关系专用性投资中的准租金挤占与治理研究
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摘要
敲竹杠(准租金挤占)是不完全契约理论(GHM)的核心内容,也是企业理论探讨的核心问题。在经济生活层面,联合风险投资协议、经理人和大股东关系、企业接管谈判、销售渠道的建立等众多工商业谈判中,大量的时间和金钱被用于建立防护敲竹杠的花费上；在社会其他层面,令人广延诟病的“国有企业外部敌意接管”、“违规建造小产权房”等也都是这一问题的现实体现。同时,经济的多元化发展又引发了特许经营、网络运营组织、外包等不同经济组织形式的纷纷涌现。因此,如何采取有效措施防止“敲竹杠”的发生,寻求到合理的专用性合约治理方案就显得尤为重要。鉴于此,本文选取了典型的关系专用性合约——4S特许汽车经营合约为案例,经过多次的实地调研,得到了合约样本、相关指标数据等可靠的一手资料,在大量文献研究的基础上,遵循理论推导——实证检验——得出结论的过程,配合Eviews6.0的Logistic估计围绕特许经营的本质、准租金分配的常态方式、克服敲竹杠问题的因素、专用性合约治理措施等问题展开研究,.主要内容安排如下：
除第一章介绍选题背景、研究必要性,研究目标、研究方法、文章框架及可能的创新之处外,第二章,作为论文的研究基础,系统的梳理了理论界一直未成共识的敲竹杠治理方案的各家观点：从Klein等人提出的“纵向一体化”与Coase为代表的“长期契约”之间的世纪之争,再到近期涌现出的改变持股份额、担保机制、参照点合约等不同组织形式中的具体治理措施。对于上述各理论和模型,本章进行了系统的梳理和评述,并讨论了各治理模型的限制条件和适用性。
第三章,深入分析了特许经营及其准租金的性质,与第二章共同作为下文研究的理论基础。首先,特许经营是能够弥补市场交易存在机会主义且无法长期进行以及企业激励程度降低、有碍产出增加等不足而具有市场和企业双重特征的中间组织。其实质相当于一种关系专用性合约；其次,分析了特许经营合约的合约结构以及合约各方所进行的专用性投资。在特许经营合约中,特许经营商和公司总部都要进行大量的专用性投资。其中,特许经营商以专用性物质和人力投资为主,总部则更多的对特许经营渠道进行专用性投资。除此之外,双方还会进行刻意的互有专用性投资。这种互有投资是为了增加彼此利益和权力的相互渗透,包含着对准租金的挤占,但更多的却是一种对准租金的保护；最后,详细分析了特许经营合约中存在的准租金性质,及其获取方式和分配机制。在特许经营合约中,准租金的获取方式分为事前结算和事后截留两种。对于可以预见的事前结算部分,并不会有挤占行为的发生。只有在事后这部分无法准确预测和控制的准租金中才潜在着发生敲竹杠机会主义行为的可能。但是,合约双方会尽可能的减少可被挤占的事后租金,并配合相关措施进行保护,使其可被挤占的数额十分微小,以致于不被合约双方所考虑,从这一角度来看的话,对于合约双方其实就已经不存在挤占与否的问题了。因此,在类似特许经营合约等非一体化的关系专用性合约中,可以说挤占并非为常态,合约双方通常会采取租金的协商分配作为一般性的配置方式。这样的配置方式保证了合约双方之间的合作关系。从稳定的角度出发,这也正是这种组织形式能够迅速发展并长久存在的内在原因。
第四章,通过上述部分的理论分析,以Klein的自我执行模型为基础进行扩展。将私人惩罚部分作进一步细分,加入随着现代交易的发展、合约关系的深化所产生的对特定购销渠道、彼此专用关系维护,以及对各种合约保护措施进行必要投入的部分加以分析,推导出关系契约治理一：默认合约与准租金挤占之间的逻辑关系。研究发现,默认合约能够通过增加合约双方的履约资本、扩大履约范围,使潜在违约方的违约收益小于其违约的损失,保证合约处于自我执行的范围之内,从而防止了敲竹杠机会主义行为的发生。同时,默认合约的实施手段众多,其实质上相当于一个一系列的“一揽子”性方案。他们相互配合,层层加深了潜在违约者的违约成本。所以,如果其中一方想要违约的话,他就要层层的突破这些成本,使其短期收益小于个人惩罚条款所引致的损失。而且默认合约相关措施的执行成本很低,所以能够比较有效的防止准租金挤占的发生。
第五章,以理论分析部分为基础构建了关系契约治理二：弹性合约对准租金挤占的传导机制。弹性合约的设计是在合约条款和合约保护措施的设定上具有一定的弹性,附加可变化条款,能够替代、可以选择。弹性合约从调节的角度来说,刻意的将关系专用性资本变成有替代性的投资,从而阻止了敲竹杠的发生。从本质上来讲,它相当于是减少了可能会引起“套牢”的专用性投资的程度,化解了部分可被挤占的危险。在这样的弹性设计下,合约双方的剩余净收益都将会得到提高,从而实现合约效率,对合约的顺利履行起到一定作用。
第六章,案例分析。将所得理论与4S特许汽车经营合约的准租金挤占与治理的实际问题相结合。通过调研获取的特许经营合约样本与受访人谈话所得相关资料,联系我国目前特许经营发展的现状,考察默认合约和弹性合约在现实案例中的实际应用。研究发现,两种治理方式在4S特许汽车经营中都发挥着作用。在4S特许经营合约中,包含着刻意的互有投资、“一次性买断”安排、筛选机制及控制加盟商数量和设店位置的默认性措施,加之管理费用、对进车、售车渠道的投入和总部与各4S加盟商之间着重建立的友好关系等都增加了彼此的履约资本,减少了违约动机；而总部允许加盟商拥有20%-40%兼营幅度的弹性选择权则保证了加盟商在经营不善时的调节周转,避免了销售不畅时100%从总部进货造成的100%套牢,减少了阻止准租金回流的障碍。
