基于成本函数的河网流域污染物治理的合作与补偿模型
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摘要
流域是一个空间整体性极强的,关联度很高的区域。流域内不仅个自然要素之间联系极为密切,而且上中下游之间,各干支流之间,各地区之间的相互制约,相互影响极其显著。流域各地区之间如果相互紧密合作,就能够实现全流域收益最大化；如果各地区奉行地方保护主义,上下游之间就会产生水污染的纠纷。目前我国流域污染的突出表现是跨界水污染问题严重。在缺乏外部干预,各地区自由排污的情况下,上游对下游造成的污染不用赔偿,上游保护水生态付出的成本,下游不用补偿。由此引发严重的水污染纠纷,严重制约了我国的经济的发展并影响了社会的安定。因此,如何解决水污染问题迫在眉睫。
目前,国内外的相关研究主要集中单条河流的上下游之间水污染问题上。为解决上下游之间的水污染造成的纠纷,建立了较为完善的水污染问题的合作与补偿模型。这些成果对于水污染的治理具有一定的实际意义。但是,在河网流域系统的干支流之间、各地区之间,上下游之间的水污染治理问题上,很少有人研究。
本文借鉴前人处理单条河流上下游水污染问题的方法,结合河网流域系统的自身的特点,建立的河网流域系统的污染物治理的合作与补偿模型。文章共分为5个部分。
第一部分主要结合河网系统自身的特点,提出了以等流量贡献比为分配准则,建立了河网流域系统污染物环境容量公平模型。并采用关联矩阵的方法,来描述干支流之间,上下游之间各种物理量之间的关系。并在此基础上,建立了再分配模型,通过多次分配剩余污染物容量,体现了“公平第一,兼顾效率”的思想。
第二部分主要建立了污染物削减量分配模型,主要解决了河网流域系统的环境容量发生变化时,如何公平的分配污染物削减量的问题。
第三部分分别从污水治理函数具有的性质和污水治理过程入手,求出了污水治理成本的函数表达式,并且经过讨论得出：当污水处理量足够大时,单位污水的处理费用接近于一常数,污水处理的总费用与处理率,初始浓度,污水处理量成正相关性,与污水的出厂浓度成负相关性。
第四部分在第三部分成本函数的基础上,以总治污费用最小为目标,建立了河网流域的污水处理的合作模型,并且利用公平区间法建立了补偿模型。分别求出公平分配,局部最优,全局最优下的各地区的治污费用以及局部最优和全局最优时,各地区应该支付或接受的补偿数额。
第五部分重点研究了两条支流间的污染物治理合作与补偿模型,通过研究得出,本文建立的合作与补偿模型,能够有效的刺激各地区提高科技含量,加大治污投入。
本文提出的模型,对于避免河网流域再走先污染再治理的老路,减少流域污染负荷,改善流域生态环境质量,缓解流域水污染纠纷,有重要的现实意义。
The river basin is a spatial integrity and strengthened region. Not only the contact of the various physical features is extremely closely, but also the restriction and the influence among the upper, middle and lower basin, between the mainstream and tributaries is remarkable. If various areas carry out the regional protectionism, the upstream and downstream will have the water pollution dispute. The problem of river basin water pollution is serious nowadays. In the absence of external pollution and the situation of pollution freely,the upstream which creates to the pollution of downstream doesn't need to compensate, the upstream which pays for the cost of protecting water doesn't receive any compensate, so that they trigger serious water pollution dispute, which have impeded the development of economy and the stability of the society. Hence, how to solve the problem is urgent.
At present the domestic and foreign related literatures about regarding the wa-ter pollution main focus on the the problem of water pollution among the upper, middle and lower of a single river. In order to solve the water pollution dispute among the upper, middle and lower, researchers have established systematical mod-els of cooperation and compensation.The result have a certain practical significance for the government of the water pollution. But such a model for the river network have not been established yet.
This article draws on the methods that dealing with the problem of water pollution of single river and consider the features of river networks, then establish the model of cooperation and compensation for dealing with river network pollutants. This article includes five chapters.
In chapter one, this article mainly introduces a new principle-allocation based on even pollution contribution per flow-as a new principle for allocation of waste water pollutants of river networks, and then establish the fair allocation model for water waste pollutants of river network. a new method-Correlation Matrix that can describe relationship between the various physical features of upper, middle, lower is also introduced. Based on these, Multiple allocations model is established. Comparing with previous allocations models, multiple allocations model distributes water waste pollutants based on the principle more than once.
