论横向并购规制中的反垄断审查实体标准
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摘要
作为反垄断法规制的三大支柱内容之一,企业集中特别是企业之间的横向并购越来越成为监管机关所关注的焦点。而反垄断审查制度作为企业并购控制的核心制度也随着欧美各国企业并购的发达和对应立法司法实践的发展而逐渐趋向透明和完善。作为该制度的核心内容,反垄断审查的实体标准解决的首要问题就是判断企业并购所造成的垄断效应(反竞争效果),从而决定是否对并购采取进一步的规制措施。
鉴于我国于2006年8月出台的《外国投资者并购境内企业规定》(“《并购新规》”)中也对该实体标准做出规定,但相关的配套适用制度尚属空白。由于实体标准及其具体适用包含了对各种因素的分析,因此本文在开展此论题时,紧紧围绕着我国的并购现实环境和反垄断立法现实,以《并购新规》为基础,确定进行比较分析的范围。本文首先从该实体标准的基础分析入手,分析欧美并购发达国家是如何设定实体标准,从而找出设定该实体标准的立法趋势,同时对《并购新规》的实体标准进行简要点评,指出其缺陷并提出笔者的修改建议。其次本文分析了西方各国在具体适用该标准时的若干要素,鉴于我国反垄断立法现实,特别是并购的现实环境,重点分析了欧美各并购发达国家应用此标准时的分析起点——相关市场和市场集中度,这种分析也呼应了2007年3月商务部刚刚出台了《外国投资者并购境内企业反垄断申报指南》所关注的焦点,即对相关市场和市场集中度的分析。最后本文分析了对该标准具体适用时的两项例外抗辩——效率抗辩和破产企业抗辩,这也是为了呼应《并购新规》所规定的两项反垄断审查豁免条件——重组企业并保障就业和引进先进技术提高企业国际竞争力,为监管机关如何更好地理解并执行这两项反垄断审查豁免条件提供借鉴。
As a basic aspect under the antitrust law system, control of concentration between the enterprises (Merger Control) has been under scrutiny by the antitrust authorities throughout the world. The antitrust review as the core content of Merger Control system has become more transparent and scientific along with the development of Mergers practice in the Europe and U.S.A. When conducting antitrust review, the substantive test is used to appraise the anti competition effect in a merger case so as to decide which measure be taken to control such merger (e.g. forbidding the merger, or other corrective measures such as spin-off).
As the Chinese Merger Control System is far from perfect, this paper intends to analysis the substantive test used in the Europe and U.S.A from the following aspects so as to offer some beneficial implications to the construction of our own Merger Control legal system:
The basic analysis of the substantive test and the relevant legislative trend
The application of the substantive test, such as the determination of relevant market, the calculation of market concentration extent and the recent hot topic of non-coordinative effect (unilateral effect).
The efficiency defense and the failing firm defense for Merger Control
It shall be noted that the above content (excluding unilateral effect) is also regulated in the newly issued Administrative Regulations in Merger of Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors (“New Merger Regulation”). So the paper will, based on the analysis of the above content, point out the disadvantages of the New Merger Regulation and offer a constructive suggestion.
鉴于我国于2006年8月出台的《外国投资者并购境内企业规定》(“《并购新规》”)中也对该实体标准做出规定,但相关的配套适用制度尚属空白。由于实体标准及其具体适用包含了对各种因素的分析,因此本文在开展此论题时,紧紧围绕着我国的并购现实环境和反垄断立法现实,以《并购新规》为基础,确定进行比较分析的范围。本文首先从该实体标准的基础分析入手,分析欧美并购发达国家是如何设定实体标准,从而找出设定该实体标准的立法趋势,同时对《并购新规》的实体标准进行简要点评,指出其缺陷并提出笔者的修改建议。其次本文分析了西方各国在具体适用该标准时的若干要素,鉴于我国反垄断立法现实,特别是并购的现实环境,重点分析了欧美各并购发达国家应用此标准时的分析起点——相关市场和市场集中度,这种分析也呼应了2007年3月商务部刚刚出台了《外国投资者并购境内企业反垄断申报指南》所关注的焦点,即对相关市场和市场集中度的分析。最后本文分析了对该标准具体适用时的两项例外抗辩——效率抗辩和破产企业抗辩,这也是为了呼应《并购新规》所规定的两项反垄断审查豁免条件——重组企业并保障就业和引进先进技术提高企业国际竞争力,为监管机关如何更好地理解并执行这两项反垄断审查豁免条件提供借鉴。
As a basic aspect under the antitrust law system, control of concentration between the enterprises (Merger Control) has been under scrutiny by the antitrust authorities throughout the world. The antitrust review as the core content of Merger Control system has become more transparent and scientific along with the development of Mergers practice in the Europe and U.S.A. When conducting antitrust review, the substantive test is used to appraise the anti competition effect in a merger case so as to decide which measure be taken to control such merger (e.g. forbidding the merger, or other corrective measures such as spin-off).
