中国西部经济内生增长机制研究
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摘要
对欠发达国家和地区的经济增长与发展影响因素及其实现机制的研究是发展经济学不可或缺的重要组成部分。我国西部大部分地区属于典型的欠发达区域,改革开放后近二十年的非均衡发展战略的推行产生的一个不容忽视的后果是,东西部经济发展差距的不断拉大,西部大开发战略正是为改变这一状况提出的新的政策举措。遗憾的是,这一发展战略近十年的贯彻实施并没有达到预期的效果。这一现象将和其它诸多发展中国家的经济实践一起成为新古典经济增长理论对欠发达国家和地区经济增长现状缺乏解释力的佐证。内生增长理论为人们重新认识和思考经济增长的决定因素和实现机制提供了新的思路。
新兴古典经济学作为内生增长理论的重要分支,以分工与专业化为核心概念,揭示了经济内生增长机制形成的一般路径。本文以新兴古典经济增长理论为支撑,试图探寻一定经济发展背景下某一特定区域经济内生增长实现机制,为我国西部地区突破传统经济发展模式,形成以自我发展能力为驱动力的经济增长机制提供理论依据。
基于上述研究目的,本文所做的研究工作包括:第一,探讨了分工、交易效率与制度的内在演进机制,认为交易效率的改进是分工演进的内在动力,而内生于一定分工与专业化水平的制度则形成了降低交易不确定性,改善交易效率的有效约束。产权制度构成了经济系统的正式经济激励,而社会结构则确定了经济中的非正式激励,社会结构对分工演进和交易效率的改进与产权结构具有同等重要的意义。第二,进一步揭示了分工、内生比较优势与制度之间的演进路径,指出外生比较优势是分工演进与内生比较优势形成的起点,内生比较优势是一个国家或地区实现经济内生增长的核心要素,分工与专业化发展导致技术进步是推动比较优势动态演进的基本力量,而制度具有节约交易费用的功能使之成为经济内生增长机制形成过程中的重要影响因素。第三,对一定区域内外生比较优势向内生比较优势的转化以及经济内生增长能力的形成途径进行了较为深入的研究。某一区域存在的制度体系在内生比较优势和经济内生增长能力形成过程中表现出的二重性特征影响着区域经济发展的速度与效率,消除或降低制度安排引起的经济效率损失对地区经济降低交易成本、增强分享分工经济好处的能力和不断累积自我发展能力具有重要意义。
在上述理论框架下,本文对西部地区经济发展状况进行了分析与诊断,得出以下结论:西部大开发战略实施以来大量资本等要素的投入和外部力量的干预推动着西部地区的经济增长与发展,自我发展能力弱是东西部经济差距进一步拉大的根本原因,西部地区比较优势的演进与转化是该地区形成自我发展能力的一般基础,经济内生增长机制的形成将推动西部地区经济起飞。
概括起来,本文的创新之处主要在于:第一,通过对经济增长理论的梳理,较为深入地分析了经济增长理论在与经济发展实践的不断背离中展开的对经济增长影响因素研究的内生化进程,指出了内生增长理论的发展与完善将在一般层面上为解释长期经济增长现象提供理论支持;第二,以新兴古典经济增长率理论为支撑,构架了发展中国家和地区经济内生增长实现机制,使内生增长理论的研究范围得以拓展;把制度因素纳入经济内生增长机制分析框架,丰富了新兴古典经济增长理论并使之更加具有现实意义:第三,结合中国经济发展实际,设计了分工水平、交易效率等核心概念的衡量指标,对分工、交易效率与经济增长关系的科学揭示进行了探索性研究。
The study of the factors that influence the economic growth and development in less developed countries and regions and their implementation mechanisms are inseparable from development economics. Most areas in western China are typical less developed regions.The strategy of non-balanced development were implemented for about nearly two decades during China's reform and opening-up,which causes the consequence that can not be ignored. The consequence is that the economic development gap between East and West continues to widen. In order to change the situation, the government brought up the western development strategy, which is a new policy .It is a pity that the implementation of the development strategy for a decade did not achieve the desired effect. This phenomenon , along with other economic practice of a number of developing countries ,will be the evidence that neo-classical theory of economic growth can't explain the condition of economic growth in less developed countries .Endogenous growth theory makes it possible for people to recognize and consider the determinants of economic growth and the implementation mechanism and provides a new way of thinking.
New classical economics, as an important branch of endogenous growth theory, which centres on the division of labor and specialization, reveales a general system in which to achieve economic growth in the framework of some government policies . This paper, on the basis of new classical economic theory , attempts to explore a endogenous growth path to achieve the economic development in a particular aera in a certain background of economic development. At the same time, it provides a theoretical basis for China's western region to break the traditional economic development model, and form a self-development capacity-driven mechanism for economic growth .
