正规金融与农民专业合作社合作的利益分配研究
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摘要
农村经济的发展离不开农村正规金融的支持。由于正规金融部门基于对贷款成本、收益和风险控制等方面的要求,对农村的信贷支持存在诸多障碍。农民专业合作社所具有的信息优势和担保功能,能够很好的解决正规金融进驻农村市场所要面对的信息不对称等问题。通过一定的途径使二者进行合作,是解决农村资金缺乏的重要渠道。本文基于正规金融与农民专业合作社合作的理论基础,选择利益分配这一研究角度,探讨在合作过程中双方如何进行利益分配,使得二者之间的合作有稳固的基础,增加合作的稳定性和持续性。本文的研究目的就是试图系统性地分析这一问题,力图为增加农村资金供给找到一条有效途径,为政策制定者理性认识正规金融与农民专业合作社之间的合作关系,以便制定政策促进双方合作提供参考。
论文首先对涉及到的国内外研究理论进行简要回顾和评析,然后阐述了正规金融与农民专业合作社进行合作的理论依据,具体包括正规金融、农民专业合作社和利益分配等概念的界定以及双方合作所依托的理论基础。本文选取东、中、西部6省1市16个典型案例作为研究对象,总结归纳出正规金融与农民专业合作社合作的一般流程,然后以贷款流程为划分依据,对体现利益分配差别的贷前信用评级、贷款支持方式和贷后监督管理的各种不同形式进行总结和分析。在此基础上,选取股权制和合约制两种典型的利益分配方式,分别构建完整的行为模型,以贷款规模、贷款利率、风险、交易成本和利润作为利益分配的核心,对正规金融与农民专业合作社合作进行利益分配时遵循的原则、具体形式做了详细的推导和论述,并指出两种利益分配方式各自的适用情况。接下来以实地调研的合作案例,对合约制下利益分配的内容、过程和结果进行了详细的论述,并作出了相应的评价。最后通过以上的研究和分析,论文得出结论并提出合理的政策建议以引导正规金融与农民专业合作社进行合理的利益分配,从而促进正规金融与农民专业合作社进行更好的合作。
论文的创新之处在于将正规金融和农民专业合作社置于平等的合作关系,从利益分配的角度探讨二者的合作。针对股权制和合约制两种常用的利益分配方式,本文分别构建了完整的行为模型对他们的运行机制、原理进行了推导和分析。在股权制条件下,有单一利率方案和差异利率方案两种利益分配方案,选择哪种方案取决于农民专业合作社社员的整体风险类型。单一利率方案下,正规金融提供全额贷款,收取较低利率,自担风险,与合作社共享收益;差异利率方案下的利益分配取决于具体贷款社员的风险类型。而在合约制条件下,模型推导的结论是利益分配的核心在于合约中对贷款利率和贷款额度条款的设计。贷款利率大小要考虑正规金融资金成本,同时能够形成对农民专业合作社的激励;贷款额度与贷款偿还率挂钩,共同构成对农民专业合作社的约束和激励。
The rural economy can not develop rapidly without the support of rural formal finance. Based on the requirements of costs, profits and risk control, there are many obstacles for formal finance to support the rural areas. The information superiority and security features which farmer cooperatives possess can solve the problems of asymmetric information that formal finance enter rural markets must be faced. Through certain channels to make them cooperate is an important way to solve lack of rural finance. This paper based on the basic theory of cooperation between formal finance and the farmer cooperatives, selecting the distribution of benefits perspective, discussing how to distribute the benefits during the cooperation, in order to make the cooperation has a solid foundation, and increase the stability and sustainability of cooperation. This paper is to try to analyze this issue systematically, in order to find an effective way to increase the capital supply in rural areas and provide a reference for policy makers to develop policies to promote bilateral cooperation.
In the beginning of the paper, a brief review and assessment of related researches in the domestic and abroad was written, and then describes theoretical basis of cooperation between formal finance and the farmer cooperatives. This paper selects 16 typical cases in 6 provinces and 1 city of eastern, central and western China, concluding the general procedure of the cooperation between the formal finance and farmer cooperatives. Based on the loan processes, summarize and analyze the different forms of credit ratings, loan guarantees and loan regulatory which reflect differences in the distribution of benefits. Selecting the option system and contract system, and then constructing behavioral models separately and completely. Take the size of loans, loan interest rates, risk, transaction costs and profit as the core of the distribution of benefits to discuss principles and forms when distribute the benefits should obey. And then take the Sheqi case as an example, the distribution of benefits under the contract system of the content, process and results were discussed in detail, and make the corresponding evaluation. At the end of the paper, drawing the conclusions and giving reasonable policy recommendations in order to guide a reasonable distribution of benefits between formal finance and the farmer cooperatives, thereby contributing to the formal finance and farmer cooperatives to better cooperation.
The main innovation points in this paper are placing the formal finance and farmer cooperatives on an equal partnership, and discuss the cooperation in distribution of benefits perspective. This paper constructed a complete behavioral model to deduce and analyze the operational mechanisms and principles of the option system and contract system. In the option system, there exist two programs for distribution of benefits, single interest rate program and mixed interest rate program, choose which programs depends on the farmer's overall risk of type cooperative members. Under the single interest rate program, formal finance offering all loans, charging a lower interest rate, bearing the risk, and sharing the benefits with the farm cooperatives. Under the other program, the distribution of benefits depends on the type of members in credit risk. In the contract system, the conclusion of model is that the core of benefits distribution is the design of loan interest rates and loan terms in contract. The interest rates should consider the formal finance cost of capital and form an incentive for farmer cooperatives. Link the Loan amount and repayment rates in order to constitute the constraints of the farmer cooperatives and incentives.
