我国财政分权对区域协调发展的影响
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摘要
中国是一个人口众多、幅员辽阔、区域差异显著的发展中大国。促进区域协调发展对于中国全面建设小康社会、加快国家现代化进程具有重大的战略意义。区域协调发展受到自然、经济、文化、制度等多种因素的影响,财政分权体制是影响区域协调发展的重要制度因素之一。
财政分权对区域协调发展的影响是一个兼具理论价值和现实意义的研究命题。从理论上看,财政分权和区域经济发展间的关系是近年来财政学和区域经济学研究的热点问题。国内外许多学者研究了财政分权对区域差距、区域一体化、区域竞争等区域经济发展现象的影响。但到目前为止,尚未建立起一个比较系统的研究财政分权对区域协调发展影响的理论框架。而从现实来看,我国财政分权改革为地方政府提供了有效的激励,推动了区域经济的高速增长。但在实行财政分权的过程中,区域发展不平衡、区域发展结构扭曲等问题也比较突出,给大国发展带来了严峻挑战。这要求我们对当前的财政分权体制作进一步的调整和改革,使其更有利于促进区域协调发展。
本文沿着“理论分析——实证分析——政策分析”的思路,系统性地研究了我国财政分权对区域协调发展的影响。在理论部分,本文探讨了财政分权和区域协调发展之间的因果逻辑关系,说明了财政分权影响区域协调发展的路径、机制与结果。在实证部分,本文综合运用统计、计量、案例等实证方法,分析了我国财政分权对区域协调发展所产生的实际影响,并解释了产生这种影响的原因。在政策部分,本文提出要进一步深化财政分权体制改革,增强其对区域协调发展的推动作用,并设计了较为完整的、具有可操作性的改革方案与措施。
本文在理论分析和实证分析部分所得到的主要结论为：
第一,财政分权体制通过政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分、地区间财力分配、地方政府财政竞争、区域间财政调控四条路径来影响区域协调发展。现实中的财政分权体制往往同时包含着促进和制约区域协调发展的因素,所以,财政分权对区域协调发展存在着双重可能影响。
第二,我国政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分的整体框架已经建立起来。但就某些特定的公共事务责权和财攻支出责任而言,其划分方式还不是十分明确与合理。与实现区域协调发展的要求相比,当前我国政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分方式还存在不少弊端。其中最突出的问题是公共事务责权和财政支出责任重心偏低,中央和省级政府责任缺位,而县级政府负担过重。
第三,在我国当前的财政分权体制下,地区间财力分配始终呈现出较大的差距。由于纵向财权划分上的一些缺陷,再加上存在横向税收转移现象,造成了初次财力分配体制不尽合理。初次分配形成的区域财力差距甚至还超过了区域经济差距。而财政转移支付的财力再平衡能力尚有不足,难以从根本上扭转区域财力分配失衡的格局。
第四,我国地方政府之间的财政竞争对区域协调发展的影响利弊共存。财政竞争促进了资本的跨地区流动,加快了各地区的基础设施建设。但是,由于各地区展开竞争的起点高度不平等,财政竞争非但没有缩小反而进一步扩大了区域经济差距。此外,当前的财政竞争过于集中在对资本和税源的争夺,造成了区域经济社会发展结构的扭曲。
第五,我国中央政府综合运用财政转移支付政策、区域财政投资政策、区域税收政策等区域间财政调控手段来促进区域协调发展,并取得了一定的成效。不过,由于中央调控政策设计缺陷、地方贯彻执行不力等诸多原因,调控政策的效力受到不同程度的削弱。
基于上述理论和实证分析结果,本文提出了要构建有利于区域协调发展的财政分权体制的观点。具体的政策建议为：首先,要积极调整政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分,优化区域发展中的政府间职责分工；其次,要努力健全地区间财力分配机制,逐步缩小地区间财力差距；再次,要不断规范地方政府财政竞争行为,建立起良性的区域竞争模式；最后,要着力完善区域间财政调控体系,持续增强调控政策的效应。
China is a populous, vast, regional differentiated developing country. Promoting coordinated regional development is of strategic significance in constructing well-off society and accelerating national modernization process. Coordinated regional development is affected by many factors such as natural factor, economic factor, cultural factor as well as institutional factor. Fiscal decentralization is one of the most important institutional factors influencing coordinated regional development.