第七章,计量检验。通过对默认合约治理和弹性合约治理两项变量进行计量检验,考察其在实际应用中的具体有效性。在上一部分中,对于默认合约治理和弹性合约治理中的各项措施均进行了详细的论述分析。但是,在这些措施中有一部分并不具有准确可衡量性,若生硬量化会影响到模型的效果。因此,从模型可行性及准确性的角度出发,同时考虑到简洁性方面的要求,本章并没有将上述全部措施笼统的纳入到计量模型中来,而是选取了易于准确量化并且所占比重较大,具有突出代表性的履约激励、违约惩罚作为默认合约的替代变量同弹性合约一起接受Logistic回归的检验。其中,履约激励和违约惩罚都能够增加合约双方的履约资本、扩大履约范围,使潜在违约方的违约收益小于其违约的损失,保证合约处于自我执行的范围之内,从而防止了敲竹杠机会主义行为的发生；而弹性合约的衡量指标——兼营权的保护措施则是通过化解专用性的投资程度减少准租金挤占发生的概率。根据调研所获的450份合约数据,利用Eviews6.0中的Logistic估计,得到结论为：默认合约与弹性合约都能够减少准租金挤占发生的概率。
第八章,总结研究所得结论。同时,指出由机会主义行为导致的准租金挤占和由市场条件发生变化所引起的利益重新分配其实质是不同的。对后者的治理同样是一个值得研究的方向,但受限于所获数据,本文未能对此作进一步研究。
Hold-up is the core content of incomplete contract and also the classic problem in the theory of firm. In the lay of economic life, so many industry and commerce negotiations like unite risk agree, relation between handlers and shareholders, takeover overspend on the protection of hold-up; In other lays, spite overtaking of state-owned business and illegal construction of houses with limited property rights are also reflections about this problem. What's more, the economic multiplex development leads to emerge of varies of organization form, like franchise, network, epibody and so on. Thus, how to protect hold-up problem, finding the way to regulate it has so much importance. In view of this, this paper select the typical model——4Sfranchise contract for study. With repeatedly research, we got contract model, indicators and other data. Based on document research, following theoretical derivation——empirical test——draw a conclusion, using Eviews6.0discuss the following issues:the nature of franchise; normal allocation of quasi-rent; essential factors to overcome hold-up; and measures for its regulation. The main content of this paper arranged as follows:
Chapter Ⅰ,Introduces the background, the purpose and necessity of this study; Describes the research objectives, builds the analytical framework of this article. Then introduces research ideas and research methods used in this study, final elaborate the innovation of the article.
