规制视角下的盐业发展研究
|
摘要
盐是与水、空气一样,是人类赖以生存的基础,是维持人体及其他许多生命体内部机能正常运行不可或缺的重要元素,如果人体不能每天摄入一定量的盐,就会出现四肢乏力的现象,久而久之,生命安全也将面临威胁。所以,盐被赋予“百味之祖”、“食肴之将”、“国之大宝”等称谓,人们对盐的重视程度由此可见一斑。同时,正是由于盐是人类存活不可或缺的重要元素,所以盐始终伴随着人类发展的每一步。人类早期的集居和城市的形成与盐有着密切的关系；人类早期的战争也源于对盐这样一种重要资源的争夺和控制；盐还与政权变迁和社会稳定有着密切的关系,在封建社会,盐税是国家财政收入的三大支柱之一,固有“天下之赋,盐利居半”一说。进入现代社会以后,盐的经济价值被逐渐开发,它成为一种重要的工业原料,并与铁、石油、石灰石、硫磺并称为五大工业原料。现今,盐产品已有14000多种。其产量、消费量和使用方式是反映一个国家工业发展水平的标志之一。我国是产盐大国,每年的盐产量达到六千六百万吨,居世界第一；盐生产能力则达到了七千两百万吨。我国的盐产量主要来自海盐、井盐和湖盐。其中,以海盐为大宗,约占全球海盐总产量的三分之一以上。
我国的盐产业规制颇具特色：首先,我国实行食盐专营制度。食盐专营制度在消除我国碘缺乏病,提高国民素质方面起到了重要作用,但因专营产生的弊端也逐渐显露。食盐专营制度将食盐和“小工业盐”纳入专营范畴,形成了“食小盐”和大工业盐并存的二元市场结构；把盐业企业的生产和销售两大环节分割开,将盐业企业分割成只能运销的盐业公司和只能生产的制盐企业的两类畸形厂商,阻碍了制盐企业和盐业公司的发展；盐业公司凭借食盐专营带来的垄断地位,无形中提高了食盐的零售价格,阻碍了其在这些存在碘缺乏病的地区发挥作用。其次,政府的过度规制导致我国的盐产业存在严重的地区垄断。盐产业的地区垄断阻碍了我国的盐产能调整,并使得不合格的,不达标的私人微型盐场长期存在。再次,盐业企业的国有产权结构不仅导致了盐业市场的恶性价格竞争行为,而且为盐产业的行政垄断提供了平台。由于盐业企业的经营者的最大化利益与盐业企业的最大化利益并不一致,并且,作为国有企业的所有者的“人们”并不明确,无法提供有力地监督,因此在我国制盐行业中,为了获得短期利益,国有制盐企业普遍竞相压价,最终导致盐品的价格小于其边际成本,造成行业恶性竞争持续泛滥。不仅如此,国有盐业企业还成为行政垄断的平台。
政府的食盐专营制度、地区垄断的长期存在以及国有产权的产权设置妨碍了盐业市场结构的优化,导致盐业市场的不良结构和恶性市场行为,最终使得我国的盐业企业长期处于散乱、弱小的处境,出现盐业市场结构畸形,恶性价格竞争频仍,企业兼并效果不明显、规模经济和范围经济低等一系列问题,降低了我国盐业在国际市场上的竞争力。
本文将盐业的改革发展作为研究对象,采用了如下研究方法：其一,是基于多学科的综合和交叉性的研究。其中具体涉及到经济学理论、管理学原理、法学、公共管理、政治学以及行政学等学科的基础,综合多种学科领域的知识；其二,理论与实践相结合的方法。通过对该领域基本理论的研究,结合我国政府盐业规制的具体现状,来研究和分析盐业规制改革问题,具有针对性和现实意义;其三,比较分析方法。通过对世界其他国家的盐业市场结构的横向比较和分析,考察他国的规制经验和教训,有助于我国的盐业规制改革的实践；其四,抽象与具体相结合。从抽象到具体的研究方法,可以更好地揭示事物的本质。以规制的视角探讨盐业发展中存在的问题,并希望研究结论可以为盐业的改革发展略尽绵薄之力。
本文以规制理论为基础,梳理了关于盐业规制和产业规制的国内外文献,并对中国的盐业改革和发展进行了系统研究。全文分为四个部分：第一部分,包括文章第2章,主要介绍了垄断理论与规制理论的起源、规制的定义、分类、以及规制的过程等基础理论,为文章的后续内容做了理论铺垫；第二部分,即文章第3章,详细介绍了我国盐业发展的概况,诸如我国盐资源的分布、我国盐产业的产能、技术基础等问题,还着重介绍了我国盐业规则的制度基础——食盐专营制度,以及组织基础——我国盐业公司的设置；第三部分,即文章的第4、5两章。在第4章介绍了我国盐业市场存在的诸多问题——产销脱节、恶性价格竞争频仍、企业兼并效果不明显等问题,并从规制角度简要地分析了出现这些问题的原因。第5章分析了我国盐业市场存在的最主要问题,即我国盐业市场主体散乱、弱小,市场集中度低,规模经济与范围经济都不明显,而盐业企业的兼并则受到了食盐专营制度、地区性的性质垄断以及国有产权的诸多限制,在此基础上,分析了我国盐业改革的主要目标,即改变盐业市场主体散乱、弱小的现状,提高盐业市场集中度,转变盐业市场的结构类型,将我国盐业“低集中型”的市场结构转变为“寡占型”的市场结构,提出了盐业市场结构转变的渐进式改革,确立了盐业市场结构转变的中期目标及最终目标；第四部分,即文章的第6、7、8章。由于盐业企业的兼并则受到了食盐专营制度、地区性的性质垄断以及国有产权的诸多限制,因而无法完成企业规模的扩大,及盐业市场主体的优化与壮大,从而也就无法凸显我国盐产业的范围经济和规模经济,因此,要实现我国盐业市场结构的转变,凸显我国盐产业的范围经济和规模经济,就首先要从食盐专营制度、地区性的性质垄断以及国有产权的改革入手。文章第6章详细论述了我国食盐专营制度改革的客观环境,并进一步提出了食盐专营制度改革的战略步骤和措施。第7章论述了我国地区性行政垄断的表现及成因,并运用经济学方法分析了地区垄断的成本和收益,进而提出了改革地区垄断措施,主要包括进行体制改革和法制建设等。第8章论述了我国盐业企业国有产权的改革问题,指出了“国进民退”的改革目标,并论述了其内涵和必要性,并总结出实现这一目标的有效路径。
文章的创新点主要体现在以下几方面：其一,广泛运用规制理论对我国的盐业规制进行分析,主要分析了食盐专营制度、地区垄断以及国有产权对我国盐业发展的制约作用,并按照相关理论提出我国盐业改革的方式和目标。使其既具有理论深度,又具有现实的借鉴意义；其二,提出了我国盐业规制改革的目标应是建立寡头垄断市场,并通过对比世界其他国家产业发展论述了寡头垄断的必要性,同时,笔者认为我国盐业改革也是一个长期的过程,需要破除多种障碍,在此基础上,提出了分步实现寡头垄断的市场结构的方案,先实现中上集中寡占型的市场结构,进而再向极高寡占型的市场结构发展的战略思路。其三,在食盐专营制度改革的目标上,提出要照顾“老少边穷”地区的改革思路,充分体现了公平、照顾弱势群体的思想,并依照不同地区的不同情况分别提出了改革思路,具有一定的创新意义。
当然,本文对盐业规制改革的部分问题的研究还不够透彻,如盐业改革如何促进盐业市场的绩效,以及能够在多大程度上改进市场绩效,实现盐业行业的健康发展,并增强我国盐企的竞争力。这是在以后的研究过程中需要深入研究的地方。
Salt is the basis for human survival like water and air. It is the indispensable element to maintain the normal operation of the human body and many other life functions within the body of, if the body is not a certain amount of daily intake of salt, there will be limb weakness of the phenomenon, the passage of time, life will be threatened. Therefore, the salt was given "Taste progenitor", "eat meat dish of the will", "Great Treasure of the Country " and other titles, It can show the importance of salt. At the same time, precisely salt is an indispensable element of human survival, so the salt is always accompanied every step of human development. Set of early human settlements and cities have a close relationship with the salt; Early human warfare also stemmed from Contention and control for salt which was such an important resources; Salt was closely related with the regime change and social stability, in feudal society, Salt is one of the three pillars of state revenue, so it was said "In a country's fiscal revenues, the salt was accounted for half of it". Into the modern society, the economic value of salt was gradually developed, it became an important industrial raw material, and with iron, oil, limestone, sulfur, together they are called the five industrial raw materials. Today, there are over 14,000 kinds of salt products. Its production, consumption and use are one of the signs that reflected the level of a country's industrial development.