As the Chinese Merger Control System is far from perfect, this paper intends to analysis the substantive test used in the Europe and U.S.A from the following aspects so as to offer some beneficial implications to the construction of our own Merger Control legal system:
The basic analysis of the substantive test and the relevant legislative trend
The application of the substantive test, such as the determination of relevant market, the calculation of market concentration extent and the recent hot topic of non-coordinative effect (unilateral effect).
The efficiency defense and the failing firm defense for Merger Control
It shall be noted that the above content (excluding unilateral effect) is also regulated in the newly issued Administrative Regulations in Merger of Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors (“New Merger Regulation”). So the paper will, based on the analysis of the above content, point out the disadvantages of the New Merger Regulation and offer a constructive suggestion.
引文
1 D·沃尔夫:《德国竞争法的经验》,王晓晔编《反垄断法与市场经济》,法律出版社 1998 年版,第 258-259页。
2 王家福:《建立反垄断法是市场经济本能的要求》,王晓晔编《反垄断法与市场经济》,法律出版社 1998年版,第 304 页。
7 Thomas O. Barnett, Substantial Lessening of Competition-the Section 7 Standard, 2005 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 295
9 Mauhuit, Somaes: Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2, E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(2), P76, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005
12 参见 COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/T61271.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
14 Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Stephen Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(5), P282, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005. 15 该并购条例的官方名称为:COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)《关于控制企业集中的第139/2004号理事会条例》
16 参见 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), Article 2 Appraisal of a Concentration3 section 2 and 3. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_024/l_02420040129en00010022.pdf, 最后访问日期2004年4月8日
17 Hyiakos Fountoukakos, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control, E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(5), 289. Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005
18 该标准的原文为 2. A concentration which would not significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared compatible with the common market. 3. A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market.” 结合上述第2款和第3款对该标准进行理解,对此我们不难看出,欧盟的立场是,即使并购足以引起支配性地位的产生和加强,如果其没有严重阻碍有效竞争,其也不应被宣布为与共同体不相容。由此明确了对并购进行规制的根本在于并购严重阻碍了有效竞争。
19 Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Stephen Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(5), P287-288, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005.
20 :http:// europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_067_en.pdf, 最后访问日期2004 年 4 月 10 日
21 该指南的官方名称为:Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings.《关于控制企业并购的理事会条例中横向并购的评估指南》,文中简称为“2004 年并购指南”。
22单边效应是指企业无需通过与其它企业的协同行为(包括明示和默示的行为)仅通过并购就能造成对市场的反竞争效果。
23 COMMISSION NOTICE on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, Published in the Official Journal: OJ C 372 on 9/12/1997, at Section II Para 7.
24 Id, at Para 8.
25 官方名称为:Horizontal Merger Guidelines,由美国司法部不时修订。自 1992 年以来由美国司法部和美国联邦贸易委员会共同发布。
26 COMMISSION NOTICE on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, Published in the Official Journal: OJ C 372 on 9/12/1997, at Para 17.
29 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1.5 Concentration and Market Shares, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日
30 Mauhuit, Somaes: Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2, E.C.L.R.2005, P78. Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005
34 Sven Volcker: Mind the Gap:Unilateral Effects Analysisi Arrives in EC Merger Control, E.C.L.R. 2004, 25(7), P 403, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2004
35 刘和平:“欧美并购控制法实体标准比较研究”,《法律科学》2005 年第 1 期,第 110-111 页
37 Williamson, Oliver E., Economics as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs. American Ecnomic Review,Vol.18, 1968, P18-42.
38 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Merger Guidelines(1968), § 10, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
39 Stockum, Steve, the Efficiencies Defense for Horizontal Mergers: What is the Government’s Standard? Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.61, 1993, P833.
40 Valentine, Debra A., Health Care Mergers: Will We Get Efficiencies Claims Right? St. Louis University School of Law, 1997.
41 1997 Mergers Guidelines, § 4, para 1. http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10日。
42 Konstanze Kinne: The “Efficiency Defense” in the U.S.Amrican Merger Policy, HWWA-Diskussionspapier 67, 1998, P19
43 See U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.Supp.1251, 1289 (1989).
44 See U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.Supp.1251,1288-1289 (1989)
45 See U.S. v. Long Islang Jewish Medical Center,938 F.Supp.121,148 (1997)
46 Commission Decision 94/208/EC,Mannesmann/Valourec/Ilva,1994 O.J. (L 102) 15, at paras 39-41.
47 Nicholas Levy: Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control, Competition Policy International Vol.1 No.1, 2005, P119
48 Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentration Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C31) at para 77.
49 Id,at para 78
50 如下所述,由于美国是判例法传统的国家,因此破产企业抗辩原则是法院通过一系列判例建立和完善的。1950 年在成文法中首次引入破产抗辩原则就是基于 1930 年美国最高法院首个认可破产抗辩原则的案例 International Shoe Co. v. FTC.
