经理股票期权制度研究
摘要
经理股票期权被认为是解决委托代理问题的有效激励措施。经理股票期权是指经营者享有在未来的一定期限内,以预先确定的某一价格购买一定数量本企业股票的权利。经理股票期权的基本理论主要包括经理股票期权的概念、特征、理论基础、法律性质和制度价值。其特征主要表现为有价性、有期性、人身性。经理股票期权的理论基础主要是人力资本理论和委托代理理论。对于经理股票期权的法律性质,应该联系经理股票期权的实际操作过程分阶段进行分析,从而得出经理股票期权在不同阶段具有不同的法律性质的结论。经理股票期权的制度价值主要体现在以下四个方面:把公司的长期薪酬制度与短期薪酬制度有机结合起来,完善了公司的薪酬制度;有利于缓解委托代理中产生的道德风险,使公司这种组织形式更加充满生机活力;有利于选择、吸引和稳定优秀人才;体现了经济公平的法律理念。我国在实行经理股票期权的过程中形成了五种模式,分别是上海模式、北京模式、武汉模式、济南模式和沈阳模式,这五种模式都结合了当地企业的情况,各有特色,但从本质上来看都不是真正意义上的经理股票期权,根本原因是我国推行经理股票期权还存在一些问题,如股票来源的障碍、公司内部法人治理结构欠规范、税收制度不健全、劳动法规不完善、未形成经理人市场、证券市场有效性不足等,只有克服上述缺陷,我国的经理股票期权制度才能不断完善,为此应采取以下措施:实行折衷授权资本制;完善公司治理结构;健全税收制度;完善劳动法规;建立和发展职业经理市场;建立健康成熟的证券市场;提供司法救济。
Executive stock option is considered as an effective incentive measure solving the principal-agent problem. ESO is that the operators can buy a certain number of stocks at pre-set price in the future. Basic theories of ESO include it's concept, characteristic, the theoretical basis, the legal nature and the system value. It is mainly characterized as payment attribute, period attribute and personal attribute. Theoretical foundation of ESO are human capital theory and principal-agent theory. As for the legal nature of ESO, I believe that we should analyze ESO contacted the actual operational process to obtain a conclusion that ESO in the different stages is of the different legal nature. System value of ESO are mainly embodied in the following four aspects: by combining the company's short-term pay system with long-term pay system organically, improve the company's pay system; help alleviate the moral hazard of agency, and strengthen vigor and vitality of company; help choose, attract and stabilize outstanding talent; be able to reflect the legal concepts of economic fair. Our country formed the five models in the course of implementing ESO, such as Shanghai model, Beijing model, Wuhan model, Jinan model and Shenyang model, the five models combined the conditions of local enterprises, each with its own characteristics, but it is not true ESO, the fundamental reason is that there are still some problems implementing ESO, such as the obstacles of stock sources, the irregular corporate government structure, the imperfect tax system, and the imperfect labor regulations, the unformed manager market, and ineffective securities market, only by overcoming these shortcomings, ESO system of China can be improved continuously. So we should take the following measures: implement eclectic authorized capital; improve the corporate governance structure; improve the tax system; improve labor regulations; establish and develop professional managers' market; establish a healthy, mature securities market; provide judicial relief. .