Salt production in China is huge. The annual salt production reached sixty-six million tons, ranking first in the world. The capacity of salt production has reached seventy-two million tons. China's salt production is mainly from sea salt, well salt and lake salt. Among them, sea salt is the bulk, accounting for more than a third of the world's salt production.
China's salt industry regulation is very distinctive:Firstly, China adopts salt monopoly system. Salt monopoly system play an important role in the elimination of iodine deficiency disorders and improved the quality of National in China, but the disadvantages are gradually revealed. The salt monopoly system will take salt and "small industrial salt" into the franchise area, forming a dual market structure which contains "small salt water" and the coexistence of large-scale industrial salt. The division of salt production and sales and the salt business which was divided into two types of abnormal salt manufacturers that were the salt distribution companies and enterprises can only produce hindered the company's business and Salt development. With the monopoly position. Salt companies indirectly raised the retail price of salt. which hindered the effect of prevention for iodine deficiency disorders in these areas. Secondly, excessive government regulation led to serious regional monopolies in China's salt industry. The regional monopolies of salt industry hindered adjustment of the salt production, and made unqualified, non-compliance of the private mini-salt exist for a long time. Thirdly, the salt company's state-owned structure not only made salt market lead to a vicious price competition, but also provided a platform for administrative monopoly of the salt industry. Moreover, the state-owned enterprises also become the Chief salt monopoly platform. As the Inconsistent of maximum benefits of salt business operators and maximum benefits of the salt business and the uncertainty of "the people" who owned state-owned enterprises, it can not provide strong oversight, the state-owned enterprises generally compete to lower prices for short-term interests, which resulting in the price of salt is less than their marginal product cost and leading to vicious competition in the industry which is continued to spread.
Government's salt monopoly system, long-standing of regional monopoly and the set of the property market structure of state-owned property hinder the optimization of salt market, lead to adverse salt market structure and vicious market behavior, and ultimately make our business a long period of salt scattered, weak situation, there are range of issues such as salt market structure deformities, frequent vicious price competition, mergers little effect, low economies of scale and scope economies, which reduce the competitiveness of salt business in the international market.
This article will take reform and development of salt as a research object, using the following methodology. Firstly, the research based on a comprehensive of multi-disciplinary and cross-cutting. Which specifically related to economic theory, management theory, law, public administration, political science and administrative science and other disciplines and based on comprehensive knowledge of a variety of subject areas; secondly, the method of combination of the theory and practice. Through basic theoretical research in this area, combined with our government regulation of the specific status of salt, it is specific and practical significance to study and analyze the salt regulatory reform; thirdly, the comparative analysis. Through the horizontal comparison and analysis of rest of the world's salt market structure, visiting other countries' regulatory experience and lessons, it is good for the reform of China's salt industry regulatory practice; fourthly, the combination of abstract and concrete. It is better to reveal the nature of things from the abstract to the specific research methods. To investigate the problems of development of salt business with the perspective of regulate, and hope that the study findings could make some contribution to the development of salt reforms.
This paper that based on the theory of regulation combs on Domestic and foreign literature of salt regulation and industry regulation, and has been systematically studied reform and development of China's salt industry.Text is divided into four parts:the first part, including articles in Chapter 2, focuses on the origin of the monopoly theory and regulation theory, the definition of regulation, classification, and the process of regulatory and other basic'theory for the article for making a theoretical groundwork for follow-up content of the article; second part, which is chapter 3 of the article, not only detailed overview of the development of our salt business, such as the distribution of resources, the capacity of China's salt industry's production, technology infrastructure and other issues, but also highlights the institutional foundation of China's salt industry rules--salt monopoly system, as well as the organizational foundation-the settings of China's salt company; the third part, which is the article's two chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 it describes that there are many problems such as sales out of touch, frequent vicious price competition, the effect of corporate mergers is not obvious and other issues in the salt market in China, and gives a brief analysis of the causes of these problems from the regulatory point of view. Chapter 5 analyzes the main existence problem of the salt market in China, including scattered, weak, low market concentration of China's salt market players, scale economies and scope economies are not obvious, and salt corporate mergers is limited by the salt monopoly system, monopoly of the regional, state-owned property as well as many restrictions, on this basis, it analyzes the main objective of China's salt industry reform, which including changing the scattered and weak status quo of salt market players, and improving the concentration of salt market, changing the type of structure of salt industry market, turning "low intensive" market structure into a "oligopolies" market structure in the salt industry in China, it proposes gradual reform of market structure changes in salt business, and establishes medium-term objectives and the ultimate goal changes in salt market structure:the fourth part of the article, including chapter 6.7and8. As the mergers of salt business is limited by the salt monopoly system, the regional monopoly, many restrictions of the state-owned property, it is unable to complete the expansion of enterprise scale and the optimization and growth of the main salt market, it will not highlight scope economies and scale economies of China's salt industry. Therefore, for achieving changes in the structure of China's salt market, highlighting scope economies and scale economies of China's salt industry, the first thing will start the reform of the salt monopoly system, the regional monopoly and state-owned property. Chapter 6 of the article discusses the objective environment of the reform of China's salt monopoly system in detail, and further proposes strategy steps and measures of salt monopoly system reform. Chapter 7 discusses the performance and causes of China's regional administrative monopoly, and analyzes the costs and benefits of regional monopolies with the use of economic approach, and then presents a regional monopolies reform measures, including institutional reform and legal construction. Chapter 8 discusses reform of state-owned property in China's salt industry, indicates the reform objectives that is "the state advances as the private sector retreats", and discusses its meaning and necessity, and summed up the effective path to achieve this goal.
