中俄电力产业政府规制改革比较研究
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摘要
电力产业是影响国民经济发展的重要基础产业,对其他各个产业部门的发展起着不可或缺的支撑作用。对电力产业的规制进行研究,推进其市场化进程,有助于实现整个国家的体制转轨。俄罗斯与中国从计划经济时期起,就具有很多相似的特点,电力产业规制改革都以效率的提高为目标。由于改革的约束条件不同,两国电力产业规制改革形成了不同的路径。
本论文紧紧围绕中俄两国电力产业改革在约束条件方面的差异,以及在这种差异下进行的规制改革进行论述。在一个转轨国家规制改革框架之下,考察约束条件下形成的产权形式、市场结构以及规制制度及其对规制改革绩效的影响。
论文共分八章。第一章为绪论。首先,从电力产业及其规制改革的重要性以及中俄两国电力产业政府规制比较的可行性和必要性等角度提出了本文的论题。其次,从自然垄断产业政府规制、电力产业政府规制改革以及中俄电力产业政府规制三个方面对相关研究进行了回顾与评述。最后,分别介绍了本文的研究意义、创新之处、研究方法以及结构安排。
第二章旨在为本文建立分析框架。本文对中俄电力产业规制改革的研究从规制经济学的理论出发,在规制经济学研究框架的基础上,利用产业经济学理论对电力产业市场结构改革进行分析,利用新制度经济学对产权改革进行分析,利用转轨经济理论对规制改革道路选择的特定约束条件进行分析,形成了专门针对转轨国家规制改革问题研究的框架。对于转轨国家来说,特定约束条件下形成的产权形式、市场结构形式以及相应的规制制度,共同决定了自然垄断产业规制改革的绩效。
第三章比较中俄两国规制改革的约束条件。不同的约束条件形成了两国各自的转轨道路和策略,进而形成了不同的电力产业规制改革,包括产权改革、市场结构改革以及规制制度改革的道路和策略,最终影响规制改革的绩效。
第四到第六章分别对两国在特定约束条件下形成的影响规制绩效的产权制度、市场结构和规制制度因素进行比较分析。第四章从产权制度的角度进行。各国在规制改革过程中形成了不同的产权形式,无论国有还是私有,都有其理论支撑。中俄两国也形成了不同的产权形式,中国以国有为主,俄罗斯则以私有为主。产权制度的不同,受两国规制改革目标及约束条件的影响。
第五章从市场结构的角度进行比较。在引入竞争机制的结构改革方面,俄罗斯走在了中国的前面。一方面由于中国在电力各环节分离的技术上落后于俄罗斯；另一方面,与中国渐进改革过程中出现新的利益集团,形成了中期现状偏好,进而对进一步改革阻挠有关。
第六章从规制制度改革的角度进行比较。规制制度由规制方法和规制体制两部分组成。规制方法改革是指以激励性规制取代传统规制,为企业效率提高提供激励。规制体制是指规制机构的设置、规制立法及其实施。规制体制对规制承诺的可信性产生影响,最终对规制改革的绩效产生影响。
第七章对规制改革绩效进行评价。对两国绩效的比较分别从总量、价格、产业效益和企业效率四个角度进行。通过比较发现,中国的短期绩效优于俄罗斯,主要是由于中国宏观经济的渐进改革为电力产业改革创造了良好的环境,而俄罗斯的激进改革则造成了产量下降,虽然实现了改革不被逆转的政治目标,但却付出了极大的代价。在长期绩效方面,俄罗斯的发展潜力可能优于中国。这是因为,中国的渐进改革从比较容易进行的增量改革方面着手,对经济中的存量成分改革并不彻底,产权改革缓慢、市场竞争结构没有完全形成、规制制度还需完善。产权、竞争、规制的基础框架搭建并没有完成,这成为经济绩效进一步提升的“瓶颈”。而俄罗斯以巨大代价换来了有助于提高效率的体制框架的基本确立,因而只需要在现有框架下推进改革,便可能带来经济绩效的快速增进。
第八章为结论与启示。首先,对中俄两国电力产业规制改革的路径进行总结。中国走的是“协调渐进”改革道路,而俄罗斯的改革路径则可以总结为“从非协调激进到协调渐进”的改革路径。其次,总结了影响规制改革绩效的因素。最后,针对中俄两国电力产业规制改革现状及存在的问题,提出了进一步改革建议。中国规制改革最大的制约是传统“行政垄断”体制下形成的“政企同盟”,只有破除“政企同盟”导致的规制阻滞,才能使规制改革进一步推进并取得良好绩效。对于俄罗斯来说,在规制框架基本建立的情况下,防止规制改革倒退则是规制改革取得良好绩效的保证。
Electric power industry is an important basic industry of national economic development. It plays an essential role in supporting the development of other industrial sectors. Its characteristic of natural monopoly, externalities and other economic or technical characteristics deicide the necessity to be regulated. Russia and China have been had many similar characteristics since the period of planned-economy. The target of regulatory reform of the power industry is to improve the efficiency, but the different constraint conditions formed a different path of regulatory reform between the two countries.