It has both theoretical and practical value to study the influence of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. From theoretical point of view, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional economic development is a hot topic in the field of public economy and regional economy. Many scholars studied the influences of fiscal decentralization on regional gap, regional integration and regional competition. But so far, a comprehensive theoretical framework has not been established to study the influences of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. From practical point of view, China'fiscal decentralization has provided effective incentives to promote rapid regional development. However, meanwhile, the problem of imbalanced regional development is also quite obvious, bringing severe challenges for China's development. Therefore, it is required to adjust and reform current fiscal decentralization in order that it is more beneficial for coordinated regional development.
Along "theoretical analysis-empirical analysis-policy analysis", the paper systematically studys the effect of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. In theoretical analysis section, the paper investigates the causal logic relationship between fiscal decentralization and coordinated regional development as well as the path, mechanism and results of the influence of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. In empirical analysis section, by comprehensive usage of statistical, regression and case analysis, the paper analyzes the influences of fiscal decentralization on China's coordinated regional development and explains the reasons of such influences. In policy analysis section, the paper puts forward that fiscal decentralization reform should be further deepened to strengthen its positive influences on promoting coordinated regional development. The paper also designs a complete, operable reform plan as well as its measures.
The paper obtains the following main conclusions based on theoretical and positive analysis:
1. The influencing paths of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development includes:intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division, regional fiscal revenue distribution, local government fiscal competition and regional fiscal regulation. In the real world, fiscal decentralization contains both factors promoting or restricting coordinated regional development. Therefore, fiscal decentralization will have dual effects on coordinated regional development.
2. The overall framework of intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division system has been set up. But when the specific public affair is concerned, the intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division is not quite clear and reasonable. Compared to the requirements of coordinated regional development, there still have many drawbacks in current intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division system. The most outstanding problem among them is that central and provincial governments have vacancies in taking their responsibility while county government's responsibility burden is ovel-weight.
3. In China's current fiscal decentralization system, there is always a large gap in regional fiscal revenue distribution. The primary distribution mechanism is not reasonable because of the lacks in longitudinal fiscal revenue division and horizontal tax transfer. The regional fiscal revenue gap is even larger than regional economic gap. The balance capacity of fiscal transfer payment is insufficient to reverse the pattern of regional fiscal revenue imbalance.
4. The local government fiscal competition in China has both advantages and disadvantages effects on coordinated regional development. The fiscal competition promotes cross-regional capital flow and speed up regional infrastructure construction. However, because of inequality in competition starting point, regional gap is becoming larger during the competition process. In addition, as the fiscal competition over-focused on attracting capital and tax sources, the regional economic and social development structure has been distorted.
5. The local government in China carries out fiscal transfer payment policy, regional investment policy and regional tax policy to promote coordinated regional development and has achieved some results. However, because of the lacks in regulation policies design and local implementation ineffectiveness, the validity of the regulation policies has been weakended.
Based on the theoretical and positive analysis results, the paper puts forward a suggestion to eastablish a fiscal decentralization system that is beneficial for coordinated regional development. The detailed suggestions include:Firstly, the intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division should be adjusted so as to optimize the intergovernmental responsibility division in regional development. Secondly, regional fiscal revenue distribution system should be improved to narrow regional fiscal revenue gap. Thirdly, local government fiscal competition should be regulated so as to form a benign regional competitive mode. Last but not least, regional fiscal regulation should be improved in order to increase the effectiveness of regulation policies.