The innovation of this articles reflects in the following aspects:First, it analyzes the regulation of China's salt industry with the extensive use of regulation theory, mainly analyzing development constraints on the role of salt business in China with the affect of the salt monopoly system, regional monopolies and state-owned property, and it proposes the way and targets of the reform of China's salt business in accordance with relevant theory. It has both theoretical depth and practical significance as reference; Second, it proposes regulatory reform of China's salt industry should aim to establish an oligopoly market, and discussed the necessity of an oligopoly by comparing the rest of the world's oligopolistic industries, at the same time. I believe that it is a long-term process of China's salt industry reform, it requires getting rid of a variety of obstacles, on this basis, it proposes to achieve oligopolistic market structure program step by step, which is a strategic thinking that it focuses on the implementation of oligopoly market structure first, and then makes it into development of high oligopoly type of market structure, Third, in the objectives of salt monopoly system reform, it proposes reform ideas of taking care of "poor and remote" areas, which fully reflects fair and the ideas of taking care of vulnerable groups, and it puts forward the reform ideas with a certain degree of innovation in accordance with different situations in different parts.
Of course, this paper is not enough thorough research in the part of problem of regulatory reform of the salt business, for example, salt business reform how to promote the performance of salt market, and the what extent that improves market performance, achieves the healthy development of salt industry, and enhances our salt prices competitive. This is the future course of the studying areas for further studying.
我国的盐产业规制颇具特色：首先,我国实行食盐专营制度。食盐专营制度在消除我国碘缺乏病,提高国民素质方面起到了重要作用,但因专营产生的弊端也逐渐显露。食盐专营制度将食盐和“小工业盐”纳入专营范畴,形成了“食小盐”和大工业盐并存的二元市场结构；把盐业企业的生产和销售两大环节分割开,将盐业企业分割成只能运销的盐业公司和只能生产的制盐企业的两类畸形厂商,阻碍了制盐企业和盐业公司的发展；盐业公司凭借食盐专营带来的垄断地位,无形中提高了食盐的零售价格,阻碍了其在这些存在碘缺乏病的地区发挥作用。其次,政府的过度规制导致我国的盐产业存在严重的地区垄断。盐产业的地区垄断阻碍了我国的盐产能调整,并使得不合格的,不达标的私人微型盐场长期存在。再次,盐业企业的国有产权结构不仅导致了盐业市场的恶性价格竞争行为,而且为盐产业的行政垄断提供了平台。由于盐业企业的经营者的最大化利益与盐业企业的最大化利益并不一致,并且,作为国有企业的所有者的“人们”并不明确,无法提供有力地监督,因此在我国制盐行业中,为了获得短期利益,国有制盐企业普遍竞相压价,最终导致盐品的价格小于其边际成本,造成行业恶性竞争持续泛滥。不仅如此,国有盐业企业还成为行政垄断的平台。
政府的食盐专营制度、地区垄断的长期存在以及国有产权的产权设置妨碍了盐业市场结构的优化,导致盐业市场的不良结构和恶性市场行为,最终使得我国的盐业企业长期处于散乱、弱小的处境,出现盐业市场结构畸形,恶性价格竞争频仍,企业兼并效果不明显、规模经济和范围经济低等一系列问题,降低了我国盐业在国际市场上的竞争力。
本文将盐业的改革发展作为研究对象,采用了如下研究方法：其一,是基于多学科的综合和交叉性的研究。其中具体涉及到经济学理论、管理学原理、法学、公共管理、政治学以及行政学等学科的基础,综合多种学科领域的知识；其二,理论与实践相结合的方法。通过对该领域基本理论的研究,结合我国政府盐业规制的具体现状,来研究和分析盐业规制改革问题,具有针对性和现实意义;其三,比较分析方法。通过对世界其他国家的盐业市场结构的横向比较和分析,考察他国的规制经验和教训,有助于我国的盐业规制改革的实践；其四,抽象与具体相结合。从抽象到具体的研究方法,可以更好地揭示事物的本质。以规制的视角探讨盐业发展中存在的问题,并希望研究结论可以为盐业的改革发展略尽绵薄之力。
本文以规制理论为基础,梳理了关于盐业规制和产业规制的国内外文献,并对中国的盐业改革和发展进行了系统研究。全文分为四个部分：第一部分,包括文章第2章,主要介绍了垄断理论与规制理论的起源、规制的定义、分类、以及规制的过程等基础理论,为文章的后续内容做了理论铺垫；第二部分,即文章第3章,详细介绍了我国盐业发展的概况,诸如我国盐资源的分布、我国盐产业的产能、技术基础等问题,还着重介绍了我国盐业规则的制度基础——食盐专营制度,以及组织基础——我国盐业公司的设置；第三部分,即文章的第4、5两章。在第4章介绍了我国盐业市场存在的诸多问题——产销脱节、恶性价格竞争频仍、企业兼并效果不明显等问题,并从规制角度简要地分析了出现这些问题的原因。第5章分析了我国盐业市场存在的最主要问题,即我国盐业市场主体散乱、弱小,市场集中度低,规模经济与范围经济都不明显,而盐业企业的兼并则受到了食盐专营制度、地区性的性质垄断以及国有产权的诸多限制,在此基础上,分析了我国盐业改革的主要目标,即改变盐业市场主体散乱、弱小的现状,提高盐业市场集中度,转变盐业市场的结构类型,将我国盐业“低集中型”的市场结构转变为“寡占型”的市场结构,提出了盐业市场结构转变的渐进式改革,确立了盐业市场结构转变的中期目标及最终目标；第四部分,即文章的第6、7、8章。由于盐业企业的兼并则受到了食盐专营制度、地区性的性质垄断以及国有产权的诸多限制,因而无法完成企业规模的扩大,及盐业市场主体的优化与壮大,从而也就无法凸显我国盐产业的范围经济和规模经济,因此,要实现我国盐业市场结构的转变,凸显我国盐产业的范围经济和规模经济,就首先要从食盐专营制度、地区性的性质垄断以及国有产权的改革入手。文章第6章详细论述了我国食盐专营制度改革的客观环境,并进一步提出了食盐专营制度改革的战略步骤和措施。第7章论述了我国地区性行政垄断的表现及成因,并运用经济学方法分析了地区垄断的成本和收益,进而提出了改革地区垄断措施,主要包括进行体制改革和法制建设等。第8章论述了我国盐业企业国有产权的改革问题,指出了“国进民退”的改革目标,并论述了其内涵和必要性,并总结出实现这一目标的有效路径。
文章的创新点主要体现在以下几方面：其一,广泛运用规制理论对我国的盐业规制进行分析,主要分析了食盐专营制度、地区垄断以及国有产权对我国盐业发展的制约作用,并按照相关理论提出我国盐业改革的方式和目标。使其既具有理论深度,又具有现实的借鉴意义；其二,提出了我国盐业规制改革的目标应是建立寡头垄断市场,并通过对比世界其他国家产业发展论述了寡头垄断的必要性,同时,笔者认为我国盐业改革也是一个长期的过程,需要破除多种障碍,在此基础上,提出了分步实现寡头垄断的市场结构的方案,先实现中上集中寡占型的市场结构,进而再向极高寡占型的市场结构发展的战略思路。其三,在食盐专营制度改革的目标上,提出要照顾“老少边穷”地区的改革思路,充分体现了公平、照顾弱势群体的思想,并依照不同地区的不同情况分别提出了改革思路,具有一定的创新意义。
当然,本文对盐业规制改革的部分问题的研究还不够透彻,如盐业改革如何促进盐业市场的绩效,以及能够在多大程度上改进市场绩效,实现盐业行业的健康发展,并增强我国盐企的竞争力。这是在以后的研究过程中需要深入研究的地方。
Salt is the basis for human survival like water and air. It is the indispensable element to maintain the normal operation of the human body and many other life functions within the body of, if the body is not a certain amount of daily intake of salt, there will be limb weakness of the phenomenon, the passage of time, life will be threatened. Therefore, the salt was given "Taste progenitor", "eat meat dish of the will", "Great Treasure of the Country " and other titles, It can show the importance of salt. At the same time, precisely salt is an indispensable element of human survival, so the salt is always accompanied every step of human development. Set of early human settlements and cities have a close relationship with the salt; Early human warfare also stemmed from Contention and control for salt which was such an important resources; Salt was closely related with the regime change and social stability, in feudal society, Salt is one of the three pillars of state revenue, so it was said "In a country's fiscal revenues, the salt was accounted for half of it". Into the modern society, the economic value of salt was gradually developed, it became an important industrial raw material, and with iron, oil, limestone, sulfur, together they are called the five industrial raw materials. Today, there are over 14,000 kinds of salt products. Its production, consumption and use are one of the signs that reflected the level of a country's industrial development.
