我国政府信用的经济学思考
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摘要
信用是人类社会交往的一种道德规范,是现代文明的重要标志。从广义的角度讲,信用是指人们在社会经济生活中能够履行契约义务而取得的信任。信用的主体是多种多样的,包括政府信用、企业信用、团体信用以及个人信用,这些主体之间的信用关系的总和构成了社会信用体系,其中政府信用处于社会信用体系的核心地位。政府信用,简言之,即政府对公众在委托契约中赋予的期待和信任的责任感及其回应。其核心就是公众对政府的信任和政府对公众的信用。政府信用具有信用主体的特殊性、信用双方的不对称性、信用影响的社会性和扩散性、信用的刚性等特征,政府信用的重要性在于:政府信用是社会主义市场经济体制建立和完善的保证,是中国加入WTO、遵守WTO规则的必然要求,是一种重要的行政资源,是建立完善社会信用体系的必要前提和价值导向,也是政治文明建设和依法治国的内在要求。但是现阶段在我国转型时期,政府信用出现了不少问题值得深思,表现在政府行使职权时“三位”(越位、缺位、错位)现象严重、政策缺乏稳定性与连续性、政府行为缺乏公开性,透明度不高、政府公务员存在滥用职权的现象,信用意识不高、维护市场秩序方面缺乏公平公正,地方保护主义严重等,究其原因,从世界各国的普遍性看,有组织制度的低层次和低效率、信息非对称、博弈论中的成本收益取舍等因素,从我国现阶段的特殊性国情看,有政府信用范围的“超边”与政府信用能力的“有限”、政府自利性的扩大化、干部考核选任机制的不合理与政府官员行为的偏差、政府信用责任机制的缺失与政府行为“自控力”的不足、社会信用管理制度缺失与信用环境运营能力不足等与因素,针对这些导致政府信用缺失的原因,主要从内环境和外环境制度创新入手,加强和提升我国的政府信用。
本文以马克思理论为指导,按照“提出问题、分析问题、解决问题”的思路来布局全文。本文的创新之处在于:有别于以往多数重视信用道德教化或者从政治学、行政学、法学角度探讨行政规范政府行为、立法自律政府行为,而是采用一般性与特殊性相结合的分析方法,运用制度经济学的信息不对称理论、博弈理论深刻地剖析了当前我国政府信用缺失的制度成因,比较系统完善地提出了当前我国政府信用建设的思路和途径,具有一定的现实性和可操作性。
Credibility is a kind of ethic rule in our society and is a very important symbol of modern civilization. In the board teams, credibility means the trust to implement agreements and duties in our social and economic life. Thus, there are a lot of bearers for the credibility, including government credibility, enterprise credibility, organization credibility and individual credibility, etc. The relation among all these bearers of credibility forms the social credit system. Among them, the credit of government is taking the core position and it is the base, playing a key role. Government credit, in short, refers to responsibility & response to hope from people in entitlement agreement. Its core is public confidence in the government and the governments of the public credit. Government credibility has the following characteristics: particularity, of credit bearer, asymmetry of bearers, big social impact, and rigidity of credit. Therefore the importance of government credibility is: it's the guarantee for establish and improve the socialist market mechanism and the requirement of entering WTO and obeying WTO rule and important administrative resource, it's the necessity to build and develop social credit and also internal requirement of political culture construction. However, at the present stage of transition, there happens some negative phenomena that when the government plat its functions, over going of position, lack of position and standing at wrong position;the government makes and implements policy in an unregulated way;lack of opening to public in government behavior, public servant abusing authority, can not take justice in maintaining market system and serious regional protectionism. From the common angle of all countries in the world, the reasons are as follows: origination system inefficiency, the lack of match in information between government and the public and cost-benefit choosing in game theory. From uniqueness of the present situation in our country, the reasons are as follows: the overrunning of government's credit capability, the extension of government's own benefit, cadre selecting system unfairness & departure in government officer's action, lack of government credit responsibility system and self-controlling in government, social credit managing system imperfection etc. Against all these happening of the lack of government creditability,
this paper mainly focuses on system creation in internal environment and external environment so as to improve government credibility.Under the guidance of Marxist theory, the thesis is organized according to the principle of "raising the problem, analyzing the problems and solving the problem" The innovation of this paper is that deferring from thinking from the angle of science of politics, public administration, law, it combines general analytical methods with particular analytical method, using information economy theory and game theory to deeply find out the root resulting in government credit problem, it puts the thoughts and approached of institution innovation about constructing government credit comparative perfectly, and these institution innovation is realistic and operational to some extent.
