中小企业排污监管机制研究
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摘要
随着人类步入二十一世纪,经济发展与资源环境的矛盾日益显现,全球对生态环境的重视程度不断提高。改革开放三十年,我国的经济发展取得了举世瞩目的成就,但为此付出的环境代价也触目惊心。环境问题的日渐积累,其危害后果正逐步显现,甚至到了集中爆发时期。各国学者加强了对环境规制政策措施的研究,各种环境保护政策也得到了不同程度的应用和发展。但是,经济构成超过半壁江山的中小企业,对其排污行为的监管措施却始终收效甚微。现行的监管措施,都是针对所有企业适用,应用于大企业的同时,也被应用于广大中小企业。由于中小企业数量巨大、分布广泛,监管的执行成本之高是监管主体难以承担的。因此,本文对中小企业的排污监管机制进行研究,力图找到对中小企业适用的排污监管机制。
     本文的主要研究内容包括:
     ①中小企业排污监管现状研究
     对中小企业的特点以及中小企业排污监管的现状及困境进行了总结,并对中小企业监管难的内部原因和外部原因进行了分析。此外,还基于重庆市沙坪坝区污染源普查数据库的资料,利用回归分析方法,实证研究了规模与企业排污强度的关系,该分析证实在相同的资源消耗条件下,规模越大的企业排污强度越小,进一步说明了加强对中小企业排污监管的必要性和重要性。
     ②基于直接模式的中小企业排污监管策略研究
     通过构建环境监管机构与企业的排污监管博弈,研究了监管机构的最优监管策略,分析了企业边际治污成本、监管机构监管效率以及处罚力度等对最优监管策略的影响,以及监管机构的监管成本、监管效率和处罚力度、排污许可证价格等对企业排污策略的影响,并提出了相应的政策建议。
     ③基于间接模式的中小企业排污监管策略研究
     基于中小企业不完全排污监管的框架,建立了在收取排污税和提供补贴两种机制下的中小企业排污监管博弈模型,对中小企业排污监管的间接模式进行了研究,分析了间接模式下被规制厂商或未被规制厂商平均排放率,以及排污税率的变化对排放漏出的影响,并对比了完全不规制、不完全规制以及完全规制下的企业均衡产量和企业的总排放量。
     ④基于集中治污的中小企业排污定价模型研究
     建立了中小企业与治污公司的博弈模型,研究了集中治污模式的实施条件以及排污价格的制定,对比分析了单独治污和集中治污模式下的中小企业产量、利润,治污企业利润以及社会福利。
     本文的主要研究结论有:
     ①通过实证分析发现,企业规模与企业的排污强度存在显著的负相关关系。
     ②在直接模式下,企业边际治污成本较高,监管机构监管效率或处罚力度较低时,应加大监管力度;排污许可证价格对企业排污策略没有影响,因此,政府若适当提高许可证价格,并将部分收入用于提高监管效率,则可在降低企业偷排概率的同时降低监管机构的检查频率和监管成本,从而提高整个社会福利;在间接模式下,被监管企业(大企业)平均排放率的降低能够促使未被监管企业(小企业)总排放量的降低;增加对被监管企业的排污税或补贴,都会导致未被监管企业总排放量的增加;产业整合会降低未被监管厂商的总排放量;不监管时厂商的总产量最高,完全监管时厂商的总产量最低。但是,不完全监管时的总排放量可能高于不监管时的总排放量,完全监管时的总排放量也可能高于不完全监管时的总排放量,这取决于具体条件。
     ③若采用完全市场化运作的集中治污,则会出现生产企业的产品价格上涨,产量降低,社会福利受到损失,即,出现“市场失灵”的情况。因此,政府应介入集中治污的干预,以提高社会福利为目标设定治污企业的收费价格上限;若政府设定的价格上限合理,则不但可以保证社会福利不被降低,甚至可以增加社会福利;集中治污在保持排污企业的利润水平的同时,使得他们能够集中精力发展主业,在同行的竞争中处于有利地位,是一种更为科学、合理的治污模式。
     据此,本文认为,要做好中小企业的排污监管,一是做好大企业的排污监管促进大企业采用清洁生产方式,降低排污率;二是优化命令与控制的监管手段,这是污染集中治理的前提条件;三是在对大企业进行排污监管的时候,必须根据产业的实际,制定不同的排污费或补贴标准,以达到间接监管中小企业排污行为的目的。最后就是要加强市场化的集中治污机制,提高中小企业污染的末端治理水平。
     论文主要具有以下创新:
     ①基于笔者负责的科研项目“沙坪坝区第一次全国污染源普查”所获一手数据,对我国中小企业的排污监管现状实证研究,得出了排污强度与企业规模的关系。
     ②基于不完全排污监管的框架,建立了在收取排污税和提供补贴两种机制下的中小企业排污监管博弈模型,提出了对中小企业排污监管间接模式下的最优监管策略。
     ③考虑在多家中小企业集中的地区,由一家专业治污公司对所有中小企业排出的污染物进行治理,建立基于集中治污的中小企业排污定价博弈模型,提出了市场化运作下和政府干预下的集中治污最优定价策略。
With the advent of the 21st century, the contradictions between economic development and environment become increasingly apparent, the global emphasis on environmental protection continues to increase. Three decades of reform and opening up, China's economic development has made remarkable achievements, but the environmental costs are also shocking. The gradual accumulation of environmental problems, its harmful consequences are gradually revealed, even to the concentration of the outbreak period. Scholars from various countries have strengthened the research work about environmental regulatory policies and measures, a variety of regulatory policy has been varying degrees of application and development. However, although the SMEs made up more than half of the GDP, the regulation policies and measures about its emission behaviors have always developed slowly. The existing regulatory measures are applicable for all enterprises. Due to the large number of SMEs and widely distributed, there is no regulation subject can afford the high cost of implementation. Therefore, this thesis studies the emission control of SMEs, and tries to find the regulatory mechanisms which are applicable to SMEs.