Salt production in China is huge. The annual salt production reached sixty-six million tons, ranking first in the world. The capacity of salt production has reached seventy-two million tons. China's salt production is mainly from sea salt, well salt and lake salt. Among them, sea salt is the bulk, accounting for more than a third of the world's salt production.
China's salt industry regulation is very distinctive:Firstly, China adopts salt monopoly system. Salt monopoly system play an important role in the elimination of iodine deficiency disorders and improved the quality of National in China, but the disadvantages are gradually revealed. The salt monopoly system will take salt and "small industrial salt" into the franchise area, forming a dual market structure which contains "small salt water" and the coexistence of large-scale industrial salt. The division of salt production and sales and the salt business which was divided into two types of abnormal salt manufacturers that were the salt distribution companies and enterprises can only produce hindered the company's business and Salt development. With the monopoly position. Salt companies indirectly raised the retail price of salt. which hindered the effect of prevention for iodine deficiency disorders in these areas. Secondly, excessive government regulation led to serious regional monopolies in China's salt industry. The regional monopolies of salt industry hindered adjustment of the salt production, and made unqualified, non-compliance of the private mini-salt exist for a long time. Thirdly, the salt company's state-owned structure not only made salt market lead to a vicious price competition, but also provided a platform for administrative monopoly of the salt industry. Moreover, the state-owned enterprises also become the Chief salt monopoly platform. As the Inconsistent of maximum benefits of salt business operators and maximum benefits of the salt business and the uncertainty of "the people" who owned state-owned enterprises, it can not provide strong oversight, the state-owned enterprises generally compete to lower prices for short-term interests, which resulting in the price of salt is less than their marginal product cost and leading to vicious competition in the industry which is continued to spread.
Government's salt monopoly system, long-standing of regional monopoly and the set of the property market structure of state-owned property hinder the optimization of salt market, lead to adverse salt market structure and vicious market behavior, and ultimately make our business a long period of salt scattered, weak situation, there are range of issues such as salt market structure deformities, frequent vicious price competition, mergers little effect, low economies of scale and scope economies, which reduce the competitiveness of salt business in the international market.
This article will take reform and development of salt as a research object, using the following methodology. Firstly, the research based on a comprehensive of multi-disciplinary and cross-cutting. Which specifically related to economic theory, management theory, law, public administration, political science and administrative science and other disciplines and based on comprehensive knowledge of a variety of subject areas; secondly, the method of combination of the theory and practice. Through basic theoretical research in this area, combined with our government regulation of the specific status of salt, it is specific and practical significance to study and analyze the salt regulatory reform; thirdly, the comparative analysis. Through the horizontal comparison and analysis of rest of the world's salt market structure, visiting other countries' regulatory experience and lessons, it is good for the reform of China's salt industry regulatory practice; fourthly, the combination of abstract and concrete. It is better to reveal the nature of things from the abstract to the specific research methods. To investigate the problems of development of salt business with the perspective of regulate, and hope that the study findings could make some contribution to the development of salt reforms.
This paper that based on the theory of regulation combs on Domestic and foreign literature of salt regulation and industry regulation, and has been systematically studied reform and development of China's salt industry.Text is divided into four parts:the first part, including articles in Chapter 2, focuses on the origin of the monopoly theory and regulation theory, the definition of regulation, classification, and the process of regulatory and other basic'theory for the article for making a theoretical groundwork for follow-up content of the article; second part, which is chapter 3 of the article, not only detailed overview of the development of our salt business, such as the distribution of resources, the capacity of China's salt industry's production, technology infrastructure and other issues, but also highlights the institutional foundation of China's salt industry rules--salt monopoly system, as well as the organizational foundation-the settings of China's salt company; the third part, which is the article's two chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 it describes that there are many problems such as sales out of touch, frequent vicious price competition, the effect of corporate mergers is not obvious and other issues in the salt market in China, and gives a brief analysis of the causes of these problems from the regulatory point of view. Chapter 5 analyzes the main existence problem of the salt market in China, including scattered, weak, low market concentration of China's salt market players, scale economies and scope economies are not obvious, and salt corporate mergers is limited by the salt monopoly system, monopoly of the regional, state-owned property as well as many restrictions, on this basis, it analyzes the main objective of China's salt industry reform, which including changing the scattered and weak status quo of salt market players, and improving the concentration of salt market, changing the type of structure of salt industry market, turning "low intensive" market structure into a "oligopolies" market structure in the salt industry in China, it proposes gradual reform of market structure changes in salt business, and establishes medium-term objectives and the ultimate goal changes in salt market structure:the fourth part of the article, including chapter 6.7and8. As the mergers of salt business is limited by the salt monopoly system, the regional monopoly, many restrictions of the state-owned property, it is unable to complete the expansion of enterprise scale and the optimization and growth of the main salt market, it will not highlight scope economies and scale economies of China's salt industry. Therefore, for achieving changes in the structure of China's salt market, highlighting scope economies and scale economies of China's salt industry, the first thing will start the reform of the salt monopoly system, the regional monopoly and state-owned property. Chapter 6 of the article discusses the objective environment of the reform of China's salt monopoly system in detail, and further proposes strategy steps and measures of salt monopoly system reform. Chapter 7 discusses the performance and causes of China's regional administrative monopoly, and analyzes the costs and benefits of regional monopolies with the use of economic approach, and then presents a regional monopolies reform measures, including institutional reform and legal construction. Chapter 8 discusses reform of state-owned property in China's salt industry, indicates the reform objectives that is "the state advances as the private sector retreats", and discusses its meaning and necessity, and summed up the effective path to achieve this goal.
