基于（r,Q）库存策略的供应链优化及协调问题研究
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摘要
供应链优化指供应链上企业以自身利润最大化为目标，对企业内部各种运作决策进行优化。供应链协调是指以供应链系统整体优化为目标，使供应链上各节点企业服务于一个共同目的，企业间的决策协调一致。供应链优化及协调问题需要考虑系统内的信息流、物流、资金流、企业间的博弈等因素，是较为复杂的供应链管理问题。本论文基于无限期连续盘点的(r,Q)库存策略的基本模型研究供应链优化及协调问题。论文分别考察“零售商管理库存”和“供应商管理库存”两类供应链管理模式，针对三种供应链结构分析不同供应链管理模式下的几类供应链合同对系统的协调效果，并研究在包含多个零售商的竞争性市场环境下的库存和定价决策优化问题。
对于供应商管理库存模式，考察包含两个节点的最基本供应链模型，分别针对“供应商拥有货权”和“零售商拥有货权”两种方式设计两类合同，对不同合同下供应链的详细运作方式与决策过程进行了分析。通过数值实验考察这两类合同下供应链的整体绩效，结果表明供应商管理库存合同对这类供应链有令人满意的协调效果。
将该模型扩展为包含定价决策的供应链，同时考虑零售商的定价与库存决策的优化，以及供应链上下游节点间的协调。通过设计零售商管理库存模式下的收益共享合同与供应商管理库存模式下的依赖于补货策略的收益共享合同实现供应链的协调。通过数值实验考察合同的绩效，结果表明在零售商管理库存模式下，收益共享合同的绩效优于批发价格合同，在供应商管理库存模式下，依赖于补货策略的收益共享合同绩效优于批发价格合同，并且可以完美协调供应链。
再将模型扩展为包含多个下游库存节点的供应链，且节点之间存在市场竞争。通过近似方法将该复杂系统适当简化，并以此为基础研究库存与定价策略同时决策时的优化问题，讨论零售商博弈的均衡点的存在性与唯一性条件，并考察库存与定价策略序贯决策时的优化问题。通过数值实验分析集中控制与分散控制下系统的绩效，结果表明分散控制下同时决策系统的绩效与集中控制下系统绩效相比有较大损失，分散控制下序贯决策系统的绩效最差。
Supply chain optimization focuses on optimizing expected profits of a particular firmin a supply chain through integrating the operational decisions of the firm. Supply chaincoordination focuses on optimizing the overall performance through coordinating the ac-tivities of all the firms so that each firm’s objective is aligned with the system’s objective.To achieve optimization and coordination of a supply chain, the tasks of managing logis-tics, information and money transfer are all important issues. In this paper, the problemof optimization and coordination of a supply chain is studied based on a basic inventorymodel with continuous review (r, Q) policy. Diferent modes of supply chain manage-ment are investigated, including “retailer managed inventory” and “vendor managed in-ventory”. Based on three basic supply chain models, diferent supply chain contracts areused to coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, the optimization of decisions of pricingand inventory management are also considered in these models.
Based on continuous review (r, Q) policy, a system comprising a single vendor and asingle retailer is considered. A vendor-managed-inventory program is used to coordinatethe system. Two business scenarios that are popular in vendor-managed-inventory pro-gram are “vendor with ownership” and “retailer with ownership”. We design two types ofcontract for these two scenarios respectively, and investigate the system performance withthe contracts through numerical studies.
For a supply chain with retailer’s pricing decision, we study how to optimize thepricing and inventory management decisions, as well as how to coordinate the actions ofdiferent firms on the chain. A normal revenue-sharing contract and a policy-dependentvendor-managed-inventory contract are designed.
For a supply chain with multiple competing retailers and involves decisions of pricingand inventory management, we give an efcient approach to characterize the relationshipbetween pricing decisions and inventory management decisions. Based on the approach,solution methods for centralized decisions and Nash equilibria in Cournot competitionwith simultaneous decisions of pricing and inventory management are developed, as wellas the existence and conditions of uniqueness of the equilibrium. Besides, optimal sequen-tial decisions of pricing and inventory management are studied. Numerical computations are provided to evaluate the efciency of the solution methods and system performancesin diferent scenarios.
对于供应商管理库存模式，考察包含两个节点的最基本供应链模型，分别针对“供应商拥有货权”和“零售商拥有货权”两种方式设计两类合同，对不同合同下供应链的详细运作方式与决策过程进行了分析。通过数值实验考察这两类合同下供应链的整体绩效，结果表明供应商管理库存合同对这类供应链有令人满意的协调效果。
将该模型扩展为包含定价决策的供应链，同时考虑零售商的定价与库存决策的优化，以及供应链上下游节点间的协调。通过设计零售商管理库存模式下的收益共享合同与供应商管理库存模式下的依赖于补货策略的收益共享合同实现供应链的协调。通过数值实验考察合同的绩效，结果表明在零售商管理库存模式下，收益共享合同的绩效优于批发价格合同，在供应商管理库存模式下，依赖于补货策略的收益共享合同绩效优于批发价格合同，并且可以完美协调供应链。
再将模型扩展为包含多个下游库存节点的供应链，且节点之间存在市场竞争。通过近似方法将该复杂系统适当简化，并以此为基础研究库存与定价策略同时决策时的优化问题，讨论零售商博弈的均衡点的存在性与唯一性条件，并考察库存与定价策略序贯决策时的优化问题。通过数值实验分析集中控制与分散控制下系统的绩效，结果表明分散控制下同时决策系统的绩效与集中控制下系统绩效相比有较大损失，分散控制下序贯决策系统的绩效最差。
Supply chain optimization focuses on optimizing expected profits of a particular firmin a supply chain through integrating the operational decisions of the firm. Supply chaincoordination focuses on optimizing the overall performance through coordinating the ac-tivities of all the firms so that each firm’s objective is aligned with the system’s objective.To achieve optimization and coordination of a supply chain, the tasks of managing logis-tics, information and money transfer are all important issues. In this paper, the problemof optimization and coordination of a supply chain is studied based on a basic inventorymodel with continuous review (r, Q) policy. Diferent modes of supply chain manage-ment are investigated, including “retailer managed inventory” and “vendor managed in-ventory”. Based on three basic supply chain models, diferent supply chain contracts areused to coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, the optimization of decisions of pricingand inventory management are also considered in these models.
Based on continuous review (r, Q) policy, a system comprising a single vendor and asingle retailer is considered. A vendor-managed-inventory program is used to coordinatethe system. Two business scenarios that are popular in vendor-managed-inventory pro-gram are “vendor with ownership” and “retailer with ownership”. We design two types ofcontract for these two scenarios respectively, and investigate the system performance withthe contracts through numerical studies.
For a supply chain with retailer’s pricing decision, we study how to optimize thepricing and inventory management decisions, as well as how to coordinate the actions ofdiferent firms on the chain. A normal revenue-sharing contract and a policy-dependentvendor-managed-inventory contract are designed.
For a supply chain with multiple competing retailers and involves decisions of pricingand inventory management, we give an efcient approach to characterize the relationshipbetween pricing decisions and inventory management decisions. Based on the approach,solution methods for centralized decisions and Nash equilibria in Cournot competitionwith simultaneous decisions of pricing and inventory management are developed, as wellas the existence and conditions of uniqueness of the equilibrium. Besides, optimal sequen-tial decisions of pricing and inventory management are studied. Numerical computations are provided to evaluate the efciency of the solution methods and system performancesin diferent scenarios.
引文
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