Chapter Ⅱ, As the base of this paper, we carding the regulative measures of different viewpoints. Beginning with the argument between vertical integration proposed by Klein and long-term contracts supported by Coase, and then state other specific methods emerging recently, which trend to solve the problem in various economic organizations, such as changing holding shares, guarantee mechanism, reference point contract and so on. We carding and comment on the above-mentioned views, and discuss the applicability and limiting condition for these views.
ChapterⅢ, We analyze the nature of franchise and its quasi-rent. This chapter with chanter Ⅱ are the theoretical basis of the following research. Firstly, franchise is one of the intermediate organizations with both traits of market and firm, it appears to offset the shortage about opportunistic behavior in market and inefficient incentive in firm. Its essence is a kind of relationship specific contract; Secondly, make a analysis on the contract structure of franchise contract and the relationship-specific investment. In franchise, franchiser and franchisee both have to-make a lot of specific investment. For franchisee, it has to invest on asset specific and human specific investment. For franchiser, its investment was mostly on specific operational channel. Even more important, both sides also make mutual investment. This investment is to increase rights penetration mutually. It may lead to hold-up, but more than that, it is a protection for quasi-rent; Finally, we analyze the nature of quasi-rent in franchise. In the franchise contract, there are two way to get the rent. One is settle accounts in advance; the other is hold back afterwards. The former does not have the chance to be squeezed. Only the latter can be hold-up because it could not be forecasted and controlled. But, both sides do their best to reduce this part, and set up protection to the rest. On this occasion, the amount of approvable quasi-rent is so little to consider for both sides, and there is no problem in squeeze or not for them. So, in these relationship specific contracts such as franchise, squeeze is not the normality, while the consultation is the normal allocation. And this is the primary cause of franchise that can develop so fast and exist so long.
ChapterIV,by means of theoretical analysis above all, we make a expansion built on Klein's self-enforcement model. Make a further subdivision on which he calls the reputation capital. Add to the investment on specific channel, maintain of relationship and various of protective measures produced with the development of modern trade. We deduced the logical relationship between implied contract and quasi-rent, then got a proposition that implied contract can reduce the probability of hold-up.
Chapter Ⅴ,Based on the theoretical analysis, we structure the transmission mechanism from flexible contract to quasi-rent. The flexible contract is making flexible and adjustable design on contract terms and protective measures. It changes the specific investment into alternative investment, thereby it can prevent hold-up as well as market risk. In essence, it reduces specific investment degree which can result in "lock in", defuse some of the risk by being squeezed. In this flexible design, both sides'residual net income will increase to realize the efficiency of the contract, and ensure the contract perform smoothly.
ChapterⅥ,is case study. We contact the conclusion with the practical issue in auto4S store contract. Text the practical application of implied contract and flexible contract, connected with the development of franchise in our country by contract sample and information from talking with the interviewer. We find that both the two measures play a very important role in4S franchise. For example, their contracts contain the implied contract, like mutual investment intentionally, buy-out in one space, screening, and amount and location controlled, besides, the administration cost and the taking more consideration to their relationship could all increased the performance cost, and then, reducing the breach motives; For flexible contract, in4S contracts, franchiser allow franchisee having sideline rights with the degree from20%to40%. This sideline rights help franchisee turnover when they have bad management. It avoids hundred-percent lock-in because of hundred-percent stock from franchiser, so it could reduces the hinder which prevents contra flow.
