减排研发激励政策研究
|
摘要
在当前全球环境污染和气候变暖的严峻形势下,鼓励和支持减排研发创新具有非常紧迫的现实意义。对于政府来说,在一定的环境政策下制定和使用技术激励政策是提高减排技术水平、实现减排目标的重要手段之一。技术激励政策在产品创新和以降低成本为特征的程序创新中的应用已经有了丰富的研究成果,近些年来在减排研发创新领域的应用也引起了国外一些学者的关注,但国内相关研究还比较少见。已有的文献集中于探讨排放税对减排技术研发的激励作用,较少关注既定的排放税下技术激励政策的选择问题。从目前减排事业发展的实际需要出发,本文对既定的排放税下技术激励政策的政策效应进行系统的研究,旨在补充和丰富减排技术创新中的激励政策效应研究,同时在实践上为政府在环境政策条件下技术激励政策的有效应用以及为推动我国的节能减排事业提供理论支撑。本文以产业组织理论有关技术激励政策的研究为基础,从政府的角度出发,设定了三种供政府选择的政策使用类型为研究对象:单独使用补贴或者合作政策以及二者一起应用(简称为组合政策)。本文在外生的排放税和溢出率条件下,建立不同政策情形下减排研发的博弈模型,通过对每一种政策类型的绩效的分析,从理论上展开对各政策类型的作用及相互之间的差异以及政府该选择政策类型等研究内容的深入探讨。
本文的主要研究工作和研究结论体现在以下几个方面:
①在已有文献的研发决策模型基础上,考虑外生的排放税和溢出率,建立了无技术激励政策情形——企业不合作研发情形下的减排研发决策模型,为研究各类型政策的作用提供了比较的基础。对不合作情形下减排研发决策的研究表明,溢出率对企业的最优研发水平和最优产出没有影响,但是企业的利润和社会福利随溢出递增。最优研发水平随税率递增;对于利润和社会福利,则分别存在两个临界税率,低于对应的临界税率,利润随税率提高单调递减,而社会福利随税率递增;反之则利润递增,而社会福利则递减。
②在无技术激励政策情形下的减排研发决策模型基础上,考虑政府的参与,建立了单一补贴、单一合作和组合政策下的减排研发决策模型,计算各类政策下的绩效并进行相互比较,揭示了各类政策的作用及相互差异。研究表明,补贴政策下最优补贴率随排放税率递减,甚至可能为负,因此对减排研发水平的提高既可能有激励作用也可能有抑制作用;合作政策对减排研发水平的提高有正向的促进作用;而组合政策对提高社会福利有正向的促进作用。各政策对研发水平的激励作用的相对大小取决于排放税率和溢出率;组合政策下的社会福利高于单一政策下的社会福利,单一补贴和单一合作政策下的社会福利相对大小取决于排放税率。
③在分析各政策效应的基础上,建立政府选择政策和企业行为之间的互动博弈模型,通过求解博弈均衡的结果发现了在一定排放税率和溢出率条件下动态选择最优技术激励政策的规律。研究表明,产业的溢出率低于临界值时,选择组合政策为最优的技术激励政策,企业采取研发合作行为;当产业的溢出率高于临界值时,补贴政策为最优的技术激励政策,企业采取不合作研发行为。
Because of global environmental pollution and warming climate, it is urgently significant to encourage and promote innovation in abatement R&D. To make and employ incentive policy with environment policy is one of main measures to promote technology and abate emissions for government. There are wide research on incentive technology policies in the area of product innovation and process innovation represented as cost reduction, in nearly years some overseas scholar had concerns on its use in environmental technology innovation, but there are less theoretical research works conducted by Chinese scholars. Some perspectives for incentive policy are concerned in those literatures, but from the view of current development of emission abatement, it is necessary to forward the research on real use of policy in a view as a whole system. By the dissertation, it is expected to theoretically supplement and rich the employment of incentive policies in environmental technology innovation, and to provide some valuable reference and suggestion for the employment of policies and the development of emission abatement in china.
The dissertation is based on the research related incentive technology policy for R&D in Industry Organization Theory. From the view of government, three ways of emploment for stimulating emission abatement R&D will be discussed: subsidization, cooperation and using both (in short, combination). A model is built based on models of D’Aspremont et al., to analyze the performance of incentive policy on emission abatement R&D, with exogenous emission tax and spillovers. By the model the equilibrium outputs, R&D level, profits and social welfare are computed under each policy for comparison, and some important problems are discussed that whether one policy will be effectively employed as well as how to decide the best incentive policy.
The main research works and conclusion of this dissertation can be summarized as below:
①on the baisis of models of D’Aspremont et al., with exogenous emission tax, to build the decision model for the base case of emission abatement R&D that is without any incentive policy employed, which provide the basis for analyzing each policy and their difference. By the analysis on the model it is found that spillovers have no effect on best R&D level and the best product outputs but the profit and the social welfare increase to spillovers. The best R&D level increases to emission tax. But for profit and social welfare, there are two critical value of tax for them, if below the corresponding critical value, profit increases to tax while social welfare decreases, if beyond the corresponding critical value, profit decreases to tax while social welfare increases.
②on the basis of model for the case without any incentive technology policy, to build the emission abatement R&D decision models for the policy cases: subsidization, cooperation and combination. To compute and compare the merits of different policies’to recognize their performances, and discuss the condition for the combination to be used effectively in consideration of the reaction of firms’behavior to the combination. It is found that in subsidization the best subsidy rate decreases to emission tax, even to be negative, which means subsidization has functions of promoting or restraining R&D level. But the policy of cooperation plays a driving role in R&D level. The policy of combination performs better in social welfare than each individual incentive policy. Which policy outputs more R&D level depends on the spillovers rate or emission tax rate. As for subsidization and cooperation, which outputs more social welfare depends on emission tax rate.
③to build the mutual reaction game model between selection of policy and firms’behavior, and then to compute equilibrium results in order to find the rule for dynamic selection of incentive technology policy with emission tax and spillovers. It is found that, if the spillovers rate is lower than the critical value the best choice is he combination and at the same time firms take cooperative action, but if the rate higher than that value the best policy is subsidization and firms take non-cooperative action.