This paper closely discusses about the differences of constraint conditions between China and Russia, how about the power industry regulatory reform went on under such differences and studies about the influence of property rights, market structure, regulation and constraints to the performance of regulatory reform under a developed framework of the regulation economics.
The paper is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. First of all, proposes the topic under three perspective of the importance of the power industry and regulation, the necessity of comparison in regulation between China and Russia. Secondly, reviews and comments on power-related research from three aspects of the government regulation on natural monopoly, regulatory reform of power industry, and comparison of government regulation between China and Russia. Finally, introduces the significance, innovation, research methods and structural arrangements.
The second chapter proposes a framework for comparative analysis of government regulatory reform of natural monopoly industries for transition states. A developed regulatory reform framework formed under the basic of the theory of regulation economics, joining the market factors of structure, property rights and the specific constraints. All these factors determine the performance of regulatory reform.
The third chapter compares the constraints of regulatory reform between China and Russia. Different constraints form different transition path and strategies of the two countries, thus form a different path and strategies of regulatory reform of power industry, including reform of property rights, market structure and regulatory system, and different reform objectives formed by different constraints ultimately influence the judgment of regulatory reform performance.
The fourth to the sixth chapter are about the comparative analysis on the property rights institution, market structure and regulatory institution between the two countries which formed under the specific constrains. Chapter four compares from the perspective of property rights institution. Different form of ownership, whether state or private is formed in the process of regulatory reform of different countries, and has its theoretical support. The formation of different property rights institution is influenced by the different objectives and constraints of the regulatory reform in the two countries.
The fifth chapter compares from the perspective of market structure. Russia goes ahead of China in the structural reforms of introducing competition mechanism. The reasons are, on the one hand, China has weaker technology than Russia in the separation of four links; on the other hand, new interest groups and mid-term status of preference has formed in the process of gradual reform, and frustrated the further reform.
The sixth chapter compares from the perspective of reform of regulation institution. Regulation institution is composed by the technical meathods and system of regulation. The technical methods of regulation mean to replace the traditional regulation of incentive regulation, to provide incentives for enterprise efficiency. Regulation system includes setting up regulatory bodies, setting and implementing regulatory legislation. Regulation system affects the credibility of commitments, and ultimately affects the performance of regulatory reform.
The seventh chapter evaluates the performance of regulatory reform. By comparison, the short-term performance of China is better than Russia. It's because that the gradual reform in macroeconomic reforms of China created a good environment for the reform of power industry, but radical reform in Russia caused the deline of production, although the reform achieved the political goal of unreversed, but paid a terrible price. In the terms of long term performance, Russia is better than China probably. This is because China's gradual reforms carried out from the aspects of incremental reform which is more easy, but the stock component of the economy has not completely reformed, property rights reform is slow, competition structure in the market has not fully formed, regulation system is not perfect. The basic framework of property rights, competition, regulation has not completed, which became the "bottleneck" of further development. Efficient basic institutional framework is established in Russia, for which great costs have been paid. The things for Russia to do are effectively promoting the performance under the existed framework. So, in the long run, performance of Russia may be better than that of China.
The eigheth chapter is the conclusion and enlightenment. Firstly, summarize for the reform path of the two countries'. China follows the path of gradual reform of coordination, and Russia's reform path can be summed up as from the radical imbalance into the path of gradual reform of coordination. Secondly, summarize the factors which may impact the performance of regulatory reform. Finally, propose suggestions for further reform. The biggest constraint of regulatory reform in China is "government-enterprise alliance" which formed under the traditional system of "administrative monopoly". Getting rid of regulation blockage which led from "government-enterprise alliance" will help promoting further regulatory reform and achieving better performance. For Russia, to prevent from going backwards under the established regulatory framework will help to guarantee better performance of regulatory reform.
