：Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-26 September 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/12, 31 October 1997, para.8.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International，2002，p．275．自1997年6月26-27日，WTO农业委员会第11次例会上各成员讨论第9.2(b)条有关出口补贴累积问题的解释和适用之后，到同年9月25-26日第12次例会，又有了一些新的发展。诸如波兰通报超过年度最高承诺水平使用出口补贴。
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agreement: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules," Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.275-276.
1 Nell Andrews, Daivd Bailey and Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.28.
2 在乌拉圭回合的最终阶段，与1986-1990年基期水平相比，很多产品接受补贴的出口数量和出口补贴的预算支出都发生了增长。参见Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotmtmg History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.27; Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries", Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.woddbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 22, 2006.
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countrie"s, Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.woddbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 22, 2006.
4 采取过这种“储蓄”行为的成员包括欧盟、美国、波兰和挪威。在实施期末期到来的时候，更多的成员开始超出出口补贴承诺水平，甚至超出了承诺的300％。参见Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agreement: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
1 出口补贴纪律的这种方法，即所谓"on a commodity-specific basis"。1993年《模式协定》附件8第7段列举了22种农产品或产品组。The Modalities Agreement, Annex 8, GATT Doc. MTN. GNG/MA/W/24, December 1993, para.7.20.
2 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries", Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 24, 2006.
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agreement: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
4 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries', Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 24, 2006.
1 Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and A Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and E1 Salvador, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 2000.
2 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, November 20, 2006.p.3.
3 关于出口信贷、出口信贷担保和保险计划，粮食援助，以及国营贸易企业的有关谈判提案和成员立场，参见本章第五节。关于出口限制和出口税，参见美国、日本、凯恩斯集团、瑞士、韩国、刚果、约旦提交的下列提案：G/AG/NG/W/15; G/AG/NG/W/91; G/AG/NG/W/93; G/AG/NG/W/94; G/AG/NG/W/98; G/AG/NG/W/135; G/AG/NG/W/140.
4 Draft Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, para.13.
5 但在多哈会议的最后几个小时，欧共体坚持本承诺“不影响谈判的结果”("without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations")，这表明最终取消所有出口补贴，并非当时成员共同同意的目标。
6 Cairns Group Negotiating proposal: Export Competition, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/11, 16 June 2000；欧共体认为，凯恩斯集团的提案有某些模糊之处，在某些地方，似乎针对所有形式的出口支持，但在另外一些地方，又只针对出口补贴。欧共体表示不接受只谈判出口补贴。Second Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 29-30 June 2000, Statement by the European Community, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/24, 11 July 2000.
1 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
2 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc.G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000; Second Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 29-30 June 2000, Statement by the European Community, Doc. G/AG/NG/W/24, 11 July 2000.
3 Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000.
4 WTO: Negotiations on Agriculture, WTO Doc. A/AG/NG/W/94, 21 December 2000.
5 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.6.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.254.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Dairy (Article 21.5 —New Zealand and US), WT/DS108/AB/RW, WT/DS108/AB/RW, para.121.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC，WT／DS108／AB／R，paras．144-147．美国——外国销售公司案上诉机构报告推翻了专家组报告，认定被指控的FSC措施不是第9.1(d)条界定的出口补贴，并继而认定无论是对减让表列明的农产品，还是减让表未列举的农产品，美国实施FSC出口补贴的方式至少威胁规避根据《农业协定》第3.3条承担的出口补贴承诺，从而与《农业协定》第10.1条不一致。上诉机构在述及理由的时候，区分了对减让表列明的农产品提供的出口补贴与减让表没有列明的农产品提供的出口补贴。
1 参见本章第二节。
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.257.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.150.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.258-259.
2 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.875.
3 专家组认为，就第10.3条而言，对没有列入减让表的农产品，美国的削减承诺水平为零，巴西作为申诉方，只需要首先证明美国没有列入减让表的农产品的出口量超过“零”。Panel Report on US -Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.793.
4 Appellate Body Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.650-652.
1 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, pare.152.
2 《农业协定》第10.3条规定，“任何声称未对超过削减承诺水平的任何出口数量提供补贴的成员，必须证实未对所涉出口数量提供出口补贴，无论此种出口补贴是否列入第9条中。”
3 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.122-7.123..
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5- New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS103/RW2, WT/DS113/RW2, para.5.18.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5- New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.76.
6 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.4.270-4.271.
1 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.4.282-4.283.
2 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.123.
3 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.29.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.877.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.266.
6 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiatio ", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.247.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.263; T. Josling, So Tangermann, and T. Warley, Agriculture in the GATT, MacMillan, London, 1996, p.197.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras.149-153.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/D'S267/AB/R, para.709.上诉机构报告认定专家组错误地适用了美国——外国销售公司案中上诉机构的分析，并否认第10.1条规避“威胁”要求存在“无条件的法律授权”。
1 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.704.
2 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.788.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, footnote 1082 to para.704.
4 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.788.
5 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.149.
6 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.713.
7 该条的潜在问题之一是对“加工的初级农产品”的认定。
1 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries", http://siteresources.woddbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/8.ExportSubsidies.pdf, November. 2006.
2 很多成员希望扩展和改进规则，防止政府规避出口补贴承诺。出口税、出口促进活动和某些可能等同于出口补贴的国内政策安排，也成为多哈回合谈判的问题。参见："WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now", updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, October 22, 2006. 2005年香港部长级会议宣言对在2013年前平行取消所有形式的出口补贴，并规范有同等效果的所有出口措施达成一致。Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.3.
3 根据《农业协定》第3.3条受削减承诺约束的出口补贴，有关预算支出和数量承诺水平在成员的减让表中都有明确列举，故而具有透明度，也较易于衡量。
4 Harry de Gorter, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries ", http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/8.ExportSubsidies.pdf, November 22，2006．《农业协定》规定了通报制度，而后三种实践，除国营贸易企业有单独的通报之外，在多哈回合中，成员才刚刚开始提议建立粮食援助和官方支持的出口信贷的通报制度。
5 虽然当前粮食援助仅占发展中国家粮食商品进口的很小一部分，国际市场影响可能不会很大，但如果粮食援助恢复到过去的较高水平，就可能对国际市场产生较大影响。Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, October 22, 2006.
6 Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, para.2, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, October 22, 2006．
1 一般情况下，都是在一般商业销售渠道之外提供。
2 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies ahd WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture:Issues and Suggestions for New Rules ", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
3 Harry de Gorier, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture:Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.619.
5 《农业协定》第10条“防止规避出口补贴承诺”之第4款规定：“捐赠国际粮食援助的成员应保证：(a) 国际粮食援助的提供与对受援国的农产品商业出口无直接或间接联系；(b) 国际粮食援助交易，包括货币化的双边粮食援助，应依照联合国粮农组织《剩余食品处理原则和协商义务》的规定进行，在适当时，还应依照通常营销要求(UMRs)制度；以及(c)此类援助应在可能的限度内以完全赠与的形式提供或以不低于《1986年粮食援助公约》第4条规定的条件提供。”
1 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第207页。
2 Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, para.13, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, October 20, 2006.
3 即马拉喀什决定("the Marrakesh Decision")，其中与粮食安全相关的部分有第3款(ⅰ)项和(ⅱ)项，即："3. Ministers accordingly agree to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round on trade in agriculture does not adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food needs of developing countries, especially least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. To this end Ministers agree: ⅰ. to review the level of food aid established periodically by the Committee on Food Aid under ttte Food Aid Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform program; ⅱ. to adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with Article Ⅳ of the Food Aid Convention 1986."
1 Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, November 22, 2006.
2 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc,.October 22, 2006.
3 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
4 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
5 Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex A, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, para.18.
1 Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.3.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey and Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.27.
3 《出口补贴例示清单》(ⅰ)项：“政府(或政府控制的特殊机构)提供的出口信贷担保或保险计划、针对出口产品成本增加或外汇风险计划的保险或担保计划，保险费率不足以弥补长期营业成本和计划的亏损。”
4 《出口补贴例示清单》(k)项：“政府(或政府控制的和／或根据政府授权活动的特殊机构)给予的出口信贷，利率低于它们使用该项资金所实际应付的利率(或如果它们为获得相同偿还期和其他信贷条件且与出口信贷货币相同的资金而从国际资本市场借人时所应付的利率)，或它们支付的出口商或其他金融机构为获得信贷所产生的全部或部分费用，只要这些费用保证在出口信贷方面能获得实质性的优势。但是，如一成员属一官方出口信贷的国际承诺的参加方，且截至1979年1月1日至少有12个本协定创始成员属该国际承诺的参加方(或创始成员所通过的后续承诺)，或如果一成员实旋相关承诺的利率条款，则符合这些条款的出口信贷做法不得视为本协定所禁止的出口补贴。”
5 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.934.
1 Export Competition: Export Subsidies to be subject to the terms of the Final Agreement, GATT Doc. MIN. GNG/AG/W/1/Add.10, 2 August 1991, para.3(h), (ⅰ).
2 Article 10.2 to Dunkel Draft, "Participants undertake not to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes otherwise than in conformity with internationally agreed disciplines".
3 以上第10.2条谈判历史，参见：Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.934-7.940; Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.620.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.766.
1 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.632-639.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.259-260.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.947.
2 关于两个协定的关系，详细论述参见第五章。
3 山下一仁，《WTO农业协定的问题和淡判的现状及展望——从乌拉圭回合谈判的参加者的角度观察》，http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/publications/summary/05050007.html, (访问日期：2006年8月6日)。
1 Marc Benitah, "U. S. Agricultural Export Credits after the WTO Cotton Ruling: The Law of Unintended Consequences", Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 6(2), http://www.wofldtradelaw.net/articles/benitahexportcredits.pdf, October 5, 2006.
2 如有关还款期限、最低保险费、利益等重要方面。
3 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 21, 2006.
4 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
5 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
6 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, October 22, 2006.第二种方法遭到发展中成 员的反对，认为加剧了当前出口补贴纪律的不公平。
1 Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, Annex A, 2 August 2004, para.18.
2 Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.3.
3 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition lssues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22, 2006.
4 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, pp.138-139.
5 该计算使用的数据是成员国营贸易企业通报的出口数量以及FAOSTAT(2003)的国际贸易数据。转引自Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http:/wwww.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22, 2006.
6 GATT1947第17条规定：1．(a) 每一缔约方承诺，如其建立或维持一国营企业，无论位于何处，或在形式上或事实上给予任何企业专有权或特权，则该企业在其涉及进口或出口的购买和销售方面，应以符合本协定对影响私营贸易商进出口的政府措施所规定的非歧视待遇的一般原则行事。(b) 本款(a)项的规定应理解为要求此类企业在适当注意本协定其他规定的前提下，应仅依照商业因素进行任何此类购买或销售，包括价格、质量、可获性、适销性、运输和其他购销条件，并应依照商业惯例给予其他缔约方的企业参与此类购买或销售的充分竞争机会。(c) 缔约方不得阻止其管辖范围内的企业(无论是否属本款(a)项所述企业)依照本款(a)项和(b)项的原则行事。2．本条第1款的规定不得适用于直接或最终供政府消费使用、而不是为转售或用于生产供销售的货物而进口的产品。对于此类进口产品，每一缔约方应对其他缔约方的贸易给予公平和公正的待遇。3．各缔约方确认，本条第1款(a)项所述企业在经营中可能对贸易造成严重障碍；因此，在互惠互利基础上进行谈判以限制或减少此类障碍对国际贸易的扩大具有重要意义。4．(a)各缔约方应将由本条第1款(a)项所述类型企业进口至各自领土或自各自领土出口的产品通知缔约方全体。(b)对一不属第2条下减让对象的产品设立、维持或授权实行进口垄断的一缔约方，应在有关产品 贸易中占实质性份额的另一缔约方的请求，应将最近代表期内该产品的进口加价通知缔约方全体，如无法进行此类通知，则应通知该产品的转售价格。(c) 如一缔约方有理由认为其在本协定项下的利益受到第1款(a)项所述企业经营活动的不利影响，在其请求下，缔约方全体可请建立、维持或授权建立该企业的缔约方提供关于其运用本协定条款情况的信息。(d) 本款的规定不得要求任何缔约方披露会阻碍执法或违背公共利益或损害特定企业合法商业利益的机密信息。
1 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, November 30，2006，p．29．然而，有关国营贸易企业通报制度的执行情况并不理想。同文第28页。
2 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round', Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22, 2006.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.88.
2 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22. 2006.
3 又称“Single-desk Selling”，指某些国家在国外营销和通过专业化的销售局出口农产品的做法，涉及到出口和进口的垄断。孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第18页。
4 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
5 Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000.
6 WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, Negotiating Proposal by Mauritius, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/96, 28 December 2000．马里要求维持最不发达国家国营贸易企业参与国际市场的权利。参见：Malian Proposal for the Future Negotiations on Agriculture, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/99, 11 January 2001..
7 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
8 Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex A, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, para.18, 2 August 2004.
1 Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para. 3.
1 Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N. D. L. Rev. 691, 2003, p.770.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System 'at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489. M, 2003, p.521; Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of The WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to Its Post-Hong Kong Directions", RAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55, May 2006, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf, November 24, 2006, p.22.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.235.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.306.
3 Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round', 79 N. D. L. Rev. 691, 2003, p.769.
4 参见《农业协定》附件3第8段。
1 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.340-341.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.385-386.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride Towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System "at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489. M, 2003, p.521.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of The WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to Its Post-Hong Kong Directions ", RAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55. May 2006. http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf. November 24. 2006. p.22.
5 来源于WTO秘书处农业和货物司官员的介绍。
1 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Declaration of 20 September 1986, GATT Doc. MIN. DEC, p.6
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, ppo386-387.
3 D. Palmeter, "Agriculture and Trade Regulations: Selected Issues in the Application of U. S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law", 23 Journal of World Trade (1989) No. 1, p.59. 转引自Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.310.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.310.
2 Jim Monke, "Farm Commodity Programs: Direct Payment, Counter-Cyclical Payment, and Marketing Loans", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33271, March 1, 2006; Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, April 20, 2006.
3 在共同市场中，主要的干预形式是价格支持。价格支持的基本目标是将市场价格维持在某个最低水平上，或高于该水平。为了达到这一目的，理事会每年都设定很多共同价格，通过各种支持机制(干预收购、私营储备安排，和一系列的其他金融工具)，将市场价格维持在特定水平上。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.311.
4 依据CAP改革方案，在1993-1996年期间，谷类的支持价格削减29％，牛肉价格支持削减15％。对于同意减少15％生产面积的农民，通过直接支付补偿收入的降低。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.219.
1 本图表数据来源：Chad E. Hart and John C. Beghin, "Rethinking Agricultural Domestic Support under the World Trade Organization", Briefing Paper 04-BP 43, November 2004, http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS[PDFFiles/04bp43.pdf, November 13, 2006. p.12.
2 差价税(Variable Levy)，又称差额税，是指在本国生产某种产品的国内价格高于同类的进口商品价格时，为了削弱进口商品的竞争能力，保护国内生产和国内市场，按国内价格与进口价格之间的差额征收的一种关税。差价税主要是欧盟对从非成员国进口的农产品征收的一种进口关税。其税额是欧盟所规定的门槛价格与实际进口的货价加运保费(CIF)之间的差额。征收差价税是欧盟实施共同农业政策的一项主要措施，其主要目的是为了保护和促进欧盟内部的农业生产。所征差价税款作为农业发展资金，用于资助和扶持内部农业生产的发展。例如，欧盟为了实行共同农业政策，建立农畜产品统一市场、统一价格，对进口的谷物、猪肉、食品、家禽、乳制品等农畜产品，征收差价税。参见山西省晋城市商务局网页资料：http://www.icsw.gov.cn/UploadFile/200631617940708.doc, December 11, 2006.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.312.
2 以上对若干支持计划的介绍，参见Brandorn Willis and Doug O'Brien, "Summary and Evolution of U. S. Farm Bill Commodity Titles", http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/commodity.html#deficiency, January 29, 2007.
3 参见李超民：《美国70年来农产品立法与农产品常平仓计划的现实意义》，http://www.shac.gov.cn/hwzc/zc/t20040804_107222.htm,(访问日期：2007年1月16日)。
4 Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", April 2006, www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, January 29, 2007.
1 Brandom Willis and Doug O'Brien, Summary and Evolution of U. S. Farm Bill Commodity Titles, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/commodity.html#deficiency, January 29 2007; Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.219.
2 Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", April 2006, www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, January 29, 2007.
3 参见李舟生：《未来WTO农业境内支持政策改革方向》，http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?showtype=pda&catid=10531,(访问日期：2007年1月18日)。
1 Randy Schnepf, "Agriculture in the WTO: Limits on Domestic Support", CRS Report for Congress, RS20840, updated May 10, 2005, September 18, 2006, available at available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21, 2006, CRS-6.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to lts Post-Hong Kong Directions", FAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55, May 2006, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf, November 24, 2006, p.23.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.314.
4 如保证粮食安全，维持和增加农民收入等。
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.387.
6 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, July 2000, p.3.
1 由于一共有34个成员基期综合支持量超过了微量水平。因此，只有这34个成员才面临着国内支持的削减问题。
2 欧共体15个成员国算作一个。可提供“黄箱”补贴的成员名单，参见：Total Aggregate Measurenment of Support, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. TN/AG/S/13, 27 January 2005.
3 参见《农业协定》第6.4条。
4 参见《农业协定》第6.2条。
5 参见《农业协定》第6.5条，指在限产计划下提供的直接支付。
1 Panel Report on Korea-Various Measures on Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R. oara.808.
2 SMU主要由欧共体提议使用。在概念上，SMU要比PSE范围窄。SMU不包括为控制供应而提供的直接支付。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GAIT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.395.
3 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, GATr Doc. MIN. GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, paras.8 & 15.
4 参见《农业协定》第6.3条。
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DSll3/AB/RW, para.89.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U. S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO ", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21, 2006, CRS-13.
3 销售信贷收益是2002年美国农业法下主要的国内支持措施之一。
4 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U. S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO ", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21, 2006, CRS-32.
5 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, p.4.
6 欧共体——食糖出口补贴案在很大程度上受到加拿大——奶制品案的影响。该案的争议问题是食糖的出口补贴，但有关“交叉补贴”(cross-subsidization)的裁定同时涉及国内支持纪律。
1 Tim Josling, "Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support", paper presented to the Conference on "Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: When are we heading?" held at Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Agriculture/Josling%20negotiations.pdf, September 28, 2006, p.2.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.88-92.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.148.
1 例如，在两个DSU第21.5条程序中，上诉机构认定“对出口”的标准过宽，不需要存在要求出口的明确说明。
2 欧共体——食糖出口补贴案要求在补贴和出口之间存在紧密地联系，从而对加拿大——奶制品案的裁决作了矫正，避免混淆出口补贴和国内支持纪律的可能性。
3 Tim Josling, "Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support', paper presented to the Conference on "Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: When are we heading?" held at Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Agriculture/Josling%20negotiations.pdf, September 28, 2006, p.18.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.92.
1 World Trade Law. net Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC) on Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, available at www.worldtradelaw.net.
2 一般认为，附件2对具体措施的列举是非穷尽性的。参见Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002，p．413。但该文同时指出，实质上是穷尽性的。参见第421页。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products:from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.421.
2 “一般服务”涉及与向农业或农村提供服务或利益的计划有关的支出(或放弃的税收)。它们不得涉及对生产者或加工者的直接支付。“一般服务”应当满足第1段规定的总体标准和第2段规定的特定政策条件。在范围上， “一般服务”包括但不限于下列清单：(a)研究，包括一般研究、与环境计划有关的研究以及与特定产品有关的研究计划；(b)病虫害控制，包括一般的和特定产品的病虫害控制措施，如早期预警制度、检疫和根除；(c)培训服务，包括一般和专门培训设施；(d)推广和咨询服务，包括提供可便利信息和研究结果向生产者和消费者传播的方法；(e)检验服务，包括一般检验服务和为健康、安全、分级或标准化为目的特定产品检验；(f)营销和促销服务，包括与特定产品有关的市场信息、咨询和促销，但不包括未列明目的的、销售者可用以降低售价或授予购买者直接经济利益的支出；以及(g)基础设施服务，包括：电力网络、道路和其他运输方式、市场和港口设施、供水设施、堤坝和排水系统以及与环境计划有关的基础设施工程。在所有情况下，支出应只直接用于基本工程的提供和建设，并且除可普遍获得的公用设施网络化建设外，不得包括提供补贴的农场设施。支出不得包括对投入或运营成本的补贴或优惠使用费。具体参见《农业协定》附件2第2段。尽管绝大多数措施非常重要，并且使用广泛，但在磋商程序中分歧不大。
3 粮食安全是政府干预农业的基本原因之一。粮食安全政策免于削减承诺是自然而然的。《农业协定》认可成员可以为了积累和保持构成国家立法确认的粮食安全计划组成部分的产品库存而支出。此外，还允许对私营产品储备提供的政府援助，只要储备构成粮食安全计划的组成部分。同时，为了避免粮食安全扭曲农业生产和贸易，《农业协定》也规定了下列具体条件：首先，此类库存的数量和积累应符合仅与粮食安全有关的预定指标。其二，库存的积累和处置过程在财务方面应透明。其三，政府的粮食采购应按现行市场价进行，粮食安全库存的销售应按不低于所涉产品和质量的现行国内市场价进行。所有这些条件都旨在避免扭曲贸易和生产的补贴伪装成真正的粮食安全政策而免于削减承诺。例如，如果对数量和价格不加任何限制，政府购买农产品就容易被用作通过以人为的管理价格无限制的购买产品。参见：《农业协定》附件2第3段。
4 此处的粮食援助是指免费或以补贴价格向需要援助的部分人口提供粮食。为了避免滥用国内粮食援助，《农业协定》规定了若干条件：其一，接受粮食援助的资格应符合与营养目标有关的明确规定的标准；其二，此类援助的提供方式应为直接向有关人员提供粮食或提供可使合格受援者按市场价格或补贴价格购买粮食的方法；其三，政府的粮食采购应按现行市场价进行，此类援助的供资和提供方式应透明。参见：《农业协定》附件2第4段。
5 除了附件2第6段至第13段所列直接支付外，《农业协定》还允许对农业生产者提供可免于削减的、各种不同形式的直接支付，只要满足附件2第6段(b)至(e)项的条件，也即直接支付的数量不得与生产的类型与产量、国际或国内价格或生产要素有关，也不得为接受此类支付而要求进行生产。一般来说，虽然不挂钩的直接支付可以是出于任何原因，为任何金额，采取收入保险、灾害救济、结构调整援助、环境或地区发展计划等彤式，但都不能超过遭受的实际损失。
1 本款表明，只要不扭曲贸易和生产，成员可以采取任何形式的直接支付，支持农民的收入。与其他直接支付不同的是，不挂钩的收入支持要求明确规定获得此类支付的资格。参见《农业协定》附件2第2段第6段。
2 此款直接支付存在原因是农业生产对自然力量的依赖，导致农业生产存在风险，故而需要政府的参与。为了保证政府的资金参与不会扭曲农业生产和贸易，本款规定了一系列的限制性条件，如获得支付的资格应由农业收入的损失确定；支付的数量应补偿生产者在其有资格获得该援助的当年收入损失的70％以下：支付的数量只应与收入有关，不与生产、价格或生产要素有关，旨在割断支付与生产和市场的联系：支付的数量不应超过当年收入损失的70％以下，除非生产者可同时获得自然灾害救济。后一情形下，支付总额不超过生产者总损失的100％。
3 本款与上一款类似，只是限于由于自然灾害导致的支付。参见《农业协定》附件2第8段。
4 参见《农业协定》附件2第9、10、11段。通过生产者退休计划提供的结构调整援助旨在便利从事适销农产品生产的人员退休或转入非农业生产活动：通过资源停用计划提供的结构调整援助旨在从适销农产品生产中退出所有土地或包括牲畜在内的其他资源；通过投资援助提供的结构调整援助旨在协助生产者针对客观地表现出的结构性缺陷进行经营方面的财政或有形结构调整。为了防止滥用和扭曲生产和贸易，上述三段额外规定了一些重要条件。如第9款规定支付接受者应当完全和永久地退休；第10段和第11段规定了生产和价格上的不挂钩要求。
5 参见《农业协定》附件2第12段。与第12段“环境计划下的支付”相对应的是《补贴协定》第8.2(c)条。提供该类支付的目的是抵销生产者因遵守政府环境或环保计划规定的具体条件，而产生的额外成本。支付取决于对该政府计划下特定条件的满足，支付的数量限于为遵守政府计划而所涉及的额外费用或收入损失。但《补贴协定》第8.2(c)条对环境补贴有更多的要求，即应为一次性的临时措施；且限于所需费用的20％等等。相比之下， 《农业协定》下的环境支付计划纪律更为宽松。
6 此类支付的首要要求是只能提供给落后地区的生产者。支付仅应使合格地区的生产者获得，但应使此类地区内的所有生产者普遍获得。《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条也规定了对一成员领土内落后地区的援助，如果满足一定条件，为不可诉补贴。比较《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条与《农业协定》附件2第2段第13款，有下列差异：其一，第13款再次强调了支付应当与生产和价格挂钩；其二， 《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条有经济测算上的要求，但《农业协定》并无此类要求。笼统的要求是该地区为落后地区，只要特定地区农民收入和一般收入有差距，便可以提供一般地区发展补贴。其相同之处是两个协定均规定：每一落后地区必须是一个明确界定的毗连地理区域，具有可确定的经济或行政特征；该地区依据中性和客观的标准，被视为属落后地区，表明该地区的困难不是因临时情况产生的。参见《农业协定》附件2第2段第13段；《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条(ⅰ)、(ⅱ)款。应当注意的是，目前《补贴协定》下已经不存在不可诉补贴的分类：然而，《农业协定》下，仍然属于不受削减承诺约束的“绿箱”措施。
7 农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版，第17页。
1 参见《农业协定》第13条。
2 Green Box Measures: Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. TN/AG/S/10, 8 November 2004.
3 巴西认为，生产灵活性合同支付和直接支付限制了可以获得支付的生产类型，如果在基期面积上种植某些生产类型，如水果、蔬菜、野生稻，将导致支付削减，甚至丧失所有的支付。此类限制的影响是引导在基期面积上种植某些特定的作物类型。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7. 358.
4 巴西认为，根据第6(a)段，前后相继的两个不挂钩的收入支持计划，如果结构、设计和资格标准相同，基期必须保持固定不变。更新基期可能会使当前支付与近期增加的产量挂钩，从而与第6(b)段不一致。巴西认为，由于存在更新的可能性，生产者可能会基于将来支持计划更新种植面积的预期，种植更多的计划下产品。但专家组却认为，无论是1996年农业法案，还是2002年农业法案，都不允许更新基期。自1996年以来，基期只更新了一次，没有证据证明美国国会将来如何制定农业法案。而且，没有证据证明生产者是否期待将来实施新的农业法案时，更新基期面积。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras. 7. 389-7. 405.
5 专家组报告遵循了司法经济原则，没有认定附件2第1段“基本要求”是否构成一项独立义务。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.406-7.412.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.364-7.388.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.315.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.329-342..
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, pp.787-788.
2 Stephen J. Powell, Andrew Schmitz, "The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture", 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 287, 2005, pp.291-293.
3 Christian Wurzbacher, "Dispute Settlement: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton", WTO News: Issues No.12, 7 March2006, http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SyswebRessources/wton12edoc/$FILE/wton12e.doc, September. 19 2006.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of The WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to Its Post-Hong Kong Directions ", RAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55, May 2006, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf, November 24, 2006, p.24.
2 参见《农业协定》附件2第6(e)段。
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.412.
4 如欧共体曾经实施的特殊牛肉保险计划，将动物分成两个独立的年龄组，将支付限制在每一年龄组不超过90头动物。虽然限制可能会降低农民每一年龄组喂养90头以上的激励，但是对于某一年龄组尚不满90头，或两组均不满90头的农民，则可能会刺激增加养殖数量，直到90头为止。Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp.23-24.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp.23-24.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p24.
3 参见Butault, Jean-Pierre and Bureau, Jean-Christophe, "WTO Constraints and the CAP: Domestic Support in EU 25Agriculture", 2006, ⅢS Discussion Paper No. 171 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=925865, December 2, 2006.
1 例如，尽管土耳其对绝大多数农产品维持了非常高的支持价格，但仍然利用微量支持豁免条款主张其支持都低于微量水平。Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.25.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.236.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride Towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System 'at the WTO: Reflections Following the CANCUN Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003, p.526.
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda lngo, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules ", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, October. 2006, p.2
1 在谈判中，曾经提出各种不同的衡量手段，如生产者补贴等量(Producer Subsidy Equivalent，PSE)、支持衡量单位(SMU)，但最终采用了综合支持量的方法(AMS)。PSE是OECD国家使用的一种衡量方法。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.307.
2 《农业协定》第1条(h)(ⅱ)款。
3 《农业协定》第6.3条。
1 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series，July 2000，p．7．计算的时候，有两种方法：政府开支和价格差。
2 《农业协定》第1条第(a)项。
3 《农业协定》第1条第(b)项。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.397.
2 《农业协定》第1条第(d)项。
3 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, p.7.
4 上述三个变量的详细描述，参见Rai Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: The Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement and lts Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N. D. L. Rev. 69, 2003, pp.767-775.
5 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, p.6.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.307.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.399.
3 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, pp.6-7.
1 Roberts, I., Podbury, T., and Hinchy, M., "Reforming Domestic Agricultural Support Policies through the World Trade Organization ", ABARE Research Report RR01.2 Canberra, available at http://abareonlineshop.com, January 22, 2007.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.18.
3 《农业协定》附件3第10段。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.400.
2 《农业协定》第13段。
3 参见《农业协定》第1(d)条。支持等值不包括《农业协定》附件2可免于削减的计划下提供的支持，此种支持：(ⅰ)对于在基期内提供的支持，指一成员减让表第四部分引用并引入的有关支持材料表中列明的支持，及(ⅱ)对于实施期任何一年中及此后提供的支持，指依照本协定附件4的规定汁算的支持，同时考虑该成员减让表第四部分引用而并入的支持材料所使用的构成数据和方法。
4 《农业协定》附件4第1段。
1 Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, GATT Doc. MIN. GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, paras.8.
2 例如，对欧共体和美国1980—1990年国内支持水平的研究表明，以生产者补贴等值计算的补贴量在1986—1987年前后达到最高峰。参见白云：《乌拉圭回合<农业协议>国内支持条款缺陷问题研究》，载《时代法学》，2006年第4卷第4期，第84页。
3 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社，2005年，第220页。
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.426.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.18.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.409-410; Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp. 19-20.
3 有关问题参见：Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2,pdf, October 28, 2006, p.8.
1 Stefan. Tangermann, "A Developed Country Perspective oftheAgendafor the New WTO Round of Agricultural Negotiations ", paper presented at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 3 March 1997, p.27; Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.425-426.
2 Harry de Gorter and Merlinda Ingco, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, Octover 28，2006，pp．8-9．虽然这个比率可能重叠计算了边境支持，致使有夸大AMS的可能性，但仍然可以看出很大一部分的国内支持并未在《农业协定》下得到有效的规范。
1 Tim Josling and Stefan Tangermann, "Implementation of the WTOAgreement on Agriculture and Developments for the Next Round of Negotiations", European Review of Agricultural Economics Vol.26(3)(1999), p.377.
2 Chad E. Hart and John C. Beghin, "Rethinking Agricultural Domestic Support under the World Trade Organization", Briefing Paper 04-BP 43, November 2004, http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/04bp43.pdf, November 13, 2006, p.5.
3 Harry de Gorter and Medinda Ingco, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, October 28,. 2006. p.3.
4 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, p.23.
5 1998年，日本在向WTO通报时，表示不再对大米使用管理支持价格，从而将综合支持量从3，1710亿日元削减到7660亿日元。但是，日本没有降低对大米的实际支持，关税配额和关税安排维持了内部支持。综合支持量的大幅削减，还致使日本可以对其他产品提供非常高的不可免除削减的支持，导致综合支持量承诺实际上没有意义。Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.17.
6 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp.11-15.
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture on the WTO, December 1998, p.16;转引自Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of lnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.424.
2 程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第78页。
1 Konrad Von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", International Institute for Substainable Development, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf, September 16, 2006, p.11.
2 参见：John R, Magnus, "The Evils of A Long Peace: Legal Consequences of WTO 'Peace Clause' Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation over Farm Subsidies", Presented to the Global Business Dialogue, Washington, DC. http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/peace_clause.pdf, October 31, 2006, p.8.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.389-7.405.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004，p．21．该文认为，对贸易和生产是否只有最小的扭曲影响，部分地取决于农民对将来支持政策修改可能性的预期和行为。如果不挂钩制度设计的好，将如同没有提供任何支持。然而，在干预期内，如果农民认为支持计划将会做出修改，当前的生产决定将会影响到将来支持的性质和程度，不挂钩的有效性就将大打折扣。关于不挂钩支付，参见该著作第20至22页。
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, October 28, 2006, pp.4-5.
4 Tim Josling, "Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support', paper presented to the Conference on "Agriculture Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we heading?" June 23-26, 2003,http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Agriculture/Josling%20negotiations.pdf, October 27, 2006, p.2.
5 Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Draft Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN (01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, parao 13.
1 Note on Domestic Support Reform: Negotiations on Agriculture, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/16, 23 June 2000; Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.美国提议，现有的支持措施不管当前属于哪一箱，都可分为两类：可韶免的支持措施，即对贸易和生产顶多只有最低限度扭曲影响的措施，和不可豁免的措施，即受削减承诺约束的措施。
2 U. S. Proposal for Global Agricultural Trade Reform (2002), http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm, FAS Online, January 16, 2007.
3 WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal-Domestic Support, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/35, 22 September. 2000.
4 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
5 Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, 12 February 2003.
1 EC-US Joint Text: Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/157, 13 August 2003.
2 Agriculture: Framework Proposal, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, 20 August 2003.
3 Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Annex A: Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WTO Doc, JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 13 September 2003.
4 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, Annex A, pp.7-10.
5 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5.
1 Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal: Domestic Support, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/35, 22 September 2000.
2 Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in WorldAgricultural Trade, Submission by ASEAN, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/55, 10 November 2000.
3 WTO Agriculture Negotiations, Proposal by Norway, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/101, 16 January 2001.
4 Seventh Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 26-28 March 2001, WTO Doe. G/AG/NG/W/155, 5 April 2001.
5 Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003, para.43; Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments Revision, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003.
1 EC-US Joint Text: Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/157, 13 August 2003.
2 Agriculture: Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162, 20 August 2003.
3 Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Annex A: Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 13 September 2003; Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, Annex A, pp.13-15. 即所谓“新蓝箱”，参见陈建宁：《“新蓝箱”：农业补贴的隐患》，载《WTO经济导刊》2004年第12期，第56页。
4 农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版，第27-29页。
5 凯恩斯集团成员要求重新审查“绿箱”支持措施的条件，从而保证这些政策不影响贸易和生产，或只有很小的影响。WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal-Domestic Support, WTO Doc G/AO/NG/W/35, 22 September 2000.加拿大对国内支持提出了单独的提案，WTO Neogtiations on Agriclture-Domestic Support, proposal by Canada, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/92; Fifth Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 5-7 February 2001, Statement by Canada, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/ll2, 13 February 2001．美国同样关注“绿箱”支持措施的标准。Note on Domestic Support Reform: Negotiations on Agriculture, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/16, 23 June 2000; Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000; Third Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 28-29 September 2000, Statement by the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/49, 5 October 2000.欧共体认为，《农业协定》的安排“为解决国内支持问题提供了正确的框架”，同意应当重新审视“绿箱”支持措施的标准。EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.日本提议对“绿箱”的范围和标准进行调整，以反映农业的多功能(Multi-functionality)。Negotiatiing Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000; Fifth Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 5-7 February 2001, Statement by Japan, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/116, 20 February 2001.一些发展中成员对国内支持措施也提出了类似的提案，提议重新审视“绿箱”标准，当前“绿箱”措施应当量化，并进行规范。Agriculture: Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, 20 August 2003, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162.
1 Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sir Lanka and E1 Salvador, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 2000; Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submitted from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
2 如一些发展中成员提议，按照特定的标准将成员的国内支持措施(“黄箱”、“蓝箱”和“绿箱”支持)归为一类，并将总量控制在国内农业产值的一定比例之内(10％)。参见成员提案：Agreement on Agriculture: Green Box/Annex 2 Subsidies, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/14; Agriculture: Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162, 20 August 2003.
3 例如，日本希望改革“绿箱”支持的标准，以使其更好地包容与生产脱钩的收入支持及收入安全网计划。Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000．韩国希望调整“绿箱”支持的标准和范围，以更好地体现农业的多功能性。Proposal for WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Submitted by the Republic of Korea, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/98, 9 January 2001.
4 Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003.
5 Negotiations on Agriculture, First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, Annex A, paras.6-16, 12 February 2003.
6 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5.
1 Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and A Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 2000.
2 The Development Box made easy, http://www.cafod.org.uk/policy_and_analysis/public_policy_papers/trade/development_box, March 1, 2007.另可参见：Oxfam International, "An Introduction to the Development Box", http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/pp0201_Devbox_English.pdf/download, April 5, 2007; Duncan Green and Tim Rice, "Development and Agriculture in the WTO: A Comparison between the Development Box, the EC's Food Security Box and the Harbinson Draft Modalities", http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/pp0201_Devbox_English.pdf/download, April 5, 2007.
1 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5.
1 例如，在澳大利亚汽车皮革案(Australia-Leather, WT/DS126)中，《补贴协定》与《与贸易有关的投资措施协定》的关系。
1 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.16.
2 GATT1947第16.3条规定：“因此，缔约方应寻求避免对初级产品的出口使用补贴。但是，如一缔约方直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，并以增加自其领土出口的任何初级产品的形式实施，则该补贴的实施不得使该缔约方在该产品的世界出口贸易中占有不公平的份额，同时应考虑前一代表期内该缔约方在该产品贸易中所占份额及可能已经影响或正在影响该产品贸易的特殊因素。”
3 《补贴协定》第6.3(d)条规定：“补贴的影响在于与以往3年期间的平均市场份额相比，提供补贴成员的一特定补贴初级产品或商品的世界市场份额增加，且此增加在给予补贴期间呈一贯的趋势。”
4 《补贴协定》第32.1条规定：“除依照由本协定解释的GATT1994的规定外，不得针对另一成员的补贴采取具体行动。”
5 E. McGovern, International Trade Regulation, Part B: Trade in Goods, Exeter, Globefield Press, 1995, p.11.38-1; 转引自Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.315.
1 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.13.
2 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.16.
3 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.227.
4 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para. 227, footnote 60.本案上诉机构报告也否认附件1A中的其他货物协定，如《补贴协定》，取代了GATT1994。Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.14.
5 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.16.
6 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, pp.18-21.
1 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.16.
2 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, para.15.
1 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, para.8.1.
2 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, para.7.122.
3 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27R/USA, para.7.123.
4 该案上诉机构报告认为，第4.1条还表明乌拉圭回合农业谈判达成了新的市场准入减让，并且包括在成员GATT1994减让表中。这些减让对于农业改革进程和《农业协定》的根本目标来说，具有根本重要性。Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.156.
5 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, para.7.124.
6 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, paras.7.125-7.126.
1 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.155.
2 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.157.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.157.