本文的主要研究工作和研究结论体现在以下几个方面:
①在已有文献的研发决策模型基础上,考虑外生的排放税和溢出率,建立了无技术激励政策情形——企业不合作研发情形下的减排研发决策模型,为研究各类型政策的作用提供了比较的基础。对不合作情形下减排研发决策的研究表明,溢出率对企业的最优研发水平和最优产出没有影响,但是企业的利润和社会福利随溢出递增。最优研发水平随税率递增;对于利润和社会福利,则分别存在两个临界税率,低于对应的临界税率,利润随税率提高单调递减,而社会福利随税率递增;反之则利润递增,而社会福利则递减。
②在无技术激励政策情形下的减排研发决策模型基础上,考虑政府的参与,建立了单一补贴、单一合作和组合政策下的减排研发决策模型,计算各类政策下的绩效并进行相互比较,揭示了各类政策的作用及相互差异。研究表明,补贴政策下最优补贴率随排放税率递减,甚至可能为负,因此对减排研发水平的提高既可能有激励作用也可能有抑制作用;合作政策对减排研发水平的提高有正向的促进作用;而组合政策对提高社会福利有正向的促进作用。各政策对研发水平的激励作用的相对大小取决于排放税率和溢出率;组合政策下的社会福利高于单一政策下的社会福利,单一补贴和单一合作政策下的社会福利相对大小取决于排放税率。
③在分析各政策效应的基础上,建立政府选择政策和企业行为之间的互动博弈模型,通过求解博弈均衡的结果发现了在一定排放税率和溢出率条件下动态选择最优技术激励政策的规律。研究表明,产业的溢出率低于临界值时,选择组合政策为最优的技术激励政策,企业采取研发合作行为;当产业的溢出率高于临界值时,补贴政策为最优的技术激励政策,企业采取不合作研发行为。
Because of global environmental pollution and warming climate, it is urgently significant to encourage and promote innovation in abatement R&D. To make and employ incentive policy with environment policy is one of main measures to promote technology and abate emissions for government. There are wide research on incentive technology policies in the area of product innovation and process innovation represented as cost reduction, in nearly years some overseas scholar had concerns on its use in environmental technology innovation, but there are less theoretical research works conducted by Chinese scholars. Some perspectives for incentive policy are concerned in those literatures, but from the view of current development of emission abatement, it is necessary to forward the research on real use of policy in a view as a whole system. By the dissertation, it is expected to theoretically supplement and rich the employment of incentive policies in environmental technology innovation, and to provide some valuable reference and suggestion for the employment of policies and the development of emission abatement in china.
The dissertation is based on the research related incentive technology policy for R&D in Industry Organization Theory. From the view of government, three ways of emploment for stimulating emission abatement R&D will be discussed: subsidization, cooperation and using both (in short, combination). A model is built based on models of D’Aspremont et al., to analyze the performance of incentive policy on emission abatement R&D, with exogenous emission tax and spillovers. By the model the equilibrium outputs, R&D level, profits and social welfare are computed under each policy for comparison, and some important problems are discussed that whether one policy will be effectively employed as well as how to decide the best incentive policy.
The main research works and conclusion of this dissertation can be summarized as below:
①on the baisis of models of D’Aspremont et al., with exogenous emission tax, to build the decision model for the base case of emission abatement R&D that is without any incentive policy employed, which provide the basis for analyzing each policy and their difference. By the analysis on the model it is found that spillovers have no effect on best R&D level and the best product outputs but the profit and the social welfare increase to spillovers. The best R&D level increases to emission tax. But for profit and social welfare, there are two critical value of tax for them, if below the corresponding critical value, profit increases to tax while social welfare decreases, if beyond the corresponding critical value, profit decreases to tax while social welfare increases.
②on the basis of model for the case without any incentive technology policy, to build the emission abatement R&D decision models for the policy cases: subsidization, cooperation and combination. To compute and compare the merits of different policies’to recognize their performances, and discuss the condition for the combination to be used effectively in consideration of the reaction of firms’behavior to the combination. It is found that in subsidization the best subsidy rate decreases to emission tax, even to be negative, which means subsidization has functions of promoting or restraining R&D level. But the policy of cooperation plays a driving role in R&D level. The policy of combination performs better in social welfare than each individual incentive policy. Which policy outputs more R&D level depends on the spillovers rate or emission tax rate. As for subsidization and cooperation, which outputs more social welfare depends on emission tax rate.
③to build the mutual reaction game model between selection of policy and firms’behavior, and then to compute equilibrium results in order to find the rule for dynamic selection of incentive technology policy with emission tax and spillovers. It is found that, if the spillovers rate is lower than the critical value the best choice is he combination and at the same time firms take cooperative action, but if the rate higher than that value the best policy is subsidization and firms take non-cooperative action.
引文
1中国税务学会.在我国建立环保税制问题专题研究报告[R].2000.6.
傅家骥. 1998.技术创新学[M].北京,清华大学出版社.
葛泽慧,胡其英. 2006.具有内生技术共享的合作研发决策分析[J].科研管理, 27(5): 45 ~52.
郭丽红,薛伟贤. 2004.垂直性R&D合作的成本分配研究[J].西安理工大学学报, 20(1): 100-104.
郭晓川.1998.企业网络合作化技术创新及其模式比较[J].科学管理研究, (10): 14-15.
侯光明,艾凤义. 2006.基于混合溢出的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理工程学报, 20(4): 94~97.
侯汉平,王浣尘. 2001. R&D知识溢出效应模型分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 21 (9) :29-32.
霍沛军,宣国良. 2000.纵向一体化与R&D投资[J].上海交通大学学报. 34(11):1562-1565.
霍沛军,宣国良. 2001.纵向一体化前后上游R&D投资的比较[J].系统工程学报. 16(1): 36-38.
霍沛军,宣国良. 2002.纵向一体化对下游R&D投资的效应[J].管理工程学报. 16(1): 44-46.
霍沛军,陈继祥. 2002.针对国内双寡头的最优R&D补贴策略[J].系统工程学报,17(2):115-120,166.
李忠,陈继祥. 2003.存在成果溢出和投资溢出下的研发组织分析[J] .系统工程理论方法运用, 12 (2) :116 -119.
刘卫民. 2006.内生溢出与R&D竞争合作的激励问题[J].管理工程学报, 20:1-5.
骆品亮,向盛斌. 2001. R&D的外部性及其内部化机制研究[J].科研管理, 22(5):56~63.
骆品亮,周勇,郭晖. 2004.虚拟研发组织的知识转移机制:一个文献综述[J].研究与发展管理, 16(5): 18-25.
生延超. 2008.创新投入补贴还是创新产品补贴:技术联盟的政府策略选择[J].中国管理科学, 16(6):184-192.
苏越良,徐禾芳,王爱虎. 2005.网络化制造环境中技术创新的基本特点及其不确定性研究[J]. 科学管理研究, 23(3): 1~5.
王渊,张彤,陈立军,许益峰. 2006.基于资源依赖理论的供应链联盟成因分析及其发展策略[J].科技进步与对策, 23(4):173-176.
吴玉萍、董锁成,2002.北京市环境政策评价研究,城市环境与城市生态[J]. 4:23-33.
夏永久、陈兴鹏、李娜,2006.西北河谷型城市环境政策评价研究———以兰州市为例,兰州大学学报(自然科学版) [J]. 4:11-25.
徐雨森. 2006.内向型企业研发联盟发展中的政府推动作用分析[J].科技政策与管理, 20:20-23.
杨仕辉,熊艳,王红玲. 2003.吸收能力、研发合作创新激励与补贴政策[J].中国管理科学, 11(1): 95～100.
张维迎. 1996.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社.
郑德渊,李湛. 2001. ,基于纵向控制框架的上游企业R&D研究[J].科研管理, 22(1): 45~50.
郑德渊,李湛. 2002.具有双向溢出效应的上游企业R&D政策研究[J].管理工程学报, 16(1): 84~85.