     The main contents of this thesis include:
     ①The present status of environmental regulations for SMEs. The characteristics of SMEs, as well as emission control status of SMEs and the dilemma were summarized, the internal and external causes are analyzed. In addition, used regression analysis method, the thesis empirical studied the relationship between the enterprises size and emission level based on the database of Chongqing Shapingba district pollution sources census information. The analysis confirmed that the resource consumption in the same conditions, the larger the enterprise the less emission, further illustrates the importance of strengthening the emission control of SMEs.
     ②The direct pattern-based environmental regulation strategy study of SMEs. The thesis build the emission control game mode between regulatory agency and enterprise, and fund the optimal regulatory strategy of regulatory agency, and analyzed the corporate marginal pollution costs, regulatory efficiency, as well as the penalties’s impact on optimal regulatory strategy. And the impacts of regulatory cost, regulatory efficiency, penalties, as well as the permit price on enterprise’s emission strategy were analyzed, and put forward relevant policy recommendations.
     ③The study of SMEs environment regulation mechanisms based on indirect pattern. Based on the framework of imperfect competition, the thesis analyzed the indirect pattern of SMEs environment regulation in the condition of collecting taxes and providing subsidies.
     ④The study of pricing model of SMEs’pollutant emission based on centralized pollution control. The thesis developed a game model of SMEs and the pollution control company, studied the conditions to assure the mode of centralized management of pollutants to implement, and compared the SMEs’product quantity and profits, the pollution control company’s profit and the social welfare under individual control mode and centralized control mode.
     The main conclusions of this study include:
     ①There was a significant negative correlation between the enterprise and emission intensity.
     ②Under direct mode, with the emission fee and penalties increasing, regulation costs decreasing, the corporations’incentive to emission by stealth will decrease so that the governor could control pollution more effectively. Under indirect mode, the reduction of regulated enterprises’(large enterprises) average emission rate can cause the reduction of unregulated enterprises’(SMEs) total emissions. The increase of emission taxes or subsidies will lead to the increase of unregulated enterprises’total emissions. The industry consolidation will reduce the unregulated enterprises’total emissions. The maximum output for no regulation, and the minimum output for complete regulation. But, the total emissions of incomplete regulation may exceed the total emissions of no regulation, as well as the total emissions of complete regulation may exceed the total emission of incomplete regulation. It is up to some specific conditions.
     ③If adopting a centralized pollution control with full marketization, the price of product will get higher, production quantity will get lower, social welfare will be decreased, that is, a "market failure" situation. As a result, the government should intervene in the management of centralized pollution control to improve social welfare as the goal setting pollution charges price cap companies. If the government set the price cap is reasonable, then not only can not be reduced to ensure social welfare, or even increase social welfare. Centralized control is a better mode of pollution control as it increases the SMEs’product quantity and social welfare.
     Accordingly, this thesis makes the conclusion there are three measures to strengthen the SMEs’environment regulation. Firstly, to strengthen the environment regulation on large enterprises, promote them adopt cleaner production methods and reduce emission rate; Secondly, to optimize the command and control of environment regulation means, and this is a prerequisite for centralized pollution control; Thirdly, to indirectly regulate SMEs’emission by set different standards of emission fee and subsidy according to industry when regulates the large enterprises. Finally, to strengthen the market-based pollution control mechanisms and improve the end treatment level of SMEs’emission.
     This thesis has the following innovations:
     ①Based on the first-hand statistics from the research project "Shapingba the first national census on pollution sources" in the charge of author, this thesis made an empirical research on the status of environmental regulation of SME, and obtained the relationship between emission intensity and the scale of enterprises.
     ②Based on the framework of incomplete environmental regulation, this thesis established game models of SMEs emission control under tow mechanisms of emission taxes and subsidiesm and put forward the optimal policies for SMEs emission control under incomplete environmental regulation.
     ③Considering that a professional company control the pollution from numbers of SMEs in an area, this thesis developes a pricing game model for centralized pollution control, and put forward the optimal pricing policies under martetization and government intervention.
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