论文首先对涉及到的国内外研究理论进行简要回顾和评析,然后阐述了正规金融与农民专业合作社进行合作的理论依据,具体包括正规金融、农民专业合作社和利益分配等概念的界定以及双方合作所依托的理论基础。本文选取东、中、西部6省1市16个典型案例作为研究对象,总结归纳出正规金融与农民专业合作社合作的一般流程,然后以贷款流程为划分依据,对体现利益分配差别的贷前信用评级、贷款支持方式和贷后监督管理的各种不同形式进行总结和分析。在此基础上,选取股权制和合约制两种典型的利益分配方式,分别构建完整的行为模型,以贷款规模、贷款利率、风险、交易成本和利润作为利益分配的核心,对正规金融与农民专业合作社合作进行利益分配时遵循的原则、具体形式做了详细的推导和论述,并指出两种利益分配方式各自的适用情况。接下来以实地调研的合作案例,对合约制下利益分配的内容、过程和结果进行了详细的论述,并作出了相应的评价。最后通过以上的研究和分析,论文得出结论并提出合理的政策建议以引导正规金融与农民专业合作社进行合理的利益分配,从而促进正规金融与农民专业合作社进行更好的合作。
论文的创新之处在于将正规金融和农民专业合作社置于平等的合作关系,从利益分配的角度探讨二者的合作。针对股权制和合约制两种常用的利益分配方式,本文分别构建了完整的行为模型对他们的运行机制、原理进行了推导和分析。在股权制条件下,有单一利率方案和差异利率方案两种利益分配方案,选择哪种方案取决于农民专业合作社社员的整体风险类型。单一利率方案下,正规金融提供全额贷款,收取较低利率,自担风险,与合作社共享收益;差异利率方案下的利益分配取决于具体贷款社员的风险类型。而在合约制条件下,模型推导的结论是利益分配的核心在于合约中对贷款利率和贷款额度条款的设计。贷款利率大小要考虑正规金融资金成本,同时能够形成对农民专业合作社的激励;贷款额度与贷款偿还率挂钩,共同构成对农民专业合作社的约束和激励。
The rural economy can not develop rapidly without the support of rural formal finance. Based on the requirements of costs, profits and risk control, there are many obstacles for formal finance to support the rural areas. The information superiority and security features which farmer cooperatives possess can solve the problems of asymmetric information that formal finance enter rural markets must be faced. Through certain channels to make them cooperate is an important way to solve lack of rural finance. This paper based on the basic theory of cooperation between formal finance and the farmer cooperatives, selecting the distribution of benefits perspective, discussing how to distribute the benefits during the cooperation, in order to make the cooperation has a solid foundation, and increase the stability and sustainability of cooperation. This paper is to try to analyze this issue systematically, in order to find an effective way to increase the capital supply in rural areas and provide a reference for policy makers to develop policies to promote bilateral cooperation.
In the beginning of the paper, a brief review and assessment of related researches in the domestic and abroad was written, and then describes theoretical basis of cooperation between formal finance and the farmer cooperatives. This paper selects 16 typical cases in 6 provinces and 1 city of eastern, central and western China, concluding the general procedure of the cooperation between the formal finance and farmer cooperatives. Based on the loan processes, summarize and analyze the different forms of credit ratings, loan guarantees and loan regulatory which reflect differences in the distribution of benefits. Selecting the option system and contract system, and then constructing behavioral models separately and completely. Take the size of loans, loan interest rates, risk, transaction costs and profit as the core of the distribution of benefits to discuss principles and forms when distribute the benefits should obey. And then take the Sheqi case as an example, the distribution of benefits under the contract system of the content, process and results were discussed in detail, and make the corresponding evaluation. At the end of the paper, drawing the conclusions and giving reasonable policy recommendations in order to guide a reasonable distribution of benefits between formal finance and the farmer cooperatives, thereby contributing to the formal finance and farmer cooperatives to better cooperation.
The main innovation points in this paper are placing the formal finance and farmer cooperatives on an equal partnership, and discuss the cooperation in distribution of benefits perspective. This paper constructed a complete behavioral model to deduce and analyze the operational mechanisms and principles of the option system and contract system. In the option system, there exist two programs for distribution of benefits, single interest rate program and mixed interest rate program, choose which programs depends on the farmer's overall risk of type cooperative members. Under the single interest rate program, formal finance offering all loans, charging a lower interest rate, bearing the risk, and sharing the benefits with the farm cooperatives. Under the other program, the distribution of benefits depends on the type of members in credit risk. In the contract system, the conclusion of model is that the core of benefits distribution is the design of loan interest rates and loan terms in contract. The interest rates should consider the formal finance cost of capital and form an incentive for farmer cooperatives. Link the Loan amount and repayment rates in order to constitute the constraints of the farmer cooperatives and incentives.
引文
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