4 即认为GATT1994和《WTO协定》附件1A所列其他多边贸易协定的规定，在不与《农业协定》条款冲突的范围内适用。
5 参见本章第二节。
1 Appellant's Submission of the European Communities, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/june/tradoc_123465.1.05)%20non-confi%20for%20web.pdf,October 23, 2006, para. 156.
2 Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, paras.7.155-7.157.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.221-223.
1 根据条约有效解释原则，专家组和上诉机构一般都倾向于作协定之间没有冲突的解释。尤其是，各项协定作为乌拉圭回合一揽子协定和《WTO协定》附件1A的组成部分，由相同的成员在相同的时间签订。
2 Panel Report on Indonesia-Automobiles, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, and WT/DS64/R, paras.14.29-14.36 & paras.14.97-14.99; Appellate Body Report on Guatemala-Cement I, WT/DS60/AB/R, para.60; Appellate Body Report on US-Hot-Rolled Steel, WT/DS138/AB/R, paras.55 and 62.参见本案专家组报告第7．154段及脚注145。
3 如美国——陆地棉补贴案(WT／DS267)
4 如欧共体——食糖出口补贴案(WT／DS265，266，283)
1 Panel Report on EC-Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, WT/DS299/R, para.7.235; Panel Report on US-Countervaling Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, para.7.418.
2 本案专家组认为， “第16．3条只适用于《农业协定》和《补贴协定》界定的出口补贴”，而不能同时适用于第16．1条适用的所有类型的补贴。”Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton，WT／DS267／R，para．7，992。对于GATT第16．1条下的诉请，专家组认为，由于《农业协定》和《补贴协定》已经对出口补贴做出了界定，因而，对于解决本争端而言，也没有必要解决巴西根据GATT第16条提出的诉请。上诉机构对有关第16条适用的诉请也遵循了司法经济原则。
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.7.62.
4 参见本文第二章第三节。
5 Panel Report on Canda-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.4.129.
6 Panel Report on Canda-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.144.
1 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.305.
2 应当注意的是，《补贴协定》第3条序言在适用上没有时问限制：而第5、6、7条相关条款，明确取决于《农业协定》第13条的适用。
3 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.141.
4 Stwart T. P. ed., The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Framework for the 21st Century and US Implementing Legislation, Washington, American Bar Association, 1996, p.171, 转引自 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.141, footnote 150.
5 GATFl994第6条征收反补贴税和第16条补贴实体纪律与《农业协定》和《补贴协定》不同。在Brazil—Desiccated Coconut案中，上诉机构强训，“《补贴协定》包含的权利和义务远远超过了仅仅适用和解释GATT第6条、第16条和第23条”。Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut，WT／DS22／AB／R， p.16．该案上诉机构还认为，GATT1994与附件1A其他货物协定(包括《补贴协定》)的关系非常复杂，必须在个案基础上审查。有学者认为，由于《补贴协定》对补贴规定了一个新的和相当详细的体制，在很多情况下，《农业协定》与WTO其他补贴与反补贴税义务的关系，相当于《农业协定》和《补贴协定》的关系。参见Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Articlel3 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002. p.315.
1 在乌拉圭回合之前，肯尼迪回合和东京回合谈判达成了一些单独的协定或“守则?，解决某些类型的非关税壁垒，扩大GATT的适用范围。缔约方在“复边”基础上参与协定，协定只对缔约方有约束力，造成了GATT时期的支离破碎状态，GAIT缔约方不一定受同一种义务约束。Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.341.
2 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. GATT/1396, 25 September 1986, p.5.
3 Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.341.
4 参见本章第一节。
5 Panel Report on Korea-Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/R, para.7.38.
6 Appellate Body Report on Korea-Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/AB.R, para.81; also see, Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Footwear (EC), WT/DS121/AB/R, para.81; Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline on WT/DS2/AB/R, p.23; Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Ⅱ, WT/DSS/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DSll/AB/R, p.12; Appellate Body Report on India-Patents (US), WT/DS50/AB/R, para.45.
7 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.221.
8 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, pp.19-20.
1 Pascal Lamy Speeches, "The Place and Role of the WTO (WTO Law) in the International Legal Order", Address before the European Society of International Law, 19 May 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/spp126_e.htm, April 5, 2006.
2 Panel Report on Indonesia-Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14. 28.
3 Panel Report on EC-Bananas, WT/DS27/R, paras.7.159 and 7.169. 有关“冲突”的论述，还可参见下列案件：Appellate Body Report on Guatemala-Cement Ⅰ, WT/DS60/AB/R, para.60; Appellate Body Report on US-Hot-Rolled Steel, WT/DS138/AB/R, paras.55 and 62.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1038.该案专家组认为，在《农业协定》第6．3条国内支持削减承诺和《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条禁止进口替代补贴之间，不存在固有的冲突。上述两项条款可以合起来理解，同时适用。因此，没有必要援引《农业协定》第21．1条，在发生冲突的情况下，适用《农业协定》的规定。但上诉机构认为，在其他情形下，第21．1条也有适用的可能性，问题的关键是《农业协定》是否对《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条就相同事项特别做出了具体规定。Appellate Body Reporl on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.532-533.
1 Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.327.
2 上诉机构在WTO法某一领域中发展出来的法理，必定对WTO协定其他领域法的发展演化产生影响。例如，GATF1994下发展出的法理，也可用以解释其他多边贸易协定的条款，反之亦然。WTO法理的交互促进强化了WTO协定内部的一致性。Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence 6y the WTOAppellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.334.
3 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.374.
4 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.227; Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.13.
5 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.15.
6 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.549; Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1071.
7 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.375.
1 例如，在欧共体——香蕉案中，上诉机构认为，在《农业协定》没有对同一事项特别作出具体规定的情形下，GATT1994和其他多边协定才能适用于农产品。Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras.155-58．
2 例如：在韩国——奶制品保障措施案中，上诉机构指出，“根据有效解释原则，条约的解释者应当协调地解释条约所有可适用的规定，使得协定所有规定均具有意义。本原则的一个重要的推论是应当将条约作为一个整体来解释。WTO协定第2．2条明确表明乌拉圭回合谈判者的初衷是《WTO协定》的规定和附件1、2和3中的多边贸易协定必须作为一个整体理解。Appellate Body Report on Korea-Dairy Safeguards．WT/DS98/AB/R, paras.81. Also See, e.g., Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.23;Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p.12; Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, paras.7.155-7.166.
3 第21．1条规定，“GATT1994和《WTO协定》附件1A所列其他多边贸易协定的规定应在遵守本协定的前提下适用。”
4 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.155.
1 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "What the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), p.375.但该文的作者认为，这种观点是站不住脚的。从目前来看，美国已经改变了看法。例如，在欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，美国作为争端第三方认为出口补贴也可能受《补贴协定》纪律的约束。Third-party Submission of the United States on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, para.9．
2 如《纺织品与服装协定》第9条。上述五项理由，参见Didier Chambovey, "HowtheExpiry D, the Peace Clause (Articlel 3 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.309-311.
1 对第13条的存在有两种可能的解释：其一，当时，成员对第21．1条的真正含义也不清楚，没有意识到第21．1条将起到与第13条相同的效果；其二，第21．1条不能取代第13条。对于后一种可能，意味着“和平条款”是使农产品免于《补贴协定》和GATI'1994纪律的唯一条款。Didier Chambovey, "How theExpiry of the Peace Clause (Article13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.312.
2 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trade System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Geneva, WTO, 1995, p.376.
3 该条英文文本原文为："The provisions of GATT1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement".
4 英文原文为："In the Event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the agreements in Annex 1A as the "WTO Agreement"), the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict."
5 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1038.
1 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002.在欧共体——关税优惠案中，上诉机构似乎将“冲突”概念扩大为包括协定某一条款授予了一项权利，而另一条款却施加了义务。Appellate Body Report on EC-Tariffs Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, para.88.
2 本文作者倾向于第三种方法。
3 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3)，2005，p．789．另外，下列文章也探讨了本案对农产品补贴纪律影响：Karen HMverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause ': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006; Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the VeTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issues Brief, March 2006, http://www.agritrade.org, /Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, ; Stephen J. Powell, Andrew Schmitz, "The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture", 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 287, 2003.
1 即《农业协定》第1(e)条、第9．1条(a)项和(c)项、第3．3条、第8条和第10条；《补贴协定》第1条、第3条，以及附件1《出口补贴例示清单》(d)段。
2 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.141; Panel Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/RW, WT/DSll3/RW, para.6.102; Panel Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/RW2, WT/DS113/RW/2, para.5.178.
3 但欧共体——食糖出口补贴案上诉机构推翻了专家组报告在这一问题上的认定，认为专家组的裁定是“错误地遵循了司法经济原则，并犯了法律上的错误”，但上诉机构拒绝完成专家组的法律分析。See, Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.336.
4 Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, para.7.377.5 在本案提起诉讼时，《农业协定》第13条尚未终止适用，因此，如适用《补贴协定》第3条，首先要判断出口补贴有没有完全符合《农业协定》第五部分的规定，能小能根据《农业协定》第13(c)(ⅱ)条，免于《补贴协定》第3．1(a)条和第3．2条的行动。目前，第13条已经终止适用。
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para. 123.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.569.
3 例如，在欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，第三方美国认为，根据《补贴协定》第3条，如果出口补贴不完全符合《农业协定》，则受《补贴协定》纪律的约束。See, Third-party Submission ofthe United States onEC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, para.9.类似的观点，还可参见Humberto N.Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, p.32; Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.21.但欧共体——食糖出口补贴案上诉机构报告表明，该问题还有诸多不确定因素。Appellate Body Report onEC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283/AB/R, para.339．另可参见本章第三节。
4 在欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，欧共体曾经在提交的材料中坚持，即便证明欧共体提供的补贴违反了《农业协定》，也不适用《补贴协定》。而且，对属于《农业协定》规范范围的产品提供的出口补贴，《补贴协定》不适用。First Written Submission by the European Communities on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras．152-154．美国认为，欧共体的主张与FSC案中DSB的建议和裁决相抵触。FSC案表明，应当同时依据《农业协定》和《补贴协定》分析补贴问题。美国认为，根据《补贴协定》第3条，如果出口补贴不完全符合《农业协定》，则受《补贴协定》纪律的约束。Third-party Submission 0fthe United States onEC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, para.9.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1019-7.1021.
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1024.
3 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1035.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1037.
5 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, footnote 1201 to para.7.1037.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1054-7.1074o
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1072.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.532-533.
1 《农业协定》附件3第7段规定，“综合支持量的计算应尽可能接近该有关基本农产品的第一销售点。针对农产品加工者的措施也包括在内，只要此类措施可使基本农产品的生产者获益。”
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.1058.
3 Appellate Body on Argentina-Footwear (EC), WT/DS121/AB/R, para.81 and footnote 72; Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.23; Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Ⅱ, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p.12, etc.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.538-552.
1 Christian Wurzbacher, "Dispute Settlement: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton ", WTO News: Issues No.12, 7 March2006, http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wton12edoc/$FILE/wton12e.doc, September 19, 2006.
2 张南蕙：《WTO美国高地棉补贴案之研究》，载《经社法制论丛》第38期。
1 Christian Wurzbacher, "Dispute Settlement: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton ", WTO News: Issues No.12, 7 March2006, http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wton12edoc/$FILE/wton12e.doc, September 19, 2006.
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1050-7.1051.
3 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1071.
1 绝大多数观点认为，《补贴协定》第3．1条不禁止符合承诺水平的农产品出口补贴。Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Aericultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(27, 2002, p.347.但也有少数观点，根据《农业协定》第13(c)(ⅱ)条，主张《补贴协定》禁止出口补贴的规定也适用于承诺水平范围内的农产品出口补贴。Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.377.
2 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2) 2002, p.318.
3 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issues Brief, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, p.20.
4 参见张南薰：《WTO美国高地棉补贴案之研究》，载《经社法制论丛》第38期。“此外，和平条款已于2004年1月1日失效，在欠缺和平条款保护下，对农产品的补贴即不可避免地必须同时受到SCM协议及农业协议之规范。针对农业协议与SCM协议之适用关系，虽有农业协议第21．1条及SCM协议第3条之规定，但依据小组及上诉机构之见解，在其对法律冲突采取狭义之解释下，欲主张农业协议优先适用之机会几乎微乎其微。因此将产生对农产品之规范强度远大于一般工业品之情形，例如对工业品之境内支持措施仅受SCM协议规范，但对于农产品之境内支持措施，不但需受SCM协议之规范，尚须受到农业协议下削减义务之拘束。此一不平衡且违反农业协议目的之现象，若无法从争端解决机制中获得解决，最后 可能仍然须循谈判管道解决之。”
1 Appellate Body Report on EC-Hormones, GATT WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para.165.
2 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.339, footnote 537.
1 第7．3条规定，“本协定附件2列举的国内补贴，只要符合附件规定的一般和具体标准，就反补贴措施而言，应被视为不可诉的”。Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, p.L.7.
2 第12条规定，“如果国内支持和出口补贴的使用符合本协定国内支持和出口补贴削减承诺，应推定没有造成总协定第16．1条意义上的严重侵害”。 Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, L.9.
3 第18．2条规定，“在本协定框架下承担的承诺的基础上，参与方在行使总协定下有关改革计划涵盖的产品的权利时，将行使适当的克制。’"Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN. TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, p.L.11.
4 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. IV: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers，1999，p．4．在乌拉圭回合谈判中，欧共体一直坚持，签订一个综合性的农业协定意味着应尽可能限制成员在WTO体制下对措施提出指控。这种观念被称为“和平条款”。Soren F Olsen, "Chapter 2: The Negotiation of Agreement on Agriculture", inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.76.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. IV: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers，1999，p．16．另一项修改是规定如果1991．1992年的出口补贴水平高于 1986-1990平均水平，出口补贴的削减可以1991-1992水平为基准。
6 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.306.
1 《农业协定》第13条(a)项。
2 《农业协定》第13条(b)项。
3 《农业协定》第13条(c)项。
1 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.369.
1 例如，按照美国法律，一旦国内产业以适当地方式提出申请，主管机关就必须发起反补贴调查，并无行使“适当克制”的余地。“适当克制”只意味着成员不主动发起反补贴税调查。但实际上，政府很少主动发起反补贴税调查。美国也只主动发起了一次反补贴税调查。因而，这一规定并无多大意义。Joseph A．McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p.214.
2 Rai Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N.D.L. Rev.681, 2003, pp.823-825.
3 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000, para.25..应当注意的是，有关“和平条款”的争论，似乎是“蓝箱”争论的延伸。一些国家希望维持“蓝箱”支持，并希望维持“和平条款”。Summary Report on the Sixth Meeting of the Special Session Held on 22-23 March 2001，supra note 322, p.5.由于只有少数成员使用“蓝箱”措施，因此，在“和平条款”终止适用后，这类措施更容易招致其它成员的指控。
4 十国集团包括11个在经济、货币和金融事项上进行合作的工业国家，包括比利时、加拿大、法国、德国、意大利、日本、荷兰、瑞典、瑞士、英国和美国(在写作当时)。
5 尤其是，欧共体明确宣布除了对发展中成员有特殊利益的产品，不接受取消农产品出口补贴。但欧共体没有指明这些产品为何。Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, p.26.
6 The End of Peace: The Potential New Era of Litigation at the WTO, Subsidy Watch, Issue 9, February 2007, http://www.globalsubsidies.org/article.php3?id article=19&var mode=calcul, April 6, 2007.
7 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, 0.27.
8 如毛里求斯提议扩大‘‘和平条款”保护的承诺范围，保证所有的成员获得公平对待。WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Negotiating Proposal by Mauritius, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/96, 28 December 2000.埃及要求审查 第13(a)(ⅰ)条，认为该条的使用为某些成员支持农业部门另开了一扇窗。Comprehensive Proposal by the Arab Republic of Egypt to the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/107, 6 February 2001.
1 为此，印度提议，对于满足附件2和协定第6条的措施，应当免于征收反补贴税，免于“非违反之诉”；没有作出削减承诺并被允许使用第9．1条(a)、(b)项列举补贴的发展中成员，免于征收反补贴税。Proposal by India in the Areas of: (ⅰ) Food Security, (ⅱ) Market Access, (ⅲ) Domestic Support, and (ⅳ) Export Competition, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/102, 15 January 2001.加拿大主张只有符合附件2标准的措施才能永久地被视为不能采取反措施的补贴。Domestic Support, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/92, 21 December 2000。尼日利亚提议附件2和第6条下的所有补贴，尤其是投资和投入补贴，均应免于征收反补贴税。WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Proposal by Nigeria, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/130, 14 February 2001.
2 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), 2004, p.27.
3 Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.163.4 Observations on the Proposal for a New Peace Clause, South Center, SC/TADP/TA/AG/1, SC/TADP/TA/DS/2, November 2005, http://www.southcentre.org/publications/AnalyticalNotes/GlobalEconomicGov/2005Nov_peaceclause_proposals.pdf, March 3, 2007, para. 21.
1 在《农业协定》下，每个成员可以提供的国内支持和出口补贴水平不同，故而此处以是否符合《农业协定》作为概括性的标准。
1 参见本章第二节。
2 虽然两个协定使用的是相同的表达方式，即“出口补贴”，但WTO争端解决机构对第9．1条列举的各项出口补贴的解释，已经超越了《补贴协定》下“出口补贴”的范围。具体参见本文第三章第一节。
3 有关争论具体参见第三章第四节。
4 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002: p.310.
5 多哈回合谈判以来，WTO多边谈判与争端解决机制之间的关系开始越来越引人注目。有关论述参见本文第六章。
1 关于对“绿箱”支持进行反补贴调查和征收反补贴税，参见第第六章第二节。
2 对于虽然只有农业部门能获得，但整个农业部门内部都能获得的补贴是否具有“专向性”，目前尚不明确。美国反补贴税条例第351．502(d)节规定，只有补贴在农业部门内部具有专向性，如只限于活牲畜部门或活牲畜部门获得了不成比例的大量补贴，才能征收反补贴税。Didder Chambovey, “How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.310.
3 David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture ", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, pp.983-984.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.421.
1 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.333-334.
2 David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture ", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, p.984.
1 Soren E Olsen, "Chapte2: The Negotiation of Agreement on Agriculture", in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.87.
2 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.337.
3 在该案中，申诉方巴西指控美国的某些国内支持措施对其他成员的利益造成严重侵害，违反《补贴协定》。
4 有关本案的分析，详细参见第六章第四节。
5 Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1, G/L/812, G/SCM/D73/1, G/AG/GEN/74, 11 January 2007.
6 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2); 2002, p.339.
1 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2); 305-352, 2002, p.342.另可参见本节前文。
2 OECD, Market Access, Domestic Support and Export Subsidy Aspects of Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture Implementation in OECD Counties, Joint Working Party of the Committee for Agriculture and the Trade Committee, COM/AGR/TD/WP (2000) 89/FINAL. 21 December 2000, p.64.
3 另外，有观点认为，成员也不能基于农产品市场条件发生不能预料的变化，致使某些补贴对生产者竞争地位的损害性影响大于当时的预期，提起非违反之诉。因为，不能合理期待在9年内市场状况都不发生改变。 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.342.
1 David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, p.989.
2 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002: p.354; David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, p.989.
3 尽管如此，在9年的实施期内，对农产品出口补贴启动反补贴调查的案件非常少。Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), 2004, p.38.
4 Panel Rencort on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.20
5 《补贴协定》第3．1条序言规定，“除《农业协定》的规定外，下列属第1条范围内的补贴应予禁止……”。
1 《农业协定》第21．1条规定，“GATT 1994年和《WTO协定》附件1A所列其他多边贸易协定的规定应在遵守本协定规定的前提下适用。”
2 欧共体曾强烈反对《补贴协定》适用于农产品出口补贴，即使该出口补贴也不符合《农业协定》。欧共体认为，依据《补贴协定》禁止农产品出口补贴，将削弱农业体制的特殊性以及所有成员同意的逐步改革过程。 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS265/R, para.7.377.
3 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-the Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), 2004, p.32.
4 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.21.
5 从WTO争端解决实践来看，申诉方同时根据《补贴协定》第3条提出诉请的动机是出于补贴救济上的考虑。《补贴协定》第4．7条对出口补贴规定了特别的救济方式，即立即撤销补贴；而如果只是认定违反《农业协定》，申诉方只能请求DSB建议被申诉方使其措施与相关协定一致。
6 欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，上诉机构拒绝完成专家组没有进行的法律分析，其理由也很值得注意。上诉机构认为，《农业协定》第3条、第8条、第9．1条和《补贴协定》第3．1(a)条、第3．2条，以及《例示清单》(a)项和(b)项并非“紧密相连”，原因是这两个协定下问题在很多方面都是不同的。Appellate Body Report on EC-ExportSubsidies on Sugar, para.338．这也表明，《补贴协定》和《农业协定》出口补贴纪律体系上的差异。
1 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283/AB/R, para.339.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 532-533.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, footnote 537.
4 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.349.
5 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-the Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1):25-42, 2004, p.34; David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture", Journal of World Trade 37(5) 2003, p.990.
1 依据《补贴协定》，WTO成员不得提供对其他成员利益造成不利影响的补贴。
2 《补贴协定》第3．1(a)条是否适用影响到申诉方胜诉后可获得的救济方式。Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para．336．《农业协定》朱对救济作特殊规定。
1 然而，第10条可否解释为《农业协定》有关农业补贴的特殊规定?本文认为，第10．1条可被视为排除《补贴协定》第3．1条的适用。否则，没有列入第9．1条的出口补贴适用《补贴协定》第3．1条，将是一概直接禁止，不符合第10条反规避纪律的性质。在WTO争端解决实践中，对“规避”的解释导致第9．1条没有列举的出口补贴的纪律非常严格。根据美国——外国销售公司案的解释，成员对减让表没有列举的产品提供出口补贴几乎是不可能的，而这又模糊了适用于减让表列明产品的纪律和没有列明的产品的纪律。
2 该类补贴在《补贴协定》下属于禁止性补贴的类型。因此，问题是符合《农业协定》进口替代补贴本身是否为《补贴协定》禁止，也即《补贴协定》第3条是否适用?只要符合《农业协定》的承诺要求，在《农业协定》下应被视为授权，《农业协定》授权的事项为《补贴协定》禁止，是否适当?在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，专家组和上诉机构报告认定即便是符合成员承诺，有进口替代效果的国内支持也为《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条所禁止。该案专家组和上诉机构的理由足，《农业协定》并未对该条做出具体规定，从而适用《补贴协定》的禁止性规定。参见本章第二节。
1 Decision by the General Council on 31 January 1995, WTO Doc. WT/L/43, 17 February 1995.
2 Notification Requirements and Formats, WTO Doco G/AG/2, 30 June 1995.
1 Notification Requirements and Formats, WTO Doc. G/AG/2, 30 June 1995.
2 如阿根廷曾通报，“根据农业委员会的通报要求(G／AG／2)，阿根廷在2003年12月1日至2004年11月30日，以及2004年12月1日和2005年11月30日之间没有提供出口补贴。”Notification, WTO Doc．G/AG/N/ARG/25.19 December 2006．
3 占列表产品世界出口份额超过5％的成员为“重要出口方”。
1 Notification Requirements and Formats (Adopted by the Committee at its meeting on 8 June 1995), WTO Doc. G/AG/2, 30 June 1995.
2 Issues Regarding Export Subsidy Notifications, WTO Doc.G/AG/W/37, 12 November 1998.
3 虽然美国只通报了1995-2001年国内支持，但美国农业部(USDA)例行公布了历史、当前和预计作物年度的美国农业计划支持。因此，USDA有关补贴支出实际和预计数据一直到2007作物年度都可获得。在起诉美国棉花补贴时，巴西大量使用了USDA公布的数据来源。Randy Schnepfand Jasper Womach, "Potential, Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Cod.e RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, February 21, 2006, CRS-13&14.
4 Negotiations Questions Spill over into RegularAgriculture Committee, 31 October 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news06_e/ag_com_31oct06_e.htm, January 22, 2007.
1 Bernard O'Connor, "The Structure of the Agreement on Agriculture", in Agriculture in the WTO Law, Bernard O' Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.87.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, February 21, 2006, CRS-13.
3 Improving Monitoring and Surveillance Mechanisms, http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/conteudo/proposals_monitoring.pdf, Februaryl3, 2007.
4 Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, para.48.
1 《补贴守则》第10条(“对某些初级产品的出口补贴”)的解释和第9条(“对初级产品外的产品的出口补贴”)的适用存在不同意见，而且，《补贴守则》其他条款，尤其是第8条和“例示清单”第(d)段，也有不同的解释。虽然反补贴税措施运作良好，但有关补贴的纪律实质上陷入僵局。最为明显的表征是争端解决程序无法正常发挥作用，但另一个更为危险的表征是，《补贴守则》运作上的挫折致使政府在《补贴守则》或甚至GAIT体制之外采取反措施。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round：A Negotiating History(1986-1992)，Vol.Ⅰ：Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.838．乌拉圭回合谈判文件也表明当时对反补贴税容易蜕变为保护主义措施存在顾虑。Checklist of lssues for Negotiations, Note by theSecretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/9, 7 September 1987, pp. 3-4.
2 Mike Gifford and Tim Josling, "Trade Litigation in Agriculture: Limiting the Abuse of Trade Remedies", IPC Trade Negotiations Issue Brief, July 25, 2004, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/IBs/tl.pdf, December 21, 2006, p.4.
3 关于“和平条款”，详细参见第五章第三节。
4 Richard Steinberg and Timothy Josling, "When the Peace Ends: Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal.Challenge ", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.382.
1 Note on the Expiry of the Peace Clause: Some Elements for Consideration by Developing Countries, South Center Analytical Note, SC/TADP/AN/AG/7, October 2003, http://www.southcentre.org/publications/AnalyticalNotes/Agriculture/2003Oct_Peace_Clause_Expiry.pdf, March 23，2007，p．6。
2 具体参见第五章第三节。
1 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, P.321.
2 Mike Gifford and Tim Josling, "Trade Litigation in Agriculture: Limiting the Abuse of Trade Remedies", IPC Trade Negotiations Issue Brief, July 25, 2004, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/IBs/tl.pdf, February 16, 2006, pp.8-9.
3 根据WTO网站资料整理。
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.293 and footnote 63.
1 Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, paras.7.380-7.386.
2 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidiess on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.329-335.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.339 and footnote 537.
1 Irina Kireeva and Bernard O'Connor, "Chapter 4: TheAgreement on Agriculture and Dispute Settlement", in Agriculture in the WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.132.
2 关于WTO框架下包括农业补贴在内的补贴争端的简要执行情况，参见William J.Davey, "Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results have been Achieved through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.111.
3 有观点认为，争端解决不应是唯一的执行工具，证明损害的要求严重限制了分类削减补贴的争端解决的可适用性。争端解决最重要的替代方法是透明度。故而，提议在秘书处内部建立一个补贴审查机制，可以确保获得公正的分析，促进国别透明度，对对抗的政府和选民施加有效的压力，降低补贴分析与削减补贴的协定实际执行之间的差距。Konrad von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", IISD Paper, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf, February 22, 2007, p.26.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, KJuwer Law International, 2002, pp.100-101.
2 在这次会议上，贸易政策专家得以讨论各种事项，而无需取得政府的最终同意。下文称之为“1943年会议”。
3 Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1990, pp.9-18.
4 某些谈判参与方，尤其是发展中国家认为，该提案是容许发达国家对发展中国家享有比较优势的产品的生产和销售给予补贴，同时却禁止对发达国家拥有比较优势的非初级产品提供补贴。Melaku Geboye Desta，The Law of lnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.101.
1 第11．2(c)规定：“对以任何形式进口的农产品和鱼制品的进口限制，此类限制对执行下列政府措施是必要的：(ⅰ)限制允许生产或销售的同类国产品的数量，或如果不存在同类国产品的大量生产，则限制可直接替代进口产品的可生产或销售的国产品的数量；或(ⅱ)消除同类国产品的暂时过剩，或如果不存在同类国产品的大量生产，则消除可直接替代进口产品的同类国产品的暂时过剩，使国内消费者的某些群体免费或以低于现行市场水平的价格获得此种过剩：或(ⅲ)限制允许生产的任何动物产品的数量，此种产品的生产全部或主要直接依赖进口商品，如该商品的国内生产相对可忽略不计。根据本款(c)项对任何产品的进口实施限制的任何缔约方，应公布今后特定时期内允许进口产品的全部数量或价值及数量或价值的任何变化。此外，与在不存在限制的情况下国内总产量和总进口量的可合理预期的比例相比，根据以上(ⅰ)目实施的任何限制不得减少总进口量相对于国内总产量的比例，在确定此比例时，该缔约方应适当考虑前一代表期的比例及可能已经影响或正在影响有关产品贸易的任何特殊因素。
2 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.221-222; GATT Panel Report on EEC-Apples (US), L/6513, adopted on 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/135; GATT Panel Report on Canada-Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568, adopted on 5 December 1989, BISD 36S/68.
3 Waiver Granted To The United States in Connection with Import Restrictions Imposed under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as Amended by Decision of of the Contracting Parties of March 5, 1955, BISD 3S/32.1952年，荷兰曾经对美国限制牛奶进口提出指控，认为这些限制并非必要的，并且没有同时限制国内生产，违反了第11．2(c)条。荷兰获得授权，对美国采取报复措施，这在GATT历史上是唯——次。但美国以退出GATT为威胁，荷兰最终放弃采取任何制裁措施。1955年，美国获得了豁免，可以维持对一些农产品设置的进口限制措施，包括食糖、花生和牛奶等。转引自：Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Satatus of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.222.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the Worm Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.223.
2 GATT1947第16．4条规定：“此外，自1958年1月1日或其后可能的尽早日期起，缔约方应停止对除初级产品外的任何产品的出口直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，此种补贴可使此种产品的出口价格低于向国内市场同类产品购买者收取的可比价格。在1957年12月31日之前，任何缔约方不得通过采用新的补贴或扩大现有补贴范围，使任何此类补贴的范围超过1955年1月1日实施的范围。”
3 GATTl947第16．3条规定：“因此，缔约方应寻求避免对初级产品的出口使用补贴。但是，如一缔约方直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，并以增加自其领土出口的任何初级产品的形式实施，则该补贴的实施不得使该缔约方在该产品的世界出口贸易中占有不公平的份额，同时应考虑前一代表期内该缔约方在该产品贸易中所占份额及可能已经影响或正在影响该产品贸易的特殊因素。”
4 第16．4条相当于直接禁止对初级产品之外的产品提供出口补贴，因为出口补贴均具有导致出口价格低于国内价格的效果，除非出口补贴措施不够有效。 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.108.
5 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.223.
6 在1955年，还没有“发展中国家”的概念，但为论述和理解方便，仍然使用该概念。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.107.
2 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds Ⅰ, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86; GAIT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds Ⅱ, DS28/R, 31 March 1992, BISD 39S/91.
3 本争端在乌拉圭回合谈判中起了重要作用。美国以本案为谈判筹码，威胁如果农业谈判不能成功结束，就将对欧共体采取可能的贸易报复。
4 关于何谓“初级产品”，东京回合《补贴守则》中的概念与GATT1947中的概念不同。前者不再包括矿产品。对矿产品提供的出口补贴，在《补贴守则》下一概禁止。关于“初级产品”概念的说明，参见Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, oo.135-137.
5 《补贴守则》第10条的细化规定涉及如何判断“超过世界出口贸易中的公平份额”、什么是“世界出口贸易的公平分额”和“前一代表期”。
6 到1994年，《补贴守则》的缔约方只有下列25个：阿根廷、澳大利亚、奥地利、巴两、加拿大、智利、 哥伦比亚、埃及、欧共体、芬兰、中国香港、印度、印度尼西亚、以色列、日本、韩国、新西兰、挪威、巴基斯坦、菲律宾、瑞典、瑞士、土耳其、美国和乌拉圭。
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.227.
2 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uuuguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer Boston, p.134.
3 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uuuguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer Boston, p.131
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.219-220.
2 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay RoundA Negotiating History (1986-1992), Volume I, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers Deventer, Boston, 1993, p.170.
3 Stefan Tangermann, "Approaches to Export Subsidies: Disciplines for Export Subsidies in Primary and Non-Primary Products ", in Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Critical lssues for the Uruguay Round, Bela Balassa ed., World Bank Discussion Papers, 1989, p.121.
4 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2006: Subsidies, Trade and the WTO, pp.190-194.
1 John R, Magnus, "The Evils of A Long Peace: Legal Consequences of WTO 'Peace Clause' Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation over Farm Subsidies", Presented to the Global Business Dialogue, Washington, DC, htto://www.tradewinsllc.net/oubli/Peace_Clause_GBD_12_03.odf, November 7, 2006, o.4.
2 具体参见东京回合《补贴守则》第8-3条“补贴的一般规定”、第10条“对某些初级产品的出口补贴”、第11条“非出口补贴”。
3 事实上，出口补贴和进口替代措施本身的目的就是扭曲国际贸易的正常流向。
1 Stefan Tangermann and William Miner, Negotiating Stronger GATT Rules for Agricultural Trade, International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, Discussion Papers Series #3, 1990, p.5.
2 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.318.
3 Stefan Tangermann and William Miner, Negotiating Stronger GATT Rules for Agricultural Trade, International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, Discussion Papers Series #3, 1990, Executive Summary.
4 Stefan Tangermann and William Miner, Negotiating Stronger GATTRules for Agricultural Trade, International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, Discussion Papers Series #3, 1990, p.9.
1 参见第四章第一节。
2 参见第三章第一节。
3 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.8.3.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.763.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Integration of Agriculture into WTO Disciplines", inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.41.
1 Bernard O'Connor, "Should There Be an Agreement onAgriculture?" inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron Mav. 2005, o.418.
2 农业补贴问题上存在很多争议。从某种意义上说，是WTO准司法机构与立法机构的不协调。从WTO秘书处的角度来看，WTO是一种机制(Institution)，需要面对的问题是如何让这个机制继续运作下去，起到应当起的作用。对于争端解决中专家组和上诉机构成员应当起的作用，目前也有很多质疑。一些比较激烈的批评者认为，专家组和上诉机构成员实际上行使了立法的职能。
3 Bernard O' Connor, "Should There Be an Agreement on Agriculture ?" in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.421.
4 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations ", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.253.
1 Bernard O' Connor, "Should There Be an Agreement on Agriculture ?" in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, pp.429-430.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Integration of Agriculture into WTO Disciplines", inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.18.
3 依据《WTO协定》第9.2条，只有部长级会议和总理事会可以在监督协定运行的理事会建议的基础上，对协定做出有权解释，有关解释应当以成员四分之三多数通过。这种解释机制迄今为止没有起到什么作用。
4 例如成员对《农业协定》第9．2(b)条解释上的争议，参见第三章第三节。
5 如新近提起的美国——玉米补贴案。该案指控的农业保护措施和援引的法律依据与美国——陆地棉补贴案有很大的相似性。具体参见本章第四节。
1 有学者将WTO的决策权在如下主体问分配：WTO成员方负责立法，根据WTO有关条约修改和制定规则；WTO中的政治组织，如收支委员会、区域性贸易协定委员会等，它们行使行政权力：WTO中的司法机构，专家组、仲裁员和上诉机构行使司法权。参见程红星：《WTO司法哲学的能动主义之维》，北京大学出版社2006年版，第144页。
2 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.792.
3 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, p.1.
4 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.789.
5 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 1995-2005: Lessons from the Past and Future Challenges", in The 14, 'TO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.46.
1 Petersmann, "Reforming the World Trading System ", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.47, Footnote 14.
2 参见DSU第3．2条。
3 笔者认为这种现象可以解释为WTO争端解决机构和成员希望争端解决作为一个机制，可以正常和良好地运作。前上诉机构成员Claus-Dieter Ehlermann曾经撰文指出，上诉机构的每一成员都有意和决心对建设一个新的机制作贡献，希望增强新机制的力量和权威性。Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO", Journal of International Economic Law 6(3), 2003, p.695.
4 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.339, footnote 537.
5 例如该案对出口信贷担保的裁定和多哈同合中制定出口信贷担保纪律的有关谈判。
1 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision ", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006, p.166.
2 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issue Brief, March 2006, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, p.1.
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference." An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2006, p.790.
2 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause ': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2005, pp.166-168.
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1)，2005，p．771．该文认为，上诉机构的条文解释方法使得谈判者知悉其承诺的范围和谈判商定文本的范围。在这方面，条文解释方法使得谈判更为困难。关于WTO协定解释方法上的评论，另外参见：Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, , "Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO", Journal of International Economic Law 6(3), 2003; Susan Esserman and Robert Howse, "The WTO at Trail", Foreign Affairs 82(10), 2003, p.139; Henry S. Gao, "Reflections on the Relationship between WTO Negotiations and Dispute Settlement: Lessons from the GATS", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi. Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes. eds.. Cambridge University Press. 2007. pp.367-380.
2 参见山下一仁，《WTO农业协定的问题和谈判的现状及展望——从乌拉圭回合淡判的参加者的角度观察》，http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/publications/summarv/05050007.html，(访问日期：2006年8月6日)
3 John Greenwald, "WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation ?" Journal of International Economic Law, 6(1), 2003, p.113.
1 例如，在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，美国认为对农产品提供的出口信贷担保等，只能通过谈判解决，但巴西反对。目前为止，该问题尚是多哈回合农业谈判的问题之一。
2 例如，欧共体——食糖出口补贴案和加拿大——奶制品案中，被申诉方认为协定没有关于“交叉补贴”的概念(cross-subsidization)，成员既没有磋商，也没有接受这样的纪律。
3 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R; Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R; Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, paras.107-108; Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.76 & paras.96-97; Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS1-3/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.96-97; Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.262-265 and 267.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DSIO3/AB/RW, WT/DSll3/AB/RW, para.114; Appellate Body Report, Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.132-133 and 140; Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 236.
6 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.237.
7 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.112-113; Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy(Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para. 128.
8 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.209.
9 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.193-200.
10 参见第五章。
1 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 18 December 2001, statement by the representative of the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/116.
2 Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappared, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/141, statement by the representative of Canada, 17 January 2003.
3 Articles 16 and 17 of the DSU.
4 例如，假若对相关WTO协定进行严格解释与专家组和上诉机构的贸易政策取向一致，则倾向于严格解释；假若对协定语言的公平解释允许WTO成员可做出与专家组或上诉机构政策敏感性相背离的解释，专家组和上诉机构往往在解释协定时忽略背离的部分；假若相关协定没有对某个问题作出规定，则专家组和上诉机构会毫不迟疑地以促进其倾向的贸易政策的方法填补空白。John Greenwald, “WTO Dispute Settlement：An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?" Journal of International Economic Law, 6(1), 2003, p.113.该文指责在某些件中，WTO专家组和上诉机构为了达到他们倾向的结果，在解释经过详细谈判确定的贸易协定时，对条文含义做了增加或删减。该文对专家组和上诉机构成员的贸易政策取向倾向提出严厉批评，认为WTO专家组和上诉机构应当有意识地自我限制。白认为担负了自由贸易或者任何其他使命，而非尽可能中立地解释WTO法的专家和上诉机构成员，应当辞职。
5 关于根据《维也纳条约法》公约解释WTO协定的详细论述，参见赵维田刘敬东编著：《WTO：解释条约的习惯规则》，湖南科学技术出版社2006年版。
6 此种解释方法，在加拿大——奶制品案和加拿大——软木材Ⅳ案中，都有体现。“这种解释方法，虽然很简单，但对解释类似《农业协定》那样技术性强、很专门具体的协定条款，则非常实用。”赵维Ⅲ刘敬东编著：《WTO：解释条约的习惯规则》，湖南科学技术出版社2006年版，第120页。
1 如第三章所述农业委员会内关于《农业协定》第9．2(b)条的争论中，新西兰、欧共体认为，假若按照协定的目的和精神解释，也不能凌驾于协定的用语之上。
2 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO", Journal of International Economic Law 6(3), 2003, p.699.