周青,曾德明,朱丹,方放. 2005.企业R&D网络化的动态博弈模型[J].预测, 24(3): 61-65.
Aghion. P., Tirole, J. 1994. On the Management of Innovation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 1185-1209.
Aggeri, F., Hatchuel, A., 1998. Managing creation and learning of new expertise in automobile project development. In: Lundin, R.A., Midler, C. _Eds.., Projects as Arenas for Renewal and Learning Processes. Kluwer Academic Publishers, NY.
Aggeri,F. 1999. Environmental policies and innovation: A knowledge-based perspective on cooperative approaches. Research Policy, 28:699-717.
Alsleben, C. 2005. The downside of knowledge spillovers: an explanation for the dispersion of hugh-tech industries. Journal of Economics. 84(3):217-248.
Audretsch,D.,1989. Joint R&D and industrial policy in Japan. In:Link, A., Tassey, G.(Eds.), Cooperative R&D: the Industry-University-Government Relationship. Kluwer Academic Publishers. London.
Amabile T. M., Patterson, C., Mueller, J., Wojcik, T. 2001. Academic-practitioner collaboration in management research: A case of cross-profession collaboration [J].Academy of Management Journal, 44(2): 418-431.
Anand, K.S., Mendelson, H.. 1997. Information and Organization for Horizontal Multi-Control[J]. Management Science, 43(12):1609-1627.
Anderson, E., Weitz, B.. 1989. Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial Channel Dyads[J]. Marketing Science, 8(4):310-323.
Axelrod, R. , 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation[M]. New York: Harper/Collins. Atallah, G.., 2002. Vertical R&D Spillover, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation[J]. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 11(3): 179-209.
Atallah, G.., 2005. R&D Cooperation with asymmetric spillovers[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 38(3):919-936.
Arrow,K.J. 1962.“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions,”in Nelson, R.R.(ed.),The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity[M], Princeton,N.J.,Princeton University Press.
Barrett S., 1994. Strategic environmental policy and international trade, J. Public Econom. 54(3)., 325-338.
Balakrishnan, S., Wernerfelt, B., 1986,.Technical Change, competition, and Vertical Integration[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 7(4): 347-359.
Bagwell, k. and Staiger, R., W. 1992. The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in battles for monopoly. International Economic Review, 33:795-816.
Bagwell, k. Staiger, R., 1994. The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in oligopolistic industries. Journal of International Economics, 36:126-150.
Banerjee,S, Lin,p., 2000, Vertical research joint ventures[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19:285-301.
Baranson, J., 1990. Transnational Strategic Alliances Why, What, Where, and How [J]. Multinational Business, 2:54-61.
Bastos, P., 2001. Inter-firm collaboration and learning: The case of the Japanese automobile industry [J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18(4): 423-441.
Beath J., Poyago-Theotoky J., Ulph D., 1998. Organization design and information- sharing in a research joint venture with spillovers[J]. Bulletin of Economic Research , 50(1): 47~59.
Brockhoff, K., 1992. R&D Cooperation between firms: A perceived transaction cost perspective [J]. Management Science, 38 (4): 514-524.
Bhattacharya,S.J..Glazer and Sappington. 1992. Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures[J].Journal of Economic Theory, 56:43-69.
Bruce,M.L.,F.Leverick and D.Wilson. 1995. Success of Factor Collaboration Alliance[J].Journal of Marketing,.57:33-46.
Bruno Cassiman, 2000. Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information[J],International journal of industrial organization 18:283-314.
Bondt,R., 1996. Spillovers and Innovative Activities[J]. International Journal of Industrial organization. 15:1-28.
Bernstein,J.I., 1989. R&D and Intra-industry Spillovers: an Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 56:249-269.
Bernstein,J.I, Nadiri, M.I. 1988. Intra-Industry R&D Spillvoers, Rates of Return, and Productivity. American economic review. 78(2): 429-434.
Brod, A. and Shivakumar, R., 1997. R&D Cooperation and Joint Exploitation of R&D. Canadian Journal of Economics. 30(3):673-684.
Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R., 2002. R&D Cooperation and spillovers: some empirical evidence form Belgium[J]. American Economic Review. 92(4):1169-1184.
Coe, D.T. and Helpman, E., 1995. International R&D spillovers[J]. European Economic Review[J]. 39:859-887.
Chaudhuri,P., 1995. Technological Asymmetry and Joint Product Development[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13:23-39.
Chiesa, V., Manzini, R., 1998. Organizing for technological collaborations: a managerial perspective[J]. R&D Management, 28:199-212.
Choi, C. J., Lee, S. H. 1997. A knowledge - based view of cooperative inter - organizational relationships[C], in P. W. Beamish and J. P. Killing, Editors. Cooperative Strategies: North American perspectives [C].San Francisco: New Lexington Press..
Coase, R.H. , 1937. The Nature of the Firm [J]. Economic, 4: 386-405.
Cohen, W. M., Levinthal, D.A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128-152.
Cheng L.,1997. Optimal trade and technology policies: dynamic leakages[J]. International Economic Review. 28(3):136-149.
Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, N. Mamingi, and H. Wang, 2001. Inspections, Pollution Prices, and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China,Ecological Economics.[J] 36: 487—498.
D’Aspremont, Jacquemin, 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers[J], American Economic Review, 78:1133-1137.
De Bondt, R., 1996. Dpillovers and Innovative Activities. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 15:1-28.
De Bondt R,Henriques L., 1995. Strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers[J]. Canadian Journal of Econornics, 28(3):656-674.
Dutta,S.&Weiss,A.M., 1997. The relationship between a firm’s level of technological innovativeness and its pattern of partnership agreements[J].Management Science, 43: 343-356.
Dyer,J.H.&Singh,H., 1998. The relational view:Cooperative strategy and the source of interorganizational competitive advantage[J].Academic Management Review 23: 660-679.
Erat, S. & Kavadias, S., 2005. Introduction of new technologies to competing industrial customers Georgia Institute of Technology. Working paper.
Fosfuri,A. and Ronde, T., 2004. hign-tech cluster, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws. International Journal of Industrial Organaization. 22(1):45-65.
Geert Davsten, Gerard Kok and Maaike Vaandrager,, 1998. Creating Win-Win situation: Partner Selection in Strategy And Strategic Technology Alliance [C]. Technology Strategy And Strategic Alliance, Proceedings R&D Management Conference, Avila.
Goto, A. and Suzuki, K., 1989. R&D capital, rate of return on R&D investment and spillovers of R&D in Janpanese Manufacturing Industries. Review of Economics and Statistics. 71(4): 555-564.
Goldberg, P., K., 1995. Strategic export promotion in the absence of government precommitment[J]. International Economic Review, 5: 407-426.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E., 1991. Trade, knowledge spillovers. European Economic Review. 35(2,3):517-526.
Glaister, K.W., Buckley, P.J., 1996. Strategic Motives for International Alliance Formation [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 33(3): 301-332.
Grant, R. M., 1996. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational capability as knowledge integration, Organization Science, 7(4): 375-388.