ChapterⅦ,is variable inspection. Investigate the practical application of implied contract and flexible contract by empirical study, to test whether the two measures could prevent hold-up. If it could be, then how goes it with the governance efforts.Using Logistic estimation in Eviews6.o,by450data, we got a conclusion that both implied contract and flexible contract can prevent hold-up occurs, under the horizontal comparison, flexible contract is more effective.
ChapterⅧ, is the conclusion. Beyond that, we find out hold-up caused by opportunistic behavior is different from rent redistribution caused by changing conditions in the market. The latter also deserves a research, but subject to the data we get, this paper could not make a further study on it.
除第一章介绍选题背景、研究必要性,研究目标、研究方法、文章框架及可能的创新之处外,第二章,作为论文的研究基础,系统的梳理了理论界一直未成共识的敲竹杠治理方案的各家观点：从Klein等人提出的“纵向一体化”与Coase为代表的“长期契约”之间的世纪之争,再到近期涌现出的改变持股份额、担保机制、参照点合约等不同组织形式中的具体治理措施。对于上述各理论和模型,本章进行了系统的梳理和评述,并讨论了各治理模型的限制条件和适用性。
第三章,深入分析了特许经营及其准租金的性质,与第二章共同作为下文研究的理论基础。首先,特许经营是能够弥补市场交易存在机会主义且无法长期进行以及企业激励程度降低、有碍产出增加等不足而具有市场和企业双重特征的中间组织。其实质相当于一种关系专用性合约；其次,分析了特许经营合约的合约结构以及合约各方所进行的专用性投资。在特许经营合约中,特许经营商和公司总部都要进行大量的专用性投资。其中,特许经营商以专用性物质和人力投资为主,总部则更多的对特许经营渠道进行专用性投资。除此之外,双方还会进行刻意的互有专用性投资。这种互有投资是为了增加彼此利益和权力的相互渗透,包含着对准租金的挤占,但更多的却是一种对准租金的保护；最后,详细分析了特许经营合约中存在的准租金性质,及其获取方式和分配机制。在特许经营合约中,准租金的获取方式分为事前结算和事后截留两种。对于可以预见的事前结算部分,并不会有挤占行为的发生。只有在事后这部分无法准确预测和控制的准租金中才潜在着发生敲竹杠机会主义行为的可能。但是,合约双方会尽可能的减少可被挤占的事后租金,并配合相关措施进行保护,使其可被挤占的数额十分微小,以致于不被合约双方所考虑,从这一角度来看的话,对于合约双方其实就已经不存在挤占与否的问题了。因此,在类似特许经营合约等非一体化的关系专用性合约中,可以说挤占并非为常态,合约双方通常会采取租金的协商分配作为一般性的配置方式。这样的配置方式保证了合约双方之间的合作关系。从稳定的角度出发,这也正是这种组织形式能够迅速发展并长久存在的内在原因。
第四章,通过上述部分的理论分析,以Klein的自我执行模型为基础进行扩展。将私人惩罚部分作进一步细分,加入随着现代交易的发展、合约关系的深化所产生的对特定购销渠道、彼此专用关系维护,以及对各种合约保护措施进行必要投入的部分加以分析,推导出关系契约治理一：默认合约与准租金挤占之间的逻辑关系。研究发现,默认合约能够通过增加合约双方的履约资本、扩大履约范围,使潜在违约方的违约收益小于其违约的损失,保证合约处于自我执行的范围之内,从而防止了敲竹杠机会主义行为的发生。同时,默认合约的实施手段众多,其实质上相当于一个一系列的“一揽子”性方案。他们相互配合,层层加深了潜在违约者的违约成本。所以,如果其中一方想要违约的话,他就要层层的突破这些成本,使其短期收益小于个人惩罚条款所引致的损失。而且默认合约相关措施的执行成本很低,所以能够比较有效的防止准租金挤占的发生。
第五章,以理论分析部分为基础构建了关系契约治理二：弹性合约对准租金挤占的传导机制。弹性合约的设计是在合约条款和合约保护措施的设定上具有一定的弹性,附加可变化条款,能够替代、可以选择。弹性合约从调节的角度来说,刻意的将关系专用性资本变成有替代性的投资,从而阻止了敲竹杠的发生。从本质上来讲,它相当于是减少了可能会引起“套牢”的专用性投资的程度,化解了部分可被挤占的危险。在这样的弹性设计下,合约双方的剩余净收益都将会得到提高,从而实现合约效率,对合约的顺利履行起到一定作用。