The innovation of this articles reflects in the following aspects:First, it analyzes the regulation of China's salt industry with the extensive use of regulation theory, mainly analyzing development constraints on the role of salt business in China with the affect of the salt monopoly system, regional monopolies and state-owned property, and it proposes the way and targets of the reform of China's salt business in accordance with relevant theory. It has both theoretical depth and practical significance as reference; Second, it proposes regulatory reform of China's salt industry should aim to establish an oligopoly market, and discussed the necessity of an oligopoly by comparing the rest of the world's oligopolistic industries, at the same time. I believe that it is a long-term process of China's salt industry reform, it requires getting rid of a variety of obstacles, on this basis, it proposes to achieve oligopolistic market structure program step by step, which is a strategic thinking that it focuses on the implementation of oligopoly market structure first, and then makes it into development of high oligopoly type of market structure, Third, in the objectives of salt monopoly system reform, it proposes reform ideas of taking care of "poor and remote" areas, which fully reflects fair and the ideas of taking care of vulnerable groups, and it puts forward the reform ideas with a certain degree of innovation in accordance with different situations in different parts.
Of course, this paper is not enough thorough research in the part of problem of regulatory reform of the salt business, for example, salt business reform how to promote the performance of salt market, and the what extent that improves market performance, achieves the healthy development of salt industry, and enhances our salt prices competitive. This is the future course of the studying areas for further studying.
引文
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐产业组织优化进路》,四川出版集团,2009年版,第2页。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐产业组织优化进路》,第173页。
①俞建国：《立即取消食盐专营制度——我不赞成》,http://news.qq.com/a/20100205/001355.htm, 2010-01-30。
②俞建国： 《立即取消食盐专营制度——我不赞成》。
①俞建国： 《立即取消食盐专营制度——我不赞成》。
① Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics 5 (Autumn), pp.335-358.
② Richard A. posner.1974.Theories of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (2),p336.
③ George J.Stigler and Claire Friedland.1962.What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity. Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October), pp.1-16.
①由Lipsey和K.Lancaster首先于1956年提出,次优理论认为,如果在一般均衡体系中存在着某些情况,使得帕累托最优的某个条件遭到破坏,那么即使其他所有帕累托最优条件得到满足,结果也未见得是令人满意的。也即帕累托最优的达到必须全部满足一系列的条件。
② Bentley.A.F.1908.The process of government.Chicago:university of Chicago Press.
③ Truman. D.B.1951.The government process:Political Interests and Public Opinion.New York: Knopf.
④William A. Jordan.1972.Producer protection, Prior market structure and the effects of Government Regulation.Journal of law and economics 15 (1), pp.151-176.
① Wesley.Magat.Introduction:Managing the Transi-tion to Deregulation-Law and Contemporary Problems,1981。
②于立、肖兴志： 《规制理论发展综述》,财经问题研究,2001年第1期,第20页。
③曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,复旦大学出版社,2006年第1版,第25页。
④ Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics 5 (Autumn).
⑤ Sam Peltzman.1976.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2), pp.211-241.
⑥ Gary S.Becker.1983.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (3), pp.371-400:1985.Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs.Journal of Pubilc Economics 28 (3), pp.329-347.
① Fred S.McChesney.1997.Money for Nothing:Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion.cambridge:Harvard University Press.
② Jerome Ellig.1991.Endogenous Change and Economic Theory of Re gulation.Journal of Regulatory Economics 3 (3), pp.265-274.
③曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第26页。
①曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第28页。
② William J.Baumol, John C.Panzar and Robert D.Willing.1982.Contestable Markets and the theory of Industry Structure.New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Ltd.
①A-J效应是由Averch and Johnson于1962年提出的,该模型主要探讨了在回报率规制下,可能会使受规制企业选择资本密集型技术,从而造成企业不在最低社会成本下生产它的产出。规制的实行还为企业提供了在一些市场上亏损的激励。
② Harold Demsetz.1968. Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1), pp55-65.
①Shleifer, A.1985.A Theory of Yardstick Competition.Rand Journal of Economics 16 (3) pp.319-327.
①规模经济是指在一定的技术水平下,当生产要素价格不变时生产某一产品,由于生产能力的扩大,企业的长期平均成本呈递减的趋势。造成规模经济的原因通常是由于生产的专业化分工,工人的学习效应导致工作效率提高,运输、原料订购上的经济性以及价格谈判上的优势所导致的。
② John Stuart Mill.1923. Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. Republished by W.J.ashley, ed.lodon: Longmans, Green.p410.
③主要包括卡恩(Kahn,1971),谢勒(Scherer,1980),克拉克森和米勒(Clarkson and Miller,1982)以及格林沃尔德(Greenwald,1994)等。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第11页。
②杨伯华、缪一德： 《西方经济学原理》,西南财经大学出版社,2004年第3版,第99页。
③吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
②吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
③吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
④王保树： 《经济法律概论》,中国经济出版社,1997年版,第277页。
⑤俆士英： 《竞争法论》,世界图书出版社,2003年版,第85页。
①曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第71页。
①于立： 《规制经济学学科定位中的几个问题》,载《东岳论丛》2005年第1期,第9页。
②市场结构理论源于微观经济学中的市场理论；市场行为理论源于微观经济学中的厂商理论和均衡价格理论；市场绩效理论综合反映了微观经济学中消费和生产的优选行为理论和分配理论等。总的来看,产业组织理论以企业与市场的结构关系为研究对象,实质上无非是微观经济学中关于价格理论,特别是垄断价格理论的深入分析和进一步发展。
③吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第22页。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第31页。
②吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第28页。
①曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第12页。
②曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第12页。
③曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第12页。
①于立： 《规制经济学学科定位中的几个问题》,第3页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,上海人民出版社,1999年版,第27页。
③Shepherd and Wilcox.1979.Public policies toward Business.6th ed.homewoeed.lL:Irwin.
④Stigler.1971.The Theory of Economic Regulation, bell journal of Economics, Spring, pp3-21.
⑤丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第29页。
①丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第44页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第47页。
③ Mitnick.B.M.1980.The Political Economy of Regulation.New York:Columbia University Press.pp7.
④ Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.1.
⑤ Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.3.
⑥ Meier.1985.Regulationg:Politics.Bureaucracy and Economics,New York:Martins Press.p.8.
① Hayek.1973.Law.Legislation and Liberty.Chicago:university of Chicago press.p.4.
② Gellhorn and Pierce.1982.Regulated Industries.Paul:West Publishing Co.pp7-8.
③丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第34页。
Breyer.1982.Regulationg and Its Reform.MA:Harvard University Press.