财政分权对区域协调发展的影响是一个兼具理论价值和现实意义的研究命题。从理论上看,财政分权和区域经济发展间的关系是近年来财政学和区域经济学研究的热点问题。国内外许多学者研究了财政分权对区域差距、区域一体化、区域竞争等区域经济发展现象的影响。但到目前为止,尚未建立起一个比较系统的研究财政分权对区域协调发展影响的理论框架。而从现实来看,我国财政分权改革为地方政府提供了有效的激励,推动了区域经济的高速增长。但在实行财政分权的过程中,区域发展不平衡、区域发展结构扭曲等问题也比较突出,给大国发展带来了严峻挑战。这要求我们对当前的财政分权体制作进一步的调整和改革,使其更有利于促进区域协调发展。
本文沿着“理论分析——实证分析——政策分析”的思路,系统性地研究了我国财政分权对区域协调发展的影响。在理论部分,本文探讨了财政分权和区域协调发展之间的因果逻辑关系,说明了财政分权影响区域协调发展的路径、机制与结果。在实证部分,本文综合运用统计、计量、案例等实证方法,分析了我国财政分权对区域协调发展所产生的实际影响,并解释了产生这种影响的原因。在政策部分,本文提出要进一步深化财政分权体制改革,增强其对区域协调发展的推动作用,并设计了较为完整的、具有可操作性的改革方案与措施。
本文在理论分析和实证分析部分所得到的主要结论为：
第一,财政分权体制通过政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分、地区间财力分配、地方政府财政竞争、区域间财政调控四条路径来影响区域协调发展。现实中的财政分权体制往往同时包含着促进和制约区域协调发展的因素,所以,财政分权对区域协调发展存在着双重可能影响。
第二,我国政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分的整体框架已经建立起来。但就某些特定的公共事务责权和财攻支出责任而言,其划分方式还不是十分明确与合理。与实现区域协调发展的要求相比,当前我国政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分方式还存在不少弊端。其中最突出的问题是公共事务责权和财政支出责任重心偏低,中央和省级政府责任缺位,而县级政府负担过重。
第三,在我国当前的财政分权体制下,地区间财力分配始终呈现出较大的差距。由于纵向财权划分上的一些缺陷,再加上存在横向税收转移现象,造成了初次财力分配体制不尽合理。初次分配形成的区域财力差距甚至还超过了区域经济差距。而财政转移支付的财力再平衡能力尚有不足,难以从根本上扭转区域财力分配失衡的格局。
第四,我国地方政府之间的财政竞争对区域协调发展的影响利弊共存。财政竞争促进了资本的跨地区流动,加快了各地区的基础设施建设。但是,由于各地区展开竞争的起点高度不平等,财政竞争非但没有缩小反而进一步扩大了区域经济差距。此外,当前的财政竞争过于集中在对资本和税源的争夺,造成了区域经济社会发展结构的扭曲。
第五,我国中央政府综合运用财政转移支付政策、区域财政投资政策、区域税收政策等区域间财政调控手段来促进区域协调发展,并取得了一定的成效。不过,由于中央调控政策设计缺陷、地方贯彻执行不力等诸多原因,调控政策的效力受到不同程度的削弱。
基于上述理论和实证分析结果,本文提出了要构建有利于区域协调发展的财政分权体制的观点。具体的政策建议为：首先,要积极调整政府间公共事务责权和财政支出责任划分,优化区域发展中的政府间职责分工；其次,要努力健全地区间财力分配机制,逐步缩小地区间财力差距；再次,要不断规范地方政府财政竞争行为,建立起良性的区域竞争模式；最后,要着力完善区域间财政调控体系,持续增强调控政策的效应。
China is a populous, vast, regional differentiated developing country. Promoting coordinated regional development is of strategic significance in constructing well-off society and accelerating national modernization process. Coordinated regional development is affected by many factors such as natural factor, economic factor, cultural factor as well as institutional factor. Fiscal decentralization is one of the most important institutional factors influencing coordinated regional development.
It has both theoretical and practical value to study the influence of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. From theoretical point of view, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional economic development is a hot topic in the field of public economy and regional economy. Many scholars studied the influences of fiscal decentralization on regional gap, regional integration and regional competition. But so far, a comprehensive theoretical framework has not been established to study the influences of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. From practical point of view, China'fiscal decentralization has provided effective incentives to promote rapid regional development. However, meanwhile, the problem of imbalanced regional development is also quite obvious, bringing severe challenges for China's development. Therefore, it is required to adjust and reform current fiscal decentralization in order that it is more beneficial for coordinated regional development.
Along "theoretical analysis-empirical analysis-policy analysis", the paper systematically studys the effect of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. In theoretical analysis section, the paper investigates the causal logic relationship between fiscal decentralization and coordinated regional development as well as the path, mechanism and results of the influence of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development. In empirical analysis section, by comprehensive usage of statistical, regression and case analysis, the paper analyzes the influences of fiscal decentralization on China's coordinated regional development and explains the reasons of such influences. In policy analysis section, the paper puts forward that fiscal decentralization reform should be further deepened to strengthen its positive influences on promoting coordinated regional development. The paper also designs a complete, operable reform plan as well as its measures.
The paper obtains the following main conclusions based on theoretical and positive analysis:
1. The influencing paths of fiscal decentralization on coordinated regional development includes:intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division, regional fiscal revenue distribution, local government fiscal competition and regional fiscal regulation. In the real world, fiscal decentralization contains both factors promoting or restricting coordinated regional development. Therefore, fiscal decentralization will have dual effects on coordinated regional development.
2. The overall framework of intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division system has been set up. But when the specific public affair is concerned, the intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division is not quite clear and reasonable. Compared to the requirements of coordinated regional development, there still have many drawbacks in current intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division system. The most outstanding problem among them is that central and provincial governments have vacancies in taking their responsibility while county government's responsibility burden is ovel-weight.
3. In China's current fiscal decentralization system, there is always a large gap in regional fiscal revenue distribution. The primary distribution mechanism is not reasonable because of the lacks in longitudinal fiscal revenue division and horizontal tax transfer. The regional fiscal revenue gap is even larger than regional economic gap. The balance capacity of fiscal transfer payment is insufficient to reverse the pattern of regional fiscal revenue imbalance.
4. The local government fiscal competition in China has both advantages and disadvantages effects on coordinated regional development. The fiscal competition promotes cross-regional capital flow and speed up regional infrastructure construction. However, because of inequality in competition starting point, regional gap is becoming larger during the competition process. In addition, as the fiscal competition over-focused on attracting capital and tax sources, the regional economic and social development structure has been distorted.
5. The local government in China carries out fiscal transfer payment policy, regional investment policy and regional tax policy to promote coordinated regional development and has achieved some results. However, because of the lacks in regulation policies design and local implementation ineffectiveness, the validity of the regulation policies has been weakended.
Based on the theoretical and positive analysis results, the paper puts forward a suggestion to eastablish a fiscal decentralization system that is beneficial for coordinated regional development. The detailed suggestions include:Firstly, the intergovernmental responsibility and fiscal expenditure division should be adjusted so as to optimize the intergovernmental responsibility division in regional development. Secondly, regional fiscal revenue distribution system should be improved to narrow regional fiscal revenue gap. Thirdly, local government fiscal competition should be regulated so as to form a benign regional competitive mode. Last but not least, regional fiscal regulation should be improved in order to increase the effectiveness of regulation policies.
引文
①本节内容参考了齐守印：《中国公共经济体制改革与公共经济学论纲》,人民出版社,2002年
①典型的经济性公共服务为电力设施、通讯设施、交通设施等。
②典型的社会性公共服务为教育、卫生、社会保障等。
①当然,各种非税收入也是纵向财权划分所要考虑的因素,只是相对于税收划分而言,非税收入的划分居于相对次要地位。
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①税收与税源问题研究课题组.陕西省税收与税源背离研究[A].区域税收转移调查[C].中国税务出版社,2007
①王少杰.论我国地方政府行为的规范与调整[D].西北大学,2004
①玖富研发中心.地方债务：是问题?不是问题![R].内部研究报告,2010,(7)
①张序.民族地区财政专项转移支付制度的规范与完善[J].西南金融,2009,(4)。
②“审计署：16个省挤占挪用中央支农专项资金6亿多”,搜狐网,http://news.sohu.com. 20080725/n258373047.shtml
①1998-2002年期间,国家预算内资金比重上升主要是应对亚洲金融危机采取积极财政政策的结果。
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①典型的经济性公共服务为电力设施、通讯设施、交通设施等。
②典型的社会性公共服务为教育、卫生、社会保障等。
①当然,各种非税收入也是纵向财权划分所要考虑的因素,只是相对于税收划分而言,非税收入的划分居于相对次要地位。
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①王少杰.论我国地方政府行为的规范与调整[D].西北大学,2004
①玖富研发中心.地方债务：是问题?不是问题![R].内部研究报告,2010,(7)
①张序.民族地区财政专项转移支付制度的规范与完善[J].西南金融,2009,(4)。
②“审计署：16个省挤占挪用中央支农专项资金6亿多”,搜狐网,http://news.sohu.com. 20080725/n258373047.shtml
①1998-2002年期间,国家预算内资金比重上升主要是应对亚洲金融危机采取积极财政政策的结果。
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