Based on the above research purposes, the research work done in the article includes the following points. First of all, it probes into the division of labor, transaction efficiency and the internal evolution mechanisms in system , considering that an improvement in transaction efficiency is the inherent power of evolution of division of labor,while that the system which is born within a certain level of division of labor and specialization forms uncertainty to reduce transaction, improving the effective constraints of transaction efficiency . System of property rights becomes formal economic incentives from the economic system , while social structure identifies the informal economic incentives. Social structure is to evolution of division of labor what improvement in transactions efficiency to the structure of property rights. Second, it further reveals how the division of labour, endogenous comparative advantage and the system reciprocally develop and points out that evolution of division of labor and endogenous comparative advantage start from exogenous comparative advantage. Endogenous comparative advantage is a core element to achieve economic endogenous growth in a country or region . Technological progress arising from the division of labour and professional development are the fundamental forces to promote the dynamic evolution of of comparative advantage.However, the system is an influential factor in the process of forming the economy endogenous growth mechanism. This is because the system has the function of saving transaction costs . Third, it analyses the transformation from exogenous comparative advantage to Endogenous comparative advantage in a certain range and the way economy endogenous growth capacity forms further. The existing system in a certain area demonstrates duality in the course of the formation of endogenous comparative advantages and economic endogenous growth capacity , which affects the speed at which regional economy develop and efficiency , also reduces or eliminates the loss of the economic efficiency caused by the institutional arrangements.Besides, it is of great significance to regional economy , reduction of transaction costs, enhancement in sharing the economic benefits brought by the division of labor and continually building up capacity for self-development.
In the above-mentioned theoretical framework, this paper analyses and diagnoses the state of the economic development of the western region . It comes to the conclusion that since the implementation of the stragety of the western development, input of a large quantity of elements such as capital , etc. and the intervention of external forces promote economic growth and developmentof the western region. It is the fundamental reason why the gap between east and west continues to widen that the capacity for self-development is weak. Because the evolution of comparative advantage from the existing conditions of the economic development in the western area makes foundation for the general formation of the capacity for self-development, the formation of economic endogenous growth mechanism will push economy in the western regions forward .
To sum up, the main innovations in this article are:
First, comb the theory of economic growth, further analyse endogenous process of influential factors on economic growth ,the theory of economic growth continually departuring from the practice of economic development growth , ,and point out the development and improvement of the endogenous growth theory provides theoretical support for explanation of the phenomenon of long-term economic growth at general level.
Second, new classical theory of economic growth as the support, frame the mechanism that makes economic endogenous growth in developing countries and regions , extending the scope of the study of the endogenous growth theory. Put the system factors into economic analysis within the framework of endogenous growth mechanisms, stressing the impact of non-economic factors on economic growth and development. This enriches the New Classical growth theory and makes it more practically significant.
Third, according to China's actual economic development,work out how to measure some core concepts such as the division level, transaction efficiency. The exploratory scientific research into the relationship between division of labor ,trade efficiency and economic growth is carried out.
新兴古典经济学作为内生增长理论的重要分支,以分工与专业化为核心概念,揭示了经济内生增长机制形成的一般路径。本文以新兴古典经济增长理论为支撑,试图探寻一定经济发展背景下某一特定区域经济内生增长实现机制,为我国西部地区突破传统经济发展模式,形成以自我发展能力为驱动力的经济增长机制提供理论依据。
基于上述研究目的,本文所做的研究工作包括:第一,探讨了分工、交易效率与制度的内在演进机制,认为交易效率的改进是分工演进的内在动力,而内生于一定分工与专业化水平的制度则形成了降低交易不确定性,改善交易效率的有效约束。产权制度构成了经济系统的正式经济激励,而社会结构则确定了经济中的非正式激励,社会结构对分工演进和交易效率的改进与产权结构具有同等重要的意义。第二,进一步揭示了分工、内生比较优势与制度之间的演进路径,指出外生比较优势是分工演进与内生比较优势形成的起点,内生比较优势是一个国家或地区实现经济内生增长的核心要素,分工与专业化发展导致技术进步是推动比较优势动态演进的基本力量,而制度具有节约交易费用的功能使之成为经济内生增长机制形成过程中的重要影响因素。第三,对一定区域内外生比较优势向内生比较优势的转化以及经济内生增长能力的形成途径进行了较为深入的研究。某一区域存在的制度体系在内生比较优势和经济内生增长能力形成过程中表现出的二重性特征影响着区域经济发展的速度与效率,消除或降低制度安排引起的经济效率损失对地区经济降低交易成本、增强分享分工经济好处的能力和不断累积自我发展能力具有重要意义。
在上述理论框架下,本文对西部地区经济发展状况进行了分析与诊断,得出以下结论:西部大开发战略实施以来大量资本等要素的投入和外部力量的干预推动着西部地区的经济增长与发展,自我发展能力弱是东西部经济差距进一步拉大的根本原因,西部地区比较优势的演进与转化是该地区形成自我发展能力的一般基础,经济内生增长机制的形成将推动西部地区经济起飞。
概括起来,本文的创新之处主要在于:第一,通过对经济增长理论的梳理,较为深入地分析了经济增长理论在与经济发展实践的不断背离中展开的对经济增长影响因素研究的内生化进程,指出了内生增长理论的发展与完善将在一般层面上为解释长期经济增长现象提供理论支持;第二,以新兴古典经济增长率理论为支撑,构架了发展中国家和地区经济内生增长实现机制,使内生增长理论的研究范围得以拓展;把制度因素纳入经济内生增长机制分析框架,丰富了新兴古典经济增长理论并使之更加具有现实意义:第三,结合中国经济发展实际,设计了分工水平、交易效率等核心概念的衡量指标,对分工、交易效率与经济增长关系的科学揭示进行了探索性研究。