①Heffron.1983.The Administrative Regulatory Process.New York:Longman.
②曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第3页。
①曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第5页。
①曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第5页。
②曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
③曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
④曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
①曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第44页。
③丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第85页。
①丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第87页。
①主要指我国的经济发展属于不平衡的发展模式,将限资源投向效益较高的区域,实行重点推进和发展,有助于获得区域经济的高速增长,但同时也带来许多问题,造成东部沿海经济比较发达,广大的中西部地区则相对欠佳的区域发展不平衡。
②由科尔奈(Kornai,1986)首次提出,它描述的是社会主义经济中一个普遍存在的现象,即政府不能承诺不去解救亏损的国有企业,这些解救措施包括财政补贴、贷款支持等等。现指向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行)未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它的当期收益的范围。
③赵合云： 《省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析》,载《中央财经大学学报》2006年第3期,第4页。
①战略性政策负担,是指在传统的赶超战略的影响下,投资于我国不具备比较优势的资本密集型产业或产业区段所形成的负担；社会性政策负担,则是指由于国有企业承担过多的冗员和工人福利等社会性职能而形成的负担。
②林毅夫、李志赞： 《政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束》,载《经济研究》,2004年第2期,第19页。
①北京华经纵横经济信息中心： 《2007年中国盐行业发展分析报告》,第37页。
①王晓晔： 《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版,第10-11页。
①林毅夫、李志： 《政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束》,载《经济研究》2004年第2期,第19页。
①贾文水：《发展食盐专营保护人民健康构建社会主义和谐社会》,载《中国盐业》2005年第5期,第12页。
①北京华经纵横经济信启、中心： 《2007年中国盐行业发展分析报告》,第43页。
①龙超：《论我国食盐专营体制及其未来变革》,载《经济问题探索》,2005年第12期,第126页。
②胡庆康： 《现代公共财政学》,复旦大学出版社,2004年版,第180页。
③董志凯：《当代中国盐业产销的变迁》,载《中国经济史研究》,2006年第3期,第13页。
①张素琴： 《财政学》,立信会计出版社,2005年版,第52-53页。
①赵合云： 《省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析》,载《中央财经大学学报》2006年第3期,第4页。
②奥尔森： 《国家兴衰探源》,商务印书馆,2000年版,第43页。
①王晓晔： 《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版,第10-11页。
①参见《中华人民共和国反垄断法》第51条。
①贺卫： 《人类行为的成本——收益分析假说》,载《昆明理工大学学报》1997年第5期。
①赵万一： 《中国竞争保护法律制度研究》,重庆大学出版社,1996年版,第17页。
①洪银兴、曹勇： 《经济体制转轨时期的地方政府功能》,载《经济研究》1996年第5期。
②洪银兴、曹勇： 《经济体制转轨时期的地方政府功能》,载《经济研究》1996年第5期。
①中共中央党校研究室课题组： 《建设公共服务和社会管理型的政府》,载《经济研究参考》2004年第65期。
①王晓峰： 《试论社会主义市场经济条件下我国地方政府的经济职能》,载《广西大学学报》(社会科学版),2003年4期。
① Steven D. Sklivas.1987.The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives.Rand Journal of Economics 18 (3),452-458.
②张维迎：《控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍》,载《经济研究》1998年第7期。
③科斯定理告诉我们,只要交易成本为零,所有权归谁都无所谓。
①张艳： 《国有企业退出理论研究综述》,载《经济纵横》2001年第5期,第61页。
①汤吉军： 《国有企业制度变迁中路径依赖的内生性分析》,载《经济体制改革》,2007年第4期,第7页。
[1]曲振涛、杨恺钧.规制经济学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006.
[2]奥尔森.国家兴衰探源[M].北京：商务印书馆,2000.
[3]张素琴.财政学[M].北京：立信会计出版社,2005.
[4]胡庆康.现代公共财政学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2004.
[5]北京华经纵横经济信息中心： 《2007年中国盐行业发展分析报告》[R].2007.
[6]俆士英.竞争法论[M].北京：世界图书出版社,2003.
[7]杨伯华、缪一德.西方经济学原理[M].北京：西南财经大学出版社,第3版,2004.
[8]吕福玉、曾凡英.垄断转型——当代盐产业组织优化进路[M].四川:四川出版集团,2009.
[9]徐晓霞、王云霞.规制经济学[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2009.
[10]刘志彪.现代产业经济学[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2003.
[11]苏东水.产业经济学[M].第2版.北京：高等教育出版社,2006.
[12]于立、王洵.产业组织学[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2006.
[13]赵万一.中国竞争保护法律制度研究[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社,1996.
[14]王晓晔.竞争法研究[M].北京：中国法制出版社,1999.
[15]史普博.管制与市场[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1999.
[16]王保树.经济法律概论[M].北京：中国经济出版社,1997.
[17]植草益著,卢东斌译.产业组织论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,1988.
[18]施蒂格勒著,潘振民译.产业组织与政府管制[M].上海：三联书店,1989.
[19]汤吉军.国有企业制度变迁中路径依赖的内生性分析[J].经济体制改革,2007(4)
[20]张艳.国有企业退出理论研究综述[J].经济纵横,2001(5)
[21]张维迎.控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究.1998(7)
[22]王晓峰.试论社会主义市场经济条件下我国地方政府的经济职能[J].广西大学学报(社会科学版).2003(4)
[23]赵合云.省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析[J].中央财经大学学报.2006(3)
[24]龙超.论我国食盐专营体制及其未来变革[J].经济问题探索.2005(12)
[25]董志凯.当代中国盐业产销的变迁[J].中国经济史研究.2006(3)
[26]林毅夫、李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究.2004(2).
[27]赵合云.省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析[J].中央财经大学学报.2006(3)
[28]贾文水.发展食盐专营保护人民健康 构建社会主义和谐社会[J].中国盐业.2005(5)
[29]于立.规制经济学学科定位中的几个问题[J].东岳论丛.2005(1)
[30]于立、肖兴志.规制理论发展综述[J].财经问题研究.2001(1)
[31]中共中央党校研究室课题组.建设公共服务和社会管理型的政府[J].经济研究参考.2004(65)
[32]洪银兴、曹勇.经济体制转轨时期的地方政府功能[J].经济研究.1996(5)
[33]贺卫.人类行为的成本——收益分析假说[J].昆明理工大学学报.1997(5)
[34]程龙刚.新中国盐业管理体制50年回眸[J].盐业史研究.2000(1):39-44.
[35]许安拓.盐业专营百弊丛生[J].中国改革.2006(5):49-50.
[36]罗兹.“盐业专营”争议[J].农经.2011(4)：22-25.
[37]贾艳雪.从碘盐风波看我国的盐业专营体制[J].法制与社会.2011(1)：119-120.
[38]董志凯.当代中国盐业产销的变迁明.中国经济史研究.2006(3)
[39]向明甄.食盐产运销规范化管理实用手册[M].中国食品工业出版社.2006年.
[40]毛慧婷.浅析我国的食盐业专营体制[J].中国市场,2010(49)：210.