3 某些涉及敏感问题的WTO规则，例如反倾销和补贴规则，是经过反复讨价还价和成员国内立法机构仔细审查后的妥协。乌拉圭回合谈判没有保存有关谈判过程的详细记录，有观点建议在将来谈判中改正这一疏漏，从而专家组在解释不明确的规定时，可以借助于淡判历史。Susan Esserman and Robert Howse, "The WTO at Trail", Foreign Affairs 82(1), 2003, p.139．
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law8(3), 2005, p.791.
2 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issue Brief, March 2006, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 28, 2007, p.20.
1 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 1995-2005: Lessons from the Past and Future Challenges", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.46-47.
2 Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1, G/L/812, G/SCM/D73/1, G/AG/GEN/74, 11 January 2007.
3 2006年7月24日，WTO总干事宣布多哈回合多边贸易谈判陷入停顿。停顿的主要原因是六个核心谈判方，即美国、欧共体、巴西、印度、澳大利亚和日本，在实现本回合农业贸易广泛目标的具休方法上陷入僵局，包括对扭曲贸易的国内补贴进行实质性削减、取消出口补贴和实质性增加农产品的市场准入。
1 Pedro de Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9 No.8 August 2005, p.4.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-8.
3 Canada Initiates WTO Dispute Proceedings against US Farm Subsidies, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-01-17/story2.htm, January 27, 2007.
4 Daniel A. Sumner, "Boxed In: Conflicts between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligations", Center for Trade Policy Studies, December 5, 2005, No.32, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-032.pdf, March 3, 2007, p.3.在影响2007年新农业法的各项因素中，除了预算赤字外，WTO陆地棉补贴案裁决的影响也很重要。“每一种商品都需要参照本案，并决定为符合WTO要求应当作出何种修改。WTO是个伟大的组织，并且在这个 方面服务于我们的目的。我们必须保证新的农业法与WTO一致。”
1 Canada goes to VeTO over U.S. corn subsidies, CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2007/01/08/cornfight.html?ref=rss, February 26, 2007.
2 加拿大对美国农业补贴磋商背景，http://www.fjsme.cn/ctinews/newscontent.asp?newid=(访问日期：2007年3月1日)。
1 市场损失援助支付(MLA)涉及的农产品包括：小麦、玉米、高粱、大麦、燕麦、陆地棉和大米。
2 反周期支付(CCP)涉及的农产品包括：小麦、玉米、高粱、大麦、燕麦、陆地棉、大米、大豆和其他油籽。
3 Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1, G/L/812, G/SCM/D73/1, G/AG/GEN/74, 11 January 2007.
4 Pedro de Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9 No.8 August 2005, p.4.
5 有关美国各时期农业政策的介绍，参见：Matthew C. Porterfield, "U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration of the WTO's Peace Clause", available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960575, April1, 2007.
1 以上对若干支持计划的介绍，参见：Brandom Willis and Doug O'Brien, "Summary and Evolution of U.S. Farm Bill Commodity Titles", The National Agricultural Law Center, htto://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/commodity.html#deficiency, January 29, 2007.
2 关于直接支付和反周期支付，具体内容参见第四章第一节。关于美国农业支持计划的更多信息，还可参见下列研究报告：James Monke, "Farm Commodity Policy: Programs and lssues for Congress", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS 21000, Updated March 8, 2007; Jim Monke, "Farm Commodity Programs: Direct Payments, Counter-Cyclical Payments, and Marketing Loans", CRS Report for Congres, RL33271, March 1, 2006. Aailable at available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 23, 2007关于美国2002年农业法案三项主要支持计划的分析，参见陈建宁：《美国想玩“箱子”转移游戏》，载《WTO经济导刊》，2004年第8期，第15-16页。
3 因为营销贷款计划，如销售贷款收益和贷款差额支付，与生产相关联，因而被通报为“黄箱”措施。
1 Panel Report on Indonesia-Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL, 33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, preamble.
3 Daniel A. Sumner, "Boxed In: Conflicts between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligations", Center for Trade Policy Studies, December 5, 2005, No.32, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-032.pdf, March 5, 2007, p.1
1 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, p.9.
2 Daniel A. Sumner, "Boxed In: Conflicts between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligation "s, Center for Trade Policy Studies, December 5, 2005, No.32, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-032.pdf, March 5, 2007, p.1.
1 Johanns Says No to Farm Bill Extension, WESTERN FARM PRESS,http://westernfarmpress.con/news/3-6-06-Johanns-farm-bill-extension/, April 1, 2007.
2 Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, April 1, 2006.
3 “贸易促进授权”，一般称为“快车道谈判授权”(Fast Track Negotiating Authority)，或TPA，授权总统将经谈判商定的贸易协定提交到国会批准。如果没有该授权，国会有权在审查协定的时候做出修改。这种修改将可能导致多边贸易协定被完全分解。TPA将于2007年7月1日到期。
4 Charles E. Hanrahan and Randy Schnepf, "WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33144, Updated September 12, 2006, available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Feb/RL33144.pdf, March 24, 2007, Summary.
5 CRS Report, WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations, by Charles E. Hanrahan and Randy Schnepf, Updated September 12, 2006, Order Code RL33144, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 24,2007, CRS-4.如提案 H.R.4332; H.R. 4775; S. 2696.
6 传统上，影响农业法的主要因素包括农业经济的状况、联邦预算的情况，以及在农业法制定时国会由谁掌权。但是，当前决策者必须要面对另一个重要因素：当前和将来的贸易政策。陆地棉补贴案影响了当前 贸易政策，可能会迫使修改国内政策。而且，围绕着下一个农业法的辩论也与有关将来多边农业贸易协定的谈判，也即WTO多哈回合谈判，相契合。这样的时机凸现了美国承担的贸易义务对国内政策的重要意义。Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, January 29, 2007.
1 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 24, 2007.
2 关于美国农业补贴面临的WTO诉讼，参见Richard H．Steinberg and Timothy Josling，“When the Peace Clause Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges," Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003; Oxfam International, "Why the EU and the USA must reform their subsidies, or pay the price", Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, available at http://www.oxfarn.org/en/policy/briefingpapers/bp81_truth, Feburary 22，2007．但也有一些贸易专家认为，虽然美国国内支持计划造成了实质性的市场扭曲，仍不可能对美国农业支持提起大量WTO指控。他们认为，WTO起诉具有事实密集性质(fact-intensive nature)，成本很大，并且潜在的不利后果可能超过通过WTO诉讼或争端解决程序获得的潜在贸易收益。Randy Schnepfand Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U. S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-1.
3 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-6.
4 另外参见: Japsper Womach, Coordinator, "Previewing a 2007 Farm Bill", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33037, Updated January 3 2007, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, April 1, 2007.
1 另外可参见: Charles Hanrahan and Jeffrey Zinn, "Green Payments in U.S. and European Union Agricultural Policy", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL32624, Updated November 22, 2005, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, April 1, 2007.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-35.
3 Emily Alpert, "How Does the USDA Farm Bill Proposal Measure Up?" Bridges, Year 11 No.1 February-March 2007, pp.3-4.
1 参见《中华人民共和国加入议定书》总则第7．2条。
2 关于农产品关税平均税率，有不同的计算结果。本数据引自中国代表团官员在2005年WTO农业委员会特会上的发言，Summary Report on the Thirtieth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session Held on 17 March and 19 April 2005，WTO Doc. TN/AG/R/19, 13 May 2005.
3 例如，国内支持方面，综合支持量在WTO成员中(尤其是在发达国家和发展中国家之间)的分配严重不平，允许发达国家使用的综合支持量约为1460亿美元，占适用于所有成员综合支持总量的90％。仅有10个发展中国家系统地计算了本国基期的综合支持量，其余的发展中国家则称其综合支持量为零或负。程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第91页；程国强：《中国农业面对的国际农业补贴环境》，国务院发展研究中心信息网，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/DRCNet.Channel.Web/expert/showdoc.asp?doc id=174671,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
4 张旭东：《生产方式落后我国连续3年出现农产品贸易逆差》，http://business.sohu.com/20070220/n248305722.shtml,(访问日期：2007年4月)。关于近年来中国农产品贸易状况，如贸易增长、贸易结构、贸易方式等，参见程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第115-131页；刘晓昀 毛学峰 辛贤著：《农产品贸易自由化对中国农村贫困的影响》，中国农业出版社2006年版，第15-25页。
5 Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat People's Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, para.20.
1 Will Martin, "Implications of Reform and WTO Accession for China's Agricultural Policies", Economics of Transition, Volume 9 (3) 2001, pp.717-718.
2 袁东明 任品品：《中国加入WTO法律文件解读》(农业篇)，地震出版社2002年版，第229页。
3 Statement of H. E. Vice Minister Long Yongtu at the Fifth Meeting of the Working Party on China's Accession to the WTO, Geneva, 1 August 1997, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/qtzz/wtothsm/t85626.htm, March 3, 2007.
1 参见《中华人民共和国加入议定书》附件8“第152号减让表——中华人民共和国”第四部分第2节，WTO文件号：WT／ACC／CHN／38／Rev．3。
2 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第275页。
3 Alan Matthews, The Possible Impact of China's WTO Membership on the WTO Agricultural Negotiations, http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2001_papers/TEPNo15AM21.pdf, March 3, 2007.
4 WTO Documents: Notification, G/AG/N/CHN/4, 7 September 2004; Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/6, April 5, 2005; Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/10, 25 October 2006.
5 参见最近美国贸易代表办公室(USTR)向国会提交的报告，表示在2007年将继续调查中国农产品出口补贴的使用状况：United States Trade Representative, 2006 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, December 11, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file688_10223.pdf, March 3, 2007.
6 Charles Hanrahan, Congressional Research Service on China/WTO: Memorandum, February 14, 2000, http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/press/release/2000/crswto.html, March 4, 2007.
1 《美国将重点关注中国农产品出口补贴问题》，发布日期：2003年4月4日，中国贸易救济信息网，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsld=201420003727，(访问日期：2007年2月28日)。“据美国《中国贸易指南》报道，近日，美国贸易官员表示，中国违反世贸组织承诺对农产品进行出口补贴，将成为2003年美国政府关注仅次于关税配额问题的另一个重大问题。美国贸易官员表示，在美国农业部预测中国2003年冬季小麦将获得历史性丰收后，美国业界向政府提供了中国小麦在国内、国际市场的购买和销售数据，以提醒政府关注中国可能将出口补贴扩大到小麦出口的问题。目前，美国政府正就此进行对比和分析，以试图找出中国小麦在国际市场的销售价格低于国内市场的证据，和了解中国进行出口补贴的具体做法。据悉，美国业界正在就中国的农产品出口补贴方式和补贴程度进行更为细致的研究，可望在2003年夏季前拿出研究结果。美国贸易官员承认，目前，美国贸易代表办公室还不清楚中国进行农产品出口补贴的具体机制。如美方将此问题诉诸世贸组织，则需要掌握更详细、准确的信息。”据中国农业部官员观点，2002年美国农业出口“没有达到预期”并不能说明问题来自中国。该年对于美国农业来说应是“情况特殊”的一年，美国国内小麦和棉花减产，出口价高于我国国内价格，从而导致进口减少。农业部官员还表示，美国对于中国农产品出口补贴的相关指责，是对中国操作方式“产生了歧义”。中国对玉米等产品确实进行了某种形式的“鼓励”，但这种“鼓励”并没有“补贴”为农民手中的现金，而是通过“促进流通和技术推广”的形式实现的，并不违反WTO有关规定。《解读两大报告：谁动了中美贸易的奶酪》，深圳农业信息网，www.szagri.gov.cn/News/Show.asp?ID=6649，(访问日期：2007年3月1日)。
2 例如，在2001年，猪肉和牛肉的增值税退税为5.2％，但鸡肉为13％。
3 例如，“中国刚刚加入WTO之后，美国产业对中国向玉米提供出口补贴表示关注，虽然中国已经承诺自加入WTO后取消所有的出口补贴。在过去一些年中，中国出口了大量的玉米，包括中国政府库存的玉米，出口价格低于中国国内价格的15-20％。结果是，美国玉米出口商丢失了部分传统亚洲市场份额，如南韩、马拉西亚，而中国却出口了玉米。白2002年以来，美国对中国可能提供的玉米出口补贴与中国进行了双边沟通，其中焦点之一是增值税退税。但2004年，贸易分析表明，中国逐渐成为玉米的纯进口国。似乎表明中国的出口主要是在商业基础上进行的，尽管仍然对中国玉米增值税退税体制表示关注。在2007年，美国将继续调查农业部门里补贴做法和增值税退税体制。美国应尽力保证取消任何山口补贴的使用。”United States Trade Representative, 2006 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, December 11, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file688_10223.pdf, March 3, 2007.
4 《中国加入工作组报告书》，WTO文件号：WT／ACC／CHN／49，2001年10月1日，第233段。
5 Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, Part Ⅳ, para.29.
1 Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, Part Ⅳ, para.31.
2 程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第107页。
3 《中华人民共和国加入议定书》附件8“第152号减让表——中华人民共和国”第四部分第1节；WT／ACC／CHN／38／Rev．3．
4 例如，通过政府采购价实施的市场价格支持，从1996年-1998年，小麦、粳稻和棉花的支持为负值，政府采购价低于外部参考价格：玉米和籼稻1996年亦为负值，自1997-1998年始为正值。对于通过政府保护价对小麦、粳稻、籼稻和玉米实施的市场价格支持，只有玉米的保护为正值。Working Party on the Accession of China, Communication from China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, 19 July 2001.
1 《中国加入工作组报告书》，WTO文件号：WT／ACC／CHN／49，2001年10月1日，第235段。
2 Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/8, 31 March 2006.
3 关于中国使用的具体“绿箱”支持措施，参见蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版，附录3，第247-251页。
4 Working Party on the Accession of China, Communication from China, WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, 19 July 2001, Support Table DS：1；程国强：《加入WTO与中国农业国内支持政策改革》，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new_product/drcexpert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174667,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
5 Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/8, 31 March 2006.
1 Working Party on the Accession of China, Communication from China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, 19 July 2001.
2 Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/8, 31 March 2006.
3 程国强：《加入WTO与中国农业国内支持政策改革》，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new product/drcexpert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174667,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
4 到2006年，全国31个省市区全部免征农业税。与1999年相比，全国农民减负总额达1250亿元人民币，人均减负约140元人民币。2007年加大了对农业生产，尤其是粮食生产的支持力度，免征农业税、取消农业特产税和两税附加，全部免征牧业税。龚锡强：《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，http://lsj.xf.cn/zxx80.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
1 据美国农业部经济研究局报告分析指出，中国2004年对农村基础设施的投入总计达到了1，500亿元人民币(折合181亿美元)，重点改善灌溉设施、乡村道路、沼气设施、小水电、草场围栏、科研和农业高科技园区的建设。而历史上农村基础设施建设经费只有30％左右真正用于农业，大部分被挪作他用。Fred Gale, Bryan Lohmar, and Francis Tuan, "China's New Farm Subsidies", WRS-05-01 February 2005, http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/ers/WRS//2000s/2005/WRS-02-02-2005_Special_Report.pdf, March 3, 2007.
2 2004年7月和9月，“吉林安华农业保险股份有限公司”和“上海安信农业保险股份有限公司”分别获中国保监会批准正式成立并投入运营，开创了中国专业性农业保险的先河，投保农户将获得政府一定比例的保费补贴。《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
3 自2004年以来，农村信用社增加了对农民的小额贷款，主要用于农资购买和再生产投资，如打井、牲畜和肥料购买、果园和温室建设等。截至2006年9月末，全国农村合作金融机构农业贷款余额1.3万亿元，其中农户贷款余额9738亿元。全国2.2亿农户(其中约50％有贷款需求)中，在农村信用社有小额信用贷款和联保贷款余额的农户己达7000多万户，占有贷款需求农户的60％左右。农民贷款难问题得到一定程度的缓解。唐双宁：《银行业与经济社会的协调发展》，2006年11月23日，http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=2863,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。另外，国家政策性银行也增加了对农产品加工企业的贷款力度，中国农业发展银行近年出台了《中国农业发展银行农业产业化龙头企业贷款办法》和《农业科技贷款暂行办法》。
4 2004年开始，中国全面放开粮食收购和销售市场，实现自由流通。6月3日，国务院正式公布了《粮食流通条例》，实施全面的粮食市场化改革。2004年，100％的中国农产品基本实现了市场化，标志着计划体制在中国农业的终结。
5 2004年，浙江省立法机关通过了中国首部有关农民专业合作组织的法规，明确规定农民专业合作组织可以取得法人资格。据悉，十届全国人大业已启动《农民合作经济组织法》的起草工作。农民专业合作组织可以提高农民进入市场的组织化程度、规避市场风险、增强农民的市场竞争力。参见《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月3日)。
6 《中央一号文件连续4年对政策性农业保险提出要求》，http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-01/31/content_514180.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月8日)。
7 来源自中国乡村发现网：《我国粮食直接补贴政策存在的问题》， http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4102,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
1 卢立：《粮食直接补贴怎么补，大有讲究》，中国乡村发现网，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4096,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
2 财政部2007年3月5日第十届全国人民代表大会第五次报告：《关于2006年中央和地方预算执行情况与2007年中央和地方预算草案的报告》，http://www.cfen.cn/loginCt/pageprocess?pageurl=ztkxx/2005-06/29/content_222870.jsp,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
1 李国祥：《现阶段我国农业补贴政策选择》，载《经济研究参考》2003年第72期，第5页。
2 蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版，第220页。
3 褚红梅：《对我国农业补贴政策的思考——丛我国农业特点出发》载《甘肃农业》2006年第5期，第85页。
4 如健全农业保险制度，借鉴美国模式，建立国家农业保险公司，政府进行宏观管理和再保险，由商业保险公司与政府签订合同具体办理。所谓“美国模式”，即农作物保险通过一系列私营保险公司进行，它们负责具休执行，向农民销售和提供具体的保险服务。但政府为这些私营保险机构提供大规模的保费补贴，包括：经营、推销费用和理赔费用补贴，从而使农民以较低的保费率普遍参加农业保险。同时，为了激励私营保险公司开展农作物保险，又向它们提供再保险服务，使私人保险公司获得保险业收益。秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版社2003年版，第44页。
5 蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版，第220-224页：程国强：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2002年版，第209-210页。
6 何忠伟：《中国农业补贴政策的效果与体系研究》，中国农业科学院学位论文，2005年，第143页。
7 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第285-286页。
1 秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版社2003年版，第44页。
2 关于各种具体补贴措施的政策建议，参见财政部财政科学研究所课题组：《中国的农业补贴：形势分析与政策建议》，载《经济研究参考》2004年底75期；甘绍群：《论农业补贴与农业政策性金融》，载《中国农业银行武汉培训学院学报》2005年第3期总第111期，第27页；李国祥：《现阶段我国农业补贴政策选择》，载《经济研究参考》2003年第72期；《我国粮食直接补贴政策存在的问题》，来源自中国乡村发现网，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4102，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
3 例如，2004年中国大米、小麦和玉米的产量为4000亿吨，平均每吨的价格为1500人民币，116亿人民币的补贴只占粮食生产总值不到2％。Fred Gale，Bryan Lohmar, and Francis Tuan，“China's New Farm Subsidies", WRS-05-01 February 2005,http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/ers/WRS//2000s/2005/WRS-02-02-2005_Special_Report.pdf, March 2, 2007.
4 Fred Gale, Bryan Lohmar, and Francis Tuan, "China's New Farm Subsidies", WRS-05-01 February 2005, http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/ers/WRS//2000s/2005/WRS-02-02-2005_Special_Report.pdf, March 15, 2007.
1 Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, Part Ⅳ.
2 全国成本调查机构近期对30个省份881个县16870户农户的种植意向进行了调查。预计今年全国农户户均粮食播种面积9.52亩，与上年持平。粮食仍是今年农业种植的主要品种，占户均总播种面积的68.4％。其中，预计户均播种稻谷3.22亩，比上年增加1.5％；户均播种小麦1.91亩，减少3.1％；户均播种玉米2.7亩，增加3.6％；户均播种大豆1.15亩，减少5.2％。《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，中国粮食储藏科技网，http://www.zlqh.com/shownews.asp?id=213754，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
3 中国“入世”之前关于农业的研究报告表明，谷物类将受到较大的冲击。价廉质优的谷类进口量的增加，将冲击国内小麦、玉米和大豆的生产。主产小麦、玉米、大豆的东北、华北地区农业将受到比较大的冲击。参见余永定 郑秉文主编，宋泓副主编：《中国“入世”研究报告：进入WTO的中国产业》，社会科学文献出版社200年版，第138-140页。
4 原中国加入WTO代表团农业谈判专家组组长程国强先生将入世后中国农业表现不俗归结为下列三项原因：第一，根据全球化的趋势，主动对农业进行了战略性调整。通过推进农业标准化、提升农产品质量、加强农产品专业化和区域化建设等举措，全面提升了农业的竞争能力；此外，更善于利用国内外的农业资源和市场，通过进口原料性、资源性农产品，出口劳动密集型产品，发挥了农业内部的比较优势。第二，中国政府高度重视“三农”问题，采取了一系列支持政策，促进了农业发展。第三，加入WTO步伐恰与由中国经济发展所带来的农业结构的调整转化期相重合，起到了互相促进的作用。张意轩：《中国农业：应对WTO何以表现不俗》，2007年1月5日，《人民日报》海外版，http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-01/05/content_5567446.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
5 美国政府对农用土地每公顷提供高达100至150美元的补贴，我国加入WTO后，目前支持水平只有2％，每公顷补贴合25美元。外国补贴产品的进口，导致国产大豆种植面积减少，价格下跌，但仍然卖不出去。玉米进口的口子拉开后，被认为有可能重蹈大豆的覆辙。杨锋磊：《拿什么保护中国农业?》，载《中国经营报》，2006年8月7日，http://business.sohu.com/20060806/n244644610.shtml，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
1 刘健男：《没有棉花就没有多哈》，载《WTO经济导刊》2007年第4期(总第46期)，第17页。
2 Lamy: China Fulfilling WTO Commitments Well, China Daily, Sep.6 2006, http://english.cri.cn/3130/2006/09/06/262@135641.htm, April 4, 2007.
3 Summary Report on the Thirtieth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session Held on 17 March and 19 April 2005, WTO Doc. TN/AG/R/19, 13 May 2005.
1 农业部软科学委员会课题组编：《假如世贸组织与中国农业》，中国农业出版社2002年版，第236页。
1．赵维田著：《世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度》，吉林人民出版社2000年版。
2．朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2004年版。
3．孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版。
4．程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版。
5．龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版。
6．蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版。
7．秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版2003年版。
8．刘晓昀、毛学峰、辛贤著：《农产品贸易自由化对中国农村贫困的影响》，中国农业出版社2006年版。
9．袁东明、任晶晶编著：《中国加入WTO法律文件解读》(农业篇)，地震出版社2002年版。
10．吴小鹏编著：《国外的农业出口补贴》，中国社会出版社2006年版。
11．朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2000年版。
12．赵维田、刘敬东编著：《WTO：解释条约的习惯规则》，湖南科学技术出版社2006年版。
13．余永定、郑秉文主编，宋泓副主编：《中国“入世”研究报告：进入WTO的中国产业》，社会科学文献出版社200年版。
14．农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版。
15．农业部软科学委员会课题组编：《加入世贸组织与中国农业》，中国农业出版社2002年版。
16．程红星著：《WTO司法哲学的能动主义之维》，北京大学出版社2006年版。
1．彭汉英：《倾听最激烈的“反对者之声”——WTO总理事会七月会议纪实》，载《中国海关》2004年第10期。
2．刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2006年11期。
3．白云：《乌拉圭回合<农业协议>国内支持条款缺陷问题研究》，载《时代法学》2006年第4卷第4期。
4．陈建宁：《“新蓝箱”：农业补贴的隐患》，载《WTO经济导刊》2004年第12期
5．张南薰：《WTO美国高地棉补贴案之研究》，载《经社法制论丛》第38期。
6．陈建宁：《美国想玩“箱子”转移游戏》，载《WTO经济导刊》2004年第8期。
7．李国祥：《现阶段我国农业补贴政策选择》，载《经济研究参考》2003年第72期。
8．褚红梅：《对我国农业补贴政策的思考——丛我国农业特点出发》，载《甘肃农业》2006年第5期。
9．财政部财政科学研究所课题组：《中国的农业补贴：形势分析与政策建议》，载《经济研究参考》2004年第75期。
10．甘绍群：《论农业补贴与农业政策性金融》，载《中国农业银行武汉培训学院学报》，2005年第3期总第111期。
11．卢先垫：《表面文章一大篇：农业框架协议对欧盟国内支持的影响》，载《WTO经济导刊》2005年第1期。
12．刘健男：《没有棉花就没有多哈》，载《WTO经济导刊》2007年第4期。
13．何忠伟：《中国农业补贴政策的效果与体系研究》，中国农业科学院博士学位论文，2005年。
1．唐勇：《如果你要吃饭，农业就很重要》，原载《环球时报》2007年1月19日第17版，http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/14549/5314651.html.(访问日期：2007年2月2日)。
2．《WTO香港会议农业谈判难在何处?》，原载《新京报》，http://news.sohu.com/20051214/n240962143.shtml,(访问日期：2006年9月10日)。
3．《素帕猜：农业是多哈回合谈判的发动机》，http://www.ccatp.com/news/news051212_1.htm,(访问日期：2006年9月6日)。
4．《夜以继日谋求一致——关于第一次修改后的香港部长级会议宣言草案》，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsId=400540000197,(访问日期：2006年10月8日)。
5．山下一仁，《WTO农业协定的问题和谈判的现状及展望——从乌拉圭回合谈判的参加者的角度观察》，http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/publications/summary/05050007.html,(访问日期：2006年8月6日)。
6．李超民：《美国70年来农产品立法与农产品常平仓计划的现实意义》，http://www.shac.gov.cn/hwzc/zc/t20040804_107222.htm,(访问日期：2007年1月16日)。
7．张旭东：《生产方式落后我国连续3年出现农产品贸易逆差》，http://business.sohu.com/20070220/n248305722.shtml,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
8．《美国将重点关注中国农产品出口补贴问题》，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsld=201420003727,(访问日期：2007年2月28日)。
9．程国强：《加入WTO与中国农业国内支持政策改革》，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new_product/drcexpert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174667,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
10．龚锡强：《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，http://lsj.xf.cn/zxx80.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
11．《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
12．唐双宁：《银行业与经济社会的协调发展》， http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?doclD=2863,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
13．《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月3日)。
14．《中央一号文件连续4年对政策性农业保险提出要求》，http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-01/31/content 514180.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月8日)。
15．中国乡村发现网：《我国粮食直接补贴政策存在的问题》，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4102,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
16．卢立：《粮食直接补贴怎么补，大有讲究》，中国乡村发现网，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4096,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
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25. Appellate Body Report on US-FSC (Article 21.5-EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted on 14 March 2006, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report.
26. Panel Report on US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, adopted on 20 July 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
27. Panel Report on EC-Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, WT/DS299/R, adopted on 3 August 2005.
28. Panel Report on Canada-Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted on 20 August 1999.
29. Appellate Body Report on Caanda-Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted on 20 August 1999.
30. Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS/138/R, adopted on 7 June 2000, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report.
31. Appellate Body Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 7 June 2000.
32. Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, adopted on 21 March 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
33. Panel Report on Canada-Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted on 19 June 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
34. Panel Report on Australia - Leather, WT/DS126/R, adopted on 16 June 1999.
18. Panel Report on Brazil - Aircraft (Article21.5 -Brazil), WT/DS46/RW/R, adopted on 21 August 2001.
35. Panel Report on EC - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS301/R, adopted on 20 June 2005.
36. Panel Report on Indonesia - Automobiles, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, and WT/DS64/R, adopted on 23 July 1998.
37. Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted on 21 March 2005.
38. Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, adopted on 27 October 1999, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
39. Panel Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, adopted on 20 March 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
40. Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, adopted on 18 December 2001.
41. Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy(Article 21.5 - New Zealand and USII),, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, adopted on adopted on 17 January 2003.
42. Appellate Body Report on EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted on 19 May 2005.
43. Panel Report on EC- Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, 19 May 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
44. Panel Report on Korea - Various Measures on Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted on 10 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
45. Appellate Body Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 1997.
46. Panel Report on EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/R/USA, adopted on 25 September 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
47. Panel Report on Korea - Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/R, adopted on 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
48. Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Footwear (EC), WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted on 12 January 2000,
49. Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996.
50. Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Ⅱ, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted on 1 November 1996.
51. Appellate Body Report on India-Patents (US), WT/DS50/AB/R, 16 January 1998.
52. Appellate Body Report on Canada-Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 July 1997.
53. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement Ⅰ, WT/DS60/AB/R, 25 November 1998.
54. Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, 25 September 1997.
55 Appellate Body Report on EC-Tariffs Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, 20 April 2004.
56. Appellate Body Report on EC-Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 13 February 1998.
世界贸易组织官方网站：www.wto.org.
国务院发展研究中心信息网：http://www.drcnet.com.cn
中国农业信息网：http://www.globalsubsidies.org
世界贸易法律网：http://www.worldtradelaw.net
贸易与可持续发展国际中心：http://www.ictsd.org
美国国会研究所报告：http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs
美国国家农业法研究中心：http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org
美国凯托研究所：http://www.freetrade.org
加拿大可持续发展国际研究所：http://www.iisd.org
国际粮食与农业贸易网：http://www.agritrade.org
2 为本文写作目的，除特别区分“国内支持”、“国内补贴”等概念外，“农业补贴”包含了《农业协定》下的“国内支持”和“出口补贴”两部分。
1 据经济学家Kym Anderson预测，如果多哈回合将贸易壁垒的一半予以自由化，那么以2005年纯现价计算，全球长期收益将超过220亿美元。如果完全取消贸易壁垒，65％的经济增长将来自于农业和粮食部门。换句话说，即便是乌拉圭回合之后，补贴和关税政策仍然严重扭曲了农业部门。Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006, pp. 149-195.由于补贴对价格有抑制作用，进口粮食的发展中国家将从取消农业补贴中受益还是受到损害，有诸多争论。虽然一些人认为农业补贴将粮食价格维持在较低水平上，有利于发展中国家，但另一些人认为，世界上绝大多数最贫困的人口生活在粮食净出口国，总的来说，取消农业补贴倾向于使穷人获益。尽管发展中国家强调农业补贴问题，但事实上所有WTO成员都能从补贴政策自由化和消除扭曲中获得收益。经济学家的分析还显示农业贸易自由化对发达国家带来的收益要多于发展中国家。
2 以对农业提供巨额补贴和支持的美国为例，美国农、林、渔等部门就业人数只占总就业人口的0.7％，农业年产值只占美国国内生产总值的约1％。唐勇：《如果你要吃饭，农业就很重要》，原载《环球时报》2007年1月19日第17版，http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/14549/531004651.html，(访问日期：2007年2月2日)。
3 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36(6), 2002, p. 1089.以美国对棉花提供的补贴为例，美国棉花补贴计划每年导致贝宁、布基纳法索、马里和其他国家损失数百万美元的出口收入。在2002-2003年度，美国棉花补贴对巴基纳法索造成的出口损失预计超过该年美国对该国提供的外国援助。再例如贝宁，补贴导致的出口损失超过外国援助的一半。在美国棉花补贴争端中，贝宁是争端第三方。调查表明，在贝宁，95％的乡村居民每日生活费低于1美元，棉花价格下跌了40％，导致棉花种植者的收入降低了21％。这反过来导致贝宁大约33万人低于贫困线。由于在最近若干年中，棉花世界价格下跌了不止40％，数据表明美国补贴政策在很大程度上导致了贝宁和其他Ⅲ口棉花的最不发达国家的经济萧条。从贝宁的情形看，补贴政策可通过扭曲价格，损害其他国家与其有竞争关系的生产者，背离自由贸易。有关数据和资料参见：Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006, pp.149-195.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.1.
2 国际乐施会(Oxfam International)是国际发展及救援的非政府组织，1942年，由Canon Theodore Richard Milford在英国牛津成立，原名为“Oxford Committee for Famine Relief”，目的是在二战中向被同盟国封锁的、德国纳粹占领的希腊运送食粮到。1963年，加拿大成立了第一家海外分会。1965年起改以电报地址OXFAM作为名称。参见：http://www.oxfam.org.hk/public/contents/article?ha=&wc=O&hb=&hc=&;revision％5fid=22613&item％5fid=1178，(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
3 Oxfam International, Truth or Consequences: Why the EU and the USA must reform their subsidies, or pay the price, Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp81_truth.pdf, September 12, 2006.
1 例如：J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969; Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1990.
2 在2000年之后，尤其是近一、两年来，国外有关WTO农业补贴纪律的法律研究明显增多。例如：Bernard O'Connor ed., Agriculture in WTO Law, Cameron May, 2005; Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Oxford University Press, 2006; Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002; Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002; Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the State of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002; Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149; Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System" at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003.另外，还有一些法律著作以相当大的篇幅论述了农业补帖问题。例如：Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006; Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer eds., The World Trade Organization: Legal Economic and PoliticalAnalysis, Springer, 2005. 具体参见本文外文参考文献。
1 例如赵维田著：《世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度》，吉林人民出版社2000年版；程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版：龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版；农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版；蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版；秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版2003年版；袁东明 任晶晶编著：《中国加入WTO法律文件解读》(农业篇)，地震出版社2002年版；吴小鹏编著：《国外的农业出口补贴》，中国社会出版社2006年版等。
1 WTO, Trade Statistics (2003)。转引自Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride towards the Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System' at The WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003, p.490.
2 The WTO Secretariat, Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.51.
3 Thomas C. Beiede, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36 (6), 2002, p.1090.
4 东京回合《补贴守则》具体内容参见本章第二节。
5 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC, 20 September 1986.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. 1993, p.133.
2 20世纪70年代是国际农产品贸易少有的黄金时期，受一系列因素的影响，市场出现了罕见的产销两旺。虽然市场形势减轻了国内农业政策的压力，主要发达国家反而提高了农业支持水平，以进一步刺激农业生产。到了80年代，受世界经济衰退和宏观经济不稳定的影响，世界农产品消费量增长趋缓，农产品价格下跌。但与此同时，在技术进步和政府农业支持的推动下，发达国家的农业生产却持续不断地扩大。当不断增长的产量遭遇日益萎缩的需求，发达国家的农业政策便不可避免地陷入了内忧外患之中。龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第114-115页。
3 Robert Wolfe, Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime, Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 73.转引自龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第115页。
4 欧元是埃居的后继货币。在1993年12月31日之前，使用的是埃居，从2000年1月起启动欧元。但埃居和欧元的内在价佰相等。欧洲央行规定，1欧元等于1埃居。
5 Christopher Ritson & David Harvey, The Common Agricultural Policy, CAB International, 1997, p. 55.转引自龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第115页。
6 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.28.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.133.
2 K.A.Ingersent, A.J.Rayner and R.C.Hine eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp.1-3.
3 Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc.G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
4 《WTO香港会议农业谈判难在何处?》，来源：《新京报》，http://news.sohu.com/20051214/n240962143.shtml，(访问日期：2006年9月10日)。
1 Jim Monke, "Farm Commodity Programs: Direct Payment, Counter-Cyclical Payment, and Marketing Loans", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL21779, Updated December 13, 2004, www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS21779.pdf, September 9, 2006, pp.5-6. 例如，美国世界上最大的玉米生产国和出口国。美国占有世界玉米产量的40％，出口量的60％。但美国玉米在世界市场上的成功，只是凭借美国农业部提供的巨额补贴才成为可能。如果没有这些补贴，美国一大部分玉米生产都没有利润。按照美国农业部的统计，在2005之前五年中，每个种植玉米的农民每种植一亩玉米就要损失230美元，整个玉米部门损失达到200亿美元。然而，政府提供的补贴远远弥补了损失，在同一时期达到250亿美元。如果没有补贴，美国的玉米生产和出口量都会降低，世界玉米价格也会更高。经济分析表明，假若不提供销售信贷和反周期支付，2004年美国玉米产量将下降15％，不存在出口，世界价格上升比率超过7％。参见Daniel Sumner, "Boxed in: Conflicts Between US Farm Policies and WTO Obligations", Appendix 1, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6816, September 10, 2006; Oxfam International, "Truth or Consequences: Why the EU and the USA Must Reform Their Subsidies, or Pay the Price", Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp81_truth.pdf, September 12, 2006.
2 T. Josling and S. Tangermann, "Production and Export Subsidies in Agriculture: Lessons from GATT and WTO Disputes Involving the US and the EC", in The WTO and Agriculture, Kym Anderson and Tim Josling eds., Volume Ⅱ, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005, p.232.
1 K.A.Ingersent, A.J.Rayner and R.C.Hine eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, St. Martin's Press, 1994 pp.1-3.
2 Konrad Von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", International Institute for Sustainable Development, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf September.18, 2006, p.25.
3 《素帕猜：农业是多哈回合谈判的发动机》，2005年12月12日，http://www.ccatp.com/news/news051212_1.htm，(访问日期：2006年9月6日)。
4 关于GATT／WTO体制下农业补贴特殊安排的具体原因和发展演化，参见本文第六章第一节。赵维田先生的著作曾将各国政府农业保护有理的种种论调概括为：“自给自足，安全所系”、“农产品价格需要稳定”和“田园风光作为文化遗产”等。赵维田著：《世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度》，吉林人民出版社2000年版，第246-247页。
1 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 18, 2006.
2 这些成员提出的提桑依次为：WTO Doc．G/AG/NG/W/90；G/AG/NG/W/91；G/AG/NG/W/94；G/AG/NG/W/96；G/AG/NG/W/98；G/AG/NG/W/101；G/AG/NG/W/103；G/AG/NG/W/135；G/AG/NG/W/140．
3 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Sept. 18, 2006.
4 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
1 Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.11.
2 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.99.
3 成员对谈判主要问题的侧重点也有不同认识。一些成员认为《农业协定》第20条的授权包含了三个方面：出口补贴、国内支持和市场准入。在适当的情况下，考虑非贸易关注和给予发展中国家的特殊和差别待遇。其他成员认为非贸易关注、给予发展中国家的特殊和差别待遇以及“三大支柱”构成五个独立的问题。但所幸目前为止没有对谈判进度产生影响。WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Sept. 18, 2006.
4 Joseph A. McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal Economic and Political Analysis, Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p.218.
5 Konrad Von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", International Institute for Sustainable Development, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade cancun research paper.pdf, September.18, 2006, p.23.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations ", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.220.
2 《日本经济新闻》：古德雷特表明美国对农业谈判的最终立场，2006．6．15。转引自刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》，2006年第11期，第5页。
3 Joseph Stiglitz, "Reasons behind the Demise of the Doha Development Round", Taipei Times, http://taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/08/15/2003323304, October 1, 2006.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.387.
5 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36(6), 2002. p.90.
1 Celso Amodm, "The New Dynamic in World Trade is Multipolar", Published in the Financial Times on 4 August 2004, http://www.brazil.org.uk/newsandmedia/ar20040804.html, October 1, 2006.