本文以马克思理论为指导,按照“提出问题、分析问题、解决问题”的思路来布局全文。本文的创新之处在于:有别于以往多数重视信用道德教化或者从政治学、行政学、法学角度探讨行政规范政府行为、立法自律政府行为,而是采用一般性与特殊性相结合的分析方法,运用制度经济学的信息不对称理论、博弈理论深刻地剖析了当前我国政府信用缺失的制度成因,比较系统完善地提出了当前我国政府信用建设的思路和途径,具有一定的现实性和可操作性。
Credibility is a kind of ethic rule in our society and is a very important symbol of modern civilization. In the board teams, credibility means the trust to implement agreements and duties in our social and economic life. Thus, there are a lot of bearers for the credibility, including government credibility, enterprise credibility, organization credibility and individual credibility, etc. The relation among all these bearers of credibility forms the social credit system. Among them, the credit of government is taking the core position and it is the base, playing a key role. Government credit, in short, refers to responsibility & response to hope from people in entitlement agreement. Its core is public confidence in the government and the governments of the public credit. Government credibility has the following characteristics: particularity, of credit bearer, asymmetry of bearers, big social impact, and rigidity of credit. Therefore the importance of government credibility is: it's the guarantee for establish and improve the socialist market mechanism and the requirement of entering WTO and obeying WTO rule and important administrative resource, it's the necessity to build and develop social credit and also internal requirement of political culture construction. However, at the present stage of transition, there happens some negative phenomena that when the government plat its functions, over going of position, lack of position and standing at wrong position;the government makes and implements policy in an unregulated way;lack of opening to public in government behavior, public servant abusing authority, can not take justice in maintaining market system and serious regional protectionism. From the common angle of all countries in the world, the reasons are as follows: origination system inefficiency, the lack of match in information between government and the public and cost-benefit choosing in game theory. From uniqueness of the present situation in our country, the reasons are as follows: the overrunning of government's credit capability, the extension of government's own benefit, cadre selecting system unfairness & departure in government officer's action, lack of government credit responsibility system and self-controlling in government, social credit managing system imperfection etc. Against all these happening of the lack of government creditability,
this paper mainly focuses on system creation in internal environment and external environment so as to improve government credibility.Under the guidance of Marxist theory, the thesis is organized according to the principle of "raising the problem, analyzing the problems and solving the problem" The innovation of this paper is that deferring from thinking from the angle of science of politics, public administration, law, it combines general analytical methods with particular analytical method, using information economy theory and game theory to deeply find out the root resulting in government credit problem, it puts the thoughts and approached of institution innovation about constructing government credit comparative perfectly, and these institution innovation is realistic and operational to some extent.
引文
[1] 张成福,孟庆存.重建政府与公民的信念关系—西方国家的经验.国家行政学院学报2003,3:4
[2] 孙智英.信用问题的经济学分析.北京:中国城市出版社,2002
[3] 梅因 古代法[M].北京:商务印书馆,1984:47～48
[4] 张康之,王喜明.公共性、公共物品和自利性的概念辨析.行政论坛,2003,4:9～10
[5] 列宁选集(第2卷).北京:人民出版社,1960:600～601
[6] 资本论.第三卷.北京:人民出版社,1975:452～453
[7] 资本论.第一卷.北京:人民出版社,1975:321～323
[8] 马占芳 符晓波.现代信用渐简论.北京:中国社会科学出版社,第94页,2004
[9] 华增风,王品正.南京西审计学院学报,2004,4
[10] [德国]康芒斯.制度经济学(上册).北京:商务印书馆,1962:87～88
[11] [美]诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:三联书店,1994:3～5,74～83,225～226
[12] 托马斯·萨斯曼.电子政府与人民的知情权的辩证分析[J].当今要论,2001,(11):38.