Grossman S. J., Hart O D., 1986. The Cost and Benefit of Ownership: A Theory of Lateral and Vertical Integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4):691–719.
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., Zaheer, A. 2000, Strategic Networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3):203-215.
Gulati R., Singh H., 1998. The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43 (4): 781-814.
Gupta, S. & Loulou, R., 1998. Process innovation, product differentiation, and channel structure: Strategic incentives in a duopoly [J]. Marketing Science 17 (4): 301~316.
Gupta, S., R. E. Romano., 1998. Monitoring the Principal with Multiple Agents [J]. The Rand Journal of Economics. 29(2):427-442.
Hagedoorn, J., 1990. Organizational Modes of Inter-firm Co-operation and Technology Transfer[J]. Technovation, 10(1): 17-30.
Hagedoorn,J., 1993. Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: interorganizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences[J].Strategic Management Journal, 14:371-385.
Harabi, N., 1997. Channels of R&D spillovers: an empirical investigation of swill firms. Technovation. 17(11,12):627-635.
Hettige, H., M. Mani, and D. Wheeler, 2000. Industrial Pollution in Economic Development: Kuznets Revisited[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2:445—476.
Hinloopen, J., 1997. Subsidizing cooperation and nonoperation R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J]. Journal of Economics, 66(2):151-175.
Gandal, N., Scotchmer S., 1993. Coordinating Research Joint Ventures[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 51:173-193.
Inkpen, A. C. 1998. Learning, knowledge acquisition, strategic alliances [J]. European Management Journal, 16(2): 223-229.
Inkpen, Dinur A C., 1998. A knowledge management process and international joint venture [J]. Organization Science, 19(4):454-468.
Iyer A, Bergen M E.. 1997. Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels[J]. Management Science, 43(4): 559-570.
Jaff, A. B., 1986. Technology opportunity and spillovers of R&D: evidence from firms’patents, profits, and market value. American Economic Review. 76(5):984-1001.
Jarillo, J. C., 1988. On Strategic Network [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 9(2): 31-41.
Kennedy P., 1994. Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition[J]. Journal of Environmental Econommy Management, 27: 49-63.
Kogut B., U. Zander., 1993. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of technology [J]. Organization Science, 3(3): 383-397.
Kogut, B., 1988. Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 9(4): 319-332.
Kogut, B., 1991. Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire[J]. Management Science, 37(1): 19-33.
Kamien, M. I., Zang,I., 2000. Meet me halfway:research joint ventures and absorptive capacity[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18:995-1012.
Kanter,R.M. ,1994. Collaborative advantage[J]..Harvard Business Review, 74:96-108.
Katz,M., 1986. An Analysis of Cooperative R&D[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 17: 527-543.
Katz M.,Order J., 1990. R&D cooperation and competition[C]. Brooking papers on economic activity, 137-191.
Kleiknecht,A.&Reijnen,J., 1992. Why do Firms Cooperate in R&D:an Empirical Study[J]. Research Policy, 21:347-360.
Katsoulakos,Y., Ulph,D, 1998. Endogenous.Spillovers and the performance of Research Joint Ventures[J].Journal of Industrial Economics, 46:333-357.
Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas. A., 1996. Environmental Innovation, Spillovers and Optimal Policy Rules, in Environmental Policy and Market Structure[C]. Carraro C., Katsoulacos Y. and Xepapadeas A. (eds.) Kluwer, Dordrecht, 126-138.
Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas. A., 1995. Environmental po1icy under o1igopoly with endogenous market structure,Scandinavian Joumal of Economics,97(4):411—420.
Lahiri S,Ono Y., 1999. R&D Subsidies under asymmetric duopoly: A note[J]. Japanese Economic Review,50(1):104一111.
Leahy, D., Neary, P., 1997. Public Policy towards R&D in Oligo-polistic Industries[J]. The American Economic Review, 87(4):CEPR Working Paper No. 1243.
Lukach R,plasmans, J., 2003. R&D and production behavour of asymmetric duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers[D]. Working Papers 2000005,University of Antwerp,faculty of Applied Eeonomies.
Long, N. V., 2005. Outsourcing and technology spillovers[J]. International Review of Economics and Finance[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 14(3):297-304.
McAfee R. ,1991. Optimal contracts for teams[J],International Economic Review,32:561-577.
McGuire, T.W., Staelin, R., 1983. An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream. Vertical Integration[J]. Marketing Science, 2(2): 161-192.
Miller, K.D., 1993. Industry and country effects on managers' perceptions of environmental uncertainties [J].Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4): 693-794.
Mansfield, E., 1985. How rapidly does new industrial technology leak out?. Journal of Indusreial E conomics. 34: 217-23.
M.Pilar Socorro, 2007. Optimal technology under asymmetric information in RJV[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62:76-97.
Muller, T., Schnitzer, M., 2006. Technology transfer and spillovers in international joint ventures[J]. Journal of International Economics, 68(2):456-468.
Muniagurria, M.,E., Singh, N., 1997. Foreign technology, spillovers and policy[J]. International Economic Review, 5:405-430.
Marit, P., Smiley, R.H., 1983. Cooperative agreements and the organization of industry[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics. 31(4):437-451.
Motta, M., 1992. Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 10:643-661.
Nato J.J., 2006. Optimal policy for product R&D with endogenous quality ordering:Asymmetric duopoly[J]. Australian Economic papers, 45(2):127-140.
Nelson Richard R., 1993. National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis[M]. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nonaka I., 1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation [J]. Organization Science, 5 (1): 14 -37.
Ornaghi, C., 2006. Spillovers in and process innovation : evidence from manufacturing firms[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 24(2):349-380.
Oxley, J.E., 1999. Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact on intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances[J]. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 38(3): 283-309.
Oxley, J.E., Sampson, R.C., 2004. The scope and governance of international R&D alliances[J].Strategic Management Journal, 25(4): 723-749.
Papaconstantionou,G., 1991. Internatyional R&D Spillovers and strategy subsidies[C]. Mimeo, OECD,Paris.
Park, Jee-Hyeong. 2001. Strategic R&D policy under vertical differentiated oligopoly.[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(4):158-175.
Pastor, M., Sandonis, J. 2002. Research joint venture vs. cross-licensing agreements: an agency approach [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(2):215-249.
Perez - Castrillo J. David & Joel Sandonis. 1997. Disclosure of Know how in Research Joint Ventures [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(1): 51 - 75.
Petrakis, E., Poyago-Theotoky, J.. 2002. R&D subsidies versus R&D cooperation in a duopoly with spillovers and pollution[J]. Australian Economic , 41: 37–52.
Pastor,M.&Sandonis,J., 2002. Research joint ventures vs cross-licensing agreements: an agency approach[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization 20:215-249.
Powell, W. W,Koput, K. W., 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and the locus of innovation: networks of learning in biotechnology[J], Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 116-146.
Poyago-Theotoky J, 1995, Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers[J],Journal of Industrial Economies, 43(2):209-226.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., 2007. The organization of R&D and environmental policy[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(1): 63-75.
Picard P.,Rey P., 1995. Incentives in cooperative research and development Essays in Honour of role for government[J].Research Policy 24:367-389.