第六章,案例分析。将所得理论与4S特许汽车经营合约的准租金挤占与治理的实际问题相结合。通过调研获取的特许经营合约样本与受访人谈话所得相关资料,联系我国目前特许经营发展的现状,考察默认合约和弹性合约在现实案例中的实际应用。研究发现,两种治理方式在4S特许汽车经营中都发挥着作用。在4S特许经营合约中,包含着刻意的互有投资、“一次性买断”安排、筛选机制及控制加盟商数量和设店位置的默认性措施,加之管理费用、对进车、售车渠道的投入和总部与各4S加盟商之间着重建立的友好关系等都增加了彼此的履约资本,减少了违约动机；而总部允许加盟商拥有20%-40%兼营幅度的弹性选择权则保证了加盟商在经营不善时的调节周转,避免了销售不畅时100%从总部进货造成的100%套牢,减少了阻止准租金回流的障碍。
第七章,计量检验。通过对默认合约治理和弹性合约治理两项变量进行计量检验,考察其在实际应用中的具体有效性。在上一部分中,对于默认合约治理和弹性合约治理中的各项措施均进行了详细的论述分析。但是,在这些措施中有一部分并不具有准确可衡量性,若生硬量化会影响到模型的效果。因此,从模型可行性及准确性的角度出发,同时考虑到简洁性方面的要求,本章并没有将上述全部措施笼统的纳入到计量模型中来,而是选取了易于准确量化并且所占比重较大,具有突出代表性的履约激励、违约惩罚作为默认合约的替代变量同弹性合约一起接受Logistic回归的检验。其中,履约激励和违约惩罚都能够增加合约双方的履约资本、扩大履约范围,使潜在违约方的违约收益小于其违约的损失,保证合约处于自我执行的范围之内,从而防止了敲竹杠机会主义行为的发生；而弹性合约的衡量指标——兼营权的保护措施则是通过化解专用性的投资程度减少准租金挤占发生的概率。根据调研所获的450份合约数据,利用Eviews6.0中的Logistic估计,得到结论为：默认合约与弹性合约都能够减少准租金挤占发生的概率。
第八章,总结研究所得结论。同时,指出由机会主义行为导致的准租金挤占和由市场条件发生变化所引起的利益重新分配其实质是不同的。对后者的治理同样是一个值得研究的方向,但受限于所获数据,本文未能对此作进一步研究。
Hold-up is the core content of incomplete contract and also the classic problem in the theory of firm. In the lay of economic life, so many industry and commerce negotiations like unite risk agree, relation between handlers and shareholders, takeover overspend on the protection of hold-up; In other lays, spite overtaking of state-owned business and illegal construction of houses with limited property rights are also reflections about this problem. What's more, the economic multiplex development leads to emerge of varies of organization form, like franchise, network, epibody and so on. Thus, how to protect hold-up problem, finding the way to regulate it has so much importance. In view of this, this paper select the typical model——4Sfranchise contract for study. With repeatedly research, we got contract model, indicators and other data. Based on document research, following theoretical derivation——empirical test——draw a conclusion, using Eviews6.0discuss the following issues:the nature of franchise; normal allocation of quasi-rent; essential factors to overcome hold-up; and measures for its regulation. The main content of this paper arranged as follows:
Chapter Ⅰ,Introduces the background, the purpose and necessity of this study; Describes the research objectives, builds the analytical framework of this article. Then introduces research ideas and research methods used in this study, final elaborate the innovation of the article.
