高知识型员工柔性绩效评价激励与流动机制研究
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摘要
随着知识经济时代的到来,高知识型员工作为组织核心资源的一部分,其战略地位不断提升,高知识型员工的数量和质量关系到组织的核心竞争力的提高和组织战略的长远发展。由于高知识型员工与一般员工相比有其自身的独有特性,有必要对高知识型员工的评价和管理进行专门的研究。目前对高知识型员工的评价和管理存在很多问题和难题亟待解决,而且学术界对此进行的专门研究还较少。基于这些现状,本论文运用现代管理和系统分析的理论、方法,对高知识型员工柔性绩效评价与激励流动机制问题进行了探索性的深入研究,主要工作如下：
第一,提出高知识型员工的概念,系统地分析了高知识型员工的需求特征、行为偏好和流动特征,基于系统的原理分析了高知识型员工绩效的影响因素,在此基础上,对其绩效评价及激励流动管理系统的特点、目标、环境等进行了分析,建立了高知识型员工绩效评价及激励流动管理系统结构的概念模型。
第二,提出高知识型员工柔性绩效评价的思想和柔性绩效指标与刚性指标的柔性评价等相关概念,分析了高知识型员工的柔性绩效构成,分析了高知识型员工与其利益相关者的绩效契约关系,在此基础上建立了基于利益相关者的高知识型员工柔性绩效评价指标体系,认为高知识型员工的利益相关者主要关注思想素质结构、业务素质结构、绩效素质结构和特殊业绩四个维度,以高校教师为例进行了柔性绩效评价体系的设计。
第三,对高知识型员工柔性绩效评价的数学模型进行研究,分别建立了柔性评价指标数据处理的统计分析模型、柔性静态评价的方法与模型和柔性动态评价的方法与模型。
第四,对显性激励的局限性以及显性激励与声誉激励的关系进行了分析,指出声誉激励是显性激励的重要补充,并能降低激励成本。利用委托-代理关系建立了高知识型员工的声誉激励模型。
第五,考虑工作本身的内在激励作用,从授权、弹性工作制、工作任务的挑战性、团队等几个方面讨论了高知识型员工的工作设计,利用委托-代理方法分析了工作设计与薪酬激励的作用规律,研究了高知识型员工工作设计的超契约机制。
第六,建立了基于胜任特征模型的高知识型员工超契约激励模式。通过建立基于胜任特征模型的职业生涯阶梯和薪酬方案,满足了高知识型员工对个人成长的需求,并且激发高知识型员工为提升自己的竞争力不断学习和提高。
第七,以和谐为背景建立高知识型员工和谐流动机制,通过科学选聘、新型劳动契约、内部营销、和谐实践社群等措施提高高知识型员工对组织的忠诚度,降低非良性流动,同时建立和谐内部流动与外部流动机制,坚持以内部流动为主外部流动为辅,促进良性流动,形成高效、和谐的组织氛围。
With the arriving of knowledge economy time, as a core resource of the organization, high-performance knowledge workers are having their status rising in human resource strategies, and their quantities and qualities are concerning with the improvement of enterprise core competence and further development of organization's strategy. Since high-performance knowledge workers have their unique characteristics, compared with other common employers, study on the evaluation and management of high-performance knowledge workers are especially important. However, there are still a lot of problems in the evaluation and management of high-performance knowledge workers, and few studies on such issues have been carried by academe. Based on these actualities, using human resource management strategy theory, performance evaluation study, incentive theory, harmonious management theory and other relative theories, using system analysis and other modern scientific management methods, this thesis makes a deep and explorative study on the flexible performance evaluation and flowing incentive system of high-performance knowledge workers. The main study aspects are as follows:
First, this thesis gives a concept of high-performance knowledge workers. It systematically analyzes the demand characteristics, behaviors preferences and flowing characteristics of high-performance knowledge workers, and based on system theory it also summarizes the indicates which influence the performance of high-performance knowledge workers. Based on the above analysis, the thesis also analyzes the characteristics, aims and environment of performance evaluation and flowing incentive management system, thus a conceptual matrix (or model) of performance evaluation and flowing incentive management system of high-performance knowledge workers is formed.