[13] 李春成.信息不对称下政治代理人的问题行为分析[J].学术界,2000,(3):31～34
[14] 马克思恩格斯全集.第1卷.[M]:北京:人民出版社,1956:82
[15] 马克思恩格斯全集.第4卷.[M]:北京:人民出版社,1995:250
[16] [美]诺思.制度、制度变革与经济绩效[M.]上海:三联书店/上海人民出版社,1994:3
[17] Andrew Kohut. Keynote Address. Annual Conference of the National Association of Schoolsof Public Affairs and Administration. Raleigh NC: October 10, 1998
[18] [美]丹尼斯·C·缪勒.公共选择理论.[M].杨春学译.北京:中国社会科学出版,1999
[19] 道格拉斯·诺斯,罗伯特·托马斯.西方世界的兴起.北京:华夏出版社,1999:182
[20] 杨善华,苏红.“代理型政权经营者”到“谋利型政权经营者”.社会学研究,2002,(1)
[21] 卢现祥.西方制度经济学[M],北京:中国发展出版社,2000
[22] Marbra A. Misztal. Trust in Modern Society. Black Publisher Inc, 1996
[23] [美]特里·L·库珀.张秀琴译.行政伦理学—实现行政责任的途径.第四版.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:62
[24] 杨凤春.审视政府信誉.南风窗.2001,12
[25] 褚松燕.我国政府信息公开的现状分析与思考.新视野,2003,3:33
[26] Marc. J. Hetherington, Suzanne Globetti. Political Trust and Racial Policy Preference. American Journal of Political Science. Vol.46, No.2, Apr, 2002
[27] Dennis. F. Thompson. Paradoxes of Government Ethics. Public Administration Review. Vol. 52, No.3, 1992
[28] 余红.诚信管理制度构想.学术月刊.2002,8
[29] 吴晶妹.现代信用学.北京:中国金融出版社,2002:47
[30] Gore. Al. The Best Kept Secrets In Government. Washington D. C.: USGPO, 1996
[31] 马克思,恩格斯.资本论.北京:人民出版社,1975
[32] 马克思,恩格斯.中共中央马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林著作编译局编译.马克思恩 格斯选集(第二卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,1973
[33] Kathyn. G. Denhardt. The Ethics of Public Service. Westport Connecticut. Greenood Press Inc., 1998
[34] 陈征,李建平,郭铁民.政治经济学.北京:经济科学出版社,2001
[35] 亚当·斯密.国富论.北京:商务印书馆,1974
[36] 何自力.比较制度经济学.天津:南开大学出版社,2003
[37] Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano. The Value of Governmental Credit. Harvard University, Oct, 1993.
[38] 郭小聪.政府经济学.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003
[39] Stephen Knack. Social Capital and the Quality of Government. American. Journal of Political Science Vol. 46, No.4, Oct, 2002
[40] W. B. Allen, Gordon Lloyd. The Essential Antifederalist. Rowman &Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002:
[41] 龚勇.信用中国.北京:中国方正出版社,2002
[42] Gabriel Badescu and Eric M. Uslaner. Social Capital and the Transitition to Democracy Routledge. London: Taylor& Francis Group, 2003
[43] A. Gollin. Trust or Consequences. Build Trust Today or Lost Your Market Tomorrow. New York: Blackwell Book Services, 2004
[44] 张德信,薄贵利,李军鹏.中国政府改革的方向.北京:人民出版社,2003
[45] 孙荣,许洁.政府经济学.上海;复旦大学出版社,2001
[46] 孔祥利.焦点问题中的政府经济行为.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003
[47] 张维迎.产权、政府与信誉.北京:三联书店,2001
[48] Claudine Day. Spirals of Trust. American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46, No.4, Oct, 2002
[49] James Coleman. Foundation of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990
[50] (德)柯武刚,史曼飞.制度经济学—社会秩序与公共政策.韩朝华译.北京:商务印书馆,2000
[51] 方福前.公共选择理论—政治的经济学.北京:中国人民大学出版,2000
[52] 张俊峰.政府信用的分析及构建.兰州学刊,2005,1
[53] 句华.政治学视野中的政府信用.国家行政学院学报,2005,2
[54] 萨缪尔森.经济学.16版.北京:机械工业出版社,1998
[55] 郑利平.腐败的经济学分析.北京:中共中央党校出版社,2000
[56] George Frederickson. Public Ethics and the New Manageralism. Public Administration and Management, Vol. 4, No.2, 1999
[57] Bart Nootebroom. Trust, Forms, Foundation, Failures and Fig Cheltenham, UK;Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002:
[2] 孙智英.信用问题的经济学分析.北京:中国城市出版社,2002
[3] 梅因 古代法[M].北京:商务印书馆,1984:47～48
[4] 张康之,王喜明.公共性、公共物品和自利性的概念辨析.行政论坛,2003,4:9～10
[5] 列宁选集(第2卷).北京:人民出版社,1960:600～601
[6] 资本论.第三卷.北京:人民出版社,1975:452～453
[7] 资本论.第一卷.北京:人民出版社,1975:321～323
[8] 马占芳 符晓波.现代信用渐简论.北京:中国社会科学出版社,第94页,2004
[9] 华增风,王品正.南京西审计学院学报,2004,4
[10] [德国]康芒斯.制度经济学(上册).北京:商务印书馆,1962:87～88
[11] [美]诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:三联书店,1994:3～5,74～83,225～226
[12] 托马斯·萨斯曼.电子政府与人民的知情权的辩证分析[J].当今要论,2001,(11):38.