Qiu L D, Tao Z.. 1998. Policy on international R&D cooperation: subsidy or tax?[J]. European Economic Review, 42(9): 1727-1750.
Romano, R., 1989. Aspects of R&D subsidization[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 863-873.
Ranjay Gulati, Nitin Nohria, Akbar Zaheer, 2000. Strategic networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal. 21(3):203- 221.
Rajeev K. Goel. 1995. Choosing the sharing rate for incentive contracts [J]. The American Economist, 39(2): 68-72.
Rajneesh Narula and John Hagedoorn, 1999. Innovating Through Strategic Alliances:Moving Towards International.Partnerships and Contractual Agreements[J].Technovation, 19:292-293.
Ring P S, Van de Ven A H. 1992. Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 483-498.
Roberts E B, Berry C A., 1985. Entering new businesses: selecting strategies for success [J]. SloanManagement Review, 26(2): 3-17.
Rosenberg, 1986. An Overview of Innovation in The positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth [M]. National Academy Press.
Rothwell,R.,1989. Technology policy and collaborative research in Europe. In:Link, A., Tassey, G.(Eds.),Cooperative R&D: the Industry-University-Government Relationship. Kluwer Academic Publishers. London.
Romer, P. M., 1990. Endogenous technological change[J]. Journal of Political Economy. 98(5): 71-102.
Ruff,L., 1969. Research and technological progress in a Cournot economy[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1:397-415.
Schmookler, J. 1969. Invention and Economic Growth[C]. Cambidge: Harvard University Press.
Segerstorm, P. S. ,1991. Innovation, imitation, and economic growth [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4): 807-827.
Silipo, D. B. and Weiss,A., 2005. Cooperation and competition in an R&D market with spillovers[J]. Research in Economics. 59(1): 41-57.
Spence, M., 1984. Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance [J]. Econometrica, 52: 101-121.
Spencer B, Brander J., 1983. International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 28:707-722.
Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran., 2005. Vish V.Krishnan. Managing technology uncertainty under multi-Firm new product development. University of Texas at Austin, Department of Information, Working paper.
Steurs, M.B. , 1995. Inter-industry R&D spillovers: what difference do they make?[J]. International Journal of industrial Organization, 13(2):249-76.
Stuart, T., 2000. Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: A study of growth and innovation rates in a high-technology industry [J]. Strategic Management, 21(8): 791- 811.
Stump R.L., Heide, J. B. 1996. Controlling supplier opportunism in industrial relationships[J]. Journal of Markeitng Research, 33: 431-441.
Suzumura K., 1992. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in oligopoly with spill- overs [J]. American Economic Review, 82(5):1307-1320.
Slawinski,G.etal, 1993, Strategic partnering:process instead of event[J]. Research Technology Management, 36:22-25.
Sinha,D.and Cusumano,M., 1991. Complementary Resources and Cooperative Research:a Model of Research Joint Ventures among Competition[J].Management Science, 37: 1091-1106.
Folster.,S., 1995. Do subsidies to cooperative R&D actually stimulate R&D investment and cooperation[J],Research Policy, 24:403-417.
Stenbacka R.,Tombak M., 1998. Technology policy and the organization of R&D[J],Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36:503-520.
Tao,Z.and C.Wu., 1997. On the organization of co-operative research and development:theory and evidence[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,Elsevier, 15(5): 573-598.
Teece, D. J., 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy[J]. Research Policy, 15:285-305.
Tiemessen I, Lane H W, Crossan M M, et al. 1997. Knowledge management in international joint ventures [A] .In :Beamish P W, Killing J P (ed) . Cooperative strategies: North American perspectives [M]. San Francisco: New Lexington Press.
Tripsas, M., Stephan Schrader, Maurizio Sobrero. 1995. Discouraging Opportunistic Behavior in Collaborative R&D: A new Role for Government [J]. Research Policy. 24(3): 367 - 389.
Tao,Z.,Wu,C., 1997. On the Organization of Cooperative Research and Development:Theory and Evidence[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15:573-598.
Ulph A., 1992.The choice of environmental policy instruments and strategic international trade, in‘‘Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources’’[C]. Pethig, ,R. Ed..,Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Ulph, A.. ,1996. Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30: 265–281.
Vonortas, N.S. ,1997. Research joint ventures in the US[J].Research Policy, 26:557-595.
Vonortas, N.S., 1994. Inter-firm cooperation in imperfectly appropriable research[J]. International Journal of industrial Organization,26:557-595.
Veugelers, R.&Kesteloot, K. ,1995. Bargained Shares in Joint Ventures among Asymmetric Partner: Is the Matthew Effect Catalyzing?[J],Journal of Economics,64:23-51.
Veugelers,R., 1998. Collaboration in R&D:An Assessment of Theoretical and Empirical Findings[J].De Economist,146(3):420-443.
Weisenfeld U. l., 2001. Managing technology as a virtual enterprise[J].R&D Management, 31:323-334.
Yun K-L, Park Y-S, Ahn B. , 2000. Spillover, Competition and Better R&D Organization [J]. Japanese Economic Review, 51(3):448~461.
Yi,S.-S. and Shin, H., 2000. Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers[J]. International Journal of industrial Organization, 18(2):229-56.
Yin, X., K. 1999. Asymmetric research joint ventures and market concentration[J]. The JapaneseEconomic Review,50(3):309-320.
Ziss,S. 1994. Strategic R&D with spillovers, collusion and welfare[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(4):375-93.
傅家骥. 1998.技术创新学[M].北京,清华大学出版社.
葛泽慧,胡其英. 2006.具有内生技术共享的合作研发决策分析[J].科研管理, 27(5): 45 ~52.
郭丽红,薛伟贤. 2004.垂直性R&D合作的成本分配研究[J].西安理工大学学报, 20(1): 100-104.
郭晓川.1998.企业网络合作化技术创新及其模式比较[J].科学管理研究, (10): 14-15.
侯光明,艾凤义. 2006.基于混合溢出的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理工程学报, 20(4): 94~97.
侯汉平,王浣尘. 2001. R&D知识溢出效应模型分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 21 (9) :29-32.
霍沛军,宣国良. 2000.纵向一体化与R&D投资[J].上海交通大学学报. 34(11):1562-1565.
霍沛军,宣国良. 2001.纵向一体化前后上游R&D投资的比较[J].系统工程学报. 16(1): 36-38.
霍沛军,宣国良. 2002.纵向一体化对下游R&D投资的效应[J].管理工程学报. 16(1): 44-46.
霍沛军,陈继祥. 2002.针对国内双寡头的最优R&D补贴策略[J].系统工程学报,17(2):115-120,166.
李忠,陈继祥. 2003.存在成果溢出和投资溢出下的研发组织分析[J] .系统工程理论方法运用, 12 (2) :116 -119.
刘卫民. 2006.内生溢出与R&D竞争合作的激励问题[J].管理工程学报, 20:1-5.
骆品亮,向盛斌. 2001. R&D的外部性及其内部化机制研究[J].科研管理, 22(5):56~63.