[41]张国利,陈鹏.双垄断博弈中的行为和选择——盐业专营制度的弊病分析[J].重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版).2010(23)：97-99.
[42]王玉梅.关于我国产权制度改革的思考[J].山西科技,2006(1)
[43]孙晋,范舟,秦丽.我国食盐业专营垄断之变异、危害及其纠补[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2011(4)：9-14.
[44]龙超.论我国食盐专营体制及其未来变革[J].经济问题探索,2005,(12):12-15.
[45]柴进.食盐专营的必要性及其法律规范问题的探讨[J].社科纵横,2004,(10):17-20.
[46]李雪萍,库东方.透析盐业腐败[J].先锋队,2008,(8):23-25.
[47]唐肖霞.第六次行政体制改革浅谈[J].南方论刊.2008,(4):5-8.
[48]朱家贤.反垄断立法与政府管制[M].北京：知识产权出版社,,2007:144-147.
[49]吕福玉.论盐业管理体制改革的可能性[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2007,(1)：35-37.
[50]雷学锋,李晓霞.我国食盐计划管理的问题及对策[J].市场研究,2004,(09).
[51]舒瑜,作为历史过程和观念的“区”与“界”---读黄国信：区与界：清代湘粤赣界邻地区食盐专卖研究[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2009,(11).
[52]金普森,董振平.论抗日战争时期国民政府盐专卖制度[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2001,(04).
[53]冯海宁.盐业专卖打破后仍需高举反垄断之鞭[N].中国证券报,2010-1-8.
[54]王兴明.盐业专营放开后地方盐业公司面临的问题及出路[J].江苏商论,2010(9)：43-45.
[55]刘建萍.专项整治考量盐业专营制度[J].中国国情国力,2005(10)：38-39.
[56]应奔奔等.食盐专营体制改革对消费者影响分析[J].现代商贸工业,2011(4)
[57]王伟.我国食盐专营体制之历史性反思[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版)2007(2)
[58]罗毅.关于食盐专卖制度弊端的法律思考[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2007(6)
[59]吕福玉.老少边穷地区食盐专营制度改革的探讨[J].经济问题探索,2008(5)
[60]单鑫.食盐专营：企业身份、行政管理与体制改革[J].行政论坛,2009(1)
[61]钟巧玲、李敬鹏.食盐专营体制改革中引入外资的可行性分析[J].中国集体经济,2009(2)
[62]吉晓燕、王东辉.强化食盐专营,创新发展理念[J].当代贵州,2009(6).
[63]张登好.用科学发展观指导食盐专营管理[J].苏盐科技,2009(6)
[64]古力、王霞.食盐专营下盐业公司治理刍议[J].现代商业,2009(9).
[65]王伟、陈于后.我国食盐专营的法律规制研究[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2009(12)
[66]赵紫雄,陈于后.非法经营食盐入罪问题探析[J].甘肃理论学刊,2010(7).
[67]曾绍伦.食盐专营及盐业管理模式比较研究[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2010(10).
[68]张蕴萍.我国政府规制改革研究[J].理论学刊,2011(7)
[69]鱼曼曼.公用事业民营化中的政府规制失灵分析[J].中国城市经济,2011(6)
[70]金今花、周芹.论政府规制及其程序规范机制[J].四川行政学院学报,2011(4).
[71]赵欣颖.转型时期政府规制失灵与规制改革路径分析[D].吉林大学,2011年。
[72]张炳雷.国有企业承担社会责任的政府规制研究[J].中国行政管理,2011(5)
[73]崔德华.论政府规制的行政性维度[J].福建论坛(人文社会科学版),2011(5).
[74]王静华、刘儒.基于自然垄断经济特性的政府规制探讨[J].商业时代,2011(4).
[75]崔德华.论政府规制的经济性维度[J].江汉论坛,2011(4).
[76]李文斐.自然垄断与政府规制理论综述[J].当代经济,2011(4)
[77]沈宏亮.路径依赖,效率特征与政府规制的边际改进[J].改革,2011(3)
[78]刘素英.中国政府规制研究[D].华东师范大学,2011年。
[79]曹永森.政府规制及其在我国的发展和应用[J].天府新论,2011(1)
[80]刘召.论政府规制有效性的判定标准[J].辽宁行政学院学报,2010(12)
[1]Breyer.1982.Regulationg and Its Reform.MA:Harvard University Press.
[2]Heffron.1983.The Administrative Regulatory Process.New York: Longman.
[3]Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.3.
[4]Meier.1985.Regulationg:Politics, Bureaucracy and Economics, New York:Martins Press.p.8.
[5]Hayek.1973.Law, Legislation and Liberty.Chicago:university of Chicago press.p.4.
[6]Gellhorn and Pierce.1982.Regulated Industries.Paul:West Publishing Co.pp7-8.
[7]Mitnick. B.M.1980.The Political Economy of Regulation.New York:Columbia University Press.pp7.
[8]Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.1.
[9]Shepherd and Wilcox.1979.Public policies toward Business.6th ed. homewoeed.1L Irwin.
[10]Stigler.1971.The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell journal of Economics, Spring, pp3-21.
[11]JJohn Stuart Mill.1923. Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. Republished by W.J.ashley, ed.lodon:Longmans, Green.p410.
[12]Harold Demsetz.1968.Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1), pp55-65.
[13]Shleifer, A.1985.A Theory of Yardstick Competition.Rand Journal of Economics 16 (3), pp.319-327.
[14]William J.Baumol, John C.Panzar and Robert D.Willing.1982.Contestable Markets and the theory of Industry Structure.New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Ltd.
[15]Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics.5 (Autumn).
[16]Sam Peltzman.1976.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2), pp.211-241.
[17]Skinner, G.William.1985, "Rural Marketing in China:Repression and Revival" The China Quarterly, No.103.
[18]Walder, Andrew G,1995, "Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy", American Journal of Sociology,101.
[19]Gary S.Becker.1983.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (3), pp.371-400.
[20]Gary S.Becker.1985.Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs.Journal of Pubilc Economics 28 (3), pp.329-347.
[21]Fred S.McChesney.1997.Money for Nothing:Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion.cambridge:Harvard University Press.
[22]Jerome Ellig.1991.Endogenous Change and Economic Theory of Re gulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 3 (3), pp.265-274.
[23]William A. Jordan.1972.Producer protection, Prior market structure and the effects of Government Regulation.Journal of law and economics 15 (1), pp.151-176.
[24]Wesley.Magat.Introduction:Managing the Transi-tion to Deregulation.Law and Contemporary Problems,1981.
[25]Bentley,A.F.1908.The process of government.Chicago:university of Chicago Press.
[26]Truman, D.B.1951.The government process:Political Interests and Public Opinion.New York:Knopf.
[27]Richard A. Posner.1974. Theories of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5(2), p336.
[28]George J.Stigler and Claire Friedland.1962. What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity. Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October), pp.1-16.
[29]Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics 5 (Autumn), pp.335-358.
[30]Steven D. Sklivas.1987.The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives.Rand Journal of Economics 18 (3),452-458.