In chapter two, this article establish the model for the allocation of the amount of reduced pollutants discharge, which solve the problem that how to allocate the amount of reduced pollutants once the environmental capacity of pollutants changes.
In chapter three, this article induce the cost function of waste water treatment based on both the nature that the function has and the process of waste water treatment. After discussing, we finally come to the following result:the cost of waste water treatment for per unit waste water will convergent to a constant when the amount of the waste water tends to infinity. The total cost of waste water treatment was positively related with disposal rate,initial concentration and the amount of waste water, negatively related with residual concentration.
In chapter four, this article establishes the cooperation model aiming to seek the minimal total cost of waste water treatment based on the cost function. This article also establishes the compensation model using the equitable interval method, then calculate the cost of waste water treatment and the compensation in condition of fair allocation,local optima allocation and global optima allocation.
In chapter five, we pay attention to a special kind of river network-the river network contains only two tributaries and find that the model established in this article can stimulate the participants in the river network to improve their technology and change their cost function in order to benefit more in the cooperation
The model of cooperation and compensation mentioned in this article has essen-tial practical significance which can avoid our country taking the old way polluting first and then government, reduce the the load of the river, improve the ecological environment quality of the river, solve the dispute, enhance the river's economic potentiality, promote the development of the basin circulation economy.
目前,国内外的相关研究主要集中单条河流的上下游之间水污染问题上。为解决上下游之间的水污染造成的纠纷,建立了较为完善的水污染问题的合作与补偿模型。这些成果对于水污染的治理具有一定的实际意义。但是,在河网流域系统的干支流之间、各地区之间,上下游之间的水污染治理问题上,很少有人研究。
本文借鉴前人处理单条河流上下游水污染问题的方法,结合河网流域系统的自身的特点,建立的河网流域系统的污染物治理的合作与补偿模型。文章共分为5个部分。
第一部分主要结合河网系统自身的特点,提出了以等流量贡献比为分配准则,建立了河网流域系统污染物环境容量公平模型。并采用关联矩阵的方法,来描述干支流之间,上下游之间各种物理量之间的关系。并在此基础上,建立了再分配模型,通过多次分配剩余污染物容量,体现了“公平第一,兼顾效率”的思想。
第二部分主要建立了污染物削减量分配模型,主要解决了河网流域系统的环境容量发生变化时,如何公平的分配污染物削减量的问题。
第三部分分别从污水治理函数具有的性质和污水治理过程入手,求出了污水治理成本的函数表达式,并且经过讨论得出：当污水处理量足够大时,单位污水的处理费用接近于一常数,污水处理的总费用与处理率,初始浓度,污水处理量成正相关性,与污水的出厂浓度成负相关性。
第四部分在第三部分成本函数的基础上,以总治污费用最小为目标,建立了河网流域的污水处理的合作模型,并且利用公平区间法建立了补偿模型。分别求出公平分配,局部最优,全局最优下的各地区的治污费用以及局部最优和全局最优时,各地区应该支付或接受的补偿数额。
第五部分重点研究了两条支流间的污染物治理合作与补偿模型,通过研究得出,本文建立的合作与补偿模型,能够有效的刺激各地区提高科技含量,加大治污投入。
本文提出的模型,对于避免河网流域再走先污染再治理的老路,减少流域污染负荷,改善流域生态环境质量,缓解流域水污染纠纷,有重要的现实意义。
The river basin is a spatial integrity and strengthened region. Not only the contact of the various physical features is extremely closely, but also the restriction and the influence among the upper, middle and lower basin, between the mainstream and tributaries is remarkable. If various areas carry out the regional protectionism, the upstream and downstream will have the water pollution dispute. The problem of river basin water pollution is serious nowadays. In the absence of external pollution and the situation of pollution freely,the upstream which creates to the pollution of downstream doesn't need to compensate, the upstream which pays for the cost of protecting water doesn't receive any compensate, so that they trigger serious water pollution dispute, which have impeded the development of economy and the stability of the society. Hence, how to solve the problem is urgent.
At present the domestic and foreign related literatures about regarding the wa-ter pollution main focus on the the problem of water pollution among the upper, middle and lower of a single river. In order to solve the water pollution dispute among the upper, middle and lower, researchers have established systematical mod-els of cooperation and compensation.The result have a certain practical significance for the government of the water pollution. But such a model for the river network have not been established yet.