2 Giovanni Anania, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, pp.539-574.
3 美国1933年的五个农业法案开创了对农业实施保护的先河。参见Miguel Antonio Figueroa, "The GATT and Agriculture: the Past, Present and the Future", 5-FALL Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 93, 1995.
4 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization-Uruguay, Doha, and Beyond", Journal of World Trade 36 (6), 2002, p.90.
5 Celso Amorim, "The new dynamic in world trade is multipolar", http://www.brazil.org.uk/newsandmedia/ar20040804.html, February2, 2007.
6 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006, pp.190-191.
7 在讨论建立国际贸易组织的过程中，曾要求绝对禁止所有形式的非关税措施，并一概禁止出口补贴。唯 一的例外是在贸易支付发生危机时，授权使用数量限制。但在农业方面，若干国家要求特别对待。美国和英国都提出需要借助数量限制措施保护国内市场免受世界价格的影响。1946年美国起草和提交的《国际贸易组织宪章草案》禁止导致出口价格低于国内价格的所有出口补贴，但对长期供给过度的产品提供的出口补贴除外。按照美国农业计划，出口受到补贴的绝大多数产品都属于这一例外类别。参见Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1990, pp.15-18. 关于农业在GATT／WTO体制下的特殊安排，参见本文第六章第一节。
1 GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Updated 6th Edition, 1995, p.411. GATT第16．1条规定：“如任何缔约方给予或维持任何补贴，包括任何形式的收入或价格支持，以直接或间接增加自其领土出口的任何产品或减少向其领土进口的任何产品的方式实施，则该缔约方应将该补贴的范围和性质、该补贴对自其领土出口、向其领土进口的受影响产品的数量所产生的预计影响以及使该补贴成为必要的情况向缔约方全体做出书面通知。在确定任何此类补贴对其他任何缔约方的利益造成或威胁造成严重侵害的任何情况下，应请求给予何关补贴的缔约方应与其他有关缔约方或缔约方全体讨论限制该补贴的可能性。”
1 在智利与澳大利亚之间的硫酸铵补贴案中，尽管澳大利亚政府没有将维持补贴的情况通知缔约方全体，但该案工作组认为智利政府没有因为澳大利亚政府没有通知缔约方全体而受到损害。在澳大利亚当局决定停止对硝酸钠提供补贴前，智利政府有机会与其讨论。澳大利亚政府与智利政府已经讨论了限制补贴影响的可能性，并且也已经与缔约方全体讨论了该问题。Working Party Report on Austrialian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950, BISD Ⅱ/188, para.10.
2 然而，1961年“补贴小组”的一份有关GATT第16条的报告认为既没有必要，也不可能对“补贴”做出协商一致的解释。而且，专家小组认为，在实践中，“补贴”一词缺乏界定没有影响到第16条的适用。Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987, p.49.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law oflnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.104.
4 GATT1947第16．3条规定，“因此，缔约方应寻求避免对初级产品的出口使用补贴。但是，如一缔约方直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，并以增加自其领土出口的任何初级产品的形式实施，则该补贴的实施不得使该缔约方在该产品的世界出口贸易中占有不公平的份额，同时应考虑前一代表期内该缔约方在该产品贸易中所占份额及可能已经影响或正在影响该产品贸易的特殊因素。”
1 GATT第16．4条规定：“此外，自1958年1月1日或其后可能的尽早日期起，缔约方应停止对除初级产品外的任何产品的出口直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，此种补贴可使此种产品的出口价格低于向国内市场同类产品购买者收取的可比价格。在1957年12月31日之前，任何缔约方不得通过采用新的补贴或扩大现有补贴范围，使任何此类补贴的范围超过1955年1月1日实施的范围。”
2 Melakn Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.107.
3 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.135.
4 参见GATT附件Ⅰ“注释和补充规定”对GATT第16条B节的解释。
5 GATT Panel Report on France-Wheat Exports, adopted on 21 November 1958, L/924, BISD 7S/46.
6 United States-Request for Consultation under Ariticle ⅩⅫ:1 on European Communities-Export Refunds for Wheat Flour, GATT Doc. L/5014, 8 August 1980.
7 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Wheat Flour Subsidies, SCM/42, 21 March 1983, unadopted, para.2.3.
1 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Pasta Subsidies, SCM/43, 19 May 1983, unadopted, para.4.2.
2 《哈瓦那宪章》第28(1)条规定，“如任何成员提供任何形式的补贴，直接或间接地维持或增加自其领土任何初级产品的出口，则该补贴的实施不能维持或增加该成员在该产品世界贸易中的公平份额。”转引自：Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.115.
3 参见GATT附件Ⅰ“注释和补充规定”对GATT第16．3条的解释。
4 GATT Panel Report on France-Wheat Exports, adopted on 21 November 1958, L/924, BISD 7S/46, paras.15-19.
5 Report of Working Party on Article ⅩⅫ:2 Consultations on United States Export Subsidy on Unmanufactured Tobacco, L/2925, 20 November 1967, paras. 21-22..
1 GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290.
2 GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290, para.4.17.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.115-119.
4 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p. 136.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.107.
6 “如一缔约方认为，由于下列原因，它在本协定项下直接或间接获得的利益正在丧失或减损，或本协定 任何目标的实现正在受到阻碍，(a) 另一缔约方未能履行其在本协定项下的义务，或 (b) 另一缔约方实施任何措施，无论该措施是否与本协定的规定产生抵触，或 (c) 存在任何其他情况，则该缔约方为使该事项得到满意的调整，可向其认为有关的另一缔约方提出书面交涉或建议。任何被接洽的缔约方应积极考虑对其提出的交涉或建议。”
1 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86, para.144.
2 Report of Review Working Party Ⅲ on Barriers to Trade Other Than Restrictions on Tariffs, L/334, 1 March 1955, para.13.
3 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.333.
1 Working Party Report on Austrialian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950, BISD Ⅱ/188, para.12; GATT, Analyticallndex: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Updated 6th Edition, 1995, p.611.
2 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86, paras.147-148.
3 依据《补贴守则》第8．3条(b)项，缔约方应当寻求避免通过使用任何补贴，使另一缔约方在总协定下直接或间接获得的利益丧失或减损。(b)项脚注24规定，总协定项下直接或问接产生的利益包括在总协定第2条下产生的关税减让约束的利益。但其用词为包括(include)，故并非排他性列举。
1 Joseph A. McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Patrick EJ. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, pp.195-196.
2 英文全称："The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles Ⅵ, ⅩⅥ, and ⅩⅩⅢ of the GATT".
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.134.东京回合《补贴守则》只有24个缔约方，并且只对损害进口国市场的补贴规定了纪律。与《补贴守则》相比，乌拉圭回合《补贴协定》还对下列两种情形规定了纪律，即进口替代(限制向补贴提供国的进口)和第三国市场取代或阻碍。
1 《补贴守则》第9条所附脚注29。
2 《补贴守则》第10．2(b)条规定，“超过世界出口贸易公平份额”应当包括考虑到世界市场的变化，缔约方提供的出口补贴导致取代另一缔约方出口的任何情形。但是，美国的上述提议与“取代”标准到底有多大的差异，令人怀疑。
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law oflnternational Trade in Agricuhural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 140.
4 GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290, para.4.17.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law oflnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.143.
1 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Wheat Flour Subsidies, SCM/42, 21 March 1983, unadopted, paras. 5.5-5.3.对于本案专家组的结论部分，存在两种观点，一种观点赞同认为确实“公平份额”标准有内在固有的困难：但另一种观点认为本案专家组主观上实践该条的立法意图。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.145.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.369-370.
3 Elements of the Negotiating Framework, Submission by the European Community, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/31, November 27, 1989, p.1.
1 Piece Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EU Law, Cameron May, 1999, p212.
2 例如：GATT Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅰ, SCM/83, 3 June 1987, unadopted, BISD 34S/194; GATT Panel Report on US-Non-Rubber Footwear, SCM/94, adopted on 13 June 1995, BISD 42S/208; GATT Panel Report on Canada-Manufacturing Beef CVD, SCM/85, 13 Ocotober 1987, unadopted; GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86; GATT Panel Report on US-Canadian Pork, DS7/R, adopted on 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30; GATT Panel Report on Canada-Grain Corn, SCM/140 and Corr.1, adopted on 26 March 1992, BISD 38S/411; GAFF Panel Report on US-Wine and Grape Products, SCM/71, adopted on 28 April 1992, BISD 39S/436; GATT Panel Report on US-Norwegian Salmon CVD, SCM/153, adopted on 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/576; GATT Panel Report on Brazil-EEC Milk, SCM/179, adopted on 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/467; GATT Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅰ, SCM/185, 15 November 1994, unadopted. GATT Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅱ, SCM/162, 19 February 1993.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.370.
4 20世纪80年代初期提起的农产品补贴争端有：澳大利亚与欧共体之间有关欧共体食糖出口补贴的纠纷、美国和欧共体之间有关欧共体罐装桃、罐装梨和葡萄干国内补贴的纠纷等等。
5 Ministerial Declaration, GATT Doc. L/5424, adopted on 29 November 1982, pp.11-12.
1 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp.92-93.
2 GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future: The Leutwiler Report (1987), at 9. 转引自Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.170.
3 GATT, Trade Policies for a Better Future: The Leutwiler Report (1987), at 44. 转引自 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.170.
1 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC, Declaration of 20 September 1986, p.6.
2 Timothy E. Josling, Stefan Tangermann & T. K. Wadey, Agriculture in the GATT, ST. Martin's Press, 1996, p.140.
3 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.172.
4 United States Prooosal for Negotiations on Agriculture. GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGS/W/14, 7 July 1987.
5 美国初始谈判立场遭到其他谈判方的反对。有些国家认为美国是在建议农产品贸易应当比制造业和服务业更为自由化。例如，日本虽然认为国际农产品贸易危机基本上是由过度生产和出口竞争造成的，因而支持取消出口补贴，但却反对美国的其他绝大多数提议。日本认为农业应当与其他部门区别对待，美国的提案过于雄心勃勃。John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.96.
6 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 96.凯恩斯集团由农产品出口国组成，在1987年10月份的联合提案中，凯恩斯集团表示，农业补贴方面的长期目标是制定GATT规则和纪律，禁止使用所有的补贴和影响农产品贸易的其他政府支持措施。Cairns Group Proposal to the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/21, 26 October 1987, para.11.但根据凯恩斯集团的方案，农业政策改革应分三个步骤进行：(1)将出口补贴、国内支持和进口限制冻结在现有的水平，阻止其进一步增长，并通过短期的补贴削减和市场准入措施改善农产品贸易状况：(2)根据总体支持削减目标，通过减让表的方式逐步削减和消除 贸易扭曲措施；(3)通过谈判创设新的多边规则，将农产品贸易完全纳入GATT纪律的有效约束之下，具体包括禁止所有GATT未明确认可的进口限制，取消所有豁免，约束并削减所有农产品关税，以及禁止所有影响农产品贸易的补贴和政府支持措施。龚宇著：((WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第118页。
1 在20世纪80年代末和90年代初，共同农业政策效率低下已经很明显。欧共体承认需要改革，但是希望在国内背景下改革，而不是放在乌拉圭回合中。共同农业政策使用出口补贴处理剩余生产，因此，共同农业政策，尤其是其中包含的出口补贴成分，被主要粮食出口国视为当时世界农业面临的很多问题的根源。因此，共同农业政策成为很多国家提案的对象。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A NegotiatingHistory (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.178.
2 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.179.
3 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.99.
4 Mid-Term Agreement on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN/TNC/11, 21 April 1989, paras5-6.
1 具体参见：Mid-Term Agreement on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN/TNC/11, 21 April 1989, para.7.
2 例如，美国认为消除世界农产品市场的扭曲和限制，就必然要求取消农业出口补贴。在农业协定中期审议之后，美国再次提出要在10年内取消出口补贴。欧共体也再次提出了之前的“重新平衡”的观点和综合支持量(AMS)，谈判为削减确定一个总体目标，但每一缔约方可自由决定达到目标的方法，灵活地削减国内支持和出口补贴。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.209.
3 Framework Agreement on Agriculture Reform Program: Draft Text by the Chairman, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170, 11 July 1990, para.18.
4 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第131页。
5 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991.
6 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products:From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.210.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.4.
2 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.16.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade inAgricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.212.
4 J. Hillman, "The US Perspective", in K. Ingersent, A. Rayner, and R. Hine eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, St. Martin's Press, 1994, p.51.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, pp.173-175; John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.203.
6 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.203.
1 Proposal of the European Commnity for Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/20, 26 October 1987; Global Proposal of the European Community on the Long-term Objectives for the Multilateral Negotiation of Agricultural Questions, GATr Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/145, 19 December 1989.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade inAgricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer La.w International, 2002, p.289.
3 因此，主要农产品出口国都认为欧共体的提案背离了谈判的总体目标。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.179.
4 Framework Agreement on Agriculture Reform Program: Draft Text by the Chairman, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170, 11 July 1990, paras.2-11.
5 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System:A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.206.
6 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Second and Revised Edition, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p.208.
1 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p. 35. 该微量支持水平最终反映在乌拉圭回合《农业协定》第6．4条(a)项和(b)项中。
2 这类措施包括欧共体的补偿支付和美国的差额补贴。参见：Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.4;
3 这意味着只要满足综合支持总量的削减承诺，成员可以自由地上调或下调提供给特定产品的支持水平。
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.393; Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.4.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.16.
6 Joseph A. McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and PoliticalAnalysis, Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p189.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.6.
2 关于国内支持措施的经济理论和影响，参见：Cliff Stevenson and Ilaria Filippi, "Distorting the Truth? The Economics of Domestic Farm Subsidies", International Trade Law & Regulation, 10(3), 2004, pp.50-58.
3 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.6.
4 参见《农业协定》序言。
1 Joseph A. McMahon, "The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and PoliticalAnalysis, Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p.228.
2 在实施期内，共同农业政策是欧盟财政最大的一项支出(占全部的42％)。由于欧共体农民已经依赖大量的补贴，改革是一个争议非常大的内部政策。U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, "World Trade Organization: Early Decisions Are Vital to Progress in Ongoing Negotiations ", Report to Congressional Requesters 13, Sept. 2000, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-879, October 2, 2006.
3 Matthew Newell, "Cotton, U.S. Domestic Policy, and Trade Wars: The Future of Agricultural Negotiations ", 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 301, 2005, p.306.
1 《农业协定》第20条认识到，改革的进程正在继续，并且，继续改革进程的谈判应当在实施期结束前一年启动。谈判的目标是继续推进重大改革，以实质性地削减农业支持和保护。
2 1999年在西雅图召开的部长级会议未能发起新一轮淡判，主要的失败原因被认为是缺乏充分的准备和有效的谈判框架，很多发展中国家无法有意义地参与谈判。
3 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7 and 8 February 2000, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/53, 15 March 2000.
4 有学者认为，多哈回合农业谈判的授权是雄心勃勃的，服务业补贴的谈判是非常不确定的，一般补贴规则的谈判是非常适中的。Konrad von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", IISD Paper, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf, October 5, 2006.
5 有关成员对出口补贴和国内支持关键问题的立场等具体问题，参见本文第三章和第四章。
6 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Septermber 9, 2006.
1 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, Septermber 9, 2006.
1 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 26, 2006.
2 有关补贴的谈判，分散在农业委员会、规则委员会和服务贸易理事会中。渔业补贴谈判在规则谈判组中，但单独谈判。
1 Draft Ministral Declaration, Fourth Session, Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, para.13.
2 Draft Ministral Declaration, Fourth Session, Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, para.13.
3 Thomas C. Beierle, "Agricultural Trade Liberation——Uruguay, Doha and Beyond", Journal of Word Trade 36(6), 2002, pp.1089-1110.
4 孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第3-4页。
5 Negotiations on Agriculture: "Overview, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/AG/6, 18 December 2002.
6 Negotiations on Agriculture First Draft of Modalitiesfor the Further Commitments, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, WTO Doc.TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003.
1 Summary Report on the Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/AG/R/7, 24 March 2003.例如，新西兰要求谈判遵守和捍卫多哈授权。多哈授权是牵扯到未来世界贸易和世界经济的、广泛的政治承诺。新西兰和凯恩斯集团不希望看到部长们在多哈达成的广泛的政治性授权，由于少数发达的农业保护主义者的撺掇而被日内瓦的委员会官员改写。尤其是这些国家在过去50年中从工业品贸易自由状态中获得利益。虽然改革的过程不容易，但是世界上其他地方的农业生产者也很不容易。无论他们的生产效率多高，不管他们多依赖农业，都被迫与北半球发达国家的国库进行竞争。哥伦比亚认为草案在削减国内支持方面尤其不够充分。中国要求主席的第二稿模式应当在取消出口补贴、规范和削减出口信贷以及实质性削减国内支持方面做出更大程度的规定。欧共体则强调包括市场准入、国内支持、出口竞争、特殊和差别待遇、非贸易关注内在的所有领域的平衡，以及可行性。
2 Negotiations on Agriculture First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments Revision, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003.
3 Negotiations on Agriculture, Stuart Harbinson, WTO Doe. TN/AG/10, 7 July 2003, para.8.
4 Agriculture Modalities: Deadline Missed, Eyes Now on Cancun, 7 Bridges-Weekly Trade News Digest, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-04-02/story1.htm, September 22, 2006.
5 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where WeAre Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agrie_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 22, 2006.
6 EU-US Joint Text on Agriculture, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/anania/WTO/EU-US％20joint％20text％20on％20agriculture％20(Aug％2013,％2003).PDF, September 22, 2006.
1 Agriculture: Real Negotiations Start as EC, US Table Joint Moralities Text, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Volume 7, Number 28, Aug. 21, 2003, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-08-21/story2.htm, September 22, 2006.
2 Agriculture-Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, E1 Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(03)/W/6, September 4, 2003.
3 孙振字主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第4页。
4 Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev. 2, Annex A, 13 September, 2003.
5 Preparations for the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference: Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Second Revision, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev. 2, 13 September 2003, para.4.
6 Patrick A. Messerlin, "Agriculture in the Doha Agenda", prepared for World Bank Roundtable on Policy Research in Preparation for the 5th WTO Ministerial 1, http://www.econ.worldbank.org/files/25198_wps3009.pdf, October 22, 2006.
7 Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad & Mali, WTO Doc. TN/AG/GEN/4, 16 May 2003.
1 孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第32页。
2 孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第5页。例如，2004年1月11日，美国谈判代表Zoellick写信给WTO各部长，建议集中于农业、工业品和服务关键领域。5月9日，欧盟委员Pascal Lamy和Frans Fischler写信表示如果其他成员愿意在欧盟关注的某些问题上做出让步，欧盟也愿意做出一些让步，包括谈判确定一个取消出口补贴的最后日期，放弃四个“新加坡”议题当中的三个议题，只剩下争议比较少的贸易便利化。WTO总干事素帕猜参加了几乎所有的贸易部长集会，并对发展中国家给予特别关注。这些会议包括2004年5月初在塞内加尔首都达喀尔召开的最不发达国家贸易部长会议、5月13-14日在巴黎召开的OECD部长会议、5月底在卢旺达首都基加利召开的非洲联盟贸易部长会议等。参见：WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where tire Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, September 23, 2006.
3 例如，多米尼加共和国谈判代表对七年前发达成员要求发展中和最不发达成员让步，七年后仍然要求他们让步表示愤慨，对多哈回合是“发展的回合”提出质疑，认为发达成员只考虑自己的利益，不接受发展中成员的意见。发达成员要求发展中成员降低关税，可自己却维持水平很高的国内补贴，编出“新蓝箱”、“敏感产品”之类的新名词，对发展中成员不公平、不公正。参见彭汉英：《倾听最激烈的“反对者之声”——WTO总理事会七月会议纪实》，载《中国海关》2004年第10期，第39页。
1 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc.WT/L/579, 2 August 2004.
2 Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, p.542.
3 Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, pp.539-574.
4 Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, Annex A, 2 August 2004, paras.13-15.
1 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, p.3.该文认为，鉴于可能提出的各种理由、发达成员的实力和财政力量，多哈许下的诺言可能会遭遇挫败。
2 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, pp.3-4.; 卢先堃：《表面文章一大篇：农业框架协议对欧盟国内支持的影响》，载《WTO经济导刊》2005年第1期，第69页。
3 另外，协议还明确规定了“灵活性”，如果被用于将政治敏感产品排除在将来协议之外，将在相当大地程度上限制协议的范围。Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, "The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects", European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32(4), 2005, pp.539-574.
4 参见孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年，第30-32页：Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, Annex A, 2 August 2004, para.47.
1 Agriculture Negotiations: Status Report Ⅱ Looking Forward to the Hong Kong Ministerial, Assessment by the Chairman, WTO Doc. TN/AG/19, 1 August 2005, para.4.
2 Agriculture Negotiations: Status Report Ⅱ Looking Forward to the Hong Kong Ministerial, Assessment by the Chairman, WTO Doe. TN/AG/19, 1 August 2005, paras.5-10
1 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.6.
2 《夜以继日 谋求一致——关于第一次修改后的香港部长级会议宣言草案》，2005年12月30日，载中国贸易救济信息网，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsId=400540000197,(访问日期：2006年10月8日)。
3 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5
1 刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易安组织动态与研究》2006年11期，第1-3页。
2 WTO News, "Talks Suspended: 'Today There Are Only Losers", 24 Jul. 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july_e.htm, October 20, 2006; DG Lamy: "Time Out Needed to Review Options and Positions", http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_24july06_e.htm, July 30, 2006.
3 刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2006年11期，第1-3页。
4 WTO News: "Lamy: 'We Have Resumed Negotiations Fully across the Board '", February 7, 2007, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/gc_dg_star_7feb07_e.htm February 30, 2007.
1 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006, p.187.
2 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause ': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006, pp.187-188.
3 Speeches, Articles and Interviews, http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/discursos/discurso_detalheoasp?ID_DISCURSO=2604, March 20, 2007.
1 依据GATT第16．2条，出口补贴应解释为“对产品的出口所给予的补贴”。
2 Report of the Working Party on Subsidies, GATT Doc. L/1381, November 1960, para.5.
3 Panel on Subsidies: Report on the Operation of the Provisions of Article ⅩⅥ, GATT Doc.L/1442, 19 April 1961, para.23.
4 GATT, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Report by the Director-General of GATT, 1979.转引自Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History(1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.815.
5 Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/8, May 2, 1975.
6 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.133.
1 参见1979年《补贴守则》第9．2条。
2 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.836; Problems in the Area of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/3, 17 March 1987.
3 Trade Policies for a Better Future, The "Leutwiler Report", the GATT and the Uruguay Round (1987).转引自Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.835.
4 G. Depayer and R. Petriccione, "Definition of Subsidy", in Subsidies and International Trade: A European Lawyers'Perspective, Jacques H. J. Bourgeo ed., Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston, 1991, p.67.
1 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EULaw, Cameron May, 1999, pp.210-217.
2 《补贴协定》对一成员应对其他成员提供的补贴规定了两种程序：第一种程序(Track 1)规定，当进口补贴产品对进口国产业造成实质性损害时，可对补贴进口产品单方面采取反补贴措施：第二种程序(Track 2)是多边行动，根据WTO的授权，采取反措施(Countermeasures)。Pierre Didier, WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law, Cameron May, 1999, pp.208-209.
3 Draft Guidelines for the Application of the Concept of Specificity in the Calculation of the Amount of A Subsidy other than an Export Subsidy, GATT Doc. SCM/W/89, 25 April 1985.
4 Problems in the Area of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat, GAFF Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/3, 17 March 1987, para.1.
1 Checklist of Issues for Negotiations, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/9/Rev.4, 12 December 1988, pp.10-12.
2 Submission by the European Community, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/36, 2 February 1990, pp.4-5.
3 Elements of the Negotiating Framework, Submission by the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/39, 27 September 1990, p.2.
4 《补贴协定》第1条规定：“1．1 就本协定而言，如出现下列情况应视为存在补贴：(a)(1) 在一成员(本协定中称“政府”)领土内，存在由政府或任何公共机构提供的财政资助，即如果：(ⅰ) 涉及资金的直接转移(如赠款、贷款和投股)、潜在的资金或债务的直接转移(如贷款担保)的政府做法；(ⅱ) 放弃或未征收在其他情况下应征收的政府税收(如税收抵免之类的财政鼓励)~1；(ⅲ) 政府提供除一般基础设施外的货物或服务，或购买货物；(ⅵ) 政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(ⅰ)至(ⅲ)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别；或 (a)(2) 存在GATT 1994第16条意义上的任何形式的收入或价格支持；及 (b) 则因此而授予一项利益。1．2 如按第1款定义的补贴依照第2条的规定属专向性补贴，则此种补贴应符合第二部分或符合第三部分或第五部分的规定。”
5 第16条第1款规定“如任何缔约方给予或维持任何补贴，包括任何形式的收入或价格支持，以直接或间接增加自其领土出口的任何产品或减少向其领土进口的任何产品的方式实施……在确定任何此类补贴对其 他任何缔约方的利益造成或威胁造成严重侵害的任何情况下，应请求，给予有关补贴的缔约方应与其他有关缔约方或缔约方全体讨论限制该补贴的可能性。”
1 参见GATT1947第16．2条。
2 参见GATT1947第16．3条。
3 Rivers & Greenwald, "The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences", 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus, 1979, p.1466.
4 《补贴守则》序言第四段规定：“认识到本协定所强调的应当是补贴的影响，并且在评估补贴之影响的时候，应当适当考虑到所涉缔约方的国内经济情况和国际经济金融关系。”第五段规定：“意图确保补贴的使用不会对本协定其他缔约方的利益造成不利影响或损害，反补贴措施不会不正当地阻碍国际贸易，以及在经协商同意的国际权利义务框架内为受到补贴不利影响的生产者提供可获得的救济。”
5 参见《补贴守则》第8．1条。
6 J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, p.369.
7 《补贴守则》第9条和第10条。
8 参见《补贴守则》第11条。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.384.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.306.
3 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EULaw, Cameron May, 1999, pp.210-211.
4 J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations, 2nd ed., The MIT Press, 1997, p.280.'
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.306.
6 Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N.D.L.Rev.691, 2003; Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause(Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture)Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp. 340-341.关于国内支持与国内补贴关系的进一步探讨，参见本文第四章第一节。
1 J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, p.369.
2 参见GATT1947附件Ⅰ第16条B节的注释。
3 如面粉、通心粉等。具体参见本文第一章第二节。
4 《农业协定》第2条“产品范围”规定，“本协定适用于本协定附件1中所列产品，下称农产品。”
5 《农业协定》第1(b)条。
6 参见《农业协定》附件3“国内支持：综合支持量的计算”第7段。该段规定，“综合支持量的计算应尽可能接近该有关基本农产品的第一销售点。针对农产品加工者的措施应包括在内，只要此类措施可使基本农产品的生产者获益。”
1 即究竟适用《农业协定》，还是《补贴协定》。关于《补贴协定》与《农业协定》的适用关系，详见本文第五章。
2 Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/26, 29 October 1975, pp.6-9.
3 Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/7(MIN), 9 December 1988, pp.18-20.
4 Communication form the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20,15 June 1988, p.4.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.855.
1 John R. Magnus, "The Evils of A Long Peace: Legal Consequences of WTO 'Peace Clause'Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation Over Farm Subsidies ", Presented to the Global Business Dialogue, Washington. DC, December. 4, 2003. http://www.tradewinsllc.net/publi/Peace Clause GBD 12 03.pdf, November 7, 2006, p.7.事实上，由于牵扯到《补贴协定》和《农业协定》的适用关系，农产品领域中被禁止的补贴的范围非常复杂。具体参见本文第三章和第五章相关内容。
2 有学者批评“补贴”定义本身用语的古怪和不合语法为曰后的争端埋下了种子。参见John R. Magnus, "World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: Is This the 'Retrenchment Round'?"Joumal of World Trade 38(6), 2004, p.986.
3 Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.65.
4 即：“政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(ⅰ)至(ⅲ)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别。”
1 Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.73.
2 本案专家组认为，“财政资助”、“利益”和“专向性”是《补贴协定》的三大要素。如果认为“财政资助”指的是政府行动的影响而非性质，就背离了协定本身，《补贴协定》的适用范围变成由“利益”和“专向性”两个因素主宰。Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.8.38.
3 Panel Report, U.S. -Export Restraints, WT/DS194/R, paras.8.28-8.29.
4 例如，第1．1(a)(1)条列举的三项“财政资助”形式，既包括金钱形式的资源转移，也包括实物或服务形式的资源转移；既包括积极行为导致的资源转移，也包括消极行为导致的资源转移。即便是基础设施，也强调只有一般性的基础设施才不被视为“财政资助”。
5 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.10.
6 在韩国——商用船舶案中，申诉方欧共体认为韩国进出口银行法第18条提供了贷款和贷款担保，而贷款和贷款担保属于《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条所指的资金的直接转移。被申诉方韩国否认欧共体的指称，认为韩国进出口银行没有参与“政府做法”。“政府做法”指的是行使政府权力，也即管理权力和征税。仅当一机构履行“通常应属于政府”的职能和“与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别的做法”时，才构成“政府做法”。在该案中，韩国进出口银行设立的目的是满足工业或商业性质的需要，也即增加市场融资便利，在以市场为导向的基础上与其他公共或私营机构进行竞争。进出口银行提供的预付款还款保证和装运前贷款计划等融资便利，属于传统银行能力，履行的是通常由银行而不是政府履行的职能。但专家组不接受韩国的观点。专家组认为，第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条“政府做法”描述的是行为的作出者，而非行为的性质。“政府做法”包含了政府或公共机构的所有行为，“政府做法”一词并不限制该条的适用范围。如果“政府做法”起到了韩国所主张的过滤功能，该词也应当被包含在第(ⅱ)、(ⅲ)分段中，但第(ⅲ)分段并无此规定。Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.25-6.31.
7 《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条列举的“资金的直接转移”形式有赠款、贷款、投股和贷款担保。专家组认为，就“交易媒介”而言，上述形式均涉及金钱的转移，而非实物转移(如货物或服务)。该案与公司重组有关的交易都具有与第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条列举的交易相同的性质。其中，降低利息和利息延期与新的贷款相似，利息／债务免除与现金赠款类似。所有这些交易都构成《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅰ)条所指的资金的直接转移。债转股作为债务免除和投股两者的结合，当然也属于资金的直接转移。Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.411-6.413.
1 Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ,WT/DS257/R,para.7.24.虽然该案只涉及“货物”，但可类推适用于服务。
2 该案中，争端双方对未砍伐的木材是否构成《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条所指的“货物”发生争议。加拿大认为，“货物”应当指“可交易”的产品，可进口或出口；而未砍伐木材是生长在土地上的树木，并非《补贴协定》第1．1条意义上的“货物”。在上诉程序中，加拿大又援引了《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条、《补贴协定》第五部分及GATT1994条款，说明“货物”一词应当是有实际或潜在关税分类的可交易事物。但专家组认为，“货物”的一般含义是指“金钱之外的有形或动产”。专家组还援引了《布莱克法律辞典》，认为“货物”包括“可与不动产分离的、可指明的事物”，而未砍伐树木即属于可与不动产分离的可指明物体。专家组认为，《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条的上下文以及第1条的目的也表明应当对“货物”一词进行广义解释，最后认定，《补贴协定》，第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条的上下文没有限制“货物”一词的含义，美国商务部裁定加拿大各省通过立木计划，向收获者提供未砍伐木材，从而以提供货物的形式提供了财政资助。在上诉程序中，上诉机构赞同专家组对《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条“货物”一词的解释，并认为加拿大的解释削弱了《补贴协定》的目的和宗旨。上诉机构认为，根据《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅲ)条条文、上下文，或者协定的目的和宗旨，不能将未砍伐的树木等有形事物排除在“货物”一词的范围之外。Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/R, paras.7.19o7.30; Appellate Body Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/AB/R, paras.57-67.
3 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, pp.10-11.
4 本案涉及美国国内岁入法(Internal Revenue Code)第921-927节及有关措施对外国销售公司(Foreign Sales Corporation，FSC)的特殊税收待遇。美国实行全球征税体制，美国公司和居民就其在全世界的所得纳税，但如收入是在国外获得并且已在国外纳税，为避免双重征税，美国公司将获得税收抵免。外国公司或自然人来自美国境内的收入，美国征收所得税，但来自境外的收入，美国通常不征税，除非该收入与在美国境内从事的贸易或商业活动有实质性的联系。但该法对与FSC有关的所得征税作出了特别规定。所谓FSC，是在符合条件的外国或美国关税领土之外的领地上设立、组织和维持的，符合美国国内岁入法第921-927节的公司。FSC的外贸毛收入可以免税。外贸毛收入指FSC来源于特定交易的收入，通常涉及供销售和租赁的出口财产。FSC必须满足一定的外国存在要求。如，FSC必须在美国关税领土之外设有办公场所，而且设备必须足以开展FSC的业务。在纳税年度，公司的管理必须发生在国外，并且与交易相关的经济活动必须发生在美国境外。FSC外贸收入中的部分被视为与美国境内的贸易或商业不存在实质性的联系，从而免税；FSC分配的股息可以从股东应税收入中扣除；在特定情形下，有关符合条件的合作社拥有的FSC销售农产品或畜产品的所有外贸收入均为可免税的外贸收入。对于关联人出售给FSC的出口财产，收入可通过三种方法之一分配到FSC：一种方法是按FSC和关联人(美国母公司)之间的实际交易价格，根据岁入法第482节的标准转移定价规定做调整；另外两种方法是“行政定价”规则，FSC和它们的母公司可在它们之间分配收入。FSC必须或者自己履行，或者支付与出口交易相关的特定经济活动。依据法律，为了获得部分免税，采纳行政定价规则的FSC必须履行、支付所有与出口交易有关的分配活动，或缔结合同。这些 活动包括推介、磋商或缔结合同，至少其中一项活动必须发生在美国境外。关于本案事实背景，参见：Panel Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/R, paras.2.1-2.8.
1 Panel Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.98.
2 上诉机构报告认为，在本案中，“but for”标准可以适用，是因为本案提供了一个很好的比较基础，从而可以确定“若无”被异议的措施，FSC的外国收入所得税将如何确定。然而，协定没有做这样的规定，而且“but for”标准尤其令人怀疑：一方面，各国税制复杂多变，可能存在多种税制；另一方面，可能为了规避这一标准，而设计出另外一种税收体制，从而使得不存在普遍适用的规则。因此，上诉机构认为，即便“but for”标准适用于本案，在其他案件中也许并不适用。Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R,para.91.
3 在DSU第21．5条上诉程序中，上诉机构报告指出，如果存在税制“一般”规则之“例外”的情形，可适用“若不是”标准，审查如果没有争议中的措施，那么收入的财税待遇如何。但由于国内税制复杂多变，常常难以区分税收“一般”适用的规则和该“一般”规则的例外。因此，专家组应比较“可合理比较的收入”间的财税待遇，以决定与争议中的收入相比，争议措施是否涉及到“在其他情况下应征收的”税收。笼统的说，应当是类似收入之间的比较。例如，销售收入就不能和雇佣收入比较。在DSU第21．5条上诉程序中，上诉机构不仅要分析措施所涉及的国内来源收入和外国来源收入，还要分析争议措施下的外国来源收入的征税方式是否与其他外国来源收入征税方式相同，即与争议措施类似的收入是否征税，如该收入征税而系争收入免税，则为政府放弃本应征收的税收。上诉机构在运用该方法后裁定，一般情况下，美国居民境外所得只对境外缴纳税收部分进行有限度的税收抵扣，但符合ETI境外所得，美国居民可选择按国内税法规定的税收抵扣，还是按照ETI规定的境外所得免税，根据后者计算的税款可能低于国内税法规定的税款。因此，与类似情况下的收入相比，同样的收入征收的税收不一样，故构成《补贴协定》第1．1(a)(1)(ⅱ))条下的补贴，即“放弃在其他情况下应征收的税收”。Appellate Body Report on US-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS 108/AB/RW, paras.91-106.
4 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.13.
1 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.10.
2 WTO Dispute: Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273.
3 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.6.32.
4 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.37-6.38.
5 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.44-6.45.
1 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.6.55.
2 Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras.6.50-6.54.
1 Paulette Vander Schueren, Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence of Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation, Vol. 11, No.6, 2005, p.198.
2 Julia Ya Qin, "WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)-A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol", Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.7, Issue 4, 2004, p.875.
3 美国——出口限制案中，专家组指出，第1．1(a)1(ⅳ)条的目的是防止政府通过私营实休，规避第(ⅰ)-(ⅲ)项措施的纪律。在内容上，第(ⅳ)项涵盖的措施与第(ⅰ)-(ⅲ)项等同。因此，前三项与第四项 的差异在于行为的主体，而非行为的性质。Panel Report on US-Exports Restraints, WT/DS267/R, para.8.53.
1 Panel Report on US-Export Restraints, WT/DS194/R, para.8.29.
2 Panel Report on US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, parao7.33.
3 Panel Report on EC-Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, WT/DS299/R, para.7.35.
1 Panel Report on US- Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, paras.106-116.
2 关于两个DRAMs案中专家组和上诉机构对“委托”或“指示”认定的评析，参见WorldTradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC) on EC- DRAMs Countervailing Measrues (panel);U.S. -DRAMs CVD Investigation (panel); U.S. - DRAMs CVD Investigation (AB), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/.
1 WTO Negotiations concerning the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Proposal by the European Communities, WTO Doc.TN/RL/W/30, 21 November 2002.
2 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
3 参见加拿大——关于影响民用飞机出口措施的纠纷案(WT／DS70)。在该案中，作为被申诉方的加拿大采取了一系列措施，包括成立专门的公司或组织一些项目，促进加拿大国内飞机制造业的发展。巴西对这些措施提出指控。在专家组确定加拿大向国产飞机产业提供补贴的具体项目是否构成《补贴协定》下的“补贴”时，双方对于这些资助是否授予了“利益”有不同看法。加拿大认为，当一个公共机构提供的财政资助造成了政府的开支，同时又为接受者提供了比市场可以提供的更多的好处，这才授予了利益。巴西则认为，不管是《补贴协定》第1条，还是《补贴协定》的目的与宗旨，都没有提出要把“政府开支”作为一个标准。该案专家组认为，要确定财政资助是否授予了“利益”，就要看财政资助是否使接受者处于比没有接受资助时更有利的地位，衡量的标准是市场。无论政府是否有开支，只要由政府或公共机构提供的“财政资助”给接受者带来了比市场条件下更优越的条件，就授予了“利益”，从而构成了《补贴协定》第1条所指的“补贴”。在上诉程序中，上诉机构也认为，市场是一个适当的比较基准，因为通过确定接受者获得“财政资助”的条件是否优于在市场上可获得的条件，可以确定“财政资助”潜在的贸易扭曲影响。概括而言，该案专家组和上诉机构报告均表明，应从接受者是否获得比市场更为优越的条件的角度确定是否存在利益，而非以政府开支为标准。这在WTO法理中已经成为一项比较稳固的原则。Panel Report on Canada - Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, paras. 9.111-9. 120; Appellate Body Repoa on Canada - Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, paras.149-1611．当然，以市场作为比较的基准，在具体的案件中仍然会产生各种争端，争端各方会提出对己有利的市场基准，用以判断是否授予了利益。从WTO争端解决实践来看，专家组或上诉机构在做出裁决时会考虑到各方面的因素，如时间、贷款担保状况等。专家组或上诉机构会根据提供的信息，对被提议的市场基准做出采纳与否的判断。在采纳的情形下，将依据这些被提供的信息，对市场基准进行必要的调整。若争端方不提供相关信息，专家组或上诉机构将拒绝采纳被提议的市场基准。同时，WTO既往报告已经表明，专家组倾向于不考虑公共机构或政府所有的实体的相关数据作为判定是否授予了利益的市场基准。参见韩国——商用船舶案专家组有关“利益”的阐述。
4 如欧共体——DRAMs反补贴措施案(WT／DS299)的相关论述。该案澄清了应当以接受者所获利益计算补贴的金额，而非财政资助提供者的开支。在该案中，在计算补贴的金额时，申诉方欧共体认为，由于补贴接受者Hynix的财政状况已经到了任何明智的私营投资者都不会对公司提供资金的地步，因此，被指控 的补贴计划不管其条款和条件为何，均应被视为赠款。但专家组不接受欧共体的观点。专家组认为贷款、贷款担保和债转股对接受者的价值，与赠款相比是不同的：前者或者使接受者负有债务，或者会冲淡现有股东的所有权请求。有关利益的分析应当主要从接受者的角度，而非财政资助提供者的角度。从这个角度上说，欧共体计算利益金额的出发点是资金提供者获偿的期望，是错误的。利益问题与财政资助提供者的成本开支无关，是关于对接受者提供的利益。简而言之，在计算补贴的金额时，调查机关应该扣除补贴接受者为获得利益而实际支付的费用，这样所得到的补贴金额才是接受者所获利益。Panel Repog on EC-DRAMs Countervailing Measrues, WT/DS299/R, para.7.211-7.215．美国——软立木Ⅳ案中，专家组和上诉机构报告对《补贴协定》第14条(d)项下衡量利益的基准的选择也有新的阐述，并引发了争议和批评。参见Raulette "Vander Schueren and Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence on Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation, 11(6), 2005, 197-204, pp.200-201.