骆品亮,周勇,郭晖. 2004.虚拟研发组织的知识转移机制:一个文献综述[J].研究与发展管理, 16(5): 18-25.
生延超. 2008.创新投入补贴还是创新产品补贴:技术联盟的政府策略选择[J].中国管理科学, 16(6):184-192.
苏越良,徐禾芳,王爱虎. 2005.网络化制造环境中技术创新的基本特点及其不确定性研究[J]. 科学管理研究, 23(3): 1~5.
王渊,张彤,陈立军,许益峰. 2006.基于资源依赖理论的供应链联盟成因分析及其发展策略[J].科技进步与对策, 23(4):173-176.
吴玉萍、董锁成,2002.北京市环境政策评价研究,城市环境与城市生态[J]. 4:23-33.
夏永久、陈兴鹏、李娜,2006.西北河谷型城市环境政策评价研究———以兰州市为例,兰州大学学报(自然科学版) [J]. 4:11-25.
徐雨森. 2006.内向型企业研发联盟发展中的政府推动作用分析[J].科技政策与管理, 20:20-23.
杨仕辉,熊艳,王红玲. 2003.吸收能力、研发合作创新激励与补贴政策[J].中国管理科学, 11(1): 95～100.
张维迎. 1996.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社.
郑德渊,李湛. 2001. ,基于纵向控制框架的上游企业R&D研究[J].科研管理, 22(1): 45~50.
郑德渊,李湛. 2002.具有双向溢出效应的上游企业R&D政策研究[J].管理工程学报, 16(1): 84~85.
周青,曾德明,朱丹,方放. 2005.企业R&D网络化的动态博弈模型[J].预测, 24(3): 61-65.
Aghion. P., Tirole, J. 1994. On the Management of Innovation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 1185-1209.
Aggeri, F., Hatchuel, A., 1998. Managing creation and learning of new expertise in automobile project development. In: Lundin, R.A., Midler, C. _Eds.., Projects as Arenas for Renewal and Learning Processes. Kluwer Academic Publishers, NY.
Aggeri,F. 1999. Environmental policies and innovation: A knowledge-based perspective on cooperative approaches. Research Policy, 28:699-717.
Alsleben, C. 2005. The downside of knowledge spillovers: an explanation for the dispersion of hugh-tech industries. Journal of Economics. 84(3):217-248.
Audretsch,D.,1989. Joint R&D and industrial policy in Japan. In:Link, A., Tassey, G.(Eds.), Cooperative R&D: the Industry-University-Government Relationship. Kluwer Academic Publishers. London.
Amabile T. M., Patterson, C., Mueller, J., Wojcik, T. 2001. Academic-practitioner collaboration in management research: A case of cross-profession collaboration [J].Academy of Management Journal, 44(2): 418-431.
Anand, K.S., Mendelson, H.. 1997. Information and Organization for Horizontal Multi-Control[J]. Management Science, 43(12):1609-1627.
Anderson, E., Weitz, B.. 1989. Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial Channel Dyads[J]. Marketing Science, 8(4):310-323.
Axelrod, R. , 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation[M]. New York: Harper/Collins. Atallah, G.., 2002. Vertical R&D Spillover, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation[J]. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 11(3): 179-209.
Atallah, G.., 2005. R&D Cooperation with asymmetric spillovers[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 38(3):919-936.
Arrow,K.J. 1962.“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions,”in Nelson, R.R.(ed.),The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity[M], Princeton,N.J.,Princeton University Press.
Barrett S., 1994. Strategic environmental policy and international trade, J. Public Econom. 54(3)., 325-338.
Balakrishnan, S., Wernerfelt, B., 1986,.Technical Change, competition, and Vertical Integration[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 7(4): 347-359.
Bagwell, k. and Staiger, R., W. 1992. The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in battles for monopoly. International Economic Review, 33:795-816.
Bagwell, k. Staiger, R., 1994. The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in oligopolistic industries. Journal of International Economics, 36:126-150.
Banerjee,S, Lin,p., 2000, Vertical research joint ventures[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19:285-301.
Baranson, J., 1990. Transnational Strategic Alliances Why, What, Where, and How [J]. Multinational Business, 2:54-61.
Bastos, P., 2001. Inter-firm collaboration and learning: The case of the Japanese automobile industry [J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18(4): 423-441.
Beath J., Poyago-Theotoky J., Ulph D., 1998. Organization design and information- sharing in a research joint venture with spillovers[J]. Bulletin of Economic Research , 50(1): 47~59.
Brockhoff, K., 1992. R&D Cooperation between firms: A perceived transaction cost perspective [J]. Management Science, 38 (4): 514-524.
Bhattacharya,S.J..Glazer and Sappington. 1992. Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures[J].Journal of Economic Theory, 56:43-69.
Bruce,M.L.,F.Leverick and D.Wilson. 1995. Success of Factor Collaboration Alliance[J].Journal of Marketing,.57:33-46.
Bruno Cassiman, 2000. Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information[J],International journal of industrial organization 18:283-314.
Bondt,R., 1996. Spillovers and Innovative Activities[J]. International Journal of Industrial organization. 15:1-28.
Bernstein,J.I., 1989. R&D and Intra-industry Spillovers: an Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 56:249-269.
Bernstein,J.I, Nadiri, M.I. 1988. Intra-Industry R&D Spillvoers, Rates of Return, and Productivity. American economic review. 78(2): 429-434.
Brod, A. and Shivakumar, R., 1997. R&D Cooperation and Joint Exploitation of R&D. Canadian Journal of Economics. 30(3):673-684.
Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R., 2002. R&D Cooperation and spillovers: some empirical evidence form Belgium[J]. American Economic Review. 92(4):1169-1184.
Coe, D.T. and Helpman, E., 1995. International R&D spillovers[J]. European Economic Review[J]. 39:859-887.
Chaudhuri,P., 1995. Technological Asymmetry and Joint Product Development[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13:23-39.
Chiesa, V., Manzini, R., 1998. Organizing for technological collaborations: a managerial perspective[J]. R&D Management, 28:199-212.
Choi, C. J., Lee, S. H. 1997. A knowledge - based view of cooperative inter - organizational relationships[C], in P. W. Beamish and J. P. Killing, Editors. Cooperative Strategies: North American perspectives [C].San Francisco: New Lexington Press..
Coase, R.H. , 1937. The Nature of the Firm [J]. Economic, 4: 386-405.
Cohen, W. M., Levinthal, D.A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 128-152.
Cheng L.,1997. Optimal trade and technology policies: dynamic leakages[J]. International Economic Review. 28(3):136-149.
Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, N. Mamingi, and H. Wang, 2001. Inspections, Pollution Prices, and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China,Ecological Economics.[J] 36: 487—498.
D’Aspremont, Jacquemin, 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers[J], American Economic Review, 78:1133-1137.
De Bondt, R., 1996. Dpillovers and Innovative Activities. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 15:1-28.
De Bondt R,Henriques L., 1995. Strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers[J]. Canadian Journal of Econornics, 28(3):656-674.