This article draws on the methods that dealing with the problem of water pollution of single river and consider the features of river networks, then establish the model of cooperation and compensation for dealing with river network pollutants. This article includes five chapters.
In chapter one, this article mainly introduces a new principle-allocation based on even pollution contribution per flow-as a new principle for allocation of waste water pollutants of river networks, and then establish the fair allocation model for water waste pollutants of river network. a new method-Correlation Matrix that can describe relationship between the various physical features of upper, middle, lower is also introduced. Based on these, Multiple allocations model is established. Comparing with previous allocations models, multiple allocations model distributes water waste pollutants based on the principle more than once.
In chapter two, this article establish the model for the allocation of the amount of reduced pollutants discharge, which solve the problem that how to allocate the amount of reduced pollutants once the environmental capacity of pollutants changes.
In chapter three, this article induce the cost function of waste water treatment based on both the nature that the function has and the process of waste water treatment. After discussing, we finally come to the following result:the cost of waste water treatment for per unit waste water will convergent to a constant when the amount of the waste water tends to infinity. The total cost of waste water treatment was positively related with disposal rate,initial concentration and the amount of waste water, negatively related with residual concentration.
In chapter four, this article establishes the cooperation model aiming to seek the minimal total cost of waste water treatment based on the cost function. This article also establishes the compensation model using the equitable interval method, then calculate the cost of waste water treatment and the compensation in condition of fair allocation,local optima allocation and global optima allocation.
In chapter five, we pay attention to a special kind of river network-the river network contains only two tributaries and find that the model established in this article can stimulate the participants in the river network to improve their technology and change their cost function in order to benefit more in the cooperation
The model of cooperation and compensation mentioned in this article has essen-tial practical significance which can avoid our country taking the old way polluting first and then government, reduce the the load of the river, improve the ecological environment quality of the river, solve the dispute, enhance the river's economic potentiality, promote the development of the basin circulation economy.
引文
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[2]傅国伟水污染物排放总量的分配方法与原则环境背景值及环境容量研究[M].北京：科学出版社,1993,444-455.
[3]林巍,傅国伟,刘春华基于公理体系的排污总量公平分配模型[J]环境科学,1996,17(3)：35-37.
[4]徐华君,徐百福污染物允许排放总量分配的公平思路与方法[J]新疆大学学报,1996,13(3)：86-89.
[5]苏惠波嫩江水污染物排放总量分配方法研究[J]环境科学进展,1997,5(5)：70-74.
[6]汪俊启,张颖总量控制中水污染物允许排放量公平分配研究[J]安庆师范学院学报(自然科学版),2000,6(3)：37-40
[7]杨玉峰,傅国伟区域差异与国家污染物排放总量分配[J]环境科学学报,2001,21(2)：129-133.
[8]李如忠区域水污染排放总量分配方法研究[J]环境工程,2002,20(6)：61-63.
[9]李如忠,钱家忠,汪家权水污染物允许排放总量分配方法研究[J]水力学报,2003,5：112-115.
[10]赵来军,李怀祖流域跨界水污染纠纷对策研究[J]中国人口资源与环境,2003,13(6)：49-54.
[11]赵来军,李怀祖,肖莜南 流域跨界水污染纠纷合作平调模型研究[J]系统工程,2004,22(3)：100-105
[12]杨志峰,曾勇跨边界区域水资源冲突与协调模型与应用(1)模型提携[J]环境科学学报,2004,24(1)：71-76.
[13]曾勇,杨志峰跨边界区域水资源冲突与协调模型与应用(2)案例研究[J]环境科学学报,2004,24(1)：77-81.
[14]栗风娟,郭成苇利用博弈分析环境的污染与治理[J]开封教育学院学报,2005,25(4)：63-64.
[15]雷雨桃流域水环境管理的博弈分析[J]中国人口资源与环境,2006,16(1)：122-126.
[16]刘玉龙,许凤冉,张春玲,阮本清,罗尧增流域生态补偿标准计算模型研究[J]中国水利,2006,22：35-38.
[17]林高松,李适宇,江峰基于公平区间的污染物允许排放量分配方法[J]水力学报,2006,37(1)：52-57.
[18]林高松,李适宇,江峰河流允许排污量公平分配的多准则决策方法[J]环境科学学报,2007,27(3)：494-500.
[19]禹雪中,李锦秀,骆辉煌,吴金萍河流水污染损失补偿模型研究[J]长江流域资源与环境,2007,16(1)：57-61.
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