The study of the factors that influence the economic growth and development in less developed countries and regions and their implementation mechanisms are inseparable from development economics. Most areas in western China are typical less developed regions.The strategy of non-balanced development were implemented for about nearly two decades during China's reform and opening-up,which causes the consequence that can not be ignored. The consequence is that the economic development gap between East and West continues to widen. In order to change the situation, the government brought up the western development strategy, which is a new policy .It is a pity that the implementation of the development strategy for a decade did not achieve the desired effect. This phenomenon , along with other economic practice of a number of developing countries ,will be the evidence that neo-classical theory of economic growth can't explain the condition of economic growth in less developed countries .Endogenous growth theory makes it possible for people to recognize and consider the determinants of economic growth and the implementation mechanism and provides a new way of thinking.
New classical economics, as an important branch of endogenous growth theory, which centres on the division of labor and specialization, reveales a general system in which to achieve economic growth in the framework of some government policies . This paper, on the basis of new classical economic theory , attempts to explore a endogenous growth path to achieve the economic development in a particular aera in a certain background of economic development. At the same time, it provides a theoretical basis for China's western region to break the traditional economic development model, and form a self-development capacity-driven mechanism for economic growth .
Based on the above research purposes, the research work done in the article includes the following points. First of all, it probes into the division of labor, transaction efficiency and the internal evolution mechanisms in system , considering that an improvement in transaction efficiency is the inherent power of evolution of division of labor,while that the system which is born within a certain level of division of labor and specialization forms uncertainty to reduce transaction, improving the effective constraints of transaction efficiency . System of property rights becomes formal economic incentives from the economic system , while social structure identifies the informal economic incentives. Social structure is to evolution of division of labor what improvement in transactions efficiency to the structure of property rights. Second, it further reveals how the division of labour, endogenous comparative advantage and the system reciprocally develop and points out that evolution of division of labor and endogenous comparative advantage start from exogenous comparative advantage. Endogenous comparative advantage is a core element to achieve economic endogenous growth in a country or region . Technological progress arising from the division of labour and professional development are the fundamental forces to promote the dynamic evolution of of comparative advantage.However, the system is an influential factor in the process of forming the economy endogenous growth mechanism. This is because the system has the function of saving transaction costs . Third, it analyses the transformation from exogenous comparative advantage to Endogenous comparative advantage in a certain range and the way economy endogenous growth capacity forms further. The existing system in a certain area demonstrates duality in the course of the formation of endogenous comparative advantages and economic endogenous growth capacity , which affects the speed at which regional economy develop and efficiency , also reduces or eliminates the loss of the economic efficiency caused by the institutional arrangements.Besides, it is of great significance to regional economy , reduction of transaction costs, enhancement in sharing the economic benefits brought by the division of labor and continually building up capacity for self-development.
In the above-mentioned theoretical framework, this paper analyses and diagnoses the state of the economic development of the western region . It comes to the conclusion that since the implementation of the stragety of the western development, input of a large quantity of elements such as capital , etc. and the intervention of external forces promote economic growth and developmentof the western region. It is the fundamental reason why the gap between east and west continues to widen that the capacity for self-development is weak. Because the evolution of comparative advantage from the existing conditions of the economic development in the western area makes foundation for the general formation of the capacity for self-development, the formation of economic endogenous growth mechanism will push economy in the western regions forward .
To sum up, the main innovations in this article are:
First, comb the theory of economic growth, further analyse endogenous process of influential factors on economic growth ,the theory of economic growth continually departuring from the practice of economic development growth , ,and point out the development and improvement of the endogenous growth theory provides theoretical support for explanation of the phenomenon of long-term economic growth at general level.
Second, new classical theory of economic growth as the support, frame the mechanism that makes economic endogenous growth in developing countries and regions , extending the scope of the study of the endogenous growth theory. Put the system factors into economic analysis within the framework of endogenous growth mechanisms, stressing the impact of non-economic factors on economic growth and development. This enriches the New Classical growth theory and makes it more practically significant.
Third, according to China's actual economic development,work out how to measure some core concepts such as the division level, transaction efficiency. The exploratory scientific research into the relationship between division of labor ,trade efficiency and economic growth is carried out.
引文
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