本论文紧紧围绕中俄两国电力产业改革在约束条件方面的差异,以及在这种差异下进行的规制改革进行论述。在一个转轨国家规制改革框架之下,考察约束条件下形成的产权形式、市场结构以及规制制度及其对规制改革绩效的影响。
论文共分八章。第一章为绪论。首先,从电力产业及其规制改革的重要性以及中俄两国电力产业政府规制比较的可行性和必要性等角度提出了本文的论题。其次,从自然垄断产业政府规制、电力产业政府规制改革以及中俄电力产业政府规制三个方面对相关研究进行了回顾与评述。最后,分别介绍了本文的研究意义、创新之处、研究方法以及结构安排。
第二章旨在为本文建立分析框架。本文对中俄电力产业规制改革的研究从规制经济学的理论出发,在规制经济学研究框架的基础上,利用产业经济学理论对电力产业市场结构改革进行分析,利用新制度经济学对产权改革进行分析,利用转轨经济理论对规制改革道路选择的特定约束条件进行分析,形成了专门针对转轨国家规制改革问题研究的框架。对于转轨国家来说,特定约束条件下形成的产权形式、市场结构形式以及相应的规制制度,共同决定了自然垄断产业规制改革的绩效。
第三章比较中俄两国规制改革的约束条件。不同的约束条件形成了两国各自的转轨道路和策略,进而形成了不同的电力产业规制改革,包括产权改革、市场结构改革以及规制制度改革的道路和策略,最终影响规制改革的绩效。
第四到第六章分别对两国在特定约束条件下形成的影响规制绩效的产权制度、市场结构和规制制度因素进行比较分析。第四章从产权制度的角度进行。各国在规制改革过程中形成了不同的产权形式,无论国有还是私有,都有其理论支撑。中俄两国也形成了不同的产权形式,中国以国有为主,俄罗斯则以私有为主。产权制度的不同,受两国规制改革目标及约束条件的影响。
第五章从市场结构的角度进行比较。在引入竞争机制的结构改革方面,俄罗斯走在了中国的前面。一方面由于中国在电力各环节分离的技术上落后于俄罗斯；另一方面,与中国渐进改革过程中出现新的利益集团,形成了中期现状偏好,进而对进一步改革阻挠有关。
第六章从规制制度改革的角度进行比较。规制制度由规制方法和规制体制两部分组成。规制方法改革是指以激励性规制取代传统规制,为企业效率提高提供激励。规制体制是指规制机构的设置、规制立法及其实施。规制体制对规制承诺的可信性产生影响,最终对规制改革的绩效产生影响。
第七章对规制改革绩效进行评价。对两国绩效的比较分别从总量、价格、产业效益和企业效率四个角度进行。通过比较发现,中国的短期绩效优于俄罗斯,主要是由于中国宏观经济的渐进改革为电力产业改革创造了良好的环境,而俄罗斯的激进改革则造成了产量下降,虽然实现了改革不被逆转的政治目标,但却付出了极大的代价。在长期绩效方面,俄罗斯的发展潜力可能优于中国。这是因为,中国的渐进改革从比较容易进行的增量改革方面着手,对经济中的存量成分改革并不彻底,产权改革缓慢、市场竞争结构没有完全形成、规制制度还需完善。产权、竞争、规制的基础框架搭建并没有完成,这成为经济绩效进一步提升的“瓶颈”。而俄罗斯以巨大代价换来了有助于提高效率的体制框架的基本确立,因而只需要在现有框架下推进改革,便可能带来经济绩效的快速增进。
第八章为结论与启示。首先,对中俄两国电力产业规制改革的路径进行总结。中国走的是“协调渐进”改革道路,而俄罗斯的改革路径则可以总结为“从非协调激进到协调渐进”的改革路径。其次,总结了影响规制改革绩效的因素。最后,针对中俄两国电力产业规制改革现状及存在的问题,提出了进一步改革建议。中国规制改革最大的制约是传统“行政垄断”体制下形成的“政企同盟”,只有破除“政企同盟”导致的规制阻滞,才能使规制改革进一步推进并取得良好绩效。对于俄罗斯来说,在规制框架基本建立的情况下,防止规制改革倒退则是规制改革取得良好绩效的保证。
Electric power industry is an important basic industry of national economic development. It plays an essential role in supporting the development of other industrial sectors. Its characteristic of natural monopoly, externalities and other economic or technical characteristics deicide the necessity to be regulated. Russia and China have been had many similar characteristics since the period of planned-economy. The target of regulatory reform of the power industry is to improve the efficiency, but the different constraint conditions formed a different path of regulatory reform between the two countries.