Dutta,S.&Weiss,A.M., 1997. The relationship between a firm’s level of technological innovativeness and its pattern of partnership agreements[J].Management Science, 43: 343-356.
Dyer,J.H.&Singh,H., 1998. The relational view:Cooperative strategy and the source of interorganizational competitive advantage[J].Academic Management Review 23: 660-679.
Erat, S. & Kavadias, S., 2005. Introduction of new technologies to competing industrial customers Georgia Institute of Technology. Working paper.
Fosfuri,A. and Ronde, T., 2004. hign-tech cluster, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws. International Journal of Industrial Organaization. 22(1):45-65.
Geert Davsten, Gerard Kok and Maaike Vaandrager,, 1998. Creating Win-Win situation: Partner Selection in Strategy And Strategic Technology Alliance [C]. Technology Strategy And Strategic Alliance, Proceedings R&D Management Conference, Avila.
Goto, A. and Suzuki, K., 1989. R&D capital, rate of return on R&D investment and spillovers of R&D in Janpanese Manufacturing Industries. Review of Economics and Statistics. 71(4): 555-564.
Goldberg, P., K., 1995. Strategic export promotion in the absence of government precommitment[J]. International Economic Review, 5: 407-426.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E., 1991. Trade, knowledge spillovers. European Economic Review. 35(2,3):517-526.
Glaister, K.W., Buckley, P.J., 1996. Strategic Motives for International Alliance Formation [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 33(3): 301-332.
Grant, R. M., 1996. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational capability as knowledge integration, Organization Science, 7(4): 375-388.
Grossman S. J., Hart O D., 1986. The Cost and Benefit of Ownership: A Theory of Lateral and Vertical Integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4):691–719.
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., Zaheer, A. 2000, Strategic Networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3):203-215.
Gulati R., Singh H., 1998. The architecture of cooperation: managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43 (4): 781-814.
Gupta, S. & Loulou, R., 1998. Process innovation, product differentiation, and channel structure: Strategic incentives in a duopoly [J]. Marketing Science 17 (4): 301~316.
Gupta, S., R. E. Romano., 1998. Monitoring the Principal with Multiple Agents [J]. The Rand Journal of Economics. 29(2):427-442.
Hagedoorn, J., 1990. Organizational Modes of Inter-firm Co-operation and Technology Transfer[J]. Technovation, 10(1): 17-30.
Hagedoorn,J., 1993. Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: interorganizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences[J].Strategic Management Journal, 14:371-385.
Harabi, N., 1997. Channels of R&D spillovers: an empirical investigation of swill firms. Technovation. 17(11,12):627-635.
Hettige, H., M. Mani, and D. Wheeler, 2000. Industrial Pollution in Economic Development: Kuznets Revisited[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2:445—476.
Hinloopen, J., 1997. Subsidizing cooperation and nonoperation R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J]. Journal of Economics, 66(2):151-175.
Gandal, N., Scotchmer S., 1993. Coordinating Research Joint Ventures[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 51:173-193.
Inkpen, A. C. 1998. Learning, knowledge acquisition, strategic alliances [J]. European Management Journal, 16(2): 223-229.
Inkpen, Dinur A C., 1998. A knowledge management process and international joint venture [J]. Organization Science, 19(4):454-468.
Iyer A, Bergen M E.. 1997. Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels[J]. Management Science, 43(4): 559-570.
Jaff, A. B., 1986. Technology opportunity and spillovers of R&D: evidence from firms’patents, profits, and market value. American Economic Review. 76(5):984-1001.
Jarillo, J. C., 1988. On Strategic Network [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 9(2): 31-41.
Kennedy P., 1994. Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition[J]. Journal of Environmental Econommy Management, 27: 49-63.
Kogut B., U. Zander., 1993. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of technology [J]. Organization Science, 3(3): 383-397.
Kogut, B., 1988. Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 9(4): 319-332.
Kogut, B., 1991. Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire[J]. Management Science, 37(1): 19-33.
Kamien, M. I., Zang,I., 2000. Meet me halfway:research joint ventures and absorptive capacity[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18:995-1012.
Kanter,R.M. ,1994. Collaborative advantage[J]..Harvard Business Review, 74:96-108.
Katz,M., 1986. An Analysis of Cooperative R&D[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 17: 527-543.
Katz M.,Order J., 1990. R&D cooperation and competition[C]. Brooking papers on economic activity, 137-191.
Kleiknecht,A.&Reijnen,J., 1992. Why do Firms Cooperate in R&D:an Empirical Study[J]. Research Policy, 21:347-360.
Katsoulakos,Y., Ulph,D, 1998. Endogenous.Spillovers and the performance of Research Joint Ventures[J].Journal of Industrial Economics, 46:333-357.
Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas. A., 1996. Environmental Innovation, Spillovers and Optimal Policy Rules, in Environmental Policy and Market Structure[C]. Carraro C., Katsoulacos Y. and Xepapadeas A. (eds.) Kluwer, Dordrecht, 126-138.
Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas. A., 1995. Environmental po1icy under o1igopoly with endogenous market structure,Scandinavian Joumal of Economics,97(4):411—420.
Lahiri S,Ono Y., 1999. R&D Subsidies under asymmetric duopoly: A note[J]. Japanese Economic Review,50(1):104一111.
Leahy, D., Neary, P., 1997. Public Policy towards R&D in Oligo-polistic Industries[J]. The American Economic Review, 87(4):CEPR Working Paper No. 1243.
Lukach R,plasmans, J., 2003. R&D and production behavour of asymmetric duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers[D]. Working Papers 2000005,University of Antwerp,faculty of Applied Eeonomies.
Long, N. V., 2005. Outsourcing and technology spillovers[J]. International Review of Economics and Finance[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 14(3):297-304.
McAfee R. ,1991. Optimal contracts for teams[J],International Economic Review,32:561-577.
McGuire, T.W., Staelin, R., 1983. An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream. Vertical Integration[J]. Marketing Science, 2(2): 161-192.
Miller, K.D., 1993. Industry and country effects on managers' perceptions of environmental uncertainties [J].Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4): 693-794.
Mansfield, E., 1985. How rapidly does new industrial technology leak out?. Journal of Indusreial E conomics. 34: 217-23.
M.Pilar Socorro, 2007. Optimal technology under asymmetric information in RJV[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62:76-97.
Muller, T., Schnitzer, M., 2006. Technology transfer and spillovers in international joint ventures[J]. Journal of International Economics, 68(2):456-468.
Muniagurria, M.,E., Singh, N., 1997. Foreign technology, spillovers and policy[J]. International Economic Review, 5:405-430.
Marit, P., Smiley, R.H., 1983. Cooperative agreements and the organization of industry[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics. 31(4):437-451.
Motta, M., 1992. Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 10:643-661.
Nato J.J., 2006. Optimal policy for product R&D with endogenous quality ordering:Asymmetric duopoly[J]. Australian Economic papers, 45(2):127-140.
Nelson Richard R., 1993. National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis[M]. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nonaka I., 1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation [J]. Organization Science, 5 (1): 14 -37.