Executive stock option is considered as an effective incentive measure solving the principal-agent problem. ESO is that the operators can buy a certain number of stocks at pre-set price in the future. Basic theories of ESO include it's concept, characteristic, the theoretical basis, the legal nature and the system value. It is mainly characterized as payment attribute, period attribute and personal attribute. Theoretical foundation of ESO are human capital theory and principal-agent theory. As for the legal nature of ESO, I believe that we should analyze ESO contacted the actual operational process to obtain a conclusion that ESO in the different stages is of the different legal nature. System value of ESO are mainly embodied in the following four aspects: by combining the company's short-term pay system with long-term pay system organically, improve the company's pay system; help alleviate the moral hazard of agency, and strengthen vigor and vitality of company; help choose, attract and stabilize outstanding talent; be able to reflect the legal concepts of economic fair. Our country formed the five models in the course of implementing ESO, such as Shanghai model, Beijing model, Wuhan model, Jinan model and Shenyang model, the five models combined the conditions of local enterprises, each with its own characteristics, but it is not true ESO, the fundamental reason is that there are still some problems implementing ESO, such as the obstacles of stock sources, the irregular corporate government structure, the imperfect tax system, and the imperfect labor regulations, the unformed manager market, and ineffective securities market, only by overcoming these shortcomings, ESO system of China can be improved continuously. So we should take the following measures: implement eclectic authorized capital; improve the corporate governance structure; improve the tax system; improve labor regulations; establish and develop professional managers' market; establish a healthy, mature securities market; provide judicial relief. .
引文
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[2]郑若山.公司制的异化.北京:北京大学出版社,2003,67-69
[3]Robert W Harmilton.The Law of Corporation.Fourth Edition.ST Paul Minneso- ta:West Publishing Co,1999,25-30
[4]陈文.股权激励与公司治理法律实务.北京:法律出版社,2005,21-27
[5]卞耀武.当代外国公司法.北京:法律出版社,1996,78-93
[6]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护.北京:法律出版社,1997,97-104
[7]范健,邵建东,戴奎生.中德商法研究.北京:法律出版社,1999,136-140
[8]施东晖.经理期权计划在美国公司的兴起和影响.世界经济,2000,40(7):63-67
[9]古小东.经理股票期权与职工持股计划之比较——兼论其法律问题与对策.江西社会科学,2003,37(8):157-159
[10]Shane A Johson,Yisong S Tian.The value and incentive effects of non- traditional executive stock option plans.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,50(57):31-34
[11]Theodore W Schultz.Investment in Human Capital.New York:The Free Press, 1977,354-360
[12]高闯.经理股票期权制度分析.北京:经济管理出版社,2003,76-80
[13]丁栋虹.企业家成长制度论.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2000,112-113