Second, this thesis gives a thought of flexible performance evaluation and some concepts are related to of flexible performance indicators and flexible evaluation of rigid indicators. the thesis analyzes the constitutes of high-performance knowledge workers'flexible performance, as well as the performance contractual relationship between high-performance knowledge workers and their stakeholders (interest-related parties), and on the basis, the thesis sets up a performance evaluation index system for high-performance knowledge workers from a perspective of stakeholders, claiming that the stakeholders of high-performance knowledge workers shall pay main attention to the following dimensions, ideological quality structure, professional quality structure, performance quality structure and special performance. In this thesis, a flexible performance evaluation system is designed for college teachers.
Third, the thesis built three model wihch inculd the flexible evaluating of data processing statistics model, the flexible static evaluating model and the flexible dynamic evaluating model in order to evaluation of flexible performance of high-performance knowledge workers.
Forth, the thesis analyzes the limitations of explicit incentive and the relationship between explicit incentive and reputation incentive. It points out that reputation incentive is a important supplement to explicit incentive, and reputation incentive will also reduce the incentive cost. Employing the principle-agent theory, the thesis set up a reputation incentive matrix for high-performance knowledge workers.
Fifth, taking into account of the inner incentive effect of the work itself, the thesis discusses the work designing of high-performance knowledge workers from the following aspects, authorizing, implementing flexible work hours, the challenge of work target and team work. Using principle-agent theory, the paper also analyzes the action law between work designing and salary incentive, as well as the beyond contract incentives of work designing of high-performance knowledge workers.
Sixth, the establishment of beyond contract incentives of the high-performance knowledge workers based on competency model that defined the career ladder and pay programs meets the high-performance knowledge workers'demand for personal growth and stimulates them to enhance their competitiveness and enhance learning.
Seventh, the harmonious flow mechanism which building on the background of harmonious for the high-performance knowledge workers improve their loyalty to the organization and reduce the the flow of non-positive through measures, such as the scientific selection, the new labor contracts, internal marketing, and harmonious community. And the harmonious also built a harmony free-flowing regulation both in insides and outsides which keep the law that the internal-flowing is main and the external-flowing reversed, and it promoting the harmony flows, controlling the non-positive flows, and forming the efficient and harmonious atmosphere in the organization.
第一,提出高知识型员工的概念,系统地分析了高知识型员工的需求特征、行为偏好和流动特征,基于系统的原理分析了高知识型员工绩效的影响因素,在此基础上,对其绩效评价及激励流动管理系统的特点、目标、环境等进行了分析,建立了高知识型员工绩效评价及激励流动管理系统结构的概念模型。
第二,提出高知识型员工柔性绩效评价的思想和柔性绩效指标与刚性指标的柔性评价等相关概念,分析了高知识型员工的柔性绩效构成,分析了高知识型员工与其利益相关者的绩效契约关系,在此基础上建立了基于利益相关者的高知识型员工柔性绩效评价指标体系,认为高知识型员工的利益相关者主要关注思想素质结构、业务素质结构、绩效素质结构和特殊业绩四个维度,以高校教师为例进行了柔性绩效评价体系的设计。
第三,对高知识型员工柔性绩效评价的数学模型进行研究,分别建立了柔性评价指标数据处理的统计分析模型、柔性静态评价的方法与模型和柔性动态评价的方法与模型。
第四,对显性激励的局限性以及显性激励与声誉激励的关系进行了分析,指出声誉激励是显性激励的重要补充,并能降低激励成本。利用委托-代理关系建立了高知识型员工的声誉激励模型。
第五,考虑工作本身的内在激励作用,从授权、弹性工作制、工作任务的挑战性、团队等几个方面讨论了高知识型员工的工作设计,利用委托-代理方法分析了工作设计与薪酬激励的作用规律,研究了高知识型员工工作设计的超契约机制。
第六,建立了基于胜任特征模型的高知识型员工超契约激励模式。通过建立基于胜任特征模型的职业生涯阶梯和薪酬方案,满足了高知识型员工对个人成长的需求,并且激发高知识型员工为提升自己的竞争力不断学习和提高。
第七,以和谐为背景建立高知识型员工和谐流动机制,通过科学选聘、新型劳动契约、内部营销、和谐实践社群等措施提高高知识型员工对组织的忠诚度,降低非良性流动,同时建立和谐内部流动与外部流动机制,坚持以内部流动为主外部流动为辅,促进良性流动,形成高效、和谐的组织氛围。