Chapter Ⅱ, As the base of this paper, we carding the regulative measures of different viewpoints. Beginning with the argument between vertical integration proposed by Klein and long-term contracts supported by Coase, and then state other specific methods emerging recently, which trend to solve the problem in various economic organizations, such as changing holding shares, guarantee mechanism, reference point contract and so on. We carding and comment on the above-mentioned views, and discuss the applicability and limiting condition for these views.
ChapterⅢ, We analyze the nature of franchise and its quasi-rent. This chapter with chanter Ⅱ are the theoretical basis of the following research. Firstly, franchise is one of the intermediate organizations with both traits of market and firm, it appears to offset the shortage about opportunistic behavior in market and inefficient incentive in firm. Its essence is a kind of relationship specific contract; Secondly, make a analysis on the contract structure of franchise contract and the relationship-specific investment. In franchise, franchiser and franchisee both have to-make a lot of specific investment. For franchisee, it has to invest on asset specific and human specific investment. For franchiser, its investment was mostly on specific operational channel. Even more important, both sides also make mutual investment. This investment is to increase rights penetration mutually. It may lead to hold-up, but more than that, it is a protection for quasi-rent; Finally, we analyze the nature of quasi-rent in franchise. In the franchise contract, there are two way to get the rent. One is settle accounts in advance; the other is hold back afterwards. The former does not have the chance to be squeezed. Only the latter can be hold-up because it could not be forecasted and controlled. But, both sides do their best to reduce this part, and set up protection to the rest. On this occasion, the amount of approvable quasi-rent is so little to consider for both sides, and there is no problem in squeeze or not for them. So, in these relationship specific contracts such as franchise, squeeze is not the normality, while the consultation is the normal allocation. And this is the primary cause of franchise that can develop so fast and exist so long.
ChapterIV,by means of theoretical analysis above all, we make a expansion built on Klein's self-enforcement model. Make a further subdivision on which he calls the reputation capital. Add to the investment on specific channel, maintain of relationship and various of protective measures produced with the development of modern trade. We deduced the logical relationship between implied contract and quasi-rent, then got a proposition that implied contract can reduce the probability of hold-up.
Chapter Ⅴ,Based on the theoretical analysis, we structure the transmission mechanism from flexible contract to quasi-rent. The flexible contract is making flexible and adjustable design on contract terms and protective measures. It changes the specific investment into alternative investment, thereby it can prevent hold-up as well as market risk. In essence, it reduces specific investment degree which can result in "lock in", defuse some of the risk by being squeezed. In this flexible design, both sides'residual net income will increase to realize the efficiency of the contract, and ensure the contract perform smoothly.
ChapterⅥ,is case study. We contact the conclusion with the practical issue in auto4S store contract. Text the practical application of implied contract and flexible contract, connected with the development of franchise in our country by contract sample and information from talking with the interviewer. We find that both the two measures play a very important role in4S franchise. For example, their contracts contain the implied contract, like mutual investment intentionally, buy-out in one space, screening, and amount and location controlled, besides, the administration cost and the taking more consideration to their relationship could all increased the performance cost, and then, reducing the breach motives; For flexible contract, in4S contracts, franchiser allow franchisee having sideline rights with the degree from20%to40%. This sideline rights help franchisee turnover when they have bad management. It avoids hundred-percent lock-in because of hundred-percent stock from franchiser, so it could reduces the hinder which prevents contra flow.
ChapterⅦ,is variable inspection. Investigate the practical application of implied contract and flexible contract by empirical study, to test whether the two measures could prevent hold-up. If it could be, then how goes it with the governance efforts.Using Logistic estimation in Eviews6.o,by450data, we got a conclusion that both implied contract and flexible contract can prevent hold-up occurs, under the horizontal comparison, flexible contract is more effective.
ChapterⅧ, is the conclusion. Beyond that, we find out hold-up caused by opportunistic behavior is different from rent redistribution caused by changing conditions in the market. The latter also deserves a research, but subject to the data we get, this paper could not make a further study on it.
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