This paper closely discusses about the differences of constraint conditions between China and Russia, how about the power industry regulatory reform went on under such differences and studies about the influence of property rights, market structure, regulation and constraints to the performance of regulatory reform under a developed framework of the regulation economics.
The paper is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. First of all, proposes the topic under three perspective of the importance of the power industry and regulation, the necessity of comparison in regulation between China and Russia. Secondly, reviews and comments on power-related research from three aspects of the government regulation on natural monopoly, regulatory reform of power industry, and comparison of government regulation between China and Russia. Finally, introduces the significance, innovation, research methods and structural arrangements.
The second chapter proposes a framework for comparative analysis of government regulatory reform of natural monopoly industries for transition states. A developed regulatory reform framework formed under the basic of the theory of regulation economics, joining the market factors of structure, property rights and the specific constraints. All these factors determine the performance of regulatory reform.
The third chapter compares the constraints of regulatory reform between China and Russia. Different constraints form different transition path and strategies of the two countries, thus form a different path and strategies of regulatory reform of power industry, including reform of property rights, market structure and regulatory system, and different reform objectives formed by different constraints ultimately influence the judgment of regulatory reform performance.
The fourth to the sixth chapter are about the comparative analysis on the property rights institution, market structure and regulatory institution between the two countries which formed under the specific constrains. Chapter four compares from the perspective of property rights institution. Different form of ownership, whether state or private is formed in the process of regulatory reform of different countries, and has its theoretical support. The formation of different property rights institution is influenced by the different objectives and constraints of the regulatory reform in the two countries.
The fifth chapter compares from the perspective of market structure. Russia goes ahead of China in the structural reforms of introducing competition mechanism. The reasons are, on the one hand, China has weaker technology than Russia in the separation of four links; on the other hand, new interest groups and mid-term status of preference has formed in the process of gradual reform, and frustrated the further reform.
The sixth chapter compares from the perspective of reform of regulation institution. Regulation institution is composed by the technical meathods and system of regulation. The technical methods of regulation mean to replace the traditional regulation of incentive regulation, to provide incentives for enterprise efficiency. Regulation system includes setting up regulatory bodies, setting and implementing regulatory legislation. Regulation system affects the credibility of commitments, and ultimately affects the performance of regulatory reform.
The seventh chapter evaluates the performance of regulatory reform. By comparison, the short-term performance of China is better than Russia. It's because that the gradual reform in macroeconomic reforms of China created a good environment for the reform of power industry, but radical reform in Russia caused the deline of production, although the reform achieved the political goal of unreversed, but paid a terrible price. In the terms of long term performance, Russia is better than China probably. This is because China's gradual reforms carried out from the aspects of incremental reform which is more easy, but the stock component of the economy has not completely reformed, property rights reform is slow, competition structure in the market has not fully formed, regulation system is not perfect. The basic framework of property rights, competition, regulation has not completed, which became the "bottleneck" of further development. Efficient basic institutional framework is established in Russia, for which great costs have been paid. The things for Russia to do are effectively promoting the performance under the existed framework. So, in the long run, performance of Russia may be better than that of China.
The eigheth chapter is the conclusion and enlightenment. Firstly, summarize for the reform path of the two countries'. China follows the path of gradual reform of coordination, and Russia's reform path can be summed up as from the radical imbalance into the path of gradual reform of coordination. Secondly, summarize the factors which may impact the performance of regulatory reform. Finally, propose suggestions for further reform. The biggest constraint of regulatory reform in China is "government-enterprise alliance" which formed under the traditional system of "administrative monopoly". Getting rid of regulation blockage which led from "government-enterprise alliance" will help promoting further regulatory reform and achieving better performance. For Russia, to prevent from going backwards under the established regulatory framework will help to guarantee better performance of regulatory reform.