[14]Williamson.Antitrust Economics:Mergers,Contracting,and Strategic Beha- vior.New York:Basil Blackwell,1987,376-380
[15]张洋.企业经营者股票期权激励制度的理论基础分析.辽宁大学学报,2002, 30(2):95-97
[16]柯琼,周仁俊.人力资本、股票期权与企业剩余索取权探析.财会月刊,2003, 36(6):24-25
[17]中国企业家协会.经营者收入分配制度.北京:企业管理出版社,2005,245-250
[18]唐振福.股票期权与所有者权益保障.兰州大学学报,2003,31(1):78-81
[19]David Brookfield,Philip Ormrod.Executive stock options volatility,managerial decisions and agency costs.Journal Multinational Financial Management,2000,60(10):275-295
[20]梁慧星.民法总论.北京:法律出版社,2001,76-78
[21]魏振瀛.民法.北京:高等教育出版社,2000,38-40
[22]颜延,张文贤.我国推行股票期权制度的法律问题.中国法学,2001,54(3): 28-38
[23]郑立,王作堂.民法学.北京:北京大学出版社,1997,154-160
[24]郝旭光.我国上市公司实行经理层股票期权的障碍及对策.管理现代化,2003,65(1):31-35
[25]Terry Baker,Denton Collins,Austin Reitenga.Stock option compensation and earnings management incentives.Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, 2000,64(65):37-38
[26]林自新.国有企业高管人员激励机制研究.福建财会管理干部学院学报,2004,34(1):9-11
[27]吴叔平,虞俊健.股权激励——企业长期激励制度研究与实践.上海:上海 远东出版社,2000,123-127
[28]Shane A Johson,Yisong S Tian.Indexed executive stock option.Journal of Financial Economics,2004,70(67):78-80
[29]李昌麒.经济法学.北京:中国政法大学出版社,1997,132-140
[30]罗韵轩,彭志军.对我国股票期权激励机制的模式探讨.南方经济,2004,54(3):49-51
[31]蔡辉,葛继红.我国上市公司虚拟股票期权激励方案研究.现代管理科学, 2004,36(4):102-103
[32]杨卫东.北京市国有企业经营者实施期股激励试点办法及其评价.广东审计, 2003,40(8):17-20
[33]叶永刚,黄河.对武汉市股票期权激励机制的进一步思考.国有资产管理, 2000,29(9):78-80
[34]Hall B,Murphy K.Stock option for undiversified executives.Journal of Accoun- ting and Economics,2002,50(33):33-42
[35]朱瑰君.我国股票期权实施中的法律问题及对策.政治与法律,2003,76(4): 101-106
[36]Jeffrey L Coles,Michael G Hertzel,Swaminathan L Kalpathy.Earnings manage- ment around employee stock option reissues.Journal of Accounting & Econo- mics,2006,49(67):78-80
[37]倪建林.公司治理结构:法律与实践.北京:法律出版社,2001,160-165
[38]刘园,李志群.股票期权制度分析.北京:对外经济贸易大学出版社,2002, 103-110
[39]罗振华.上市公司实施经理股票期权的理论与实践分析.浙江统计,2001,30(6):9-11
[40]晚春东,岳璞.经理股票期权计划实施的利弊分析.经济师,2002,35(9):43-45
[41]孙敏.股票期权:国企分配制度改革的探索.中国改革,2001,36(3):43-44
[42]范湘凌,何晓平.中国股票期权制度的法律设计.学术论坛,2001,37(6):61-64
[43]胡静林.人力资本提升与认股期权激励制度.劳动经济,2001,27(1):24-25
[44]许香兰.对我国上市公司实行股票期权相关法律问题的思考.山西财政税务专科学校学报,2002,32(4):13-15
[45]余颖,唐京明,陈琦伟.我国如何实施股票期权制.经济研究参考,2001,42(15):31-32
[46]史际春.企业公司法.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001,196-197
[47]龙海红,张建华.对股票期权的思考——股票期权在我国企业的适用性研究.中央财经大学学报,2003,60(10):37-40
[48]Stefan Winter. Tax and accounting implications of sequential stock option grants.Research Report,2001,67(65):78-81
[49]Alan R Palmiter.Corporations Examples and Explanations.Fourth Edition.New York:Aspen Publishers,2003,345-349
[50]段厚省.略论股东代表诉讼.政治与法律,2000,51(4):33-37
[2]郑若山.公司制的异化.北京:北京大学出版社,2003,67-69
[3]Robert W Harmilton.The Law of Corporation.Fourth Edition.ST Paul Minneso- ta:West Publishing Co,1999,25-30
[4]陈文.股权激励与公司治理法律实务.北京:法律出版社,2005,21-27
[5]卞耀武.当代外国公司法.北京:法律出版社,1996,78-93
[6]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护.北京:法律出版社,1997,97-104
[7]范健,邵建东,戴奎生.中德商法研究.北京:法律出版社,1999,136-140
[8]施东晖.经理期权计划在美国公司的兴起和影响.世界经济,2000,40(7):63-67
[9]古小东.经理股票期权与职工持股计划之比较——兼论其法律问题与对策.江西社会科学,2003,37(8):157-159