[13] 李春成.信息不对称下政治代理人的问题行为分析[J].学术界,2000,(3):31～34
[14] 马克思恩格斯全集.第1卷.[M]:北京:人民出版社,1956:82
[15] 马克思恩格斯全集.第4卷.[M]:北京:人民出版社,1995:250
[16] [美]诺思.制度、制度变革与经济绩效[M.]上海:三联书店/上海人民出版社,1994:3
[17] Andrew Kohut. Keynote Address. Annual Conference of the National Association of Schoolsof Public Affairs and Administration. Raleigh NC: October 10, 1998
[18] [美]丹尼斯·C·缪勒.公共选择理论.[M].杨春学译.北京:中国社会科学出版,1999
[19] 道格拉斯·诺斯,罗伯特·托马斯.西方世界的兴起.北京:华夏出版社,1999:182
[20] 杨善华,苏红.“代理型政权经营者”到“谋利型政权经营者”.社会学研究,2002,(1)
[21] 卢现祥.西方制度经济学[M],北京:中国发展出版社,2000
[22] Marbra A. Misztal. Trust in Modern Society. Black Publisher Inc, 1996
[23] [美]特里·L·库珀.张秀琴译.行政伦理学—实现行政责任的途径.第四版.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:62
[24] 杨凤春.审视政府信誉.南风窗.2001,12
[25] 褚松燕.我国政府信息公开的现状分析与思考.新视野,2003,3:33
[26] Marc. J. Hetherington, Suzanne Globetti. Political Trust and Racial Policy Preference. American Journal of Political Science. Vol.46, No.2, Apr, 2002
[27] Dennis. F. Thompson. Paradoxes of Government Ethics. Public Administration Review. Vol. 52, No.3, 1992
[28] 余红.诚信管理制度构想.学术月刊.2002,8
[29] 吴晶妹.现代信用学.北京:中国金融出版社,2002:47
[30] Gore. Al. The Best Kept Secrets In Government. Washington D. C.: USGPO, 1996
[31] 马克思,恩格斯.资本论.北京:人民出版社,1975
[32] 马克思,恩格斯.中共中央马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林著作编译局编译.马克思恩 格斯选集(第二卷)[M].北京:人民出版社,1973
[33] Kathyn. G. Denhardt. The Ethics of Public Service. Westport Connecticut. Greenood Press Inc., 1998
[34] 陈征,李建平,郭铁民.政治经济学.北京:经济科学出版社,2001
[35] 亚当·斯密.国富论.北京:商务印书馆,1974
[36] 何自力.比较制度经济学.天津:南开大学出版社,2003
[37] Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano. The Value of Governmental Credit. Harvard University, Oct, 1993.
[38] 郭小聪.政府经济学.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003
[39] Stephen Knack. Social Capital and the Quality of Government. American. Journal of Political Science Vol. 46, No.4, Oct, 2002
[40] W. B. Allen, Gordon Lloyd. The Essential Antifederalist. Rowman &Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002:
[41] 龚勇.信用中国.北京:中国方正出版社,2002
[42] Gabriel Badescu and Eric M. Uslaner. Social Capital and the Transitition to Democracy Routledge. London: Taylor& Francis Group, 2003
[43] A. Gollin. Trust or Consequences. Build Trust Today or Lost Your Market Tomorrow. New York: Blackwell Book Services, 2004
[44] 张德信,薄贵利,李军鹏.中国政府改革的方向.北京:人民出版社,2003
[45] 孙荣,许洁.政府经济学.上海;复旦大学出版社,2001
[46] 孔祥利.焦点问题中的政府经济行为.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003
[47] 张维迎.产权、政府与信誉.北京:三联书店,2001
[48] Claudine Day. Spirals of Trust. American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46, No.4, Oct, 2002
[49] James Coleman. Foundation of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990
[50] (德)柯武刚,史曼飞.制度经济学—社会秩序与公共政策.韩朝华译.北京:商务印书馆,2000
[51] 方福前.公共选择理论—政治的经济学.北京:中国人民大学出版,2000
[52] 张俊峰.政府信用的分析及构建.兰州学刊,2005,1
[53] 句华.政治学视野中的政府信用.国家行政学院学报,2005,2
[54] 萨缪尔森.经济学.16版.北京:机械工业出版社,1998
[55] 郑利平.腐败的经济学分析.北京:中共中央党校出版社,2000
[56] George Frederickson. Public Ethics and the New Manageralism. Public Administration and Management, Vol. 4, No.2, 1999
[57] Bart Nootebroom. Trust, Forms, Foundation, Failures and Fig Cheltenham, UK;Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002: