信息通信技术标准化下的专利竞赛研究
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摘要
对于以技术为驱动的信息通信竞争市场，制定标准是可持续竞争力的潜在有效来源，而知识产权则是一个国家提升创新能力和国际竞争力的有力武器，由此二者相结合对企业战略发展的重要作用引发了在标准化条件下企业间激烈的专利竞赛。本文首先构建了信息通信技术标准化下专利竞赛的理论框架，然后对其各阶段进行了模型分析研究，主要创新点包括以下三个方面。
(1)运用TRIZ法则对标准化下专利竞赛的内在机理进行分析。
标准化下专利竞赛的内在机理分析是整个理论框架的基础部分，本文运用TRIZ方法中最常用的两个理论即技术系统进化法则和理想化水平理论，对信息通信领域的企业何时进行标准化，何时进行专利竞赛进行了深入的分析，得出的结论是信息通信技术的标准化在系统进化的婴儿期就已经存在，这时它的发展相对会比较缓慢，而专利竞赛也会在这一时期的后面阶段发生，此时专利质量较高，到了成长期以后的阶段，发展的速度就会很快。本文同时构建了适合标准化下专利竞赛的理想化水平函数，将专利的价值和侵权的损耗都考虑在内，使之能更好的反映企业在专利竞赛中的行为目标。
(2)信息通信技术标准化下专利竞赛的开源模型分析
标准化下专利竞赛的外在因素有很多，其中开放性的市场结构是当今标准发展和专利在商业上策略应用的一个发展新趋势，已有的文献只是对其积极作用进行了阐述性的描述，没有定性和定量分析。本文构建了寡头垄断市场结构下两个不同企业在这种开放的市场结构下的博弈分析，最后的结论认为领先企业为了降低研发风险，会开放部分源代码，但跟随企业一方面要充分利用这些先进的技术，为自己所用，但同时也要谨慎对待，以免消耗企业大量的其他资源，而把自己的优势丧失掉。
(3)信息通信技术标准化下的专利竞赛模型分析
标准化下专利竞赛的模型分析是整个理论框架的核心部分，即在内因、外因的推动下，企业开始进入竞赛阶段。本文对Richard的模型假设进行部分变更，修正了其对标准、专利的模糊界定，模拟我国弱势企业与国外强势企业进行争夺标准话语权的专利竞赛之争。该模型以竞争同时代的法定标准为前提，将竞争分为两个阶段，第一个阶段进行技术研发、申请专利的竞赛，该阶段和一般专利竞赛的不同之处在于两个企业分属不同国度，而且是为了达到同一功能，分别研制类似技术，因此理论上是可以分别申请到专利，所以竞赛的最终结果不是完全意义上的“优胜者获得所有的博弈”的情况，该竞赛结果仅是后面阶段的一个过程。第二个阶段是两个国家在考虑到社会福利最大化的条件下考虑选择含有不同技术专利的标准的博弈分析。最后模型分析的结果表明在研发强度同等的情况下，弱势企业只有在强势企业选择次优技术的情况下，才有蛙跳超越竞争对手的可能，每个国家选择技术标准也是优先选择含有本民族企业的技术专利的标准，如果考虑下网络效应的市场规模的影响，需要选择含有竞争对手的专利技术的标准时应满足一定的条件。最后本文对企业的合作进行了模型分析，一种是卡特尔模型，一种是合作演进模型。
本论文获得了北京市科委的博士生论文基金(No.ZZ0640)资助。
As for the Information Communication Competition market driven by the related technologies, establishing standardization is a potential resource for the durative competition in market, and IPR(Intellectual Property Right) is just the most effective and powerful weapon to improve the innovation ability and international competence. Therefore, the drastic patent races among different companies were caused by the integration of Standardization and IPR that has a great importance for companies' developing strategy. In this dissertation, the theory structure about patent races in the standardization is clarified firstly, and then the characteristic of each phase for such race process is further analyzed and studied with the related models. The main contributions are as follows:
(1) Analysis of the inner mechanism of patent races in the standardization through TRIZ principle
The basic part of the whole theory structure is the analysis of the inner mechanism of patent races in the standardization. This dissertation makes a good use of the two popular theories: technological system evolution principle and ideal function of TRIZ theory, so as to analyze when to be prepared for standardization and IPR races for ICT companies, the dissertation researches the information communication area.
The innovation conclusion from this dissertation is that the standardization of information communication technology (ICT) would exist during the baby's period when the standardization would develop slowly and patents races would appear with so high qualities. After then, each other period would develop quickly; the ideal function used for the analysis of patent races is also established. Moreover, the patent value and the waste from piracy are also considered in this function so as to reflect the real object of patent races.
(2) Analysis of Open Source Software in the patent races
Many external reasons affect the patent races in the standardization, including the open market structure, which is an important new trend for the development of standard and patent. This dissertation try to analyze the strategy with a background of monopolistic market structure, and get a conclusion the leading companies would open some parts source code to decrease the risk from the research and developing, and they also need to regard this measure carefully in case that much resource would be cost and lost their own advantages because some other companies would make good use of these open-source technology.
(3) Analysis of the model of patent races in the standardization
The model of patent races in the standardization is the core of the dissertation. Derived by intrinsic reasons and external reasons, enterprises begin to step into the phase of patent races. The dissertation simulates the patent races between Chinese companies and the other more powerful oversea company through modifying the boundary between standard and patent in "Richard Model". The model, whose premise is that the patent race is for the de jure standard and classifieds by two phases, the first one is about the R&D and patent applying competition, and the difference between this first phase and the normal patent race is that these two companies who are competing with each other for the same market. Therefore, in theory, they can apply for patents respectively, and the last outcome may not be the instance that the leader would get a fully victory. The second phase is the game process between two countries, and such competition process is to choose different standard technology based on a premise about the maximum of the society welfare.
Moreover, the conclusion from the model analyzed in this dissertation indicates that those powerless companies may have the possibilities to surpass their opponents quickly only if the powerful and leader companies choose the second-class better technologies besides the best one to develop, and each country would prefer to consider those standards in which its domestic companies may have many IPRs.
In the end, this dissertation brings forward the cooperative model including TSC model and RJVs model.
(1)运用TRIZ法则对标准化下专利竞赛的内在机理进行分析。
标准化下专利竞赛的内在机理分析是整个理论框架的基础部分，本文运用TRIZ方法中最常用的两个理论即技术系统进化法则和理想化水平理论，对信息通信领域的企业何时进行标准化，何时进行专利竞赛进行了深入的分析，得出的结论是信息通信技术的标准化在系统进化的婴儿期就已经存在，这时它的发展相对会比较缓慢，而专利竞赛也会在这一时期的后面阶段发生，此时专利质量较高，到了成长期以后的阶段，发展的速度就会很快。本文同时构建了适合标准化下专利竞赛的理想化水平函数，将专利的价值和侵权的损耗都考虑在内，使之能更好的反映企业在专利竞赛中的行为目标。
(2)信息通信技术标准化下专利竞赛的开源模型分析
标准化下专利竞赛的外在因素有很多，其中开放性的市场结构是当今标准发展和专利在商业上策略应用的一个发展新趋势，已有的文献只是对其积极作用进行了阐述性的描述，没有定性和定量分析。本文构建了寡头垄断市场结构下两个不同企业在这种开放的市场结构下的博弈分析，最后的结论认为领先企业为了降低研发风险，会开放部分源代码，但跟随企业一方面要充分利用这些先进的技术，为自己所用，但同时也要谨慎对待，以免消耗企业大量的其他资源，而把自己的优势丧失掉。
(3)信息通信技术标准化下的专利竞赛模型分析
标准化下专利竞赛的模型分析是整个理论框架的核心部分，即在内因、外因的推动下，企业开始进入竞赛阶段。本文对Richard的模型假设进行部分变更，修正了其对标准、专利的模糊界定，模拟我国弱势企业与国外强势企业进行争夺标准话语权的专利竞赛之争。该模型以竞争同时代的法定标准为前提，将竞争分为两个阶段，第一个阶段进行技术研发、申请专利的竞赛，该阶段和一般专利竞赛的不同之处在于两个企业分属不同国度，而且是为了达到同一功能，分别研制类似技术，因此理论上是可以分别申请到专利，所以竞赛的最终结果不是完全意义上的“优胜者获得所有的博弈”的情况，该竞赛结果仅是后面阶段的一个过程。第二个阶段是两个国家在考虑到社会福利最大化的条件下考虑选择含有不同技术专利的标准的博弈分析。最后模型分析的结果表明在研发强度同等的情况下，弱势企业只有在强势企业选择次优技术的情况下，才有蛙跳超越竞争对手的可能，每个国家选择技术标准也是优先选择含有本民族企业的技术专利的标准，如果考虑下网络效应的市场规模的影响，需要选择含有竞争对手的专利技术的标准时应满足一定的条件。最后本文对企业的合作进行了模型分析，一种是卡特尔模型，一种是合作演进模型。
本论文获得了北京市科委的博士生论文基金(No.ZZ0640)资助。
As for the Information Communication Competition market driven by the related technologies, establishing standardization is a potential resource for the durative competition in market, and IPR(Intellectual Property Right) is just the most effective and powerful weapon to improve the innovation ability and international competence. Therefore, the drastic patent races among different companies were caused by the integration of Standardization and IPR that has a great importance for companies' developing strategy. In this dissertation, the theory structure about patent races in the standardization is clarified firstly, and then the characteristic of each phase for such race process is further analyzed and studied with the related models. The main contributions are as follows:
(1) Analysis of the inner mechanism of patent races in the standardization through TRIZ principle
The basic part of the whole theory structure is the analysis of the inner mechanism of patent races in the standardization. This dissertation makes a good use of the two popular theories: technological system evolution principle and ideal function of TRIZ theory, so as to analyze when to be prepared for standardization and IPR races for ICT companies, the dissertation researches the information communication area.
The innovation conclusion from this dissertation is that the standardization of information communication technology (ICT) would exist during the baby's period when the standardization would develop slowly and patents races would appear with so high qualities. After then, each other period would develop quickly; the ideal function used for the analysis of patent races is also established. Moreover, the patent value and the waste from piracy are also considered in this function so as to reflect the real object of patent races.
(2) Analysis of Open Source Software in the patent races
Many external reasons affect the patent races in the standardization, including the open market structure, which is an important new trend for the development of standard and patent. This dissertation try to analyze the strategy with a background of monopolistic market structure, and get a conclusion the leading companies would open some parts source code to decrease the risk from the research and developing, and they also need to regard this measure carefully in case that much resource would be cost and lost their own advantages because some other companies would make good use of these open-source technology.
(3) Analysis of the model of patent races in the standardization
The model of patent races in the standardization is the core of the dissertation. Derived by intrinsic reasons and external reasons, enterprises begin to step into the phase of patent races. The dissertation simulates the patent races between Chinese companies and the other more powerful oversea company through modifying the boundary between standard and patent in "Richard Model". The model, whose premise is that the patent race is for the de jure standard and classifieds by two phases, the first one is about the R&D and patent applying competition, and the difference between this first phase and the normal patent race is that these two companies who are competing with each other for the same market. Therefore, in theory, they can apply for patents respectively, and the last outcome may not be the instance that the leader would get a fully victory. The second phase is the game process between two countries, and such competition process is to choose different standard technology based on a premise about the maximum of the society welfare.
Moreover, the conclusion from the model analyzed in this dissertation indicates that those powerless companies may have the possibilities to surpass their opponents quickly only if the powerful and leader companies choose the second-class better technologies besides the best one to develop, and each country would prefer to consider those standards in which its domestic companies may have many IPRs.
In the end, this dissertation brings forward the cooperative model including TSC model and RJVs model.
引文
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[7] 朱彤《网络效应经济理论》pp．175
[8] 朱彤《网络效应经济理论》pp．176
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[26] Bhagwati．J．(2000)“如何使发展中国家进入新一轮回合的多边贸易谈判”，纽约，哥伦比亚大学，pp．2，http://www.dfait-maeci-qc.ca/eet/02-e.pdf
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[29] http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/abstract-_ip_pub.htm
[30] 英国的知识产权报告《整合知识产权与发展政策》
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[1] 李春田，标准化概论[M]，北京，中国人民大学出版社，1995，pp．13
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[1] 李品媛，企业核心竞争力研究—理论与实证分析[M]，经济科学出版社，2003．4，pp．93
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[4] 傅家骥 雷家骗 程源 著，技术经济学前沿问题[M]，经济科学出版社，2003．4，pp．233
[5] 高山行 江旭等，企业专利竞赛理论与策略[M]，科学出版社，2005．6，pp．2
[6] 张耀辉，技术生成模型及其政策含义[J]，汕头大学学报(人文社会科学版)，Vol．20．No．2 2004，pp．56—60
[7] 黄继刚，核心竞争力的动态管理[M]，经济管理出版社，2004．2，pp．3
[8] Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1980), see also Cynthia Porter and Michael Porter, eds., Strategy: Seeking and Securing Competitive Advantage (Cambridge, MA:Harvard Business School Publishing, 1992)
[9] 马浩，竞争优势：解剖与集合[M]，中信出版社，2004．11，pp．96
[10] 杨清亮，发明是这样诞生的—TRIZ理论全接触[M]，机械工业出版社，2006．7，pp．6
[11] 邬贺铨，http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/t/2002-08-19/1544133319.shtml
[1] 濮小金、司志刚等编著，网络经济学[M]，机械工业出版社，2006．1，pp．1
[2] Schmalensee, Richard, The Economics of Networks,Intemational Joumal of Industrial Organization, High-Tech Innovation[J], 1996, vol. 14, no. 6: pp. 673-699
[3] Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, Network Extemalities, Competition and Compatibility, American Economic Review, 1985, vol. 75(3): pp. 424-440
[4] 朱彤《网络效应经济中国理论》[M]，人民大学出版社，2004．10，pp．99
[5] Yang, and C. C. Barret. Nonconcave, Nonmonotonic Network Externalities. Economic Research Institute Study Paper ERI#95-28[D], Utah University, 1997
[6] Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility. American Economic Review, 1985, vol. 75(3), pp. 424-440
[7] 朱彤《网络效应经济理论》pp．175
[8] 朱彤《网络效应经济理论》pp．176
[9] Farrell, Joseph and G. Saloner. Competition, compatibility and standards: the economics of horses, penguins, and lemmings. In Landis Gable ed. Product Standardization, and competitive Strategy: north Holland, 1987
[10] 朱彤《网络效应经济理论》pp．177
[11] Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985)
[12] Rohlfs, J. A.,Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, Bell joural of Economics, 1974, vol. 5, no. pp. 1: 16-37
[13] Katz, M. and C.Shapiro, Network Extemalities, Competition and Compatibility, American Economic Reviw, 1985, vol.75 (3): pp.424-440
[14] Liebowitz, S.J.and S.E.Margolis, Are Network Externalities A New Source of Market Failure? Research in Law and Economics, 1995.
[15] Westarp, EV., Reconsidering Network Effect Theory, Research papers submitted to the 8th European Conference on Information Systems, 2000
[16] 玛丽亚·莫斯坎瑞斯著，柯旭清廖君译，李明志校，企业经济学第2版，北京大学出版社2004．1，PP．11
[17] 坎贝尔·R·麦克南，斯坦利·L·布鲁伊著，李绍荣等译，经济学原理、问题与政策，中国财政经济出版社，2004．1 pp．552
[18] 玛丽亚·莫斯坎瑞斯著，柯旭清廖君译，李明志校，企业经济学第2版，北京大学出版社2004．1，pp．27—28
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[20] 奥兹·夏伊，产业组织理论与应用，清华大学出版社，2005．5，PP．153—155
[21] 方福前，公共选择理论—政治的经济学[M]，中国人民大学出版社2000年，pp．35。
[22] 张耀辉，技术创新与产业组织演变[M]，经济管理出版社，2004，12，pp．265
[23]“新全球主义”[R]—中国高科技标准战略研究报告
[24] 刘李胜著：《知识产权保护与国际技术贸易》[M]，中国经济出版社，1995年9月版，PP．135
[25] http://www.chinallaws.com/bbs/list.asp?boardid=48
[26] Bhagwati．J．(2000)“如何使发展中国家进入新一轮回合的多边贸易谈判”，纽约，哥伦比亚大学，pp．2，http://www.dfait-maeci-qc.ca/eet/02-e.pdf
[27] 朱星华，刘彦，高志前，标准化条件下应对专利壁垒的战略对策，中国软科学，2005．10，pp．21-25
[28] OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Regulatory reform and international standardization", OECD Document:TD/TC/WP (98) 36/FINAL. 29-January-1999. 1 International Trade Center (ITC), "First Evaluation on environment related trade barriers", Working Paper, 2001.
[29] http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/abstract-_ip_pub.htm
[30] 英国的知识产权报告《整合知识产权与发展政策》
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