[10]Shane A Johson,Yisong S Tian.The value and incentive effects of non- traditional executive stock option plans.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,50(57):31-34
[11]Theodore W Schultz.Investment in Human Capital.New York:The Free Press, 1977,354-360
[12]高闯.经理股票期权制度分析.北京:经济管理出版社,2003,76-80
[13]丁栋虹.企业家成长制度论.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2000,112-113
[14]Williamson.Antitrust Economics:Mergers,Contracting,and Strategic Beha- vior.New York:Basil Blackwell,1987,376-380
[15]张洋.企业经营者股票期权激励制度的理论基础分析.辽宁大学学报,2002, 30(2):95-97
[16]柯琼,周仁俊.人力资本、股票期权与企业剩余索取权探析.财会月刊,2003, 36(6):24-25
[17]中国企业家协会.经营者收入分配制度.北京:企业管理出版社,2005,245-250
[18]唐振福.股票期权与所有者权益保障.兰州大学学报,2003,31(1):78-81
[19]David Brookfield,Philip Ormrod.Executive stock options volatility,managerial decisions and agency costs.Journal Multinational Financial Management,2000,60(10):275-295
[20]梁慧星.民法总论.北京:法律出版社,2001,76-78
[21]魏振瀛.民法.北京:高等教育出版社,2000,38-40
[22]颜延,张文贤.我国推行股票期权制度的法律问题.中国法学,2001,54(3): 28-38
[23]郑立,王作堂.民法学.北京:北京大学出版社,1997,154-160
[24]郝旭光.我国上市公司实行经理层股票期权的障碍及对策.管理现代化,2003,65(1):31-35
[25]Terry Baker,Denton Collins,Austin Reitenga.Stock option compensation and earnings management incentives.Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, 2000,64(65):37-38
[26]林自新.国有企业高管人员激励机制研究.福建财会管理干部学院学报,2004,34(1):9-11
[27]吴叔平,虞俊健.股权激励——企业长期激励制度研究与实践.上海:上海 远东出版社,2000,123-127
[28]Shane A Johson,Yisong S Tian.Indexed executive stock option.Journal of Financial Economics,2004,70(67):78-80
[29]李昌麒.经济法学.北京:中国政法大学出版社,1997,132-140
[30]罗韵轩,彭志军.对我国股票期权激励机制的模式探讨.南方经济,2004,54(3):49-51
[31]蔡辉,葛继红.我国上市公司虚拟股票期权激励方案研究.现代管理科学, 2004,36(4):102-103
[32]杨卫东.北京市国有企业经营者实施期股激励试点办法及其评价.广东审计, 2003,40(8):17-20
[33]叶永刚,黄河.对武汉市股票期权激励机制的进一步思考.国有资产管理, 2000,29(9):78-80
[34]Hall B,Murphy K.Stock option for undiversified executives.Journal of Accoun- ting and Economics,2002,50(33):33-42
[35]朱瑰君.我国股票期权实施中的法律问题及对策.政治与法律,2003,76(4): 101-106
[36]Jeffrey L Coles,Michael G Hertzel,Swaminathan L Kalpathy.Earnings manage- ment around employee stock option reissues.Journal of Accounting & Econo- mics,2006,49(67):78-80
[37]倪建林.公司治理结构:法律与实践.北京:法律出版社,2001,160-165
[38]刘园,李志群.股票期权制度分析.北京:对外经济贸易大学出版社,2002, 103-110
[39]罗振华.上市公司实施经理股票期权的理论与实践分析.浙江统计,2001,30(6):9-11
[40]晚春东,岳璞.经理股票期权计划实施的利弊分析.经济师,2002,35(9):43-45
[41]孙敏.股票期权:国企分配制度改革的探索.中国改革,2001,36(3):43-44
[42]范湘凌,何晓平.中国股票期权制度的法律设计.学术论坛,2001,37(6):61-64
[43]胡静林.人力资本提升与认股期权激励制度.劳动经济,2001,27(1):24-25
[44]许香兰.对我国上市公司实行股票期权相关法律问题的思考.山西财政税务专科学校学报,2002,32(4):13-15
[45]余颖,唐京明,陈琦伟.我国如何实施股票期权制.经济研究参考,2001,42(15):31-32
[46]史际春.企业公司法.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001,196-197
[47]龙海红,张建华.对股票期权的思考——股票期权在我国企业的适用性研究.中央财经大学学报,2003,60(10):37-40
[48]Stefan Winter. Tax and accounting implications of sequential stock option grants.Research Report,2001,67(65):78-81
[49]Alan R Palmiter.Corporations Examples and Explanations.Fourth Edition.New York:Aspen Publishers,2003,345-349
[50]段厚省.略论股东代表诉讼.政治与法律,2000,51(4):33-37