With the arriving of knowledge economy time, as a core resource of the organization, high-performance knowledge workers are having their status rising in human resource strategies, and their quantities and qualities are concerning with the improvement of enterprise core competence and further development of organization's strategy. Since high-performance knowledge workers have their unique characteristics, compared with other common employers, study on the evaluation and management of high-performance knowledge workers are especially important. However, there are still a lot of problems in the evaluation and management of high-performance knowledge workers, and few studies on such issues have been carried by academe. Based on these actualities, using human resource management strategy theory, performance evaluation study, incentive theory, harmonious management theory and other relative theories, using system analysis and other modern scientific management methods, this thesis makes a deep and explorative study on the flexible performance evaluation and flowing incentive system of high-performance knowledge workers. The main study aspects are as follows:
First, this thesis gives a concept of high-performance knowledge workers. It systematically analyzes the demand characteristics, behaviors preferences and flowing characteristics of high-performance knowledge workers, and based on system theory it also summarizes the indicates which influence the performance of high-performance knowledge workers. Based on the above analysis, the thesis also analyzes the characteristics, aims and environment of performance evaluation and flowing incentive management system, thus a conceptual matrix (or model) of performance evaluation and flowing incentive management system of high-performance knowledge workers is formed.
Second, this thesis gives a thought of flexible performance evaluation and some concepts are related to of flexible performance indicators and flexible evaluation of rigid indicators. the thesis analyzes the constitutes of high-performance knowledge workers'flexible performance, as well as the performance contractual relationship between high-performance knowledge workers and their stakeholders (interest-related parties), and on the basis, the thesis sets up a performance evaluation index system for high-performance knowledge workers from a perspective of stakeholders, claiming that the stakeholders of high-performance knowledge workers shall pay main attention to the following dimensions, ideological quality structure, professional quality structure, performance quality structure and special performance. In this thesis, a flexible performance evaluation system is designed for college teachers.
Third, the thesis built three model wihch inculd the flexible evaluating of data processing statistics model, the flexible static evaluating model and the flexible dynamic evaluating model in order to evaluation of flexible performance of high-performance knowledge workers.
Forth, the thesis analyzes the limitations of explicit incentive and the relationship between explicit incentive and reputation incentive. It points out that reputation incentive is a important supplement to explicit incentive, and reputation incentive will also reduce the incentive cost. Employing the principle-agent theory, the thesis set up a reputation incentive matrix for high-performance knowledge workers.
Fifth, taking into account of the inner incentive effect of the work itself, the thesis discusses the work designing of high-performance knowledge workers from the following aspects, authorizing, implementing flexible work hours, the challenge of work target and team work. Using principle-agent theory, the paper also analyzes the action law between work designing and salary incentive, as well as the beyond contract incentives of work designing of high-performance knowledge workers.
Sixth, the establishment of beyond contract incentives of the high-performance knowledge workers based on competency model that defined the career ladder and pay programs meets the high-performance knowledge workers'demand for personal growth and stimulates them to enhance their competitiveness and enhance learning.
Seventh, the harmonious flow mechanism which building on the background of harmonious for the high-performance knowledge workers improve their loyalty to the organization and reduce the the flow of non-positive through measures, such as the scientific selection, the new labor contracts, internal marketing, and harmonious community. And the harmonious also built a harmony free-flowing regulation both in insides and outsides which keep the law that the internal-flowing is main and the external-flowing reversed, and it promoting the harmony flows, controlling the non-positive flows, and forming the efficient and harmonious atmosphere in the organization.
引文
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