1 参见美国——对原产于英国的部分热轧铅铋钢产品征收反补贴税案(WT／DS138)。该案中，经过反补贴调查后，美国对从联合工程钢材有限公司(United Engineering Steel Limited，UES)进口的热轧铅铋钢板材征收反补贴税。但自1995年起，UES已经不复存在。UES是1986年英国国有钢铁公司(BSC)和另一家公司合资组建的公司，1988年BSC私有化，英国钢铁股份有限公司(British Steel plc，BSplc)继承了BSC的权利义务，成为UES两个投资者之一；1995年，BSplc购买了另一个投资者的股份，UES成为BSplc的独资子公司；随后它更名为英国工程钢材公司(British Steel Engineering Steels，BSES)。该案所涉及的补贴是1977—78年度和1985—86年度英国政府向BSC的资金注入。美国商务部将这笔投入看作不会重复发生的补贴，根据钢铁工业生产资料使用年限，将其平均分配到18年。美国商务部认为，对BSC的资金注入先是转到了UES，然后又惠及BSES。美国商务部把英国政府对BSC的补贴看作对UES的补贴，随后又看作对BSES的补贴。在年度复审中，商务部认为UES(BSES)继续从英国政府对BSE的补贴中受益。美国商务部提出，BSC、UES、BSplc／BSES都是相同的公司，对BSC的补贴就是对其他公司的补贴，因此无需确认UES、BSplc／BSES得到了利益。但认定Bsplc和BSES是否继续受到补贴，不能简单地以BSC受到补贴来推理，而应当证明在BSC私有化时Bsplc并没有支付市场价，而是从中得到了比市场条件优惠的利益。利益不是抽象的，也不是给予某个产品的，必须有接受补贴的受益者。该案专家组认为，在私有化过程中，BSC的资产有偿转让给了BSplc，在企业转让时，UES和BSPLC／BSES以正常的市场价格支付了所有的生产性资产、商誉等，从而认定UES或BSPLC／BSES未获得授予BSC的“财政资助”的“利益”。上诉机构报告也维持了这一结论。本案对于分析国有企业原来获得的补贴，在私有化后是否可能被后继公司继承，具有很强的实践意义。参见该案专家组和上诉机构报告有关内容及朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2004年版，第549-563页。
2 GATT Panel Report on US-Canada Pork, DS7/R, adopted on 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30, para.4.9.
3 Panel Report on US- Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS/138/R, footnote. 69.
1 Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS/138/R, para. 6.70; Appellate Body Report on US-Lead and Bismuth H, WT/DS138/AB/R, para.62.本案具体案情，参见前文脚注。
2 Panel Report on US - Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/R, para.7.91.
3 GATT1994第6.3条规定：在任何缔约方领土的任何产品进口至另一缔约方领土时所征收的反补贴税，金额不得超过对此种产品在原产国或出口国制造、生产或出口时所直接或间接给予的津贴或补贴的估计金额，包括对一特定产品的运输所给予的任何特殊补贴。“反补贴税”一词应理解为目的为抵消对制造、生产或出口所直接或间接给予的任何津贴或补贴而征收的一种特别税。
1 Benefit Pass-through, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/7, 14 July 2004.
1 Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc.TN/RL/W/193, 16 November 2005.
2 Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Canada, WTO Doc.TN/RL/GEN/86, 17 November 2005.
3 《补贴协定》第1.2条规定，“如按第1款定义的补贴依照第2条的规定属专向性补贴，则此种补贴应符合第二部分或符合第三部分或第五部分的规定。”
4 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006. pp.129-130.
5 《补贴协定》第2.1条(a)项规定，“如授予机关或其运作所根据的立法将补贴的获得明确限于某些企业，则此种补贴应属专向性补贴。”
1 《补贴协定》第2.1条(b)项规定，“如授予机关或其运作所根据的立法制定适用于获得补贴资格和补贴数量的客观标准或条件，则不存在专向性，只要该资格为自动的，且此类标准和条件得到严格遵守。标准或条件必须在法律、法规或其他官方文件中明确说明，以便能够进行核实。”
2 《补贴协定》第2.1条(c)项规定，“如尽管因为适用(a)项和(b)项规定的原则而表现为非专向性补贴，但是有理由认为补贴可能事实上属专向性补贴，则可考虑其他因素。此类因素为：有限数量的某些企业使用补贴计划、某些企业主要使用补贴、给予某些企业不成比例的大量补贴以及授予机关在作出给予补贴的决定时行使决定权的方式。在适用本项时，应考虑授予机关管辖范围内经济活动的多样性程度，及已经实施补贴计划的持续时间。”
3 《补贴协定》第2.2条规定，“限于授予机关管辖范围内指定地理区域的某些企业的补贴属专向性补贴。各方理解，就本协定而言，不得将有资格的各级政府所采取的确定或改变普遍适用的税率的行动被视为专向性补贴。”
4 《补贴协定》第2.3条规定，“任何属第3条规定范围内的补贴应被视为专向性补贴。”此处“第3条”，是《补贴协定》下关于禁止性补贴的规定。
5 Paul Waer & Edwin Vermulst, "ECAnti-subsidy Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round: a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing", Journal of World Trade 33(3), 1999, p.19.
6 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.107.
7 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.111.
8 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.8.121.
1 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, paras.7.119-7.121.
2 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1142.
3 Gustavo E. Luengo Hemandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp.132-137.
4 Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/112, 6 June 2003.
1 即：(1)只有数量非常有限的企业利用了补贴计划，也即在200家合格的企业中只有6家利用了计划；(2)Hyundai集团公司不成比例地利用了补贴计划；(3)总补贴金额的41％被不成比例地提供给了Hynix。另外，欧共体还指出，韩国内有些处于类似困难境地的企业也在抱怨缺乏透明度和资格标准。这些批评表明欧共体考虑到了批准企业参与KDB债券计划过程中行使自由裁量权的方式。See，
2 该项规定的相关措辞为“such factors are：……”。参见Gustavo E. Luengo Hemandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.139.
3 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.108.
4 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.113.
5 Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS257/R, para.7.123.
6 Specificity, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/6, 14 July 2004.
7 Specificity, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/191, 16 November 2005.
8 Paulette Vander Schueren, Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence of Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation, Vol. 11, No.6, 2005, p.203.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.174.
2 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer Boston, 1993, p.886.
3 关于GATT1994第16.3条，参见第一章第二节。本节只介绍GATT和WTO下的一般补贴纪律。
1 Raj Bhala, Modern GATT Law: A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, p.893.
2 GaTT1994第16.2条规定，“各缔约方认识到，一缔约方对任何产品的出口所给予的补贴，可能对其他进口和出口缔约方造成有害影响，可能对它们的正常商业利益造成不适当的干扰，并可阻碍本协定目标的实现。”
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.107-108.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para.166.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para.167.
2 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.179.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.178.
4 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, paras.10.184, 10.186, 10.191.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.193.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, para.100.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R,para. 167.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R,para. 167.需要强调的是，认定一项补贴是出口补贴，并不需要出口实绩是补贴的唯一条件，可以是若干条件之一。
4 Panel Report onAustralia - Leather, WT/DS126/R, para.9.54.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, paras.169-172.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para.173．在澳大利亚皮革案中，专家组报告指出，《补贴协定》脚注4第二句话“不排除在禁止性补贴审查中考虑某一公司从事出口的事实，或者公司的出口水平。它仅仅禁止以向从事出口的公司提供补贴作为认定禁止性补贴的唯一原因。”Panel Report on Australia -Leather, WT/DS126/R, para.9.66.
3 “1960年宣言”于1962年生效。Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006,p.6.
4 参见东京回合《补贴守则》第9.2条及附件。
5 在乌拉圭回合谈判中，曾有谈判方主张为穷尽性列举，遭到美国和欧共体的反对。
1 对于“出口补贴例示清单”列举的各项出口补贴的使用，已经有若干WTO争端解决案件涉及。详细内容参见Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, pp.27-35.
2 Panel Report on Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/R, paras.6.30-6.31．再例如在韩国——商用船舶案(WT／DS273)中，专家组认定，依据“出口补贴例示清单”(j)项，如果申诉方证实另一成员的出口信贷担保计划不能弥补长期营业成本和损失，就足以裁定整个计划构成禁止性出口补贴，而不需要进行协定第1条和第3条下的分析。
3 (j)项规定，“政府(或政府控制的特殊机构)提供的出口信贷担保或保险汁划、针对出口产品成本增加或外汇风险计划的保险或担保计划，保险费率不足以弥补长期营业成本和计划的亏损。”
1 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GAIT Uruguay RoundA Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer Boston, 1993, p.886.
2 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.35.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.221.
4 GATT Panel Report on Italy - Agricultural Machinery, L/833, adopted on 23 October 1958, BISD7S/60, p.64, para. 12.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, paras.139-143.
1 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006, p.35.
2 Panel Report on Indonesia - Automobiles, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, and WT/DS64/R, paras.14.33-14.39.
3 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.157.
4 还可参见：Panel Report on Canada -Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, para.10.215.
5 GATT1994第3.8(b)条规定，“本条的规定不阻止仅给予国内生产者的补贴的支付，包括自以与本条规定相一致的方式实施的国内税费所得收入中产生的对国内生产者的支付和政府购买国产品所实行的补贴。”本案专家组认为，这意味着如果补贴只给予产品的国内生产者而不给予外国生产者，就不会与第3.4条不符。专家组认为，TDM法规是欧盟授权成员国采取援助，对制造集装箱运货船、油轮、化学品运输船和液化天然气运输船提供直接援助的法律基础。这种国家援助只有某些种类的船舶的国内生产者才能获得，而外国生产者不能获得，这正是第3.4(b)条所指的不同待遇，因此与第3条并无不符。专家组最终认为，既然依据TDM支付的补贴属于第3.8(b)条的适用范围，那么就不能因将TDM视为一项规章制度，认定与GATT1994第3.4条不符。Panel Report on EC - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS301/R, paras7.62-7.75.
1 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.157.
2 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78,19 March 2003; Negotiating Group on Rules, Expanding the Prohibited "Red Light" Subsidy Category, Paper from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/94, 16 January 2006.
3 Subsidies, Submission of the European Communities, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/135, 24 April 2006.
4 General Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Submission from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/85, 30 April 2003.
5 Further Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Submission from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/139, 18 July 2003; Prohibited Export Subsidies, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/22, 19 October 2004; Prohibited Export Subsidies, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/34, 23 March 2005; Prohibited Export Subsidies, Paper from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/80, 16 November 2005.
6 De Facto Export Contingency, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/88, 18 November 2005.
7 WTO Negotiations concerning the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Proposal by the European Communities, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/30, 21 November 2002.
1 Proposals on Implementation Related lssues and Concerns, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures/Anti-DumpingAgreement, Submission by India, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/4, 25 April 2002.
2 Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/1, 15 April 2002.加拿大本身的国内市场狭小。
3 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EULaw, Cameron May, 1999, p.208.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.103.
5 第16.4条要求停止对除初级产品外的任何产品提供补贴，导致产品的出口价格低于向国内市场同类产品购买者收取的可比价格。但是这一禁止性规定不适用于国内补贴，而且也未对国内补贴规定任何行动。如果国内补贴对另一缔约方的利益造成实质损害，涉案的缔约方只负有讨论“限制该补贴的可能性”的义务。
6 GATT第6条和第16条在对待生产补贴等国内补贴方面有差异。依据第6条，可以对国内补贴采取反补贴措施，助长了缔约方单边征收反补贴税。
1 Pierre Didder, WTO Trade Instrument in EU Law, Cameron May, 1999, p.211.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.369.
3 Article 13.4: "If, as a result of its review, the Committee concludes that an export subsidy is being granted in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement or that a subsidv is being granted or maintained in such a manner as to cause injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice, it shall make such recommendations to the parties as may be appropriate to resolve the issue and, in the event the recommendations are not followed, it may authorize such countermeasures as may be appropriate, taking into account the degree and nature of the adverse effects found to exist, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Part Ⅵ."此处与an export subsidy"并列使用"a subsidy"，应认为后者包括除出口补贴之外的其他补贴形式。
1 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.166.
2 《补贴守则》第8.3条规定，缔约方承认应当避免因使用任何补贴造成下列影响：(a)损害另一缔约方的国内产业：(b)使其他缔约方在总协定项下直接或间接获得的利益丧失或减损：或(c)对另一缔约方的利益造成严重侵害。第8.4条规定，“证明丧失或减损，或严重侵害所需的对另一缔约方利益的不利影响，可产生于；(a)接受补贴进口产品在进口缔约方国内市场的影响；(b)补贴的影响在于在补贴提供国市场中取代或阻碍同类产品的进口；(c)接受补贴出口产品的影响在于在第三国市场上取代另一缔约方同类产品的出口。”
1 本项是为对国内产业受到补贴进口产品损害的国家的反补贴调查提供一种选择。Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies - The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, p.34.
2 本文不涉及成员单方采取的反补贴措施，故略去不提。
3 有关“非违反之诉”，参见本文第一章第二节。
4 GATT Panel Report on EC - Sugar Exports (Brazil), L/5011, adopted 10 November 1980; GATT Panel Report on EC- Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted 6 November 1979.
1 GATT Panel Report on EC - Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted 6 November 1979, p.32.
2 GATT Panel Report on EC - Sugar Exports (Brazil), L/5011, adopted 10 November 1980, p.30.
3 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
1 Communication from the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/1, March 16, 1987; Communication from the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, June 15, 1988; Communication from New Zealand, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/2, March 16, 1987.
2 Communication from the United States, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20, June 15, 1988.
3 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002,p.324．但也有观点认为，在某些情况下，不利影响标准可能更易于证明，尤其是确定严重侵害的存在。任何影响产品生产的国内补贴，都会在其境内市场或第三国市场上取代或阻碍同类产品的进口或出口。例如，一成员为促进使用环保燃料，向某些生产者提供补贴。假定补贴事实上有利于燃料的国内生产者，在该成员市场上取代了同类产品的进口。Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.178.
1 参见《补贴协定》第6.2条。
2 持反对立场的成员有：多米尼加共和国、马来西亚、巴基斯坦、印度、新西兰等。马来西亚认为，除非发展中成员的某些关注得到满足，否则不支持延长适用。巴勒斯坦的观点与马来西亚类似。泰国认为，尚缺乏适用第6.1条的实践。原因或者是这一条款没有用处，或者是条款本身不充分，导致成员无法适用。如果是前者，应当废弃；如果是后者，除非发展中成员关注的问题得到解决，否则保留这些临时适用的条款也没有用处。Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/24, 26 April 2000.
3 如瑞士建议延长4年到5年，此后再对临时适用的条款进行审查。这些成员认为，目前适用第6.1条的经验太少，而该条款又对保持协定的平衡起到了某种作用，对所有成员都具有某些价值。中国香港也支持在一定期限内延长适用，从而有时间考虑发展中成员关注的问题。Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/24, 26 April 2000.
1 有的成员表示支持，如加拿大、日本、波兰、塞浦路斯、韩国、土耳其、捷克、欧共体、瑞士、美国、斯洛文尼亚；但也有多个成员表示反对，如马来西亚、墨西哥、巴拿马、巴基斯坦、印度、埃及、印度尼西亚、泰国、阿根廷等等。马来西亚表示愿意遵守总理事会主席的决定，宁愿遵循善意和适当克制，而不愿意对第6.1条、第8条、第9条给予任何延期。巴拿马认为，第31条没有授权委员会同意任何延期，对协定作出修改，应当是部长级会议，或在部长级会议休会的时候，总理事会的权力。巴基斯坦也认为，委员会没有授权临时延长适用第31条临时适用的各条款。Minutes of the Special Meeting Held on 20 December 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/22, 17 February 2000.
2 Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Coutnervailing Measures, communication form Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/112, 6 June 2003.
3 参见Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1184-7.1187;韩国——商用船舶案专家组也报告指出，在解释《补贴协定》第6.3条时，仍然可以考虑《补贴协定》第6.1条。Panel Report on Korea - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.7.583.
4 对于上述四种情形，在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，专家组澄清，第6.3条“可能”(may)一词不要求证明第6.3条列举之外的因素，第6.3条列举的要素本身可导致或构成严重侵害。当第6.3条列举的一种或多种情况存在时，即可认定产生严重侵害。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1370-7.1382.
1 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp.172-173.
2 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, para14.211.
1 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, paras 14.212-14.217.
2 《补贴协定》第6.4条规定，“就第3款(b)项而言，对出口产品的取代或阻碍，在遵守第7款规定的前提下，应包括已被证明存在不利于未受补贴的同类产品相对市场份额变化的任何情况(经过一段足以证明有关产品明确市场发展趋势的适当代表期后，在通常情况下，该代表期应至少为1年)。‘相对市场份额变化’应包括下列任何一种情况：(a)补贴产品的市场份额增加；(b)补贴产品的市场份额保持不变，但如果不存在该补贴，市场份额则会降低；(c)补贴产品的市场份额降低，但速度低于不存在该补贴的情况。”
3 《补贴协定》第6.5条规定，“就第3款(c)项而言，价格削低应包括通过对供应同一市场的补贴产品与未受补贴产品的价格进行比较所表明的此类价格削低的任何情况。此种比较应在同一贸易水平上和可比的时间内进行，同时适当考虑影响价格可比性的任何其他因素。但是，如不可能进行此类直接比较，则可依据出口单价证明存在价格削低。”
4 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, paras. 14.246-14.256.
1 Panel Report on Korea - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para. 7.553; also see, Panel Report on US - Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, at footnote 1333.
2 Paulette Vander Schueren and Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence on Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments ", International Trade Law and Regulation", Vol.11, No.6, 2005, p.202
3 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1277-7.1313.
4 Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.406; Panel Report on Korea - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.7.566.
5 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1238-7.1244; Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.309-409.
6 Panel Report on Indonesia -Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, para.14.254
1 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1317-7.1334.
2 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1427-7.1464.
3 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, p.177.
4 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, ppo177.但美国——陆地棉补贴案仍然涉及第6.3条(d)款的解释与适用。关于(d)项与GATT1994第16.3条的关系，参见：Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges", Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003, po386.
5 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.9, No. 1, 2006, po181.
1 Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.437; Panel Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1344.
2 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1358-7.1364.
3 参见《补贴协定》第15.5条。Paulette Vander Schueren and Nikolay Mizulin, "WTO Jurisprudence on Non-Agricultural Subsidies: New Developments", International Trade Law and Regulation", Vol.11, No.6, 2005, p.202.
4 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO: A Brief Overview", CRS Report for Congress, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21. 2006.
1 Daniel Bodansky, "United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton", 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 852, 2005, pp.860-862.
2 参见：Stephen J. Powell, Andrew Schmitz, "The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlemen System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture", 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 287, 2005; Jason G. Buhi, "Serious Prejudice: The Decline and Fall of A Agricultural Subsidies After The World Trade Organization's Upland Cotton Decision", 24 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 237, 2005.
3 例如：美国——棉花补贴案(WT／DS267)中，将所有的补贴措施视为一个补贴来考虑其影响，即是否造成了“严重侵害”。并且，已经终止适用的措施也在专家组的职权范围之内。
4 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
5 Improved Disciplines under theAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/112, 6 June 2003．另外，加拿大还提出，《补贴协定》附件四采纳政府开支方法计算《补贴协定》第6.1(a)条总从价补贴额，存在固有的困难。建议在计算从价补贴总额时，以接受者所获利益的方法取代政府开支方法等。Serious Prejudice, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/14, 15 September 2004.
1 Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/81, 16 November 2005.
2 Further Proposal on Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/113, 21 April 2006.
3 Comments and Views from Australia on Canada's Submission on Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/135, 14 July 2003.
4 Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement, Communication from the United States, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/78, 19 March 2003.
1 Serious Prejudice, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/14, 15 September 2004.加拿大关于第7条的提议遭到巴西反对。Proposed Amendments to Certain Provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/112, 21 April 2006.
2 Further Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules on theAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Communication from Australia, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/139, 18 July 2003.
3 巴西认为，第6.3条应当更为准确地涵盖世界市场上农业补贴的贸易扭曲影响，世界出口市场份额不仅对于指明严重侵害很重要，对于衡量补贴在国际市场上的不利影响也很重要。另外，补贴造成的不利影响不仅与提供补贴成员市场份额的增加有关，还应包括市场份额的维持。为了精确地观测补贴在世界出口市场的影响，应当分析维持市场份额的能力。为此，做出上述建议。Further Proposal on Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc.TN/RL/GEN/113, 21 April 2006.
4 Further Proposal on Serious Prejudice, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/113, 21 April 2006.
1 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, p.4.本文作者是农业政策和贸易顾问，巴西农业生产与贸易部前秘书长。
2 Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges", Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003, p388.
3 GATT1994和《补贴协定》提供了五种途径，分别是：《补贴协定》第3条与农业出口补贴、GATT第23.1(b)条“非违反之诉”、根据GATT1994和《补贴协定》单边征收反补贴税、GATT1994第16.3条和《补贴协定》第5条和第6条可诉补贴纪律。Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges", Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003, pp.376-389.
1 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.150, footnote 702.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT194 7 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.214.
3 DSu第3.2条规定：“WTO争端解决体制在为多边贸易体制提供可靠性和可预测性方面是一个重要因素。各成员认识到该体制适于保护各成员在适用协定项下的权利和义务，及依照解释国际公法的惯例澄清这些协定的现有规定。”
1 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, Para.4.126.
2 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, Para.4.129.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.134.在本案中，加拿大曾经以涉案措施不构成补贴为由，进行抗辩。但申诉方认为，涉案措施构成《农业协定》第9.1条列举的出口补贴，一旦符合第9.1条规定的相关标准，就无需满足其它的条件。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.215.
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.4.144-4.152.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, Para.4.144.
6 Appellate Body Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut. WT/DS22/AB/R, p.14.
7 在该案中，申诉方新西兰认为，在解释《农业协定》下“出口补贴”概念时，可作为参照的包括《补贴 协定》、GATT1947以及GATT时期的实践。美国则强调《农业协定》中“补贴”一词，应当在其背景下进行解释。《补贴协定》中的“补贴”定义与解释《农业协定》下同一词语相关，但《农业协定》下“补贴”概念并不只由《补贴协定》第1条界定，或者优先于《农业协定》本身的相关条款。在该案中，专家组没有特别考虑《农业协定》下“补贴”一词应具有什么含义，而是直接审查争议措施是否符合《农业协定》第9.1条(a)、(c)两项列举。
1 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.150.
2 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", 9 J. Int'l Econ. L. 149, 2006.
3 PanelReportonUS-FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.141;Appellate Body Report on US-FSC (Article 21.5-EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, para.192; Appellate Body Report on United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.571.
1 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.31.
2 Panel Report on US-FSC，WT／DS108／R，para．7．150．但专家组报告随即指出，一般来说，除非《农业协定》有相反规定，一项措施如果具备《补贴协定》的“补贴”概念，也构成《农业协定》所指的“补贴”。
3 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.132.
4 例如《农业协定》第9.1条(c)段列举的出口补贴，具体参见本节下文。
1 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103, 113/R, para.4.127.
2 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103, 113/R, para.7.38．与第9.1(c)条“对农产品的出口”("on the export")不同，第9.1(a)条的用词与《补贴协定》第3.1(a)条相同，即“视出口实绩”("contingent on export performance")。在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，专家组和上诉机构认定，根据(2002年农业安全和农村投资法案》提供给陆地棉出口商的使用者销售支付(step 2)，构成《农业协定》第9.1(a)条和《补贴·协定》第3.1(a)条下的“视出口实绩”。该案有关“视出口实绩”的推理颇为值得关注。Panel Report on United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras. 7.697-7.748; Appellate Body Report on United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.582.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.221.
2 在该案原专家组程序中，申诉方认为加拿大根据特别牛奶分类计划第5(d)、(e)两项提供的牛奶，涉及《农业协定》第9.1(a)条下的出口补贴。加拿大政府机构，即CDC和省销售委员会，以低于当前国内牛奶价格，向加工商／出口商提供的特别分类计划下5(d)和(e)两项牛奶。Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.7.35-7.37.
3 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.44.
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.43.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.44.
6 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.88.
7 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.90.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.87.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.91.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.92.
4 即所谓“由生产者供资的出口补贴”("producer-financed export subsidies")。在GAIT时期，该问题已经引起过关注和讨论。Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras. 4.146-4.149.
5 在本案原专家组程序中，争端各方对政府资金未直接介入第5类(d)和(e)两组无异议。加拿大政府和代理机构都没有以较高的国内价格购买牛奶，然后为出口的目的，以造成亏损的低价格出售，由政府资金弥补成本。争端各方都承认，只有牛奶生产商对用于出口目的的牛奶销售出资。加拿大不否认政府也参与了特别牛奶分类计划，但提出政府的作用是监督其建立和有效运转；而美国和新西兰则提出，如果没有政府的参与，根本不可能建立这样一个机制。Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, paras. 7.64-7.66.
1 专家组在解释"provide"一词的通常含义时，援引了《牛津简明英语辞典》。“Provide”一词有下列含义：“1，预知：2，由于某一可能的事件，采取适当措施，作充分准备；……4，(在某事之前)准备、预备，或安排；5，为某一特定目的作必要的准备或装备：提供或供应某物；6，……使可获得；生产、提供”。Panel Report on Canada-Dairy，WT／DS103／R，WT／DS／113／R，para．7．65．
2 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.67.
3 第5类中前3组属于“配额内牛奶"(in-quota)，这些牛奶的全部销售收入都进入一个总帐户(special class pooling)，然后由各省的牛奶销售委员会分配给牛奶生产者。对第5类中后两组出口奶制品的补助也从这一总帐户中支出的。第5类(d)牛奶每年出口量由CMSMC确定，出口商向CDC提出申请，CDC发给批准证书，出口商据此购买用于生产出口奶制品的牛奶，批准证书须标明计划生产的奶制品种类。第5类(e)牛奶出口有两种情况：第一种情况是CDC根据国内市场牛奶供应情况启动的“消除过剩计划”。CDC无需经过省销售委员会的同意，可直接与出口奶制品生产商签订销售合同，CDC或者直接购买奶制品向其他国家出口，或者向出口奶制品生产商颁发批准证书，生产商从某个省份低价购买牛奶，再自行出口奶制品。第二种情况是，加工者与外国签订了奶制品出口协议之后，向CDC申请购买第5类(e)牛奶，CDC颁发批准证书，加工者向某个省份的销售委员会购买牛奶。在这种情况下，CDC也可以直接买下加工成的奶制品，自行出口。参见朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2000年版，第347页。
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.74.
5 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.81-86.
1 省牛奶销售协会根据联邦和省立法设立和运作，对各省之间，以及联邦政府通过CDC授权的对外贸易行使权力，另外还包括省当局授予的权力。Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.76.
2 Panel Report on Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS/113/R, para.7.78．专家组还强调加拿大政府对绝大多数(如果不是全部)委员会的活动有最终的控制和监督权，可界定、批准修改委员会的授权和职能。
3 Appellate Body Report, Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS/113/AB/R, para.97.
4 如下文所述，第9.1(c)条要求在政府措施和支付的融资之间存在可以证明的联系；第9.1(a)条将重点放在政府介入涉案措施的程度。但对于这两个标准只是在文字表述上有所不同，还是有实质上的差别，并不明显。
5 《补贴协定》第1.1(a)(ⅳ)条规定，“政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(ⅰ)至(ⅲ)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别”。关于本条款“委托”与“指示”在WTO争端解决实践中的解释与运用，参见本文第二章第二节。
1 “商业上可获得的”的措辞指在选择国产品和进口产品方面无限制，仅取决于商业考虑。
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.221.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS 113/AB/RW, para.76.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, WT/DS103/AB/R/Corr.1, WT/DS 113/AB/R/Corr. 1, paras.107-108.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, para.112; Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.73.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.24.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.33.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.44.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.148.
5 Appellate Body Report on EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.254.
1 Appellate Body Report, Canada -Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, pare. 97.
2 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras. 127-128.
3 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para. 132.
4 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para. 113; Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy(Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US Ⅱ),, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.130.
5 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras. 113-115; Appellate Body Report, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 -New Zealand and USⅡ)，WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, palas.130-134．但事实上，笼统地说政府行动和为支付提供融资之间所需联系的确切性质是非常困难的。政府总是为追求各种目标进行各种管制。See, Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, para.114.
6 Appellate Body Report on EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.244.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.222.
2 Panel Report on EC- Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, pare. 7.275.
3 在该案中，食糖生产者可自由决定是否生产C类食糖，但一旦生产，就必须出口，除非一直延续到来年作为配额食糖。
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS103/AB/RW/2, WT/DS 113/AB/RW/2, para.95.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Dairy (Article 21.5 —New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW/2, WT/DS113/AB/RW/2, para.128.
1 Panel Report on US - FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.154.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras.130-131.
1 “出口补贴例示清单”(c)段规定：“政府提供或授权的对出口装运货物征收的内部运输和货运费用，条件优于给予国内装运货物的条件。”
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.230.
3 Geoffrey S. Becker and Charles E. Hanrahan, "Trade Remedies and Agriculture", CRS Report for Congress, RL31296, February 22, 2002, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, October 21, 2006.
4 尤其是反补贴调查中上游补贴的利益传递(Benefit Pass-through)。如GAIT时期的US-Canadian Pork案专家组报告。在该案中，专家组认为，生猪和猪肉在加拿大是两个遵循正常交易原则的独立产业，提供给生猪生产者的补贴只有导致猪肉生产者对生猪支付的价格低于对其他可获得商业供应来源的生猪支付的价格水平，才能被视为对猪肉的生产给予了补贴。除非提供给生猪生产的补贴产生了价格影响，否则不能认为加拿大猪肉生产者接受了补贴。参见：GATT Panel Repog on US-Canadian Pork, DS7/R, adopted on 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30, para.4.9.WTO成立后，比较典型的案件还有涉及私有化前的补贴问题US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ(WT／DS138)案，以及美国——软木材Ⅳ(WT／DS257)。具体参见本文第二章第二节。
5 在当前多哈回合谈判中，有多个成员的提案涉及上游补贴的利益传递问题。参见：Benefit Pass-through, Communication from Canada, WTO Doc.TN/RL/GEN/7, 14 July 2004; Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Canada, WTO Doc. TN/RL/GEN/86, 17 November 2005; Benefit Pass-through, Paper from Brazil, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/193, 16 November 2005.
6 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.214-230.
1 详细内容参见本文第六章第三节。
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.219.
3 Appellate Body Report on US- Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.615 & para.626.
4 Panel Report on US- Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.799.
1 美国——陆地棉补贴案专家组和上诉机构分析农产品出口信贷担保纪律的方法，遭到了一些批评。批评者认为，专家组和上诉机构的解释，出乎了谈判者的意料，尤其是美国。Marc Benitah, "U.S. Agricultural Export Credits after the WTO Cotton Ruling: The Law of Unintended Consequences", Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 6(2), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/benitahexportcredits.pdf, November 2, 2006.
2 第9.1条列举了6项受《农业协定》项下削减承诺约束的出口补贴类型，分别是：(a)直接出口补贴，包括实物支付；(b)政府或其代理机构以低于国内市场价格的价格，出口非商业性农产品库存；(c)依靠政府措施供资的出口支付(无论是否涉及自公共帐户的支出)，包括由对产品征税的收入供资的支付；(d)为减少出口农产品的营销成本而提供的补贴，包括处理、升级和其它加工成本，以及国际运输成本和运费；(e)政府提供或授权的出口装运货物的国内运费，其条件优于国内装运货物；(f)视出口产品所含农产品的情况而对该农产品提供的补贴。
1 即《农业协定》第9.1条列举的出口补贴。
2 Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, Annex 8, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, para.7.
3 《模式协定》第12段规定，不得对农产品或产品组的出口提供或重新提供基期内没有提供的补贴。此处没有区分《模式协定》附件7(即《农业协定》第9.1条)列举的出口补贴与没有列举的出口补贴，因此，一般认为，指所有形式的出口补贴。但具体的削减承诺只涉及第9.1条列举的出口补贴，也即《模式协定》附件7列举的出口补贴。The Modalities Agreement, GATT Doc. MTN. GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, para.12.
4 这22类农产品或产品组包括：小麦和面粉、谷粒、大米、油籽、植物油、豆饼、食糖、黄油和乳脂肪、脱脂奶粉、奶酪、其他奶制品、牛肉、猪肉、家禽肉、羔羊肉、活动物、鸡蛋、葡萄酒、水果、蔬菜、烟草和棉花。The Modalities Agreement, Annex 8, GATT Doc. MTN. GNG/MA/W/24, para.7, 20 December 1993.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.243.
6 参见《农业协定》第9.2条。
1 关于农产品出口补贴的削减，参见本章第三节。
2 The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.pdf, February 3, 2007, p.19.
3 也即没有承担削减承诺的农产品。
1 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri(Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, November 21, 2006.
2 Jan Wouters and Dominic Coppens, "An Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Including a Discussion of the Agreement on Agriculture", K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 104, December 2006, http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP104e.pdf, November 22, 2006. "第9.1条列举之外 的出口补贴，只受《农业协定》反规避纪律的约束。在《农业协定》下，这些类型的出口补贴本身不被禁止，不管接受补贴的农产品是否是减让表列明的农产品。”
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.237-240; Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law Intemational, 2006, pp.228-229．后文倾向于认为，根据《农业协定》和《补贴协定》第3.1(a)条，禁止对没有列入减让表的农产品提供出口补贴。
2 Gustavo E. Luengo Hernandez de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC Law: Conflicts in International Trade Law, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp.227-228.
3 如美国——外国销售公司案、美国——陆地棉补贴案等专家组和上诉机构报告。具体参见本章第四节。
4 Appellate Body Report on US - FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.143.
5 具体参见本章第四节。
1 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.137
2 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.7.137.
3 Panel Report on US- FSC, WT/DS108/R, paras.7.138-7.139.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.147.
1 关于《模式协定》的效力及与《农业协定》的关系，参见：Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Integration of Agriculture into WTO Disciplines", in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, pp.27-37; Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.246.
2 参见《维也纳条约法公约》第32条。
3 The Modalities Agreement, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, paras.11-12.
4 但在满足《模式协定》附件8第5段(c)项和(d)项条件的情形下，预算支出和数量承诺的削减也可在1991-1992年相应平均水平的基础上进行。也即以1990-1991取代1986-1990，作为基期水平。
1 《模式协定》附件8第5(a)段的规定："5. (a) By the conclusion of the implementation period, each participant shall reduce: (ⅰ) the quantities of each agricultural product or group of products specified in this Annex benefiting from export subsidies by 21 percent from the base period level; and (ⅱ) its budgetary outlays for export subsidies for each agricultural product or group of products specified in this Annex by 36 percent from the base period level."
2 假若用符号来表示，设定“自实施期开始起至所涉年份止，此类补贴的预算支出累计数额”为A，“完 全符合该成员减让表列明的相关年度支出承诺水平所产生的累计数额”为B，“此类预算支出基期水平”为C，给定年度之前相关年度预算支出承诺之和为D，给定年度之前相关年度该成员出口补贴实际预算支出之和为E，在符合《农业协定》第9.2(b)条(ⅰ)段条件的前提下，给定年度补贴的预算支出最高额为F，给定年度该成员出口补贴的预算支出承诺水平为G，则相关关系如下：A应当小于或等于“B+C×3％”。假若此处的累计数额为成员减让表列明的相关年度预算支持水平之和，则相当于允许成员“储蓄”给定年度之前年度中没有使用的额度，以做将来年度应急的储备；假若此处的累计数额为相关年度中成员实际预算支出的累计数额，则相当于不允许成员“储蓄”给定年度之前年度中没有使用的额度。按照前一种理解，A(E+F) 应当小于或等于“B(D+G)+c×3％”：按照第二种理解，A(E+F)应当小于或等于“B(E+G)+C×3％”。比如，假设A成员对某农产品提供出口补贴的基期平均预算支出水平为100个单位，在基期内每年削减基期水平的6％，实施期结束时应削减至64个单位。也就是说，从1995年到2000年，每年的预算支出水平分别为94、88、82、76、70和64。在1995年和1996年两个年度，该农产品的生产和营销状况比较好，因此，在上述两个年度，成员出口补贴的预算支出只使用了50个单位。但到了1997年，该农产品的世界价格低迷，A成员被迫超出该年度预算支出水平，对出口补贴提供更多的资金。此处提出的问题就是：A成员可否使用1995-1996年度没有使用的预算支出?1997年可以提供的预算支出的最高金额为多少?假若按照第一种理解计算，根据上文的公式，1997年A成员可以提供的预算支出的最高金额F=(94+88)+82+100×3％-(50+50)=167个单位。假若按照第二种理解计算，根据上述公式，1997年A成员可以提供的预算支出的最高金额F=(94+88)+82++100×3％-(94+88)=85个单位。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.268-271.
1 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 26-27June 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/11, 28 July 1997.
2 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-26 September 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/12, para.7, 31 October 1997.
3 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 26-27 June 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/11, 28 July 1997.
4 Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-26 September 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/12, 31 October 1997, para.8.
1 各成员的具体观点参见：Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 25-26 September 1997, WTO Doc. G/AG/R/12, 31 October 1997, para.8.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International，2002，p．275．自1997年6月26-27日，WTO农业委员会第11次例会上各成员讨论第9.2(b)条有关出口补贴累积问题的解释和适用之后，到同年9月25-26日第12次例会，又有了一些新的发展。诸如波兰通报超过年度最高承诺水平使用出口补贴。
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agreement: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules," Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.275-276.