引文
①指在一定的产出范围内,生产函数呈规模报酬递增(成本递减)的状态,即生产规模越大,单位产品德成本越小,由一家企业大规模生产要比几家小规模企业同时生产更有效率。
②指当同时提供多种产品(或服务)是,由一家企业提供的效率要高于这些产品(或服务)分别由不同企业提供时的效率。
③指在某行业中某单一企业生产所有各种产品的成本小于若干个企业分别生产这些产品的成本之和
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①转引自植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1992：19
②植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1992：209
①有效竞争是指将竞争作用与规模经济作用有效地协调,从而形成一种有利于长期均衡的竞争格局
②盛洪.现代制度经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2003：序言9
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①A·布兹加林,B·达拉耶夫.转引自文革.经济转轨与制度变迁方式比较——以中俄战略演变为背景的分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：244
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②“制度荒原”或“制度混乱”指旧机制被打破,但新的市场机制尚不能承担所有的协调任务。见科尔奈.后社会主义转轨的思考[M].长春：吉林人民出版社,2003：18
①曲文轶.转轨经济中自然垄断产业的私有化：俄罗斯案例分析,2004(5)：26、27
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①曲文轶.转轨经济中自然垄断产业的私有化：俄罗斯案例分析[J].俄罗斯中亚东欧研究,2004(5)：29
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②A·布兹加林,B·达拉耶夫.转引自文革.经济转轨与制度变迁方式比较——以中俄战略演变为背景的分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：244
①谢地.自然垄断行业国有经济调整与政府规制改革互动论[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007：16
① Kirill Fetisov. The evolution of Russian power industry from monopoly to market operation [C]. Lappeenranta University of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering, 2007(5):55
② Kirill Fetisov. The evolution of Russian power industry from monopoly to market operation [C]. Lappeenranta University of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering,2007(5)::55
③为西西伯利亚地区最大的配电公司,2005年成立,公司网址http://global.te.ru/
④负责经营莫斯科地区和首都莫斯科的配电业务,2005年4月成立,公司网址http://www.moesk.ru/
①资料来源跨区配电网控股公司网站
② Kirill Fetisov. The evolution of Russian power industry from monopoly to market operation [C]. Lappeenranta University of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering,2007(5):60-61
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①国家电力公司排斥作为独立发电企业的四川二滩水电站的电力上网。二滩发电后,实际上网电价为0.1850元/千瓦时,远远低于国家计委的批复上网电价(1998-2000年：0.4388 元/千瓦时,01-09年：0.4688元/千瓦时),并且执行数量仅由132亿千瓦时,远远低于计委批复的322亿千瓦时,使得二滩水电站自1998年建成投产至2000年末的两年间就巨亏十几个亿
②赵卓.竞争、产权、规制与网络型基础产业绩效[M].广州：中山大学出版社,2009：151
①2005年在东北地区率先启动了区域电力市场,通过建立区域电力调度交易中心,为电力企业提供了一个公平竞争的平台。
②资料来自于国家电力公司网站[EB/OL].http://service.sgcc.com.cn/ssl/login.php
①国家电力监管委员会编制《2009年度全国电力交易与市场秩序情况监管报告》,第10-11页
②华东电力市场2005年度监管报告,来源于[EB/OL].http://www.ecerb.gov.cn/jgbj.jsp
①贵州金元、江苏苏源、山东鲁能、四川启明星等均已成为当地发电企业中的举足轻重的“新贵”。
②其在以下发电集团所占注册资本份额为：在OGK-1为40.17%,TGC-7为32.18%、TGC-11为27.45%,TGC-6为23.58%
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①拉丰也认为中国实行的一厂一价政策能从本质上保证全部(投资)成本的收回,而不管其融资结构如何。同时,这也有利于吸引电力部门的投资。参见拉丰. 规制与发展[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：13
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②指当同时提供多种产品(或服务)是,由一家企业提供的效率要高于这些产品(或服务)分别由不同企业提供时的效率。
③指在某行业中某单一企业生产所有各种产品的成本小于若干个企业分别生产这些产品的成本之和
④曼昆.经济学原理[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2005：260
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①盛洪.现代制度经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2003：序言9
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②植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1992：209
①有效竞争是指将竞争作用与规模经济作用有效地协调,从而形成一种有利于长期均衡的竞争格局
②盛洪.现代制度经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2003：序言9
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②植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1992：：59