Ornaghi, C., 2006. Spillovers in and process innovation : evidence from manufacturing firms[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 24(2):349-380.
Oxley, J.E., 1999. Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact on intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances[J]. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 38(3): 283-309.
Oxley, J.E., Sampson, R.C., 2004. The scope and governance of international R&D alliances[J].Strategic Management Journal, 25(4): 723-749.
Papaconstantionou,G., 1991. Internatyional R&D Spillovers and strategy subsidies[C]. Mimeo, OECD,Paris.
Park, Jee-Hyeong. 2001. Strategic R&D policy under vertical differentiated oligopoly.[J]. Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(4):158-175.
Pastor, M., Sandonis, J. 2002. Research joint venture vs. cross-licensing agreements: an agency approach [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(2):215-249.
Perez - Castrillo J. David & Joel Sandonis. 1997. Disclosure of Know how in Research Joint Ventures [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(1): 51 - 75.
Petrakis, E., Poyago-Theotoky, J.. 2002. R&D subsidies versus R&D cooperation in a duopoly with spillovers and pollution[J]. Australian Economic , 41: 37–52.
Pastor,M.&Sandonis,J., 2002. Research joint ventures vs cross-licensing agreements: an agency approach[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization 20:215-249.
Powell, W. W,Koput, K. W., 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and the locus of innovation: networks of learning in biotechnology[J], Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 116-146.
Poyago-Theotoky J, 1995, Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers[J],Journal of Industrial Economies, 43(2):209-226.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., 2007. The organization of R&D and environmental policy[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(1): 63-75.
Picard P.,Rey P., 1995. Incentives in cooperative research and development Essays in Honour of role for government[J].Research Policy 24:367-389.
Qiu L D, Tao Z.. 1998. Policy on international R&D cooperation: subsidy or tax?[J]. European Economic Review, 42(9): 1727-1750.
Romano, R., 1989. Aspects of R&D subsidization[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 863-873.
Ranjay Gulati, Nitin Nohria, Akbar Zaheer, 2000. Strategic networks [J]. Strategic Management Journal. 21(3):203- 221.
Rajeev K. Goel. 1995. Choosing the sharing rate for incentive contracts [J]. The American Economist, 39(2): 68-72.
Rajneesh Narula and John Hagedoorn, 1999. Innovating Through Strategic Alliances:Moving Towards International.Partnerships and Contractual Agreements[J].Technovation, 19:292-293.
Ring P S, Van de Ven A H. 1992. Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 483-498.
Roberts E B, Berry C A., 1985. Entering new businesses: selecting strategies for success [J]. SloanManagement Review, 26(2): 3-17.
Rosenberg, 1986. An Overview of Innovation in The positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth [M]. National Academy Press.
Rothwell,R.,1989. Technology policy and collaborative research in Europe. In:Link, A., Tassey, G.(Eds.),Cooperative R&D: the Industry-University-Government Relationship. Kluwer Academic Publishers. London.
Romer, P. M., 1990. Endogenous technological change[J]. Journal of Political Economy. 98(5): 71-102.
Ruff,L., 1969. Research and technological progress in a Cournot economy[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1:397-415.
Schmookler, J. 1969. Invention and Economic Growth[C]. Cambidge: Harvard University Press.
Segerstorm, P. S. ,1991. Innovation, imitation, and economic growth [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4): 807-827.
Silipo, D. B. and Weiss,A., 2005. Cooperation and competition in an R&D market with spillovers[J]. Research in Economics. 59(1): 41-57.
Spence, M., 1984. Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance [J]. Econometrica, 52: 101-121.
Spencer B, Brander J., 1983. International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 28:707-722.
Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran., 2005. Vish V.Krishnan. Managing technology uncertainty under multi-Firm new product development. University of Texas at Austin, Department of Information, Working paper.
Steurs, M.B. , 1995. Inter-industry R&D spillovers: what difference do they make?[J]. International Journal of industrial Organization, 13(2):249-76.
Stuart, T., 2000. Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: A study of growth and innovation rates in a high-technology industry [J]. Strategic Management, 21(8): 791- 811.
Stump R.L., Heide, J. B. 1996. Controlling supplier opportunism in industrial relationships[J]. Journal of Markeitng Research, 33: 431-441.
Suzumura K., 1992. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in oligopoly with spill- overs [J]. American Economic Review, 82(5):1307-1320.
Slawinski,G.etal, 1993, Strategic partnering:process instead of event[J]. Research Technology Management, 36:22-25.
Sinha,D.and Cusumano,M., 1991. Complementary Resources and Cooperative Research:a Model of Research Joint Ventures among Competition[J].Management Science, 37: 1091-1106.
Folster.,S., 1995. Do subsidies to cooperative R&D actually stimulate R&D investment and cooperation[J],Research Policy, 24:403-417.
Stenbacka R.,Tombak M., 1998. Technology policy and the organization of R&D[J],Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36:503-520.
Tao,Z.and C.Wu., 1997. On the organization of co-operative research and development:theory and evidence[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,Elsevier, 15(5): 573-598.
Teece, D. J., 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy[J]. Research Policy, 15:285-305.
Tiemessen I, Lane H W, Crossan M M, et al. 1997. Knowledge management in international joint ventures [A] .In :Beamish P W, Killing J P (ed) . Cooperative strategies: North American perspectives [M]. San Francisco: New Lexington Press.
Tripsas, M., Stephan Schrader, Maurizio Sobrero. 1995. Discouraging Opportunistic Behavior in Collaborative R&D: A new Role for Government [J]. Research Policy. 24(3): 367 - 389.
Tao,Z.,Wu,C., 1997. On the Organization of Cooperative Research and Development:Theory and Evidence[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15:573-598.
Ulph A., 1992.The choice of environmental policy instruments and strategic international trade, in‘‘Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources’’[C]. Pethig, ,R. Ed..,Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Ulph, A.. ,1996. Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30: 265–281.
Vonortas, N.S. ,1997. Research joint ventures in the US[J].Research Policy, 26:557-595.
Vonortas, N.S., 1994. Inter-firm cooperation in imperfectly appropriable research[J]. International Journal of industrial Organization,26:557-595.
Veugelers, R.&Kesteloot, K. ,1995. Bargained Shares in Joint Ventures among Asymmetric Partner: Is the Matthew Effect Catalyzing?[J],Journal of Economics,64:23-51.
Veugelers,R., 1998. Collaboration in R&D:An Assessment of Theoretical and Empirical Findings[J].De Economist,146(3):420-443.
Weisenfeld U. l., 2001. Managing technology as a virtual enterprise[J].R&D Management, 31:323-334.
Yun K-L, Park Y-S, Ahn B. , 2000. Spillover, Competition and Better R&D Organization [J]. Japanese Economic Review, 51(3):448~461.
Yi,S.-S. and Shin, H., 2000. Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers[J]. International Journal of industrial Organization, 18(2):229-56.
Yin, X., K. 1999. Asymmetric research joint ventures and market concentration[J]. The JapaneseEconomic Review,50(3):309-320.
Ziss,S. 1994. Strategic R&D with spillovers, collusion and welfare[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(4):375-93.