51 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Failing Firm Defense S 5.0, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
52 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Failing Firm Defense S 5.1, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
54 R.A. Posner, Antitrust: cases, economic notes and other materials, West Publishing 1981 2nd edn, P472.
56 关于这方面的案例,请参见 Case IV/M.774 Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/Nom [1997] O.J. L247/1, Case IV/M. 1221 Rewe/Meinl [1999] O.J. L274/1.
58 Alessandro Fedele, MassimoTognoni, Failing Firm Defense with Entry Deterrence, at soc.uoc.gr, 2005, P3.
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2 王家福:《建立反垄断法是市场经济本能的要求》,王晓晔编《反垄断法与市场经济》,法律出版社 1998年版,第 304 页。
7 Thomas O. Barnett, Substantial Lessening of Competition-the Section 7 Standard, 2005 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 295
9 Mauhuit, Somaes: Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2, E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(2), P76, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005
12 参见 COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/T61271.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
14 Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Stephen Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(5), P282, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005. 15 该并购条例的官方名称为:COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)《关于控制企业集中的第139/2004号理事会条例》
16 参见 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), Article 2 Appraisal of a Concentration3 section 2 and 3. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_024/l_02420040129en00010022.pdf, 最后访问日期2004年4月8日
17 Hyiakos Fountoukakos, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control, E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(5), 289. Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005
18 该标准的原文为 2. A concentration which would not significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared compatible with the common market. 3. A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market.” 结合上述第2款和第3款对该标准进行理解,对此我们不难看出,欧盟的立场是,即使并购足以引起支配性地位的产生和加强,如果其没有严重阻碍有效竞争,其也不应被宣布为与共同体不相容。由此明确了对并购进行规制的根本在于并购严重阻碍了有效竞争。
19 Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Stephen Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(5), P287-288, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005.
20 :http:// europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_067_en.pdf, 最后访问日期2004 年 4 月 10 日
21 该指南的官方名称为:Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings.《关于控制企业并购的理事会条例中横向并购的评估指南》,文中简称为“2004 年并购指南”。
22单边效应是指企业无需通过与其它企业的协同行为(包括明示和默示的行为)仅通过并购就能造成对市场的反竞争效果。
23 COMMISSION NOTICE on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, Published in the Official Journal: OJ C 372 on 9/12/1997, at Section II Para 7.
24 Id, at Para 8.
25 官方名称为:Horizontal Merger Guidelines,由美国司法部不时修订。自 1992 年以来由美国司法部和美国联邦贸易委员会共同发布。
26 COMMISSION NOTICE on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, Published in the Official Journal: OJ C 372 on 9/12/1997, at Para 17.
29 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1.5 Concentration and Market Shares, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日
30 Mauhuit, Somaes: Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2, E.C.L.R.2005, P78. Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2005
34 Sven Volcker: Mind the Gap:Unilateral Effects Analysisi Arrives in EC Merger Control, E.C.L.R. 2004, 25(7), P 403, Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 2004
35 刘和平:“欧美并购控制法实体标准比较研究”,《法律科学》2005 年第 1 期,第 110-111 页
37 Williamson, Oliver E., Economics as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs. American Ecnomic Review,Vol.18, 1968, P18-42.
38 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Merger Guidelines(1968), § 10, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
39 Stockum, Steve, the Efficiencies Defense for Horizontal Mergers: What is the Government’s Standard? Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.61, 1993, P833.
40 Valentine, Debra A., Health Care Mergers: Will We Get Efficiencies Claims Right? St. Louis University School of Law, 1997.
41 1997 Mergers Guidelines, § 4, para 1. http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10日。
42 Konstanze Kinne: The “Efficiency Defense” in the U.S.Amrican Merger Policy, HWWA-Diskussionspapier 67, 1998, P19
43 See U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.Supp.1251, 1289 (1989).
44 See U.S. v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.Supp.1251,1288-1289 (1989)
45 See U.S. v. Long Islang Jewish Medical Center,938 F.Supp.121,148 (1997)
46 Commission Decision 94/208/EC,Mannesmann/Valourec/Ilva,1994 O.J. (L 102) 15, at paras 39-41.
47 Nicholas Levy: Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control, Competition Policy International Vol.1 No.1, 2005, P119
48 Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentration Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C31) at para 77.
49 Id,at para 78
50 如下所述,由于美国是判例法传统的国家,因此破产企业抗辩原则是法院通过一系列判例建立和完善的。1950 年在成文法中首次引入破产抗辩原则就是基于 1930 年美国最高法院首个认可破产抗辩原则的案例 International Shoe Co. v. FTC.
51 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Failing Firm Defense S 5.0, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
52 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Failing Firm Defense S 5.1, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm, 最后访问日期 2007 年 4 月 10 日。
54 R.A. Posner, Antitrust: cases, economic notes and other materials, West Publishing 1981 2nd edn, P472.
56 关于这方面的案例,请参见 Case IV/M.774 Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/Nom [1997] O.J. L247/1, Case IV/M. 1221 Rewe/Meinl [1999] O.J. L274/1.
58 Alessandro Fedele, MassimoTognoni, Failing Firm Defense with Entry Deterrence, at soc.uoc.gr, 2005, P3.
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