1 Nell Andrews, Daivd Bailey and Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.28.
2 在乌拉圭回合的最终阶段，与1986-1990年基期水平相比，很多产品接受补贴的出口数量和出口补贴的预算支出都发生了增长。参见Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotmtmg History (1986-1994), Vol. Ⅳ: The End Game, Kluwer Law And Taxation Publishers, 1999, p.27; Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries", Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.woddbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 22, 2006.
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countrie"s, Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.woddbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 22, 2006.
4 采取过这种“储蓄”行为的成员包括欧盟、美国、波兰和挪威。在实施期末期到来的时候，更多的成员开始超出出口补贴承诺水平，甚至超出了承诺的300％。参见Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agreement: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
1 出口补贴纪律的这种方法，即所谓"on a commodity-specific basis"。1993年《模式协定》附件8第7段列举了22种农产品或产品组。The Modalities Agreement, Annex 8, GATT Doc. MTN. GNG/MA/W/24, December 1993, para.7.20.
2 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries", Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 24, 2006.
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agreement: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
4 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries', Trade Note, the World Bank Group, September 10, 2003, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote8.pdf, November 24, 2006.
1 Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and A Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and E1 Salvador, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 2000.
2 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, November 20, 2006.p.3.
3 关于出口信贷、出口信贷担保和保险计划，粮食援助，以及国营贸易企业的有关谈判提案和成员立场，参见本章第五节。关于出口限制和出口税，参见美国、日本、凯恩斯集团、瑞士、韩国、刚果、约旦提交的下列提案：G/AG/NG/W/15; G/AG/NG/W/91; G/AG/NG/W/93; G/AG/NG/W/94; G/AG/NG/W/98; G/AG/NG/W/135; G/AG/NG/W/140.
4 Draft Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, para.13.
5 但在多哈会议的最后几个小时，欧共体坚持本承诺“不影响谈判的结果”("without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations")，这表明最终取消所有出口补贴，并非当时成员共同同意的目标。
6 Cairns Group Negotiating proposal: Export Competition, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/11, 16 June 2000；欧共体认为，凯恩斯集团的提案有某些模糊之处，在某些地方，似乎针对所有形式的出口支持，但在另外一些地方，又只针对出口补贴。欧共体表示不接受只谈判出口补贴。Second Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 29-30 June 2000, Statement by the European Community, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/24, 11 July 2000.
1 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
2 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc.G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000; Second Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 29-30 June 2000, Statement by the European Community, Doc. G/AG/NG/W/24, 11 July 2000.
3 Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000.
4 WTO: Negotiations on Agriculture, WTO Doc. A/AG/NG/W/94, 21 December 2000.
5 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.6.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.254.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada —Dairy (Article 21.5 —New Zealand and US), WT/DS108/AB/RW, WT/DS108/AB/RW, para.121.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC，WT／DS108／AB／R，paras．144-147．美国——外国销售公司案上诉机构报告推翻了专家组报告，认定被指控的FSC措施不是第9.1(d)条界定的出口补贴，并继而认定无论是对减让表列明的农产品，还是减让表未列举的农产品，美国实施FSC出口补贴的方式至少威胁规避根据《农业协定》第3.3条承担的出口补贴承诺，从而与《农业协定》第10.1条不一致。上诉机构在述及理由的时候，区分了对减让表列明的农产品提供的出口补贴与减让表没有列明的农产品提供的出口补贴。
1 参见本章第二节。
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.257.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.150.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.258-259.
2 Panel Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.875.
3 专家组认为，就第10.3条而言，对没有列入减让表的农产品，美国的削减承诺水平为零，巴西作为申诉方，只需要首先证明美国没有列入减让表的农产品的出口量超过“零”。Panel Report on US -Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.793.
4 Appellate Body Report on US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.650-652.
1 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, pare.152.
2 《农业协定》第10.3条规定，“任何声称未对超过削减承诺水平的任何出口数量提供补贴的成员，必须证实未对所涉出口数量提供出口补贴，无论此种出口补贴是否列入第9条中。”
3 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.122-7.123..
4 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5- New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS103/RW2, WT/DS113/RW2, para.5.18.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5- New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.76.
6 Panel Report on Canada - Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.4.270-4.271.
1 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, paras.4.282-4.283.
2 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.123.
3 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.29.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.877.
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.266.
6 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiatio ", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.247.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.263; T. Josling, So Tangermann, and T. Warley, Agriculture in the GATT, MacMillan, London, 1996, p.197.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, paras.149-153.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/D'S267/AB/R, para.709.上诉机构报告认定专家组错误地适用了美国——外国销售公司案中上诉机构的分析，并否认第10.1条规避“威胁”要求存在“无条件的法律授权”。
1 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.704.
2 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.788.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, footnote 1082 to para.704.
4 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.788.
5 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, para.149.
6 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.713.
7 该条的潜在问题之一是对“加工的初级农产品”的认定。
1 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries", http://siteresources.woddbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/8.ExportSubsidies.pdf, November. 2006.
2 很多成员希望扩展和改进规则，防止政府规避出口补贴承诺。出口税、出口促进活动和某些可能等同于出口补贴的国内政策安排，也成为多哈回合谈判的问题。参见："WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now", updated 1 December 2004,http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, October 22, 2006. 2005年香港部长级会议宣言对在2013年前平行取消所有形式的出口补贴，并规范有同等效果的所有出口措施达成一致。Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.3.
3 根据《农业协定》第3.3条受削减承诺约束的出口补贴，有关预算支出和数量承诺水平在成员的减让表中都有明确列举，故而具有透明度，也较易于衡量。
4 Harry de Gorter, "Export Subsidies: Agricultural Policy Reform and Developing Countries ", http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/8.ExportSubsidies.pdf, November 22，2006．《农业协定》规定了通报制度，而后三种实践，除国营贸易企业有单独的通报之外，在多哈回合中，成员才刚刚开始提议建立粮食援助和官方支持的出口信贷的通报制度。
5 虽然当前粮食援助仅占发展中国家粮食商品进口的很小一部分，国际市场影响可能不会很大，但如果粮食援助恢复到过去的较高水平，就可能对国际市场产生较大影响。Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, October 22, 2006.
6 Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, para.2, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, October 22, 2006．
1 一般情况下，都是在一般商业销售渠道之外提供。
2 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies ahd WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture:Issues and Suggestions for New Rules ", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
3 Harry de Gorier, Merlinda Ingco and Lilian Ruiz, "Export Subsidies and WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture:Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", Prepared for the World Bank's Agricultural Trade Group, March 2002.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.619.
5 《农业协定》第10条“防止规避出口补贴承诺”之第4款规定：“捐赠国际粮食援助的成员应保证：(a) 国际粮食援助的提供与对受援国的农产品商业出口无直接或间接联系；(b) 国际粮食援助交易，包括货币化的双边粮食援助，应依照联合国粮农组织《剩余食品处理原则和协商义务》的规定进行，在适当时，还应依照通常营销要求(UMRs)制度；以及(c)此类援助应在可能的限度内以完全赠与的形式提供或以不低于《1986年粮食援助公约》第4条规定的条件提供。”
1 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第207页。
2 Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, para.13, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, October 20, 2006.
3 即马拉喀什决定("the Marrakesh Decision")，其中与粮食安全相关的部分有第3款(ⅰ)项和(ⅱ)项，即："3. Ministers accordingly agree to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round on trade in agriculture does not adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food needs of developing countries, especially least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. To this end Ministers agree: ⅰ. to review the level of food aid established periodically by the Committee on Food Aid under ttte Food Aid Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform program; ⅱ. to adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with Article Ⅳ of the Food Aid Convention 1986."
1 Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Food Aid, Committee on Commodity Problems, FAO, Sixty-fifth Session, Rome, Italy, 11-13 April 2005, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/j4701e/j4701e00.htm, November 22, 2006.
2 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc,.October 22, 2006.
3 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
4 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
5 Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex A, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, para.18.
1 Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.3.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey and Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.27.
3 《出口补贴例示清单》(ⅰ)项：“政府(或政府控制的特殊机构)提供的出口信贷担保或保险计划、针对出口产品成本增加或外汇风险计划的保险或担保计划，保险费率不足以弥补长期营业成本和计划的亏损。”
4 《出口补贴例示清单》(k)项：“政府(或政府控制的和／或根据政府授权活动的特殊机构)给予的出口信贷，利率低于它们使用该项资金所实际应付的利率(或如果它们为获得相同偿还期和其他信贷条件且与出口信贷货币相同的资金而从国际资本市场借人时所应付的利率)，或它们支付的出口商或其他金融机构为获得信贷所产生的全部或部分费用，只要这些费用保证在出口信贷方面能获得实质性的优势。但是，如一成员属一官方出口信贷的国际承诺的参加方，且截至1979年1月1日至少有12个本协定创始成员属该国际承诺的参加方(或创始成员所通过的后续承诺)，或如果一成员实旋相关承诺的利率条款，则符合这些条款的出口信贷做法不得视为本协定所禁止的出口补贴。”
5 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.934.
1 Export Competition: Export Subsidies to be subject to the terms of the Final Agreement, GATT Doc. MIN. GNG/AG/W/1/Add.10, 2 August 1991, para.3(h), (ⅰ).
2 Article 10.2 to Dunkel Draft, "Participants undertake not to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes otherwise than in conformity with internationally agreed disciplines".
3 以上第10.2条谈判历史，参见：Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.934-7.940; Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.620.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.766.
1 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.632-639.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.259-260.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.947.
2 关于两个协定的关系，详细论述参见第五章。
3 山下一仁，《WTO农业协定的问题和淡判的现状及展望——从乌拉圭回合谈判的参加者的角度观察》，http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/publications/summary/05050007.html, (访问日期：2006年8月6日)。
1 Marc Benitah, "U. S. Agricultural Export Credits after the WTO Cotton Ruling: The Law of Unintended Consequences", Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 6(2), http://www.wofldtradelaw.net/articles/benitahexportcredits.pdf, October 5, 2006.
2 如有关还款期限、最低保险费、利益等重要方面。
3 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 21, 2006.
4 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
5 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
6 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, updated 1 December 2004, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.doc, October 22, 2006.第二种方法遭到发展中成 员的反对，认为加剧了当前出口补贴纪律的不公平。
1 Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579, Annex A, 2 August 2004, para.18.
2 Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.3.
3 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition lssues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22, 2006.
4 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, pp.138-139.
5 该计算使用的数据是成员国营贸易企业通报的出口数量以及FAOSTAT(2003)的国际贸易数据。转引自Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http:/wwww.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22, 2006.
6 GATT1947第17条规定：1．(a) 每一缔约方承诺，如其建立或维持一国营企业，无论位于何处，或在形式上或事实上给予任何企业专有权或特权，则该企业在其涉及进口或出口的购买和销售方面，应以符合本协定对影响私营贸易商进出口的政府措施所规定的非歧视待遇的一般原则行事。(b) 本款(a)项的规定应理解为要求此类企业在适当注意本协定其他规定的前提下，应仅依照商业因素进行任何此类购买或销售，包括价格、质量、可获性、适销性、运输和其他购销条件，并应依照商业惯例给予其他缔约方的企业参与此类购买或销售的充分竞争机会。(c) 缔约方不得阻止其管辖范围内的企业(无论是否属本款(a)项所述企业)依照本款(a)项和(b)项的原则行事。2．本条第1款的规定不得适用于直接或最终供政府消费使用、而不是为转售或用于生产供销售的货物而进口的产品。对于此类进口产品，每一缔约方应对其他缔约方的贸易给予公平和公正的待遇。3．各缔约方确认，本条第1款(a)项所述企业在经营中可能对贸易造成严重障碍；因此，在互惠互利基础上进行谈判以限制或减少此类障碍对国际贸易的扩大具有重要意义。4．(a)各缔约方应将由本条第1款(a)项所述类型企业进口至各自领土或自各自领土出口的产品通知缔约方全体。(b)对一不属第2条下减让对象的产品设立、维持或授权实行进口垄断的一缔约方，应在有关产品 贸易中占实质性份额的另一缔约方的请求，应将最近代表期内该产品的进口加价通知缔约方全体，如无法进行此类通知，则应通知该产品的转售价格。(c) 如一缔约方有理由认为其在本协定项下的利益受到第1款(a)项所述企业经营活动的不利影响，在其请求下，缔约方全体可请建立、维持或授权建立该企业的缔约方提供关于其运用本协定条款情况的信息。(d) 本款的规定不得要求任何缔约方披露会阻碍执法或违背公共利益或损害特定企业合法商业利益的机密信息。
1 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, November 30，2006，p．29．然而，有关国营贸易企业通报制度的执行情况并不理想。同文第28页。
2 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round', Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22, 2006.
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.88.
2 Philip C. Abbott and Linda M. Young, "Export Competition Issues in the Doha Round", Invited paper presented at the International Conference: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.ecostat.unical.it/2003agtradeconf/Invited%20papers/Abbott%20and%20Young.pdf, October 22. 2006.
3 又称“Single-desk Selling”，指某些国家在国外营销和通过专业化的销售局出口农产品的做法，涉及到出口和进口的垄断。孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版，第18页。
4 Proposal for Comprehensive: Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission for the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
5 Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000.
6 WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, Negotiating Proposal by Mauritius, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/96, 28 December 2000．马里要求维持最不发达国家国营贸易企业参与国际市场的权利。参见：Malian Proposal for the Future Negotiations on Agriculture, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/99, 11 January 2001..
7 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
8 Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex A, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, para.18, 2 August 2004.
1 Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para. 3.
1 Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N. D. L. Rev. 691, 2003, p.770.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System 'at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489. M, 2003, p.521; Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of The WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to Its Post-Hong Kong Directions", RAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55, May 2006, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf, November 24, 2006, p.22.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.235.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.306.
3 Raj Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round', 79 N. D. L. Rev. 691, 2003, p.769.
4 参见《农业协定》附件3第8段。
1 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.340-341.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.385-386.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride Towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System "at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489. M, 2003, p.521.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of The WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to Its Post-Hong Kong Directions ", RAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55. May 2006. http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf. November 24. 2006. p.22.
5 来源于WTO秘书处农业和货物司官员的介绍。
1 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Declaration of 20 September 1986, GATT Doc. MIN. DEC, p.6
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, ppo386-387.
3 D. Palmeter, "Agriculture and Trade Regulations: Selected Issues in the Application of U. S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law", 23 Journal of World Trade (1989) No. 1, p.59. 转引自Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.310.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.310.
2 Jim Monke, "Farm Commodity Programs: Direct Payment, Counter-Cyclical Payment, and Marketing Loans", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33271, March 1, 2006; Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, April 20, 2006.
3 在共同市场中，主要的干预形式是价格支持。价格支持的基本目标是将市场价格维持在某个最低水平上，或高于该水平。为了达到这一目的，理事会每年都设定很多共同价格，通过各种支持机制(干预收购、私营储备安排，和一系列的其他金融工具)，将市场价格维持在特定水平上。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.311.
4 依据CAP改革方案，在1993-1996年期间，谷类的支持价格削减29％，牛肉价格支持削减15％。对于同意减少15％生产面积的农民，通过直接支付补偿收入的降低。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. Ⅰ: Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.219.
1 本图表数据来源：Chad E. Hart and John C. Beghin, "Rethinking Agricultural Domestic Support under the World Trade Organization", Briefing Paper 04-BP 43, November 2004, http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS[PDFFiles/04bp43.pdf, November 13, 2006. p.12.
2 差价税(Variable Levy)，又称差额税，是指在本国生产某种产品的国内价格高于同类的进口商品价格时，为了削弱进口商品的竞争能力，保护国内生产和国内市场，按国内价格与进口价格之间的差额征收的一种关税。差价税主要是欧盟对从非成员国进口的农产品征收的一种进口关税。其税额是欧盟所规定的门槛价格与实际进口的货价加运保费(CIF)之间的差额。征收差价税是欧盟实施共同农业政策的一项主要措施，其主要目的是为了保护和促进欧盟内部的农业生产。所征差价税款作为农业发展资金，用于资助和扶持内部农业生产的发展。例如，欧盟为了实行共同农业政策，建立农畜产品统一市场、统一价格，对进口的谷物、猪肉、食品、家禽、乳制品等农畜产品，征收差价税。参见山西省晋城市商务局网页资料：http://www.icsw.gov.cn/UploadFile/200631617940708.doc, December 11, 2006.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.312.
2 以上对若干支持计划的介绍，参见Brandorn Willis and Doug O'Brien, "Summary and Evolution of U. S. Farm Bill Commodity Titles", http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/commodity.html#deficiency, January 29, 2007.
3 参见李超民：《美国70年来农产品立法与农产品常平仓计划的现实意义》，http://www.shac.gov.cn/hwzc/zc/t20040804_107222.htm,(访问日期：2007年1月16日)。
4 Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", April 2006, www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, January 29, 2007.
1 Brandom Willis and Doug O'Brien, Summary and Evolution of U. S. Farm Bill Commodity Titles, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/commodity.html#deficiency, January 29 2007; Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.219.
2 Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", April 2006, www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, January 29, 2007.
3 参见李舟生：《未来WTO农业境内支持政策改革方向》，http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?showtype=pda&catid=10531,(访问日期：2007年1月18日)。
1 Randy Schnepf, "Agriculture in the WTO: Limits on Domestic Support", CRS Report for Congress, RS20840, updated May 10, 2005, September 18, 2006, available at available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21, 2006, CRS-6.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to lts Post-Hong Kong Directions", FAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55, May 2006, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf, November 24, 2006, p.23.
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.314.
4 如保证粮食安全，维持和增加农民收入等。
5 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.387.
6 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, July 2000, p.3.
1 由于一共有34个成员基期综合支持量超过了微量水平。因此，只有这34个成员才面临着国内支持的削减问题。
2 欧共体15个成员国算作一个。可提供“黄箱”补贴的成员名单，参见：Total Aggregate Measurenment of Support, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. TN/AG/S/13, 27 January 2005.
3 参见《农业协定》第6.4条。
4 参见《农业协定》第6.2条。
5 参见《农业协定》第6.5条，指在限产计划下提供的直接支付。
1 Panel Report on Korea-Various Measures on Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R. oara.808.
2 SMU主要由欧共体提议使用。在概念上，SMU要比PSE范围窄。SMU不包括为控制供应而提供的直接支付。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GAIT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.395.
3 Negotiating Group on Market Access, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, GATr Doc. MIN. GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, paras.8 & 15.
4 参见《农业协定》第6.3条。
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DSll3/AB/RW, para.89.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U. S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO ", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21, 2006, CRS-13.
3 销售信贷收益是2002年美国农业法下主要的国内支持措施之一。
4 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U. S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO ", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, November 21, 2006, CRS-32.
5 Pedro Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9, No.8, August 2005, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES9-8.pdf, September 21, 2006, p.4.
6 欧共体——食糖出口补贴案在很大程度上受到加拿大——奶制品案的影响。该案的争议问题是食糖的出口补贴，但有关“交叉补贴”(cross-subsidization)的裁定同时涉及国内支持纪律。
1 Tim Josling, "Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support", paper presented to the Conference on "Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: When are we heading?" held at Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Agriculture/Josling%20negotiations.pdf, September 28, 2006, p.2.
2 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.88-92.
3 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para.148.
1 例如，在两个DSU第21.5条程序中，上诉机构认定“对出口”的标准过宽，不需要存在要求出口的明确说明。
2 欧共体——食糖出口补贴案要求在补贴和出口之间存在紧密地联系，从而对加拿大——奶制品案的裁决作了矫正，避免混淆出口补贴和国内支持纪律的可能性。
3 Tim Josling, "Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support', paper presented to the Conference on "Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: When are we heading?" held at Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Agriculture/Josling%20negotiations.pdf, September 28, 2006, p.18.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.92.
1 World Trade Law. net Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC) on Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, available at www.worldtradelaw.net.
2 一般认为，附件2对具体措施的列举是非穷尽性的。参见Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002，p．413。但该文同时指出，实质上是穷尽性的。参见第421页。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products:from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.421.
2 “一般服务”涉及与向农业或农村提供服务或利益的计划有关的支出(或放弃的税收)。它们不得涉及对生产者或加工者的直接支付。“一般服务”应当满足第1段规定的总体标准和第2段规定的特定政策条件。在范围上， “一般服务”包括但不限于下列清单：(a)研究，包括一般研究、与环境计划有关的研究以及与特定产品有关的研究计划；(b)病虫害控制，包括一般的和特定产品的病虫害控制措施，如早期预警制度、检疫和根除；(c)培训服务，包括一般和专门培训设施；(d)推广和咨询服务，包括提供可便利信息和研究结果向生产者和消费者传播的方法；(e)检验服务，包括一般检验服务和为健康、安全、分级或标准化为目的特定产品检验；(f)营销和促销服务，包括与特定产品有关的市场信息、咨询和促销，但不包括未列明目的的、销售者可用以降低售价或授予购买者直接经济利益的支出；以及(g)基础设施服务，包括：电力网络、道路和其他运输方式、市场和港口设施、供水设施、堤坝和排水系统以及与环境计划有关的基础设施工程。在所有情况下，支出应只直接用于基本工程的提供和建设，并且除可普遍获得的公用设施网络化建设外，不得包括提供补贴的农场设施。支出不得包括对投入或运营成本的补贴或优惠使用费。具体参见《农业协定》附件2第2段。尽管绝大多数措施非常重要，并且使用广泛，但在磋商程序中分歧不大。
3 粮食安全是政府干预农业的基本原因之一。粮食安全政策免于削减承诺是自然而然的。《农业协定》认可成员可以为了积累和保持构成国家立法确认的粮食安全计划组成部分的产品库存而支出。此外，还允许对私营产品储备提供的政府援助，只要储备构成粮食安全计划的组成部分。同时，为了避免粮食安全扭曲农业生产和贸易，《农业协定》也规定了下列具体条件：首先，此类库存的数量和积累应符合仅与粮食安全有关的预定指标。其二，库存的积累和处置过程在财务方面应透明。其三，政府的粮食采购应按现行市场价进行，粮食安全库存的销售应按不低于所涉产品和质量的现行国内市场价进行。所有这些条件都旨在避免扭曲贸易和生产的补贴伪装成真正的粮食安全政策而免于削减承诺。例如，如果对数量和价格不加任何限制，政府购买农产品就容易被用作通过以人为的管理价格无限制的购买产品。参见：《农业协定》附件2第3段。
4 此处的粮食援助是指免费或以补贴价格向需要援助的部分人口提供粮食。为了避免滥用国内粮食援助，《农业协定》规定了若干条件：其一，接受粮食援助的资格应符合与营养目标有关的明确规定的标准；其二，此类援助的提供方式应为直接向有关人员提供粮食或提供可使合格受援者按市场价格或补贴价格购买粮食的方法；其三，政府的粮食采购应按现行市场价进行，此类援助的供资和提供方式应透明。参见：《农业协定》附件2第4段。
5 除了附件2第6段至第13段所列直接支付外，《农业协定》还允许对农业生产者提供可免于削减的、各种不同形式的直接支付，只要满足附件2第6段(b)至(e)项的条件，也即直接支付的数量不得与生产的类型与产量、国际或国内价格或生产要素有关，也不得为接受此类支付而要求进行生产。一般来说，虽然不挂钩的直接支付可以是出于任何原因，为任何金额，采取收入保险、灾害救济、结构调整援助、环境或地区发展计划等彤式，但都不能超过遭受的实际损失。
1 本款表明，只要不扭曲贸易和生产，成员可以采取任何形式的直接支付，支持农民的收入。与其他直接支付不同的是，不挂钩的收入支持要求明确规定获得此类支付的资格。参见《农业协定》附件2第2段第6段。
2 此款直接支付存在原因是农业生产对自然力量的依赖，导致农业生产存在风险，故而需要政府的参与。为了保证政府的资金参与不会扭曲农业生产和贸易，本款规定了一系列的限制性条件，如获得支付的资格应由农业收入的损失确定；支付的数量应补偿生产者在其有资格获得该援助的当年收入损失的70％以下：支付的数量只应与收入有关，不与生产、价格或生产要素有关，旨在割断支付与生产和市场的联系：支付的数量不应超过当年收入损失的70％以下，除非生产者可同时获得自然灾害救济。后一情形下，支付总额不超过生产者总损失的100％。
3 本款与上一款类似，只是限于由于自然灾害导致的支付。参见《农业协定》附件2第8段。
4 参见《农业协定》附件2第9、10、11段。通过生产者退休计划提供的结构调整援助旨在便利从事适销农产品生产的人员退休或转入非农业生产活动：通过资源停用计划提供的结构调整援助旨在从适销农产品生产中退出所有土地或包括牲畜在内的其他资源；通过投资援助提供的结构调整援助旨在协助生产者针对客观地表现出的结构性缺陷进行经营方面的财政或有形结构调整。为了防止滥用和扭曲生产和贸易，上述三段额外规定了一些重要条件。如第9款规定支付接受者应当完全和永久地退休；第10段和第11段规定了生产和价格上的不挂钩要求。
5 参见《农业协定》附件2第12段。与第12段“环境计划下的支付”相对应的是《补贴协定》第8.2(c)条。提供该类支付的目的是抵销生产者因遵守政府环境或环保计划规定的具体条件，而产生的额外成本。支付取决于对该政府计划下特定条件的满足，支付的数量限于为遵守政府计划而所涉及的额外费用或收入损失。但《补贴协定》第8.2(c)条对环境补贴有更多的要求，即应为一次性的临时措施；且限于所需费用的20％等等。相比之下， 《农业协定》下的环境支付计划纪律更为宽松。
6 此类支付的首要要求是只能提供给落后地区的生产者。支付仅应使合格地区的生产者获得，但应使此类地区内的所有生产者普遍获得。《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条也规定了对一成员领土内落后地区的援助，如果满足一定条件，为不可诉补贴。比较《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条与《农业协定》附件2第2段第13款，有下列差异：其一，第13款再次强调了支付应当与生产和价格挂钩；其二， 《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条有经济测算上的要求，但《农业协定》并无此类要求。笼统的要求是该地区为落后地区，只要特定地区农民收入和一般收入有差距，便可以提供一般地区发展补贴。其相同之处是两个协定均规定：每一落后地区必须是一个明确界定的毗连地理区域，具有可确定的经济或行政特征；该地区依据中性和客观的标准，被视为属落后地区，表明该地区的困难不是因临时情况产生的。参见《农业协定》附件2第2段第13段；《补贴协定》第8.2(b)条(ⅰ)、(ⅱ)款。应当注意的是，目前《补贴协定》下已经不存在不可诉补贴的分类：然而，《农业协定》下，仍然属于不受削减承诺约束的“绿箱”措施。
7 农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版，第17页。
1 参见《农业协定》第13条。
2 Green Box Measures: Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. TN/AG/S/10, 8 November 2004.
3 巴西认为，生产灵活性合同支付和直接支付限制了可以获得支付的生产类型，如果在基期面积上种植某些生产类型，如水果、蔬菜、野生稻，将导致支付削减，甚至丧失所有的支付。此类限制的影响是引导在基期面积上种植某些特定的作物类型。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7. 358.
4 巴西认为，根据第6(a)段，前后相继的两个不挂钩的收入支持计划，如果结构、设计和资格标准相同，基期必须保持固定不变。更新基期可能会使当前支付与近期增加的产量挂钩，从而与第6(b)段不一致。巴西认为，由于存在更新的可能性，生产者可能会基于将来支持计划更新种植面积的预期，种植更多的计划下产品。但专家组却认为，无论是1996年农业法案，还是2002年农业法案，都不允许更新基期。自1996年以来，基期只更新了一次，没有证据证明美国国会将来如何制定农业法案。而且，没有证据证明生产者是否期待将来实施新的农业法案时，更新基期面积。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras. 7. 389-7. 405.
5 专家组报告遵循了司法经济原则，没有认定附件2第1段“基本要求”是否构成一项独立义务。Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.406-7.412.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.364-7.388.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.315.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.329-342..
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, pp.787-788.
2 Stephen J. Powell, Andrew Schmitz, "The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture", 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 287, 2005, pp.291-293.
3 Christian Wurzbacher, "Dispute Settlement: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton", WTO News: Issues No.12, 7 March2006, http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SyswebRessources/wton12edoc/$FILE/wton12e.doc, September. 19 2006.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, "Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: The Evolution of The WTO Agreement on Agriculture from Its Uruguay Round Origins to Its Post-Hong Kong Directions ", RAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE #55, May 2006, http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/desta%20fao.pdf, November 24, 2006, p.24.
2 参见《农业协定》附件2第6(e)段。
3 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.412.
4 如欧共体曾经实施的特殊牛肉保险计划，将动物分成两个独立的年龄组，将支付限制在每一年龄组不超过90头动物。虽然限制可能会降低农民每一年龄组喂养90头以上的激励，但是对于某一年龄组尚不满90头，或两组均不满90头的农民，则可能会刺激增加养殖数量，直到90头为止。Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp.23-24.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp.23-24.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p24.
3 参见Butault, Jean-Pierre and Bureau, Jean-Christophe, "WTO Constraints and the CAP: Domestic Support in EU 25Agriculture", 2006, ⅢS Discussion Paper No. 171 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=925865, December 2, 2006.
1 例如，尽管土耳其对绝大多数农产品维持了非常高的支持价格，但仍然利用微量支持豁免条款主张其支持都低于微量水平。Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.25.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.236.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Bumpy Ride Towards The Establishment of 'A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System 'at the WTO: Reflections Following the CANCUN Setback", 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003, p.526.
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda lngo, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules ", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, October. 2006, p.2
1 在谈判中，曾经提出各种不同的衡量手段，如生产者补贴等量(Producer Subsidy Equivalent，PSE)、支持衡量单位(SMU)，但最终采用了综合支持量的方法(AMS)。PSE是OECD国家使用的一种衡量方法。Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.307.
2 《农业协定》第1条(h)(ⅱ)款。
3 《农业协定》第6.3条。
1 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series，July 2000，p．7．计算的时候，有两种方法：政府开支和价格差。
2 《农业协定》第1条第(a)项。
3 《农业协定》第1条第(b)项。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.397.
2 《农业协定》第1条第(d)项。
3 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, p.7.
4 上述三个变量的详细描述，参见Rai Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: The Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement and lts Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N. D. L. Rev. 69, 2003, pp.767-775.
5 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, p.6.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.307.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.399.
3 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, pp.6-7.
1 Roberts, I., Podbury, T., and Hinchy, M., "Reforming Domestic Agricultural Support Policies through the World Trade Organization ", ABARE Research Report RR01.2 Canberra, available at http://abareonlineshop.com, January 22, 2007.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.18.
3 《农业协定》附件3第10段。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.400.
2 《农业协定》第13段。
3 参见《农业协定》第1(d)条。支持等值不包括《农业协定》附件2可免于削减的计划下提供的支持，此种支持：(ⅰ)对于在基期内提供的支持，指一成员减让表第四部分引用并引入的有关支持材料表中列明的支持，及(ⅱ)对于实施期任何一年中及此后提供的支持，指依照本协定附件4的规定汁算的支持，同时考虑该成员减让表第四部分引用而并入的支持材料所使用的构成数据和方法。
4 《农业协定》附件4第1段。
1 Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, GATT Doc. MIN. GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 1993, paras.8.
2 例如，对欧共体和美国1980—1990年国内支持水平的研究表明，以生产者补贴等值计算的补贴量在1986—1987年前后达到最高峰。参见白云：《乌拉圭回合<农业协议>国内支持条款缺陷问题研究》，载《时代法学》，2006年第4卷第4期，第84页。
3 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社，2005年，第220页。
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.426.
1 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.18.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.409-410; Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp. 19-20.
3 有关问题参见：Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2,pdf, October 28, 2006, p.8.
1 Stefan. Tangermann, "A Developed Country Perspective oftheAgendafor the New WTO Round of Agricultural Negotiations ", paper presented at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 3 March 1997, p.27; Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp.425-426.
2 Harry de Gorter and Merlinda Ingco, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, Octover 28，2006，pp．8-9．虽然这个比率可能重叠计算了边境支持，致使有夸大AMS的可能性，但仍然可以看出很大一部分的国内支持并未在《农业协定》下得到有效的规范。
1 Tim Josling and Stefan Tangermann, "Implementation of the WTOAgreement on Agriculture and Developments for the Next Round of Negotiations", European Review of Agricultural Economics Vol.26(3)(1999), p.377.
2 Chad E. Hart and John C. Beghin, "Rethinking Agricultural Domestic Support under the World Trade Organization", Briefing Paper 04-BP 43, November 2004, http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/04bp43.pdf, November 13, 2006, p.5.
3 Harry de Gorter and Medinda Ingco, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, October 28,. 2006. p.3.
4 Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, Domestic Support Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond, Canada Trade Research Series, July 2000, p.23.
5 1998年，日本在向WTO通报时，表示不再对大米使用管理支持价格，从而将综合支持量从3，1710亿日元削减到7660亿日元。但是，日本没有降低对大米的实际支持，关税配额和关税安排维持了内部支持。综合支持量的大幅削减，还致使日本可以对其他产品提供非常高的不可免除削减的支持，导致综合支持量承诺实际上没有意义。Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, p.17.
6 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004, pp.11-15.
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture on the WTO, December 1998, p.16;转引自Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of lnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.424.
2 程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第78页。
1 Konrad Von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", International Institute for Substainable Development, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf, September 16, 2006, p.11.
2 参见：John R, Magnus, "The Evils of A Long Peace: Legal Consequences of WTO 'Peace Clause' Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation over Farm Subsidies", Presented to the Global Business Dialogue, Washington, DC. http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/peace_clause.pdf, October 31, 2006, p.8.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.389-7.405.
2 Neil Andrews, David Bailey, Ivan Roberts, Agriculture in the Doha Round, The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004，p．21．该文认为，对贸易和生产是否只有最小的扭曲影响，部分地取决于农民对将来支持政策修改可能性的预期和行为。如果不挂钩制度设计的好，将如同没有提供任何支持。然而，在干预期内，如果农民认为支持计划将会做出修改，当前的生产决定将会影响到将来支持的性质和程度，不挂钩的有效性就将大打折扣。关于不挂钩支付，参见该著作第20至22页。
3 Harry de Gorter, Merlinda Ingo, "The AMS and Domestic Support in the WTO Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Suggestions for New Rules", http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/DS2.pdf, October 28, 2006, pp.4-5.
4 Tim Josling, "Domestic Farm Policies and the WTO Negotiations on Domestic Support', paper presented to the Conference on "Agriculture Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we heading?" June 23-26, 2003,http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Agriculture/Josling%20negotiations.pdf, October 27, 2006, p.2.
5 Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Draft Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN (01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001, parao 13.
1 Note on Domestic Support Reform: Negotiations on Agriculture, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/16, 23 June 2000; Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.美国提议，现有的支持措施不管当前属于哪一箱，都可分为两类：可韶免的支持措施，即对贸易和生产顶多只有最低限度扭曲影响的措施，和不可豁免的措施，即受削减承诺约束的措施。
2 U. S. Proposal for Global Agricultural Trade Reform (2002), http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm, FAS Online, January 16, 2007.
3 WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal-Domestic Support, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/35, 22 September. 2000.
4 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.
5 Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, 12 February 2003.
1 EC-US Joint Text: Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/157, 13 August 2003.
2 Agriculture: Framework Proposal, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, 20 August 2003.
3 Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Annex A: Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WTO Doc, JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 13 September 2003.
4 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, Annex A, pp.7-10.
5 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5.
1 Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal: Domestic Support, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/35, 22 September 2000.
2 Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in WorldAgricultural Trade, Submission by ASEAN, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/55, 10 November 2000.
3 WTO Agriculture Negotiations, Proposal by Norway, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/101, 16 January 2001.
4 Seventh Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 26-28 March 2001, WTO Doe. G/AG/NG/W/155, 5 April 2001.
5 Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003, para.43; Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments Revision, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003.
1 EC-US Joint Text: Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/157, 13 August 2003.
2 Agriculture: Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162, 20 August 2003.
3 Draft Cancun Ministerial Text, Annex A: Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 13 September 2003; Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, Annex A, pp.13-15. 即所谓“新蓝箱”，参见陈建宁：《“新蓝箱”：农业补贴的隐患》，载《WTO经济导刊》2004年第12期，第56页。
4 农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版，第27-29页。
5 凯恩斯集团成员要求重新审查“绿箱”支持措施的条件，从而保证这些政策不影响贸易和生产，或只有很小的影响。WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal-Domestic Support, WTO Doc G/AO/NG/W/35, 22 September 2000.加拿大对国内支持提出了单独的提案，WTO Neogtiations on Agriclture-Domestic Support, proposal by Canada, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/92; Fifth Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 5-7 February 2001, Statement by Canada, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/ll2, 13 February 2001．美国同样关注“绿箱”支持措施的标准。Note on Domestic Support Reform: Negotiations on Agriculture, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/16, 23 June 2000; Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submission from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000; Third Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 28-29 September 2000, Statement by the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/49, 5 October 2000.欧共体认为，《农业协定》的安排“为解决国内支持问题提供了正确的框架”，同意应当重新审视“绿箱”支持措施的标准。EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000.日本提议对“绿箱”的范围和标准进行调整，以反映农业的多功能(Multi-functionality)。Negotiatiing Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000; Fifth Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 5-7 February 2001, Statement by Japan, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/116, 20 February 2001.一些发展中成员对国内支持措施也提出了类似的提案，提议重新审视“绿箱”标准，当前“绿箱”措施应当量化，并进行规范。Agriculture: Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, 20 August 2003, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162.
1 Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sir Lanka and E1 Salvador, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 2000; Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform, Submitted from the United States, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000.
2 如一些发展中成员提议，按照特定的标准将成员的国内支持措施(“黄箱”、“蓝箱”和“绿箱”支持)归为一类，并将总量控制在国内农业产值的一定比例之内(10％)。参见成员提案：Agreement on Agriculture: Green Box/Annex 2 Subsidies, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/14; Agriculture: Framework Proposal, Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/162, 20 August 2003.
3 例如，日本希望改革“绿箱”支持的标准，以使其更好地包容与生产脱钩的收入支持及收入安全网计划。Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000．韩国希望调整“绿箱”支持的标准和范围，以更好地体现农业的多功能性。Proposal for WTO Negotiations on Agriculture Submitted by the Republic of Korea, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/98, 9 January 2001.
4 Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003.
5 Negotiations on Agriculture, First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO Doc. TN/AG/W/1, Annex A, paras.6-16, 12 February 2003.
6 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5.
1 Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and A Development Box, Proposal to the June 2000 Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture by Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 2000.
2 The Development Box made easy, http://www.cafod.org.uk/policy_and_analysis/public_policy_papers/trade/development_box, March 1, 2007.另可参见：Oxfam International, "An Introduction to the Development Box", http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/pp0201_Devbox_English.pdf/download, April 5, 2007; Duncan Green and Tim Rice, "Development and Agriculture in the WTO: A Comparison between the Development Box, the EC's Food Security Box and the Harbinson Draft Modalities", http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/pp0201_Devbox_English.pdf/download, April 5, 2007.
1 Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. MT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, para.5.
1 例如，在澳大利亚汽车皮革案(Australia-Leather, WT/DS126)中，《补贴协定》与《与贸易有关的投资措施协定》的关系。
1 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.16.
2 GATT1947第16.3条规定：“因此，缔约方应寻求避免对初级产品的出口使用补贴。但是，如一缔约方直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，并以增加自其领土出口的任何初级产品的形式实施，则该补贴的实施不得使该缔约方在该产品的世界出口贸易中占有不公平的份额，同时应考虑前一代表期内该缔约方在该产品贸易中所占份额及可能已经影响或正在影响该产品贸易的特殊因素。”
3 《补贴协定》第6.3(d)条规定：“补贴的影响在于与以往3年期间的平均市场份额相比，提供补贴成员的一特定补贴初级产品或商品的世界市场份额增加，且此增加在给予补贴期间呈一贯的趋势。”
4 《补贴协定》第32.1条规定：“除依照由本协定解释的GATT1994的规定外，不得针对另一成员的补贴采取具体行动。”
5 E. McGovern, International Trade Regulation, Part B: Trade in Goods, Exeter, Globefield Press, 1995, p.11.38-1; 转引自Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.315.
1 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.13.
2 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.16.
3 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.227.
4 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para. 227, footnote 60.本案上诉机构报告也否认附件1A中的其他货物协定，如《补贴协定》，取代了GATT1994。Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.14.
5 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.16.
6 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, pp.18-21.
1 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.16.
2 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, para.15.
1 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, para.8.1.
2 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, para.7.122.
3 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27R/USA, para.7.123.
4 该案上诉机构报告认为，第4.1条还表明乌拉圭回合农业谈判达成了新的市场准入减让，并且包括在成员GATT1994减让表中。这些减让对于农业改革进程和《农业协定》的根本目标来说，具有根本重要性。Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.156.
5 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, para.7.124.
6 Panel Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/R/USA, paras.7.125-7.126.
1 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.155.
2 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.157.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.157.
4 即认为GATT1994和《WTO协定》附件1A所列其他多边贸易协定的规定，在不与《农业协定》条款冲突的范围内适用。
5 参见本章第二节。
1 Appellant's Submission of the European Communities, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/june/tradoc_123465.1.05)%20non-confi%20for%20web.pdf,October 23, 2006, para. 156.
2 Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, paras.7.155-7.157.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.221-223.
1 根据条约有效解释原则，专家组和上诉机构一般都倾向于作协定之间没有冲突的解释。尤其是，各项协定作为乌拉圭回合一揽子协定和《WTO协定》附件1A的组成部分，由相同的成员在相同的时间签订。
2 Panel Report on Indonesia-Automobiles, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, and WT/DS64/R, paras.14.29-14.36 & paras.14.97-14.99; Appellate Body Report on Guatemala-Cement I, WT/DS60/AB/R, para.60; Appellate Body Report on US-Hot-Rolled Steel, WT/DS138/AB/R, paras.55 and 62.参见本案专家组报告第7．154段及脚注145。
3 如美国——陆地棉补贴案(WT／DS267)
4 如欧共体——食糖出口补贴案(WT／DS265，266，283)
1 Panel Report on EC-Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, WT/DS299/R, para.7.235; Panel Report on US-Countervaling Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, para.7.418.
2 本案专家组认为， “第16．3条只适用于《农业协定》和《补贴协定》界定的出口补贴”，而不能同时适用于第16．1条适用的所有类型的补贴。”Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton，WT／DS267／R，para．7，992。对于GATT第16．1条下的诉请，专家组认为，由于《农业协定》和《补贴协定》已经对出口补贴做出了界定，因而，对于解决本争端而言，也没有必要解决巴西根据GATT第16条提出的诉请。上诉机构对有关第16条适用的诉请也遵循了司法经济原则。
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.7.62.
4 参见本文第二章第三节。
5 Panel Report on Canda-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.4.129.
6 Panel Report on Canda-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.144.
1 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.305.
2 应当注意的是，《补贴协定》第3条序言在适用上没有时问限制：而第5、6、7条相关条款，明确取决于《农业协定》第13条的适用。
3 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.141.
4 Stwart T. P. ed., The World Trade Organization: The Multilateral Framework for the 21st Century and US Implementing Legislation, Washington, American Bar Association, 1996, p.171, 转引自 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.4.141, footnote 150.
5 GATFl994第6条征收反补贴税和第16条补贴实体纪律与《农业协定》和《补贴协定》不同。在Brazil—Desiccated Coconut案中，上诉机构强训，“《补贴协定》包含的权利和义务远远超过了仅仅适用和解释GATT第6条、第16条和第23条”。Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut，WT／DS22／AB／R， p.16．该案上诉机构还认为，GATT1994与附件1A其他货物协定(包括《补贴协定》)的关系非常复杂，必须在个案基础上审查。有学者认为，由于《补贴协定》对补贴规定了一个新的和相当详细的体制，在很多情况下，《农业协定》与WTO其他补贴与反补贴税义务的关系，相当于《农业协定》和《补贴协定》的关系。参见Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Articlel3 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002. p.315.
1 在乌拉圭回合之前，肯尼迪回合和东京回合谈判达成了一些单独的协定或“守则?，解决某些类型的非关税壁垒，扩大GATT的适用范围。缔约方在“复边”基础上参与协定，协定只对缔约方有约束力，造成了GATT时期的支离破碎状态，GAIT缔约方不一定受同一种义务约束。Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.341.
2 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. GATT/1396, 25 September 1986, p.5.
3 Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.341.
4 参见本章第一节。
5 Panel Report on Korea-Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/R, para.7.38.
6 Appellate Body Report on Korea-Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/AB.R, para.81; also see, Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Footwear (EC), WT/DS121/AB/R, para.81; Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline on WT/DS2/AB/R, p.23; Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Ⅱ, WT/DSS/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DSll/AB/R, p.12; Appellate Body Report on India-Patents (US), WT/DS50/AB/R, para.45.
7 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.221.
8 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, pp.19-20.
1 Pascal Lamy Speeches, "The Place and Role of the WTO (WTO Law) in the International Legal Order", Address before the European Society of International Law, 19 May 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/spp126_e.htm, April 5, 2006.
2 Panel Report on Indonesia-Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14. 28.
3 Panel Report on EC-Bananas, WT/DS27/R, paras.7.159 and 7.169. 有关“冲突”的论述，还可参见下列案件：Appellate Body Report on Guatemala-Cement Ⅰ, WT/DS60/AB/R, para.60; Appellate Body Report on US-Hot-Rolled Steel, WT/DS138/AB/R, paras.55 and 62.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1038.该案专家组认为，在《农业协定》第6．3条国内支持削减承诺和《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条禁止进口替代补贴之间，不存在固有的冲突。上述两项条款可以合起来理解，同时适用。因此，没有必要援引《农业协定》第21．1条，在发生冲突的情况下，适用《农业协定》的规定。但上诉机构认为，在其他情形下，第21．1条也有适用的可能性，问题的关键是《农业协定》是否对《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条就相同事项特别做出了具体规定。Appellate Body Reporl on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.532-533.
1 Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.327.
2 上诉机构在WTO法某一领域中发展出来的法理，必定对WTO协定其他领域法的发展演化产生影响。例如，GATF1994下发展出的法理，也可用以解释其他多边贸易协定的条款，反之亦然。WTO法理的交互促进强化了WTO协定内部的一致性。Gabrielle Marceau, "Balance and Coherence 6y the WTOAppellate Body: Who Could Do Better?" in The WTO at TEN, Giorgio Sacerdoit, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.334.
3 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.374.
4 Panel Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para.227; Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.13.
5 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p.15.
6 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.549; Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1071.
7 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.375.
1 例如，在欧共体——香蕉案中，上诉机构认为，在《农业协定》没有对同一事项特别作出具体规定的情形下，GATT1994和其他多边协定才能适用于农产品。Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras.155-58．
2 例如：在韩国——奶制品保障措施案中，上诉机构指出，“根据有效解释原则，条约的解释者应当协调地解释条约所有可适用的规定，使得协定所有规定均具有意义。本原则的一个重要的推论是应当将条约作为一个整体来解释。WTO协定第2．2条明确表明乌拉圭回合谈判者的初衷是《WTO协定》的规定和附件1、2和3中的多边贸易协定必须作为一个整体理解。Appellate Body Report on Korea-Dairy Safeguards．WT/DS98/AB/R, paras.81. Also See, e.g., Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.23;Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p.12; Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, paras.7.155-7.166.
3 第21．1条规定，“GATT1994和《WTO协定》附件1A所列其他多边贸易协定的规定应在遵守本协定的前提下适用。”
4 Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.155.
1 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "What the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), p.375.但该文的作者认为，这种观点是站不住脚的。从目前来看，美国已经改变了看法。例如，在欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，美国作为争端第三方认为出口补贴也可能受《补贴协定》纪律的约束。Third-party Submission of the United States on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, para.9．
2 如《纺织品与服装协定》第9条。上述五项理由，参见Didier Chambovey, "HowtheExpiry D, the Peace Clause (Articlel 3 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.309-311.
1 对第13条的存在有两种可能的解释：其一，当时，成员对第21．1条的真正含义也不清楚，没有意识到第21．1条将起到与第13条相同的效果；其二，第21．1条不能取代第13条。对于后一种可能，意味着“和平条款”是使农产品免于《补贴协定》和GATI'1994纪律的唯一条款。Didier Chambovey, "How theExpiry of the Peace Clause (Article13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.312.
2 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trade System: A History of the Uruguay Round, Geneva, WTO, 1995, p.376.
3 该条英文文本原文为："The provisions of GATT1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement".
4 英文原文为："In the Event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the agreements in Annex 1A as the "WTO Agreement"), the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict."
5 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1038.
1 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002.在欧共体——关税优惠案中，上诉机构似乎将“冲突”概念扩大为包括协定某一条款授予了一项权利，而另一条款却施加了义务。Appellate Body Report on EC-Tariffs Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, para.88.
2 本文作者倾向于第三种方法。
3 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3)，2005，p．789．另外，下列文章也探讨了本案对农产品补贴纪律影响：Karen HMverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause ': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006; Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the VeTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issues Brief, March 2006, http://www.agritrade.org, /Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, ; Stephen J. Powell, Andrew Schmitz, "The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture", 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 287, 2003.
1 即《农业协定》第1(e)条、第9．1条(a)项和(c)项、第3．3条、第8条和第10条；《补贴协定》第1条、第3条，以及附件1《出口补贴例示清单》(d)段。
2 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.141; Panel Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/RW, WT/DSll3/RW, para.6.102; Panel Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/RW2, WT/DS113/RW/2, para.5.178.
3 但欧共体——食糖出口补贴案上诉机构推翻了专家组报告在这一问题上的认定，认为专家组的裁定是“错误地遵循了司法经济原则，并犯了法律上的错误”，但上诉机构拒绝完成专家组的法律分析。See, Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.336.
4 Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, para.7.377.5 在本案提起诉讼时，《农业协定》第13条尚未终止适用，因此，如适用《补贴协定》第3条，首先要判断出口补贴有没有完全符合《农业协定》第五部分的规定，能小能根据《农业协定》第13(c)(ⅱ)条，免于《补贴协定》第3．1(a)条和第3．2条的行动。目前，第13条已经终止适用。
1 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para. 123.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.569.
3 例如，在欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，第三方美国认为，根据《补贴协定》第3条，如果出口补贴不完全符合《农业协定》，则受《补贴协定》纪律的约束。See, Third-party Submission ofthe United States onEC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, para.9.类似的观点，还可参见Humberto N.Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, p.32; Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.21.但欧共体——食糖出口补贴案上诉机构报告表明，该问题还有诸多不确定因素。Appellate Body Report onEC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283/AB/R, para.339．另可参见本章第三节。
4 在欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，欧共体曾经在提交的材料中坚持，即便证明欧共体提供的补贴违反了《农业协定》，也不适用《补贴协定》。而且，对属于《农业协定》规范范围的产品提供的出口补贴，《补贴协定》不适用。First Written Submission by the European Communities on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras．152-154．美国认为，欧共体的主张与FSC案中DSB的建议和裁决相抵触。FSC案表明，应当同时依据《农业协定》和《补贴协定》分析补贴问题。美国认为，根据《补贴协定》第3条，如果出口补贴不完全符合《农业协定》，则受《补贴协定》纪律的约束。Third-party Submission 0fthe United States onEC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283, para.9.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1019-7.1021.
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1024.
3 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1035.
4 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1037.
5 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, footnote 1201 to para.7.1037.
1 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1054-7.1074o
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1072.
3 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.532-533.
1 《农业协定》附件3第7段规定，“综合支持量的计算应尽可能接近该有关基本农产品的第一销售点。针对农产品加工者的措施也包括在内，只要此类措施可使基本农产品的生产者获益。”
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.1058.
3 Appellate Body on Argentina-Footwear (EC), WT/DS121/AB/R, para.81 and footnote 72; Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, p.23; Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Ⅱ, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p.12, etc.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras.538-552.
1 Christian Wurzbacher, "Dispute Settlement: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton ", WTO News: Issues No.12, 7 March2006, http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wton12edoc/$FILE/wton12e.doc, September 19, 2006.
2 张南蕙：《WTO美国高地棉补贴案之研究》，载《经社法制论丛》第38期。
1 Christian Wurzbacher, "Dispute Settlement: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton ", WTO News: Issues No.12, 7 March2006, http://www.unisg.ch/org/siaw/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/wton12edoc/$FILE/wton12e.doc, September 19, 2006.
2 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, paras.7.1050-7.1051.
3 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.7.1071.
1 绝大多数观点认为，《补贴协定》第3．1条不禁止符合承诺水平的农产品出口补贴。Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Aericultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(27, 2002, p.347.但也有少数观点，根据《农业协定》第13(c)(ⅱ)条，主张《补贴协定》禁止出口补贴的规定也适用于承诺水平范围内的农产品出口补贴。Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.377.
2 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2) 2002, p.318.
3 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issues Brief, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, p.20.
4 参见张南薰：《WTO美国高地棉补贴案之研究》，载《经社法制论丛》第38期。“此外，和平条款已于2004年1月1日失效，在欠缺和平条款保护下，对农产品的补贴即不可避免地必须同时受到SCM协议及农业协议之规范。针对农业协议与SCM协议之适用关系，虽有农业协议第21．1条及SCM协议第3条之规定，但依据小组及上诉机构之见解，在其对法律冲突采取狭义之解释下，欲主张农业协议优先适用之机会几乎微乎其微。因此将产生对农产品之规范强度远大于一般工业品之情形，例如对工业品之境内支持措施仅受SCM协议规范，但对于农产品之境内支持措施，不但需受SCM协议之规范，尚须受到农业协议下削减义务之拘束。此一不平衡且违反农业协议目的之现象，若无法从争端解决机制中获得解决，最后 可能仍然须循谈判管道解决之。”
1 Appellate Body Report on EC-Hormones, GATT WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para.165.
2 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.339, footnote 537.
1 第7．3条规定，“本协定附件2列举的国内补贴，只要符合附件规定的一般和具体标准，就反补贴措施而言，应被视为不可诉的”。Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, p.L.7.
2 第12条规定，“如果国内支持和出口补贴的使用符合本协定国内支持和出口补贴削减承诺，应推定没有造成总协定第16．1条意义上的严重侵害”。 Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, L.9.
3 第18．2条规定，“在本协定框架下承担的承诺的基础上，参与方在行使总协定下有关改革计划涵盖的产品的权利时，将行使适当的克制。’"Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN. TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, p.L.11.
4 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. IV: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers，1999，p．4．在乌拉圭回合谈判中，欧共体一直坚持，签订一个综合性的农业协定意味着应尽可能限制成员在WTO体制下对措施提出指控。这种观念被称为“和平条款”。Soren F Olsen, "Chapter 2: The Negotiation of Agreement on Agriculture", inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.76.
5 Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. IV: The End Game, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers，1999，p．16．另一项修改是规定如果1991．1992年的出口补贴水平高于 1986-1990平均水平，出口补贴的削减可以1991-1992水平为基准。
6 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.306.
1 《农业协定》第13条(a)项。
2 《农业协定》第13条(b)项。
3 《农业协定》第13条(c)项。
1 Richard H. Steinberg and Timothy E. Josling, "When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.369.
1 例如，按照美国法律，一旦国内产业以适当地方式提出申请，主管机关就必须发起反补贴调查，并无行使“适当克制”的余地。“适当克制”只意味着成员不主动发起反补贴税调查。但实际上，政府很少主动发起反补贴税调查。美国也只主动发起了一次反补贴税调查。因而，这一规定并无多大意义。Joseph A．McMahon, "Chapter 6: The Agreement on Agriculture", in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer eds., Springer, 2005, p.214.
2 Rai Bhala, "World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement and Its Implications for the Doha Round", 79 N.D.L. Rev.681, 2003, pp.823-825.
3 EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000, para.25..应当注意的是，有关“和平条款”的争论，似乎是“蓝箱”争论的延伸。一些国家希望维持“蓝箱”支持，并希望维持“和平条款”。Summary Report on the Sixth Meeting of the Special Session Held on 22-23 March 2001，supra note 322, p.5.由于只有少数成员使用“蓝箱”措施，因此，在“和平条款”终止适用后，这类措施更容易招致其它成员的指控。
4 十国集团包括11个在经济、货币和金融事项上进行合作的工业国家，包括比利时、加拿大、法国、德国、意大利、日本、荷兰、瑞典、瑞士、英国和美国(在写作当时)。
5 尤其是，欧共体明确宣布除了对发展中成员有特殊利益的产品，不接受取消农产品出口补贴。但欧共体没有指明这些产品为何。Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, p.26.
6 The End of Peace: The Potential New Era of Litigation at the WTO, Subsidy Watch, Issue 9, February 2007, http://www.globalsubsidies.org/article.php3?id article=19&var mode=calcul, April 6, 2007.
7 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1), 2004, 0.27.
8 如毛里求斯提议扩大‘‘和平条款”保护的承诺范围，保证所有的成员获得公平对待。WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Negotiating Proposal by Mauritius, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/96, 28 December 2000.埃及要求审查 第13(a)(ⅰ)条，认为该条的使用为某些成员支持农业部门另开了一扇窗。Comprehensive Proposal by the Arab Republic of Egypt to the WTO Negotiations on Agriculture, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/107, 6 February 2001.
1 为此，印度提议，对于满足附件2和协定第6条的措施，应当免于征收反补贴税，免于“非违反之诉”；没有作出削减承诺并被允许使用第9．1条(a)、(b)项列举补贴的发展中成员，免于征收反补贴税。Proposal by India in the Areas of: (ⅰ) Food Security, (ⅱ) Market Access, (ⅲ) Domestic Support, and (ⅳ) Export Competition, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/102, 15 January 2001.加拿大主张只有符合附件2标准的措施才能永久地被视为不能采取反措施的补贴。Domestic Support, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/92, 21 December 2000。尼日利亚提议附件2和第6条下的所有补贴，尤其是投资和投入补贴，均应免于征收反补贴税。WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Proposal by Nigeria, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/130, 14 February 2001.
2 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun ", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), 2004, p.27.
3 Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.163.4 Observations on the Proposal for a New Peace Clause, South Center, SC/TADP/TA/AG/1, SC/TADP/TA/DS/2, November 2005, http://www.southcentre.org/publications/AnalyticalNotes/GlobalEconomicGov/2005Nov_peaceclause_proposals.pdf, March 3, 2007, para. 21.
1 在《农业协定》下，每个成员可以提供的国内支持和出口补贴水平不同，故而此处以是否符合《农业协定》作为概括性的标准。
1 参见本章第二节。
2 虽然两个协定使用的是相同的表达方式，即“出口补贴”，但WTO争端解决机构对第9．1条列举的各项出口补贴的解释，已经超越了《补贴协定》下“出口补贴”的范围。具体参见本文第三章第一节。
3 有关争论具体参见第三章第四节。
4 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002: p.310.
5 多哈回合谈判以来，WTO多边谈判与争端解决机制之间的关系开始越来越引人注目。有关论述参见本文第六章。
1 关于对“绿箱”支持进行反补贴调查和征收反补贴税，参见第第六章第二节。
2 对于虽然只有农业部门能获得，但整个农业部门内部都能获得的补贴是否具有“专向性”，目前尚不明确。美国反补贴税条例第351．502(d)节规定，只有补贴在农业部门内部具有专向性，如只限于活牲畜部门或活牲畜部门获得了不成比例的大量补贴，才能征收反补贴税。Didder Chambovey, “How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.310.
3 David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture ", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, pp.983-984.
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.421.
1 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.333-334.
2 David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture ", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, p.984.
1 Soren E Olsen, "Chapte2: The Negotiation of Agreement on Agriculture", in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.87.
2 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.337.
3 在该案中，申诉方巴西指控美国的某些国内支持措施对其他成员的利益造成严重侵害，违反《补贴协定》。
4 有关本案的分析，详细参见第六章第四节。
5 Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1, G/L/812, G/SCM/D73/1, G/AG/GEN/74, 11 January 2007.
6 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2); 2002, p.339.
1 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2); 305-352, 2002, p.342.另可参见本节前文。
2 OECD, Market Access, Domestic Support and Export Subsidy Aspects of Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture Implementation in OECD Counties, Joint Working Party of the Committee for Agriculture and the Trade Committee, COM/AGR/TD/WP (2000) 89/FINAL. 21 December 2000, p.64.
3 另外，有观点认为，成员也不能基于农产品市场条件发生不能预料的变化，致使某些补贴对生产者竞争地位的损害性影响大于当时的预期，提起非违反之诉。因为，不能合理期待在9年内市场状况都不发生改变。 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.342.
1 David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, p.989.
2 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002: p.354; David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture", Journal of World Trade 37(5), 2003, p.989.
3 尽管如此，在9年的实施期内，对农产品出口补贴启动反补贴调查的案件非常少。Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-The Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), 2004, p.38.
4 Panel Rencort on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, para.7.20
5 《补贴协定》第3．1条序言规定，“除《农业协定》的规定外，下列属第1条范围内的补贴应予禁止……”。
1 《农业协定》第21．1条规定，“GATT 1994年和《WTO协定》附件1A所列其他多边贸易协定的规定应在遵守本协定规定的前提下适用。”
2 欧共体曾强烈反对《补贴协定》适用于农产品出口补贴，即使该出口补贴也不符合《农业协定》。欧共体认为，依据《补贴协定》禁止农产品出口补贴，将削弱农业体制的特殊性以及所有成员同意的逐步改革过程。 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS265/R, para.7.377.
3 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-the Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31 (1), 2004, p.32.
4 Panel Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/R, WT/DSll3/R, para.7.21.
5 从WTO争端解决实践来看，申诉方同时根据《补贴协定》第3条提出诉请的动机是出于补贴救济上的考虑。《补贴协定》第4．7条对出口补贴规定了特别的救济方式，即立即撤销补贴；而如果只是认定违反《农业协定》，申诉方只能请求DSB建议被申诉方使其措施与相关协定一致。
6 欧共体——食糖出口补贴案中，上诉机构拒绝完成专家组没有进行的法律分析，其理由也很值得注意。上诉机构认为，《农业协定》第3条、第8条、第9．1条和《补贴协定》第3．1(a)条、第3．2条，以及《例示清单》(a)项和(b)项并非“紧密相连”，原因是这两个协定下问题在很多方面都是不同的。Appellate Body Report on EC-ExportSubsidies on Sugar, para.338．这也表明，《补贴协定》和《农业协定》出口补贴纪律体系上的差异。
1 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265, 266, 283/AB/R, para.339.
2 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 532-533.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, footnote 537.
4 Didder Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.349.
5 Humberto N. Siuves, "The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies-the Outlook Post-Cancun", Legal Issues of Economic Integration 31(1):25-42, 2004, p.34; David Morgan and Gavin GOH, "Peace in Our Time? An Analysis of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture", Journal of World Trade 37(5) 2003, p.990.
1 依据《补贴协定》，WTO成员不得提供对其他成员利益造成不利影响的补贴。
2 《补贴协定》第3．1(a)条是否适用影响到申诉方胜诉后可获得的救济方式。Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para．336．《农业协定》朱对救济作特殊规定。
1 然而，第10条可否解释为《农业协定》有关农业补贴的特殊规定?本文认为，第10．1条可被视为排除《补贴协定》第3．1条的适用。否则，没有列入第9．1条的出口补贴适用《补贴协定》第3．1条，将是一概直接禁止，不符合第10条反规避纪律的性质。在WTO争端解决实践中，对“规避”的解释导致第9．1条没有列举的出口补贴的纪律非常严格。根据美国——外国销售公司案的解释，成员对减让表没有列举的产品提供出口补贴几乎是不可能的，而这又模糊了适用于减让表列明产品的纪律和没有列明的产品的纪律。
2 该类补贴在《补贴协定》下属于禁止性补贴的类型。因此，问题是符合《农业协定》进口替代补贴本身是否为《补贴协定》禁止，也即《补贴协定》第3条是否适用?只要符合《农业协定》的承诺要求，在《农业协定》下应被视为授权，《农业协定》授权的事项为《补贴协定》禁止，是否适当?在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，专家组和上诉机构报告认定即便是符合成员承诺，有进口替代效果的国内支持也为《补贴协定》第3．1(b)条所禁止。该案专家组和上诉机构的理由足，《农业协定》并未对该条做出具体规定，从而适用《补贴协定》的禁止性规定。参见本章第二节。
1 Decision by the General Council on 31 January 1995, WTO Doc. WT/L/43, 17 February 1995.
2 Notification Requirements and Formats, WTO Doco G/AG/2, 30 June 1995.
1 Notification Requirements and Formats, WTO Doc. G/AG/2, 30 June 1995.
2 如阿根廷曾通报，“根据农业委员会的通报要求(G／AG／2)，阿根廷在2003年12月1日至2004年11月30日，以及2004年12月1日和2005年11月30日之间没有提供出口补贴。”Notification, WTO Doc．G/AG/N/ARG/25.19 December 2006．
3 占列表产品世界出口份额超过5％的成员为“重要出口方”。
1 Notification Requirements and Formats (Adopted by the Committee at its meeting on 8 June 1995), WTO Doc. G/AG/2, 30 June 1995.
2 Issues Regarding Export Subsidy Notifications, WTO Doc.G/AG/W/37, 12 November 1998.
3 虽然美国只通报了1995-2001年国内支持，但美国农业部(USDA)例行公布了历史、当前和预计作物年度的美国农业计划支持。因此，USDA有关补贴支出实际和预计数据一直到2007作物年度都可获得。在起诉美国棉花补贴时，巴西大量使用了USDA公布的数据来源。Randy Schnepfand Jasper Womach, "Potential, Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Cod.e RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, February 21, 2006, CRS-13&14.
4 Negotiations Questions Spill over into RegularAgriculture Committee, 31 October 2006, http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news06_e/ag_com_31oct06_e.htm, January 22, 2007.
1 Bernard O'Connor, "The Structure of the Agreement on Agriculture", in Agriculture in the WTO Law, Bernard O' Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.87.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, February 21, 2006, CRS-13.
3 Improving Monitoring and Surveillance Mechanisms, http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/conteudo/proposals_monitoring.pdf, Februaryl3, 2007.
4 Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc. WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, para.48.
1 《补贴守则》第10条(“对某些初级产品的出口补贴”)的解释和第9条(“对初级产品外的产品的出口补贴”)的适用存在不同意见，而且，《补贴守则》其他条款，尤其是第8条和“例示清单”第(d)段，也有不同的解释。虽然反补贴税措施运作良好，但有关补贴的纪律实质上陷入僵局。最为明显的表征是争端解决程序无法正常发挥作用，但另一个更为危险的表征是，《补贴守则》运作上的挫折致使政府在《补贴守则》或甚至GAIT体制之外采取反措施。Terence P Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay Round：A Negotiating History(1986-1992)，Vol.Ⅰ：Commentary, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p.838．乌拉圭回合谈判文件也表明当时对反补贴税容易蜕变为保护主义措施存在顾虑。Checklist of lssues for Negotiations, Note by theSecretariat, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/9, 7 September 1987, pp. 3-4.
2 Mike Gifford and Tim Josling, "Trade Litigation in Agriculture: Limiting the Abuse of Trade Remedies", IPC Trade Negotiations Issue Brief, July 25, 2004, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/IBs/tl.pdf, December 21, 2006, p.4.
3 关于“和平条款”，详细参见第五章第三节。
4 Richard Steinberg and Timothy Josling, "When the Peace Ends: Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal.Challenge ", Journal of International Economic Law 6(2), 2003, p.382.
1 Note on the Expiry of the Peace Clause: Some Elements for Consideration by Developing Countries, South Center Analytical Note, SC/TADP/AN/AG/7, October 2003, http://www.southcentre.org/publications/AnalyticalNotes/Agriculture/2003Oct_Peace_Clause_Expiry.pdf, March 23，2007，p．6。
2 具体参见第五章第三节。
1 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, P.321.
2 Mike Gifford and Tim Josling, "Trade Litigation in Agriculture: Limiting the Abuse of Trade Remedies", IPC Trade Negotiations Issue Brief, July 25, 2004, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/IBs/tl.pdf, February 16, 2006, pp.8-9.
3 根据WTO网站资料整理。
4 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.293 and footnote 63.
1 Panel Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, paras.7.380-7.386.
2 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidiess on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.329-335.
3 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.339 and footnote 537.
1 Irina Kireeva and Bernard O'Connor, "Chapter 4: TheAgreement on Agriculture and Dispute Settlement", in Agriculture in the WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.132.
2 关于WTO框架下包括农业补贴在内的补贴争端的简要执行情况，参见William J.Davey, "Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results have been Achieved through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.111.
3 有观点认为，争端解决不应是唯一的执行工具，证明损害的要求严重限制了分类削减补贴的争端解决的可适用性。争端解决最重要的替代方法是透明度。故而，提议在秘书处内部建立一个补贴审查机制，可以确保获得公正的分析，促进国别透明度，对对抗的政府和选民施加有效的压力，降低补贴分析与削减补贴的协定实际执行之间的差距。Konrad von Moltke, "Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organization", IISD Paper, September 2003, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_cancun_research_paper.pdf, February 22, 2007, p.26.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, KJuwer Law International, 2002, pp.100-101.
2 在这次会议上，贸易政策专家得以讨论各种事项，而无需取得政府的最终同意。下文称之为“1943年会议”。
3 Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 2nd Edition, 1990, pp.9-18.
4 某些谈判参与方，尤其是发展中国家认为，该提案是容许发达国家对发展中国家享有比较优势的产品的生产和销售给予补贴，同时却禁止对发达国家拥有比较优势的非初级产品提供补贴。Melaku Geboye Desta，The Law of lnternational Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.101.
1 第11．2(c)规定：“对以任何形式进口的农产品和鱼制品的进口限制，此类限制对执行下列政府措施是必要的：(ⅰ)限制允许生产或销售的同类国产品的数量，或如果不存在同类国产品的大量生产，则限制可直接替代进口产品的可生产或销售的国产品的数量；或(ⅱ)消除同类国产品的暂时过剩，或如果不存在同类国产品的大量生产，则消除可直接替代进口产品的同类国产品的暂时过剩，使国内消费者的某些群体免费或以低于现行市场水平的价格获得此种过剩：或(ⅲ)限制允许生产的任何动物产品的数量，此种产品的生产全部或主要直接依赖进口商品，如该商品的国内生产相对可忽略不计。根据本款(c)项对任何产品的进口实施限制的任何缔约方，应公布今后特定时期内允许进口产品的全部数量或价值及数量或价值的任何变化。此外，与在不存在限制的情况下国内总产量和总进口量的可合理预期的比例相比，根据以上(ⅰ)目实施的任何限制不得减少总进口量相对于国内总产量的比例，在确定此比例时，该缔约方应适当考虑前一代表期的比例及可能已经影响或正在影响有关产品贸易的任何特殊因素。
2 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.221-222; GATT Panel Report on EEC-Apples (US), L/6513, adopted on 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/135; GATT Panel Report on Canada-Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568, adopted on 5 December 1989, BISD 36S/68.
3 Waiver Granted To The United States in Connection with Import Restrictions Imposed under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as Amended by Decision of of the Contracting Parties of March 5, 1955, BISD 3S/32.1952年，荷兰曾经对美国限制牛奶进口提出指控，认为这些限制并非必要的，并且没有同时限制国内生产，违反了第11．2(c)条。荷兰获得授权，对美国采取报复措施，这在GATT历史上是唯——次。但美国以退出GATT为威胁，荷兰最终放弃采取任何制裁措施。1955年，美国获得了豁免，可以维持对一些农产品设置的进口限制措施，包括食糖、花生和牛奶等。转引自：Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Satatus of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.222.
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the Worm Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.223.
2 GATT1947第16．4条规定：“此外，自1958年1月1日或其后可能的尽早日期起，缔约方应停止对除初级产品外的任何产品的出口直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，此种补贴可使此种产品的出口价格低于向国内市场同类产品购买者收取的可比价格。在1957年12月31日之前，任何缔约方不得通过采用新的补贴或扩大现有补贴范围，使任何此类补贴的范围超过1955年1月1日实施的范围。”
3 GATTl947第16．3条规定：“因此，缔约方应寻求避免对初级产品的出口使用补贴。但是，如一缔约方直接或间接地给予任何形式的补贴，并以增加自其领土出口的任何初级产品的形式实施，则该补贴的实施不得使该缔约方在该产品的世界出口贸易中占有不公平的份额，同时应考虑前一代表期内该缔约方在该产品贸易中所占份额及可能已经影响或正在影响该产品贸易的特殊因素。”
4 第16．4条相当于直接禁止对初级产品之外的产品提供出口补贴，因为出口补贴均具有导致出口价格低于国内价格的效果，除非出口补贴措施不够有效。 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.108.
5 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.223.
6 在1955年，还没有“发展中国家”的概念，但为论述和理解方便，仍然使用该概念。
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.107.
2 GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds Ⅰ, L/6627, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86; GAIT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds Ⅱ, DS28/R, 31 March 1992, BISD 39S/91.
3 本争端在乌拉圭回合谈判中起了重要作用。美国以本案为谈判筹码，威胁如果农业谈判不能成功结束，就将对欧共体采取可能的贸易报复。
4 关于何谓“初级产品”，东京回合《补贴守则》中的概念与GATT1947中的概念不同。前者不再包括矿产品。对矿产品提供的出口补贴，在《补贴守则》下一概禁止。关于“初级产品”概念的说明，参见Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kluwer Law International, 2002, oo.135-137.
5 《补贴守则》第10条的细化规定涉及如何判断“超过世界出口贸易中的公平份额”、什么是“世界出口贸易的公平分额”和“前一代表期”。
6 到1994年，《补贴守则》的缔约方只有下列25个：阿根廷、澳大利亚、奥地利、巴两、加拿大、智利、 哥伦比亚、埃及、欧共体、芬兰、中国香港、印度、印度尼西亚、以色列、日本、韩国、新西兰、挪威、巴基斯坦、菲律宾、瑞典、瑞士、土耳其、美国和乌拉圭。
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.227.
2 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uuuguay Round:A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer Boston, p.134.
3 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uuuguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol.1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer Boston, p.131
1 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, pp.219-220.
2 Terence P. Stewart ed., The GATT Uruguay RoundA Negotiating History (1986-1992), Volume I, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers Deventer, Boston, 1993, p.170.
3 Stefan Tangermann, "Approaches to Export Subsidies: Disciplines for Export Subsidies in Primary and Non-Primary Products ", in Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Critical lssues for the Uruguay Round, Bela Balassa ed., World Bank Discussion Papers, 1989, p.121.
4 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2006: Subsidies, Trade and the WTO, pp.190-194.
1 John R, Magnus, "The Evils of A Long Peace: Legal Consequences of WTO 'Peace Clause' Expiry and Practical Issues for New Litigation over Farm Subsidies", Presented to the Global Business Dialogue, Washington, DC, htto://www.tradewinsllc.net/oubli/Peace_Clause_GBD_12_03.odf, November 7, 2006, o.4.
2 具体参见东京回合《补贴守则》第8-3条“补贴的一般规定”、第10条“对某些初级产品的出口补贴”、第11条“非出口补贴”。
3 事实上，出口补贴和进口替代措施本身的目的就是扭曲国际贸易的正常流向。
1 Stefan Tangermann and William Miner, Negotiating Stronger GATT Rules for Agricultural Trade, International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, Discussion Papers Series #3, 1990, p.5.
2 Didier Chambovey, "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.318.
3 Stefan Tangermann and William Miner, Negotiating Stronger GATT Rules for Agricultural Trade, International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, Discussion Papers Series #3, 1990, Executive Summary.
4 Stefan Tangermann and William Miner, Negotiating Stronger GATTRules for Agricultural Trade, International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, Discussion Papers Series #3, 1990, p.9.
1 参见第四章第一节。
2 参见第三章第一节。
3 Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, para.8.3.
4 Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, para.763.
1 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Integration of Agriculture into WTO Disciplines", inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.41.
1 Bernard O'Connor, "Should There Be an Agreement onAgriculture?" inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron Mav. 2005, o.418.
2 农业补贴问题上存在很多争议。从某种意义上说，是WTO准司法机构与立法机构的不协调。从WTO秘书处的角度来看，WTO是一种机制(Institution)，需要面对的问题是如何让这个机制继续运作下去，起到应当起的作用。对于争端解决中专家组和上诉机构成员应当起的作用，目前也有很多质疑。一些比较激烈的批评者认为，专家组和上诉机构成员实际上行使了立法的职能。
3 Bernard O' Connor, "Should There Be an Agreement on Agriculture ?" in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.421.
4 Fabian Delcros, "The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization: State of Play at the Start of Negotiations ", Journal of World Trade 36(2), 2002, p.253.
1 Bernard O' Connor, "Should There Be an Agreement on Agriculture ?" in Agriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, pp.429-430.
2 Melaku Geboye Desta, "The Integration of Agriculture into WTO Disciplines", inAgriculture in WTO Law, Bernard O'Connor ed., Cameron May, 2005, p.18.
3 依据《WTO协定》第9.2条，只有部长级会议和总理事会可以在监督协定运行的理事会建议的基础上，对协定做出有权解释，有关解释应当以成员四分之三多数通过。这种解释机制迄今为止没有起到什么作用。
4 例如成员对《农业协定》第9．2(b)条解释上的争议，参见第三章第三节。
5 如新近提起的美国——玉米补贴案。该案指控的农业保护措施和援引的法律依据与美国——陆地棉补贴案有很大的相似性。具体参见本章第四节。
1 有学者将WTO的决策权在如下主体问分配：WTO成员方负责立法，根据WTO有关条约修改和制定规则；WTO中的政治组织，如收支委员会、区域性贸易协定委员会等，它们行使行政权力：WTO中的司法机构，专家组、仲裁员和上诉机构行使司法权。参见程红星：《WTO司法哲学的能动主义之维》，北京大学出版社2006年版，第144页。
2 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.792.
3 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, p.1.
4 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2005, p.789.
5 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 1995-2005: Lessons from the Past and Future Challenges", in The 14, 'TO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.46.
1 Petersmann, "Reforming the World Trading System ", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.47, Footnote 14.
2 参见DSU第3．2条。
3 笔者认为这种现象可以解释为WTO争端解决机构和成员希望争端解决作为一个机制，可以正常和良好地运作。前上诉机构成员Claus-Dieter Ehlermann曾经撰文指出，上诉机构的每一成员都有意和决心对建设一个新的机制作贡献，希望增强新机制的力量和权威性。Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO", Journal of International Economic Law 6(3), 2003, p.695.
4 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.339, footnote 537.
5 例如该案对出口信贷担保的裁定和多哈同合中制定出口信贷担保纪律的有关谈判。
1 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision ", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006, p.166.
2 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issue Brief, March 2006, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 23, 2007, p.1.
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference." An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 8(3), 2006, p.790.
2 Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause ': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2005, pp.166-168.
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law 9(1)，2005，p．771．该文认为，上诉机构的条文解释方法使得谈判者知悉其承诺的范围和谈判商定文本的范围。在这方面，条文解释方法使得谈判更为困难。关于WTO协定解释方法上的评论，另外参见：Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, , "Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO", Journal of International Economic Law 6(3), 2003; Susan Esserman and Robert Howse, "The WTO at Trail", Foreign Affairs 82(10), 2003, p.139; Henry S. Gao, "Reflections on the Relationship between WTO Negotiations and Dispute Settlement: Lessons from the GATS", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi. Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes. eds.. Cambridge University Press. 2007. pp.367-380.
2 参见山下一仁，《WTO农业协定的问题和谈判的现状及展望——从乌拉圭回合淡判的参加者的角度观察》，http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/publications/summarv/05050007.html，(访问日期：2006年8月6日)
3 John Greenwald, "WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation ?" Journal of International Economic Law, 6(1), 2003, p.113.
1 例如，在美国——陆地棉补贴案中，美国认为对农产品提供的出口信贷担保等，只能通过谈判解决，但巴西反对。目前为止，该问题尚是多哈回合农业谈判的问题之一。
2 例如，欧共体——食糖出口补贴案和加拿大——奶制品案中，被申诉方认为协定没有关于“交叉补贴”的概念(cross-subsidization)，成员既没有磋商，也没有接受这样的纪律。
3 Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R; Appellate Body Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R; Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R.
4 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, paras.107-108; Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, para.76 & paras.96-97; Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and USⅡ), WT/DS1-3/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.96-97; Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.262-265 and 267.
5 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DSIO3/AB/RW, WT/DSll3/AB/RW, para.114; Appellate Body Report, Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, paras.132-133 and 140; Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 236.
6 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.237.
7 Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy (Article 21.5-New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras.112-113; Appellate Body Report on Canada-Dairy(Article 21.5-New Zealand and US Ⅱ), WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, para. 128.
8 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para.209.
9 Appellate Body Report on EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, paras.193-200.
10 参见第五章。
1 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 18 December 2001, statement by the representative of the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/116.
2 Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappared, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/141, statement by the representative of Canada, 17 January 2003.
3 Articles 16 and 17 of the DSU.
4 例如，假若对相关WTO协定进行严格解释与专家组和上诉机构的贸易政策取向一致，则倾向于严格解释；假若对协定语言的公平解释允许WTO成员可做出与专家组或上诉机构政策敏感性相背离的解释，专家组和上诉机构往往在解释协定时忽略背离的部分；假若相关协定没有对某个问题作出规定，则专家组和上诉机构会毫不迟疑地以促进其倾向的贸易政策的方法填补空白。John Greenwald, “WTO Dispute Settlement：An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?" Journal of International Economic Law, 6(1), 2003, p.113.该文指责在某些件中，WTO专家组和上诉机构为了达到他们倾向的结果，在解释经过详细谈判确定的贸易协定时，对条文含义做了增加或删减。该文对专家组和上诉机构成员的贸易政策取向倾向提出严厉批评，认为WTO专家组和上诉机构应当有意识地自我限制。白认为担负了自由贸易或者任何其他使命，而非尽可能中立地解释WTO法的专家和上诉机构成员，应当辞职。
5 关于根据《维也纳条约法》公约解释WTO协定的详细论述，参见赵维田刘敬东编著：《WTO：解释条约的习惯规则》，湖南科学技术出版社2006年版。
6 此种解释方法，在加拿大——奶制品案和加拿大——软木材Ⅳ案中，都有体现。“这种解释方法，虽然很简单，但对解释类似《农业协定》那样技术性强、很专门具体的协定条款，则非常实用。”赵维Ⅲ刘敬东编著：《WTO：解释条约的习惯规则》，湖南科学技术出版社2006年版，第120页。
1 如第三章所述农业委员会内关于《农业协定》第9．2(b)条的争论中，新西兰、欧共体认为，假若按照协定的目的和精神解释，也不能凌驾于协定的用语之上。
2 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO", Journal of International Economic Law 6(3), 2003, p.699.
3 某些涉及敏感问题的WTO规则，例如反倾销和补贴规则，是经过反复讨价还价和成员国内立法机构仔细审查后的妥协。乌拉圭回合谈判没有保存有关谈判过程的详细记录，有观点建议在将来谈判中改正这一疏漏，从而专家组在解释不明确的规定时，可以借助于淡判历史。Susan Esserman and Robert Howse, "The WTO at Trail", Foreign Affairs 82(1), 2003, p.139．
1 Isabelle Van Damme, "Fifth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview", Journal of International Economic Law8(3), 2005, p.791.
2 Tim Josling, Longyue Zhao, Jeronimo Carcelen and Kaush Arha, "Implications of WTO Litigation for the WTO Agricultural Negotiations", IPC Issue Brief, March 2006, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/WTO%201itigation.pdf, January 28, 2007, p.20.
1 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 1995-2005: Lessons from the Past and Future Challenges", in The WTO in the Twenty-first Century:Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich Jan Bohanes, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.46-47.
2 Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1, G/L/812, G/SCM/D73/1, G/AG/GEN/74, 11 January 2007.
3 2006年7月24日，WTO总干事宣布多哈回合多边贸易谈判陷入停顿。停顿的主要原因是六个核心谈判方，即美国、欧共体、巴西、印度、澳大利亚和日本，在实现本回合农业贸易广泛目标的具休方法上陷入僵局，包括对扭曲贸易的国内补贴进行实质性削减、取消出口补贴和实质性增加农产品的市场准入。
1 Pedro de Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9 No.8 August 2005, p.4.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-8.
3 Canada Initiates WTO Dispute Proceedings against US Farm Subsidies, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-01-17/story2.htm, January 27, 2007.
4 Daniel A. Sumner, "Boxed In: Conflicts between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligations", Center for Trade Policy Studies, December 5, 2005, No.32, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-032.pdf, March 3, 2007, p.3.在影响2007年新农业法的各项因素中，除了预算赤字外，WTO陆地棉补贴案裁决的影响也很重要。“每一种商品都需要参照本案，并决定为符合WTO要求应当作出何种修改。WTO是个伟大的组织，并且在这个 方面服务于我们的目的。我们必须保证新的农业法与WTO一致。”
1 Canada goes to VeTO over U.S. corn subsidies, CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2007/01/08/cornfight.html?ref=rss, February 26, 2007.
2 加拿大对美国农业补贴磋商背景，http://www.fjsme.cn/ctinews/newscontent.asp?newid=(访问日期：2007年3月1日)。
1 市场损失援助支付(MLA)涉及的农产品包括：小麦、玉米、高粱、大麦、燕麦、陆地棉和大米。
2 反周期支付(CCP)涉及的农产品包括：小麦、玉米、高粱、大麦、燕麦、陆地棉、大米、大豆和其他油籽。
3 Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1, G/L/812, G/SCM/D73/1, G/AG/GEN/74, 11 January 2007.
4 Pedro de Camargo Neto, "An End to Dumping through Domestic Agricultural Support", Bridges, Year 9 No.8 August 2005, p.4.
5 有关美国各时期农业政策的介绍，参见：Matthew C. Porterfield, "U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration of the WTO's Peace Clause", available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960575, April1, 2007.
1 以上对若干支持计划的介绍，参见：Brandom Willis and Doug O'Brien, "Summary and Evolution of U.S. Farm Bill Commodity Titles", The National Agricultural Law Center, htto://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/commodity.html#deficiency, January 29, 2007.
2 关于直接支付和反周期支付，具体内容参见第四章第一节。关于美国农业支持计划的更多信息，还可参见下列研究报告：James Monke, "Farm Commodity Policy: Programs and lssues for Congress", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS 21000, Updated March 8, 2007; Jim Monke, "Farm Commodity Programs: Direct Payments, Counter-Cyclical Payments, and Marketing Loans", CRS Report for Congres, RL33271, March 1, 2006. Aailable at available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 23, 2007关于美国2002年农业法案三项主要支持计划的分析，参见陈建宁：《美国想玩“箱子”转移游戏》，载《WTO经济导刊》，2004年第8期，第15-16页。
3 因为营销贷款计划，如销售贷款收益和贷款差额支付，与生产相关联，因而被通报为“黄箱”措施。
1 Panel Report on Indonesia-Autos, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL, 33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, preamble.
3 Daniel A. Sumner, "Boxed In: Conflicts between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligations", Center for Trade Policy Studies, December 5, 2005, No.32, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-032.pdf, March 5, 2007, p.1
1 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, p.9.
2 Daniel A. Sumner, "Boxed In: Conflicts between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligation "s, Center for Trade Policy Studies, December 5, 2005, No.32, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-032.pdf, March 5, 2007, p.1.
1 Johanns Says No to Farm Bill Extension, WESTERN FARM PRESS,http://westernfarmpress.con/news/3-6-06-Johanns-farm-bill-extension/, April 1, 2007.
2 Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, April 1, 2006.
3 “贸易促进授权”，一般称为“快车道谈判授权”(Fast Track Negotiating Authority)，或TPA，授权总统将经谈判商定的贸易协定提交到国会批准。如果没有该授权，国会有权在审查协定的时候做出修改。这种修改将可能导致多边贸易协定被完全分解。TPA将于2007年7月1日到期。
4 Charles E. Hanrahan and Randy Schnepf, "WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33144, Updated September 12, 2006, available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Feb/RL33144.pdf, March 24, 2007, Summary.
5 CRS Report, WTO Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations, by Charles E. Hanrahan and Randy Schnepf, Updated September 12, 2006, Order Code RL33144, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 24,2007, CRS-4.如提案 H.R.4332; H.R. 4775; S. 2696.
6 传统上，影响农业法的主要因素包括农业经济的状况、联邦预算的情况，以及在农业法制定时国会由谁掌权。但是，当前决策者必须要面对另一个重要因素：当前和将来的贸易政策。陆地棉补贴案影响了当前 贸易政策，可能会迫使修改国内政策。而且，围绕着下一个农业法的辩论也与有关将来多边农业贸易协定的谈判，也即WTO多哈回合谈判，相契合。这样的时机凸现了美国承担的贸易义务对国内政策的重要意义。Doug O'Brien, "World Trade Organization and the Commodity Title of the Next Farm Bill: A Practitioner's View", www.NationalAgLawCenter.org, January 29, 2007.
1 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 24, 2007.
2 关于美国农业补贴面临的WTO诉讼，参见Richard H．Steinberg and Timothy Josling，“When the Peace Clause Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges," Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003; Oxfam International, "Why the EU and the USA must reform their subsidies, or pay the price", Oxfam Briefing Paper 81, available at http://www.oxfarn.org/en/policy/briefingpapers/bp81_truth, Feburary 22，2007．但也有一些贸易专家认为，虽然美国国内支持计划造成了实质性的市场扭曲，仍不可能对美国农业支持提起大量WTO指控。他们认为，WTO起诉具有事实密集性质(fact-intensive nature)，成本很大，并且潜在的不利后果可能超过通过WTO诉讼或争端解决程序获得的潜在贸易收益。Randy Schnepfand Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U. S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-1.
3 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-6.
4 另外参见: Japsper Womach, Coordinator, "Previewing a 2007 Farm Bill", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33037, Updated January 3 2007, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, April 1, 2007.
1 另外可参见: Charles Hanrahan and Jeffrey Zinn, "Green Payments in U.S. and European Union Agricultural Policy", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL32624, Updated November 22, 2005, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, April 1, 2007.
2 Randy Schnepf and Jasper Womach, "Potential Challenges to U.S. Farm Subsidies in the WTO", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33697, October 25, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org, March 3, 2007, CRS-35.
3 Emily Alpert, "How Does the USDA Farm Bill Proposal Measure Up?" Bridges, Year 11 No.1 February-March 2007, pp.3-4.
1 参见《中华人民共和国加入议定书》总则第7．2条。
2 关于农产品关税平均税率，有不同的计算结果。本数据引自中国代表团官员在2005年WTO农业委员会特会上的发言，Summary Report on the Thirtieth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session Held on 17 March and 19 April 2005，WTO Doc. TN/AG/R/19, 13 May 2005.
3 例如，国内支持方面，综合支持量在WTO成员中(尤其是在发达国家和发展中国家之间)的分配严重不平，允许发达国家使用的综合支持量约为1460亿美元，占适用于所有成员综合支持总量的90％。仅有10个发展中国家系统地计算了本国基期的综合支持量，其余的发展中国家则称其综合支持量为零或负。程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第91页；程国强：《中国农业面对的国际农业补贴环境》，国务院发展研究中心信息网，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/DRCNet.Channel.Web/expert/showdoc.asp?doc id=174671,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
4 张旭东：《生产方式落后我国连续3年出现农产品贸易逆差》，http://business.sohu.com/20070220/n248305722.shtml,(访问日期：2007年4月)。关于近年来中国农产品贸易状况，如贸易增长、贸易结构、贸易方式等，参见程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第115-131页；刘晓昀 毛学峰 辛贤著：《农产品贸易自由化对中国农村贫困的影响》，中国农业出版社2006年版，第15-25页。
5 Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat People's Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, para.20.
1 Will Martin, "Implications of Reform and WTO Accession for China's Agricultural Policies", Economics of Transition, Volume 9 (3) 2001, pp.717-718.
2 袁东明 任品品：《中国加入WTO法律文件解读》(农业篇)，地震出版社2002年版，第229页。
3 Statement of H. E. Vice Minister Long Yongtu at the Fifth Meeting of the Working Party on China's Accession to the WTO, Geneva, 1 August 1997, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/qtzz/wtothsm/t85626.htm, March 3, 2007.
1 参见《中华人民共和国加入议定书》附件8“第152号减让表——中华人民共和国”第四部分第2节，WTO文件号：WT／ACC／CHN／38／Rev．3。
2 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第275页。
3 Alan Matthews, The Possible Impact of China's WTO Membership on the WTO Agricultural Negotiations, http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2001_papers/TEPNo15AM21.pdf, March 3, 2007.
4 WTO Documents: Notification, G/AG/N/CHN/4, 7 September 2004; Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/6, April 5, 2005; Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/10, 25 October 2006.
5 参见最近美国贸易代表办公室(USTR)向国会提交的报告，表示在2007年将继续调查中国农产品出口补贴的使用状况：United States Trade Representative, 2006 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, December 11, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file688_10223.pdf, March 3, 2007.
6 Charles Hanrahan, Congressional Research Service on China/WTO: Memorandum, February 14, 2000, http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/press/release/2000/crswto.html, March 4, 2007.
1 《美国将重点关注中国农产品出口补贴问题》，发布日期：2003年4月4日，中国贸易救济信息网，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsld=201420003727，(访问日期：2007年2月28日)。“据美国《中国贸易指南》报道，近日，美国贸易官员表示，中国违反世贸组织承诺对农产品进行出口补贴，将成为2003年美国政府关注仅次于关税配额问题的另一个重大问题。美国贸易官员表示，在美国农业部预测中国2003年冬季小麦将获得历史性丰收后，美国业界向政府提供了中国小麦在国内、国际市场的购买和销售数据，以提醒政府关注中国可能将出口补贴扩大到小麦出口的问题。目前，美国政府正就此进行对比和分析，以试图找出中国小麦在国际市场的销售价格低于国内市场的证据，和了解中国进行出口补贴的具体做法。据悉，美国业界正在就中国的农产品出口补贴方式和补贴程度进行更为细致的研究，可望在2003年夏季前拿出研究结果。美国贸易官员承认，目前，美国贸易代表办公室还不清楚中国进行农产品出口补贴的具体机制。如美方将此问题诉诸世贸组织，则需要掌握更详细、准确的信息。”据中国农业部官员观点，2002年美国农业出口“没有达到预期”并不能说明问题来自中国。该年对于美国农业来说应是“情况特殊”的一年，美国国内小麦和棉花减产，出口价高于我国国内价格，从而导致进口减少。农业部官员还表示，美国对于中国农产品出口补贴的相关指责，是对中国操作方式“产生了歧义”。中国对玉米等产品确实进行了某种形式的“鼓励”，但这种“鼓励”并没有“补贴”为农民手中的现金，而是通过“促进流通和技术推广”的形式实现的，并不违反WTO有关规定。《解读两大报告：谁动了中美贸易的奶酪》，深圳农业信息网，www.szagri.gov.cn/News/Show.asp?ID=6649，(访问日期：2007年3月1日)。
2 例如，在2001年，猪肉和牛肉的增值税退税为5.2％，但鸡肉为13％。
3 例如，“中国刚刚加入WTO之后，美国产业对中国向玉米提供出口补贴表示关注，虽然中国已经承诺自加入WTO后取消所有的出口补贴。在过去一些年中，中国出口了大量的玉米，包括中国政府库存的玉米，出口价格低于中国国内价格的15-20％。结果是，美国玉米出口商丢失了部分传统亚洲市场份额，如南韩、马拉西亚，而中国却出口了玉米。白2002年以来，美国对中国可能提供的玉米出口补贴与中国进行了双边沟通，其中焦点之一是增值税退税。但2004年，贸易分析表明，中国逐渐成为玉米的纯进口国。似乎表明中国的出口主要是在商业基础上进行的，尽管仍然对中国玉米增值税退税体制表示关注。在2007年，美国将继续调查农业部门里补贴做法和增值税退税体制。美国应尽力保证取消任何山口补贴的使用。”United States Trade Representative, 2006 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, December 11, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file688_10223.pdf, March 3, 2007.
4 《中国加入工作组报告书》，WTO文件号：WT／ACC／CHN／49，2001年10月1日，第233段。
5 Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, Part Ⅳ, para.29.
1 Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, Part Ⅳ, para.31.
2 程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版，第107页。
3 《中华人民共和国加入议定书》附件8“第152号减让表——中华人民共和国”第四部分第1节；WT／ACC／CHN／38／Rev．3．
4 例如，通过政府采购价实施的市场价格支持，从1996年-1998年，小麦、粳稻和棉花的支持为负值，政府采购价低于外部参考价格：玉米和籼稻1996年亦为负值，自1997-1998年始为正值。对于通过政府保护价对小麦、粳稻、籼稻和玉米实施的市场价格支持，只有玉米的保护为正值。Working Party on the Accession of China, Communication from China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, 19 July 2001.
1 《中国加入工作组报告书》，WTO文件号：WT／ACC／CHN／49，2001年10月1日，第235段。
2 Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/8, 31 March 2006.
3 关于中国使用的具体“绿箱”支持措施，参见蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版，附录3，第247-251页。
4 Working Party on the Accession of China, Communication from China, WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, 19 July 2001, Support Table DS：1；程国强：《加入WTO与中国农业国内支持政策改革》，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new_product/drcexpert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174667,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
5 Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/8, 31 March 2006.
1 Working Party on the Accession of China, Communication from China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3, 19 July 2001.
2 Notification, WTO Doc. G/AG/N/CHN/8, 31 March 2006.
3 程国强：《加入WTO与中国农业国内支持政策改革》，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new product/drcexpert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174667,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
4 到2006年，全国31个省市区全部免征农业税。与1999年相比，全国农民减负总额达1250亿元人民币，人均减负约140元人民币。2007年加大了对农业生产，尤其是粮食生产的支持力度，免征农业税、取消农业特产税和两税附加，全部免征牧业税。龚锡强：《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，http://lsj.xf.cn/zxx80.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
1 据美国农业部经济研究局报告分析指出，中国2004年对农村基础设施的投入总计达到了1，500亿元人民币(折合181亿美元)，重点改善灌溉设施、乡村道路、沼气设施、小水电、草场围栏、科研和农业高科技园区的建设。而历史上农村基础设施建设经费只有30％左右真正用于农业，大部分被挪作他用。Fred Gale, Bryan Lohmar, and Francis Tuan, "China's New Farm Subsidies", WRS-05-01 February 2005, http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/ers/WRS//2000s/2005/WRS-02-02-2005_Special_Report.pdf, March 3, 2007.
2 2004年7月和9月，“吉林安华农业保险股份有限公司”和“上海安信农业保险股份有限公司”分别获中国保监会批准正式成立并投入运营，开创了中国专业性农业保险的先河，投保农户将获得政府一定比例的保费补贴。《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
3 自2004年以来，农村信用社增加了对农民的小额贷款，主要用于农资购买和再生产投资，如打井、牲畜和肥料购买、果园和温室建设等。截至2006年9月末，全国农村合作金融机构农业贷款余额1.3万亿元，其中农户贷款余额9738亿元。全国2.2亿农户(其中约50％有贷款需求)中，在农村信用社有小额信用贷款和联保贷款余额的农户己达7000多万户，占有贷款需求农户的60％左右。农民贷款难问题得到一定程度的缓解。唐双宁：《银行业与经济社会的协调发展》，2006年11月23日，http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=2863,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。另外，国家政策性银行也增加了对农产品加工企业的贷款力度，中国农业发展银行近年出台了《中国农业发展银行农业产业化龙头企业贷款办法》和《农业科技贷款暂行办法》。
4 2004年开始，中国全面放开粮食收购和销售市场，实现自由流通。6月3日，国务院正式公布了《粮食流通条例》，实施全面的粮食市场化改革。2004年，100％的中国农产品基本实现了市场化，标志着计划体制在中国农业的终结。
5 2004年，浙江省立法机关通过了中国首部有关农民专业合作组织的法规，明确规定农民专业合作组织可以取得法人资格。据悉，十届全国人大业已启动《农民合作经济组织法》的起草工作。农民专业合作组织可以提高农民进入市场的组织化程度、规避市场风险、增强农民的市场竞争力。参见《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月3日)。
6 《中央一号文件连续4年对政策性农业保险提出要求》，http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-01/31/content_514180.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月8日)。
7 来源自中国乡村发现网：《我国粮食直接补贴政策存在的问题》， http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4102,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
1 卢立：《粮食直接补贴怎么补，大有讲究》，中国乡村发现网，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4096,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
2 财政部2007年3月5日第十届全国人民代表大会第五次报告：《关于2006年中央和地方预算执行情况与2007年中央和地方预算草案的报告》，http://www.cfen.cn/loginCt/pageprocess?pageurl=ztkxx/2005-06/29/content_222870.jsp,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
1 李国祥：《现阶段我国农业补贴政策选择》，载《经济研究参考》2003年第72期，第5页。
2 蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版，第220页。
3 褚红梅：《对我国农业补贴政策的思考——丛我国农业特点出发》载《甘肃农业》2006年第5期，第85页。
4 如健全农业保险制度，借鉴美国模式，建立国家农业保险公司，政府进行宏观管理和再保险，由商业保险公司与政府签订合同具体办理。所谓“美国模式”，即农作物保险通过一系列私营保险公司进行，它们负责具休执行，向农民销售和提供具体的保险服务。但政府为这些私营保险机构提供大规模的保费补贴，包括：经营、推销费用和理赔费用补贴，从而使农民以较低的保费率普遍参加农业保险。同时，为了激励私营保险公司开展农作物保险，又向它们提供再保险服务，使私人保险公司获得保险业收益。秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版社2003年版，第44页。
5 蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版，第220-224页：程国强：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2002年版，第209-210页。
6 何忠伟：《中国农业补贴政策的效果与体系研究》，中国农业科学院学位论文，2005年，第143页。
7 龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版，第285-286页。
1 秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版社2003年版，第44页。
2 关于各种具体补贴措施的政策建议，参见财政部财政科学研究所课题组：《中国的农业补贴：形势分析与政策建议》，载《经济研究参考》2004年底75期；甘绍群：《论农业补贴与农业政策性金融》，载《中国农业银行武汉培训学院学报》2005年第3期总第111期，第27页；李国祥：《现阶段我国农业补贴政策选择》，载《经济研究参考》2003年第72期；《我国粮食直接补贴政策存在的问题》，来源自中国乡村发现网，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4102，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
3 例如，2004年中国大米、小麦和玉米的产量为4000亿吨，平均每吨的价格为1500人民币，116亿人民币的补贴只占粮食生产总值不到2％。Fred Gale，Bryan Lohmar, and Francis Tuan，“China's New Farm Subsidies", WRS-05-01 February 2005,http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/ers/WRS//2000s/2005/WRS-02-02-2005_Special_Report.pdf, March 2, 2007.
4 Fred Gale, Bryan Lohmar, and Francis Tuan, "China's New Farm Subsidies", WRS-05-01 February 2005, http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/ers/WRS//2000s/2005/WRS-02-02-2005_Special_Report.pdf, March 15, 2007.
1 Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/161, 28 February 2006, Part Ⅳ.
2 全国成本调查机构近期对30个省份881个县16870户农户的种植意向进行了调查。预计今年全国农户户均粮食播种面积9.52亩，与上年持平。粮食仍是今年农业种植的主要品种，占户均总播种面积的68.4％。其中，预计户均播种稻谷3.22亩，比上年增加1.5％；户均播种小麦1.91亩，减少3.1％；户均播种玉米2.7亩，增加3.6％；户均播种大豆1.15亩，减少5.2％。《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，中国粮食储藏科技网，http://www.zlqh.com/shownews.asp?id=213754，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
3 中国“入世”之前关于农业的研究报告表明，谷物类将受到较大的冲击。价廉质优的谷类进口量的增加，将冲击国内小麦、玉米和大豆的生产。主产小麦、玉米、大豆的东北、华北地区农业将受到比较大的冲击。参见余永定 郑秉文主编，宋泓副主编：《中国“入世”研究报告：进入WTO的中国产业》，社会科学文献出版社200年版，第138-140页。
4 原中国加入WTO代表团农业谈判专家组组长程国强先生将入世后中国农业表现不俗归结为下列三项原因：第一，根据全球化的趋势，主动对农业进行了战略性调整。通过推进农业标准化、提升农产品质量、加强农产品专业化和区域化建设等举措，全面提升了农业的竞争能力；此外，更善于利用国内外的农业资源和市场，通过进口原料性、资源性农产品，出口劳动密集型产品，发挥了农业内部的比较优势。第二，中国政府高度重视“三农”问题，采取了一系列支持政策，促进了农业发展。第三，加入WTO步伐恰与由中国经济发展所带来的农业结构的调整转化期相重合，起到了互相促进的作用。张意轩：《中国农业：应对WTO何以表现不俗》，2007年1月5日，《人民日报》海外版，http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-01/05/content_5567446.htm，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
5 美国政府对农用土地每公顷提供高达100至150美元的补贴，我国加入WTO后，目前支持水平只有2％，每公顷补贴合25美元。外国补贴产品的进口，导致国产大豆种植面积减少，价格下跌，但仍然卖不出去。玉米进口的口子拉开后，被认为有可能重蹈大豆的覆辙。杨锋磊：《拿什么保护中国农业?》，载《中国经营报》，2006年8月7日，http://business.sohu.com/20060806/n244644610.shtml，(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
1 刘健男：《没有棉花就没有多哈》，载《WTO经济导刊》2007年第4期(总第46期)，第17页。
2 Lamy: China Fulfilling WTO Commitments Well, China Daily, Sep.6 2006, http://english.cri.cn/3130/2006/09/06/262@135641.htm, April 4, 2007.
3 Summary Report on the Thirtieth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session Held on 17 March and 19 April 2005, WTO Doc. TN/AG/R/19, 13 May 2005.
1 农业部软科学委员会课题组编：《假如世贸组织与中国农业》，中国农业出版社2002年版，第236页。
1．赵维田著：《世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度》，吉林人民出版社2000年版。
2．朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2004年版。
3．孙振宇主编：《WTO多哈回合谈判中期回顾》，人民出版社2005年版。
4．程国强著：《WTO农业规则与中国农业发展》，中国经济出版社2001年版。
5．龚宇著：《WTO农产品贸易法律制度研究》，厦门大学出版社2005年版。
6．蓝海涛著：《国际农业贸易制度解读政策应用》，中国海关出版社2002年版。
7．秦富、王秀清、辛贤、何秀荣和张莉勤等著：《国外农业支持政策》，中国农业出版2003年版。
8．刘晓昀、毛学峰、辛贤著：《农产品贸易自由化对中国农村贫困的影响》，中国农业出版社2006年版。
9．袁东明、任晶晶编著：《中国加入WTO法律文件解读》(农业篇)，地震出版社2002年版。
10．吴小鹏编著：《国外的农业出口补贴》，中国社会出版社2006年版。
11．朱榄叶编著：《世界贸易组织国际贸易纠纷案例评析》，法律出版社2000年版。
12．赵维田、刘敬东编著：《WTO：解释条约的习惯规则》，湖南科学技术出版社2006年版。
13．余永定、郑秉文主编，宋泓副主编：《中国“入世”研究报告：进入WTO的中国产业》，社会科学文献出版社200年版。
14．农业部农业贸易促进中心编：《WTO新一轮农业谈判框架协议解读》，中国农业出版社2005年版。
15．农业部软科学委员会课题组编：《加入世贸组织与中国农业》，中国农业出版社2002年版。
16．程红星著：《WTO司法哲学的能动主义之维》，北京大学出版社2006年版。
1．彭汉英：《倾听最激烈的“反对者之声”——WTO总理事会七月会议纪实》，载《中国海关》2004年第10期。
2．刘昌黎：《WTO谈判冻结及其影响》，载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2006年11期。
3．白云：《乌拉圭回合<农业协议>国内支持条款缺陷问题研究》，载《时代法学》2006年第4卷第4期。
4．陈建宁：《“新蓝箱”：农业补贴的隐患》，载《WTO经济导刊》2004年第12期
5．张南薰：《WTO美国高地棉补贴案之研究》，载《经社法制论丛》第38期。
6．陈建宁：《美国想玩“箱子”转移游戏》，载《WTO经济导刊》2004年第8期。
7．李国祥：《现阶段我国农业补贴政策选择》，载《经济研究参考》2003年第72期。
8．褚红梅：《对我国农业补贴政策的思考——丛我国农业特点出发》，载《甘肃农业》2006年第5期。
9．财政部财政科学研究所课题组：《中国的农业补贴：形势分析与政策建议》，载《经济研究参考》2004年第75期。
10．甘绍群：《论农业补贴与农业政策性金融》，载《中国农业银行武汉培训学院学报》，2005年第3期总第111期。
11．卢先垫：《表面文章一大篇：农业框架协议对欧盟国内支持的影响》，载《WTO经济导刊》2005年第1期。
12．刘健男：《没有棉花就没有多哈》，载《WTO经济导刊》2007年第4期。
13．何忠伟：《中国农业补贴政策的效果与体系研究》，中国农业科学院博士学位论文，2005年。
1．唐勇：《如果你要吃饭，农业就很重要》，原载《环球时报》2007年1月19日第17版，http://world.people.com.cn/BIG5/14549/5314651.html.(访问日期：2007年2月2日)。
2．《WTO香港会议农业谈判难在何处?》，原载《新京报》，http://news.sohu.com/20051214/n240962143.shtml,(访问日期：2006年9月10日)。
3．《素帕猜：农业是多哈回合谈判的发动机》，http://www.ccatp.com/news/news051212_1.htm,(访问日期：2006年9月6日)。
4．《夜以继日谋求一致——关于第一次修改后的香港部长级会议宣言草案》，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsId=400540000197,(访问日期：2006年10月8日)。
5．山下一仁，《WTO农业协定的问题和谈判的现状及展望——从乌拉圭回合谈判的参加者的角度观察》，http://www.rieti.go.jp/cn/publications/summary/05050007.html,(访问日期：2006年8月6日)。
6．李超民：《美国70年来农产品立法与农产品常平仓计划的现实意义》，http://www.shac.gov.cn/hwzc/zc/t20040804_107222.htm,(访问日期：2007年1月16日)。
7．张旭东：《生产方式落后我国连续3年出现农产品贸易逆差》，http://business.sohu.com/20070220/n248305722.shtml,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
8．《美国将重点关注中国农产品出口补贴问题》，http://www.cacs.gov.cn/DefaultWebApp/showNews.jsp?newsld=201420003727,(访问日期：2007年2月28日)。
9．程国强：《加入WTO与中国农业国内支持政策改革》，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/new_product/drcexpert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174667,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
10．龚锡强：《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，http://lsj.xf.cn/zxx80.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
11．《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
12．唐双宁：《银行业与经济社会的协调发展》， http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?doclD=2863,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
13．《2004年：农业完成计划体制到市场轨道“软着陆”》，http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/gyzg/t178377.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月3日)。
14．《中央一号文件连续4年对政策性农业保险提出要求》，http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-01/31/content 514180.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月8日)。
15．中国乡村发现网：《我国粮食直接补贴政策存在的问题》，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4102,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
16．卢立：《粮食直接补贴怎么补，大有讲究》，中国乡村发现网，http://www.zgxcfx.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=4096,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
17．《关于2006年中央和地方预算执行情况与2007年中央和地方预算草案的报告》，http://www.cfen.cn/loginCt/pageprocess?pageurl=ztkxx/2005-06/29/content_222870.jsp,(2007年4月10日)。
18．《2007年我国粮食市场形势和对策》，中国粮食储藏科技网，http://www.zlqh.com/shownews.asp?id= 213754,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
19．张意轩：《中国农业：应对WTO何以表现不俗》，2007年1月5日，《人民日报》海外版，http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-01/05/content_5567446.htm,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
20．杨锋磊：《拿什么保护中国农业?》，载《中国经营报》，2006年8月7日，http://business.sohu.com/20060806/n244644610.shtml,(访问日期：2007年4月10日)。
21．加拿大对美国农业补贴磋商背景，http://www.fjsme.cn/ctinews/newscontent.asp?newsid=128105,(访问日期：2007年3月1日)。
22．程国强：《中国农业面对的国际农业补贴环境》，参见国研网，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/rDRCNet.Channel.Web/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174671,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
23．程国强：《中国农业面对的国际农业补贴环境》，参见国研网，http://www.drcnet.com.cn/DRCNet.Channel.Web/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=174671,(访问日期：2007年4月2日)。
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1. Karen Halverson Cross, King Cotton, Developing Countries and the "Peace Clause": The WTO's US Cotton Subsidies Decision, Journal of International Economic Law 9(1), 2006.
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5. Melaku Geboye Desta, The Bumpy Ride towards the Establishment of "A Fair and Market-oriented Agricultural Trading System" at the WTO: Reflections Following the Cancun Setback, 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 489, 2003.
6. Giovanni Anania, Jean-Christophe Bureau, The Negotiations on Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects, European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol.32(4), 2005.
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18. Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) -A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.7, Issue 4, 2004.
19. Paul Waer & Edwin Vermulst, EC Anti-subsidy Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round: a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, Journal of World Trade 33(3), 1999.
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21. Richard H. Steinberg, Timothy E. Fosling, When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC AND US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenges, Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2), 2003.
22. Daniel Bodansky, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 852,2005.
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1. Joseph Stiglitz, Reasons behind the Demise of the Doha Development Round, http://taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/08/15/2003323304, Oct. 1,2006.
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1. Working Party Report on Austrialian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted by the Contracting Parties on 3 April 1950, BISD Ⅱ/188.
2. GATT Panel Report on France-Wheat Exports, adopted on 21 November 1958, L/924, BISD 7S/46.
3. GATT Panel Report on EEC-Wheat Flour Subsidies, SCM/42, 21 March 1983, unadopted.
4. GATT Panel Report on EEC-Pasta Subsidies, SCM/43, 19 May 1983, unadopted.
5. GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Australia), L/4833, adopted on 6 November 1979, BISD 26S/290.
6. GATT Panel Report on EEC-Oilseeds I, L/6627, adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86.
7. GATT Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber I, SCM/83, 3 June 1987, unadopted, BISD 34S/194.
8. GATT Panel Report on US-Non-Rubber Footwear, SCM/94, adopted on 13 June 1995, BISD 42S/208.
9. GATT Panel Report on Canada-Manufacturing Beef CVD, SCM/85, 13 October 1987, unadopted.
10. GATT Panel Report on US-Canadian Pork, DS7/R, adopted 11 July 1991, BISD 38S/30.
11. GATT Panel Report on Canada-Grain Corn, SCM/140 and Corr.1, adopted on 26 March 1992, BISD 38S/411.
12. GATT Panel Report on US-Wine and Grape Products, SCM/71, adopted on 28 April 1992, BISD 39S/436.
13. GATT Panel Report on US-Norwegian Salmon CVD, SCM/153, adopted on 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/576.
14. GATT Panel Report on Brazil-EEC Milk, SCM/179, adopted on 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/467.
15. GATT Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅰ, SCM/185, 15 November 1994, unadopted.
16. GATT Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅱ, SCM/162, 19 February 1993.
17. GATT Panel Report on Italy-Agricultural Machinery, L/833, adopted on 23 October 1958, BISD7S/60.
18. GATT Panel Report on EC-Sugar Exports (Brazil), L/5011, adopted on 10 November 1980.
19. Panel Report on US-Exports. Restraints, WT/DS194/R, adopted on 23 August 2001.
20. Panel Report on Korea-Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted on 11 April 2005.
21. Panel Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/R, adopted on 17 February 2004, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
22. Appellate Body Report on US-Softwood Lumber Ⅳ, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted on 17 February 2004.
23. Panel Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/R, adopted on 20 March 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
24. Appellate Body Report on US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 2000.
25. Appellate Body Report on US-FSC (Article 21.5-EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted on 14 March 2006, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report.
26. Panel Report on US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, adopted on 20 July 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
27. Panel Report on EC-Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, WT/DS299/R, adopted on 3 August 2005.
28. Panel Report on Canada-Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted on 20 August 1999.
29. Appellate Body Report on Caanda-Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted on 20 August 1999.
30. Panel Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS/138/R, adopted on 7 June 2000, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report.
31. Appellate Body Report on US-Lead and Bismuth Ⅱ, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 7 June 2000.
32. Panel Report on US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, adopted on 21 March 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
33. Panel Report on Canada-Autos, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted on 19 June 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
34. Panel Report on Australia - Leather, WT/DS126/R, adopted on 16 June 1999.
18. Panel Report on Brazil - Aircraft (Article21.5 -Brazil), WT/DS46/RW/R, adopted on 21 August 2001.
35. Panel Report on EC - Commercial Vessels, WT/DS301/R, adopted on 20 June 2005.
36. Panel Report on Indonesia - Automobiles, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, and WT/DS64/R, adopted on 23 July 1998.
37. Appellate Body Report on US - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted on 21 March 2005.
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39. Panel Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, adopted on 20 March 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
40. Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, adopted on 18 December 2001.
41. Appellate Body Report on Canada - Dairy(Article 21.5 - New Zealand and USII),, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, adopted on adopted on 17 January 2003.
42. Appellate Body Report on EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted on 19 May 2005.
43. Panel Report on EC- Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS283/R, 19 May 2005, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
44. Panel Report on Korea - Various Measures on Beef, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted on 10 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
45. Appellate Body Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 1997.
46. Panel Report on EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/R/USA, adopted on 25 September 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
47. Panel Report on Korea - Dairy Safeguards, WT/DS98/R, adopted on 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
48. Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Footwear (EC), WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted on 12 January 2000,
49. Appellate Body Report on US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996.
50. Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Ⅱ, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted on 1 November 1996.
51. Appellate Body Report on India-Patents (US), WT/DS50/AB/R, 16 January 1998.
52. Appellate Body Report on Canada-Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 July 1997.
53. Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement Ⅰ, WT/DS60/AB/R, 25 November 1998.
54. Appellate Body Report on EC-Bananas Ⅲ, WT/DS27/AB/R, 25 September 1997.
55 Appellate Body Report on EC-Tariffs Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R, 20 April 2004.
56. Appellate Body Report on EC-Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 13 February 1998.
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