③植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1992：：58
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①A·布兹加林,B·达拉耶夫.转引自文革.经济转轨与制度变迁方式比较——以中俄战略演变为背景的分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：244
②[比]热若尔·罗兰.转型与经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002：49
①刘文革.经济转轨与制度变迁方式比较——以中俄战略演变为背景的分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：309
②“制度荒原”或“制度混乱”指旧机制被打破,但新的市场机制尚不能承担所有的协调任务。见科尔奈.后社会主义转轨的思考[M].长春：吉林人民出版社,2003：18
①曲文轶.转轨经济中自然垄断产业的私有化：俄罗斯案例分析,2004(5)：26、27
① De Alessi.L.Proper right, transaction costs,and efficiency:an essay in economic theory[J].American Economic Review,1983(77):64-81
①曲文轶.转轨经济中自然垄断产业的私有化：俄罗斯案例分析[J].俄罗斯中亚东欧研究,2004(5)：29
①刘文革.经济转轨与制度变迁方式比较——以中俄战略演变为背景的分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：244
②A·布兹加林,B·达拉耶夫.转引自文革.经济转轨与制度变迁方式比较——以中俄战略演变为背景的分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：244
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① Kirill Fetisov. The evolution of Russian power industry from monopoly to market operation [C]. Lappeenranta University of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering, 2007(5):55
② Kirill Fetisov. The evolution of Russian power industry from monopoly to market operation [C]. Lappeenranta University of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering,2007(5)::55
③为西西伯利亚地区最大的配电公司,2005年成立,公司网址http://global.te.ru/
④负责经营莫斯科地区和首都莫斯科的配电业务,2005年4月成立,公司网址http://www.moesk.ru/
①资料来源跨区配电网控股公司网站
② Kirill Fetisov. The evolution of Russian power industry from monopoly to market operation [C]. Lappeenranta University of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering,2007(5):60-61
①冯绍雷,相蓝欣.俄罗斯经济转型[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2005
①罗纳德·科斯.企业的性质[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2003：104
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①国家电力公司排斥作为独立发电企业的四川二滩水电站的电力上网。二滩发电后,实际上网电价为0.1850元/千瓦时,远远低于国家计委的批复上网电价(1998-2000年：0.4388 元/千瓦时,01-09年：0.4688元/千瓦时),并且执行数量仅由132亿千瓦时,远远低于计委批复的322亿千瓦时,使得二滩水电站自1998年建成投产至2000年末的两年间就巨亏十几个亿
②赵卓.竞争、产权、规制与网络型基础产业绩效[M].广州：中山大学出版社,2009：151
①2005年在东北地区率先启动了区域电力市场,通过建立区域电力调度交易中心,为电力企业提供了一个公平竞争的平台。
②资料来自于国家电力公司网站[EB/OL].http://service.sgcc.com.cn/ssl/login.php
①国家电力监管委员会编制《2009年度全国电力交易与市场秩序情况监管报告》,第10-11页
②华东电力市场2005年度监管报告,来源于[EB/OL].http://www.ecerb.gov.cn/jgbj.jsp
①贵州金元、江苏苏源、山东鲁能、四川启明星等均已成为当地发电企业中的举足轻重的“新贵”。
②其在以下发电集团所占注册资本份额为：在OGK-1为40.17%,TGC-7为32.18%、TGC-11为27.45%,TGC-6为23.58%
①[日]植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京：发展出版社,1992：28-29
②王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论——基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[J].北京：商务印书馆,2008：153
①王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论——基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[J].北京：商务印书馆,2008：110
①主要参考王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论——基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[J].北京：商务印书馆,2008：116-132
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①拉丰.规制与发展[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：151-154
①拉丰也认为中国实行的一厂一价政策能从本质上保证全部(投资)成本的收回,而不管其融资结构如何。同时,这也有利于吸引电力部门的投资。参见拉丰. 规制与发展[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：13
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②关于俄罗斯中央和地方财税体制改革的具体内容见郑羽,蒋明君.普京八年：俄罗斯复兴之路(政治卷)[M].经济管理出版社,2008：115-144
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