摘要
“法与金融理论”兴起于20世纪90年代中后期,以关注法律制度与金融市场发展的关系为重点,其核心是关于投资者保护问题的研究。该理论认为法律制度的差别造成了投资者保护水平的不同,进而影响到公司的股权结构、公司治理以及公司价值,并最终影响到一国金融市场以及国民经济的发展水平。中国证券监督管理委员会把保护投资者利益列为工作的重中之重,理论界和监管当局也通过各种努力保护上市公司投资者权益以促进金融市场发展,这些努力包括于2006年修订并施行的《公司法》和《证券法》,以及即将完成的股权分置改革。因此,在股权分置改革完成后,针对中国证券市场的投资者权益保护就显得尤为重要,一方面体现在如何正确认识法律制度对投资者保护的作用及其机理,另一方面体现在如何结合股权分置改革后股权全流通市场条件下中国证券市场呈现的特性而推行更加有效的法律制度。
文章以股权分置改革后全流通市场即将形成为背景,采用比较分析的方法,并结合实证研究,以法和金融理论的观点和结论为主线,对法与金融理论相关文献进行系统梳理和阐述,分析了股权分置改革后投资者受侵害的可能因素,借鉴成熟资本市场国家的立法和成功经验,研究分析股权分置改革后我国投资者权益法律保护机制及不足,进而提出可能采取的对策和建议。
“Law and finance theory”was built up in the late of 1990s. It focuses on the relation between law institutions and financial market, the core of the theory is the research on the investor protection. The“law and finance theory”tried to find out how the law institutions result in the investor protection, then influencing on the ownership of the company, corporation governance and the corporation value, and ever the development of financial market and national economy. The SEC of China has made the investor protection to be one of the most important things in its daily fairs. The government and some experts in related fields came to realize the importance of the investor protection and tried their best to make some rules and revise the law. These efforts included the revise of“The Company Law”and“The security law”and the“share reform”in listed company. In this case, the research on“law and finance”of Chinese stock market seem to be more important, which reflex on confirming the investor protective function and its mechanism from law institutions on one hand, and on promoting more valid law system combining the special property of the Chinese stock market on the other hand.
The paper tries to attain target with the comparable analysis and the empirical research under the circumstance of“share reform”. Through compared with the reasons of minority shareholder oppression and referring the experience of foreign developed countries, it presents some advices and measures to solve these problems.
引文
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