[31]White, HarrisonC.1981, "Where Do Markets Come From?", American Journal of Sociology,87.
[32]Wade. Robert.1982. "System of Administrative and Political Corruption:Canal Irrigation in South India." Journal of Development Studies 18(April 1982):287-328.
[33]Wade, Robert.1985. "The Market for Public Office:Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development?" World Development 13:467-97.
[34]Wade, Robert.1987. "Management of Common Property Resources:Finding a Cooperative Solution." World Bank Research Observer 2(2):219-34.
[35]Zhou, Xueguang,2000, "Reply:Beyond the Debate and toward Substantive Institutional Analysis", American Journal of Sociology,105.
[36]Wilson, James Q.1989. Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do It. New York:Basic Books.
[37]North, Douglass.,1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
[38]Nee, Vietor.2000, "The role of the state in making a market economy". Journal of Institutional and The Theoretical Economics,156(1).
[39]Lin, J.. and Z. Li (2008):"Policy burden, privatization and soft budget constraint,'" Journal of Comparative Economics.36(1),90-102.
[40]Song, M., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2009):"Growing Like China," CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7149.
[41]The Complete World Development Report,1978-2009 (Single User DVD):30th Anniversary Edition World Bank Publications, Washington DC (2009), ISBN 978-0-8213-7270-8.
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐产业组织优化进路》,第173页。
①俞建国：《立即取消食盐专营制度——我不赞成》,http://news.qq.com/a/20100205/001355.htm, 2010-01-30。
②俞建国： 《立即取消食盐专营制度——我不赞成》。
①俞建国： 《立即取消食盐专营制度——我不赞成》。
① Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics 5 (Autumn), pp.335-358.
② Richard A. posner.1974.Theories of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (2),p336.
③ George J.Stigler and Claire Friedland.1962.What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity. Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October), pp.1-16.
①由Lipsey和K.Lancaster首先于1956年提出,次优理论认为,如果在一般均衡体系中存在着某些情况,使得帕累托最优的某个条件遭到破坏,那么即使其他所有帕累托最优条件得到满足,结果也未见得是令人满意的。也即帕累托最优的达到必须全部满足一系列的条件。
② Bentley.A.F.1908.The process of government.Chicago:university of Chicago Press.
③ Truman. D.B.1951.The government process:Political Interests and Public Opinion.New York: Knopf.
④William A. Jordan.1972.Producer protection, Prior market structure and the effects of Government Regulation.Journal of law and economics 15 (1), pp.151-176.
① Wesley.Magat.Introduction:Managing the Transi-tion to Deregulation-Law and Contemporary Problems,1981。
②于立、肖兴志： 《规制理论发展综述》,财经问题研究,2001年第1期,第20页。
③曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,复旦大学出版社,2006年第1版,第25页。
④ Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics 5 (Autumn).
⑤ Sam Peltzman.1976.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2), pp.211-241.
⑥ Gary S.Becker.1983.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (3), pp.371-400:1985.Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs.Journal of Pubilc Economics 28 (3), pp.329-347.
① Fred S.McChesney.1997.Money for Nothing:Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion.cambridge:Harvard University Press.
② Jerome Ellig.1991.Endogenous Change and Economic Theory of Re gulation.Journal of Regulatory Economics 3 (3), pp.265-274.
③曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第26页。
①曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第28页。
② William J.Baumol, John C.Panzar and Robert D.Willing.1982.Contestable Markets and the theory of Industry Structure.New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Ltd.
①A-J效应是由Averch and Johnson于1962年提出的,该模型主要探讨了在回报率规制下,可能会使受规制企业选择资本密集型技术,从而造成企业不在最低社会成本下生产它的产出。规制的实行还为企业提供了在一些市场上亏损的激励。
② Harold Demsetz.1968. Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1), pp55-65.
①Shleifer, A.1985.A Theory of Yardstick Competition.Rand Journal of Economics 16 (3) pp.319-327.
①规模经济是指在一定的技术水平下,当生产要素价格不变时生产某一产品,由于生产能力的扩大,企业的长期平均成本呈递减的趋势。造成规模经济的原因通常是由于生产的专业化分工,工人的学习效应导致工作效率提高,运输、原料订购上的经济性以及价格谈判上的优势所导致的。
② John Stuart Mill.1923. Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. Republished by W.J.ashley, ed.lodon: Longmans, Green.p410.
③主要包括卡恩(Kahn,1971),谢勒(Scherer,1980),克拉克森和米勒(Clarkson and Miller,1982)以及格林沃尔德(Greenwald,1994)等。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第11页。
②杨伯华、缪一德： 《西方经济学原理》,西南财经大学出版社,2004年第3版,第99页。
③吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
②吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
③吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第12页。
④王保树： 《经济法律概论》,中国经济出版社,1997年版,第277页。
⑤俆士英： 《竞争法论》,世界图书出版社,2003年版,第85页。
①曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第71页。
①于立： 《规制经济学学科定位中的几个问题》,载《东岳论丛》2005年第1期,第9页。
②市场结构理论源于微观经济学中的市场理论；市场行为理论源于微观经济学中的厂商理论和均衡价格理论；市场绩效理论综合反映了微观经济学中消费和生产的优选行为理论和分配理论等。总的来看,产业组织理论以企业与市场的结构关系为研究对象,实质上无非是微观经济学中关于价格理论,特别是垄断价格理论的深入分析和进一步发展。
③吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第22页。
①吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第31页。
②吕福玉、曾凡英： 《垄断转型——当代盐业组织优化进路》,第28页。
①曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第12页。
②曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第12页。
③曲振涛、杨恺钧： 《规制经济学》,第12页。
①于立： 《规制经济学学科定位中的几个问题》,第3页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,上海人民出版社,1999年版,第27页。
③Shepherd and Wilcox.1979.Public policies toward Business.6th ed.homewoeed.lL:Irwin.
④Stigler.1971.The Theory of Economic Regulation, bell journal of Economics, Spring, pp3-21.
⑤丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第29页。
①丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第44页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第47页。
③ Mitnick.B.M.1980.The Political Economy of Regulation.New York:Columbia University Press.pp7.
④ Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.1.
⑤ Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.3.
⑥ Meier.1985.Regulationg:Politics.Bureaucracy and Economics,New York:Martins Press.p.8.
① Hayek.1973.Law.Legislation and Liberty.Chicago:university of Chicago press.p.4.
② Gellhorn and Pierce.1982.Regulated Industries.Paul:West Publishing Co.pp7-8.
③丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第34页。
Breyer.1982.Regulationg and Its Reform.MA:Harvard University Press.
①Heffron.1983.The Administrative Regulatory Process.New York:Longman.
②曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第3页。
①曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第5页。
①曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第5页。
②曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
③曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
④曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
①曲振涛、杨恺凯： 《规制经济学》,第6页。
②丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第44页。
③丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第85页。
①丹尼尔·F·史普博： 《管制与市场》,第87页。
①主要指我国的经济发展属于不平衡的发展模式,将限资源投向效益较高的区域,实行重点推进和发展,有助于获得区域经济的高速增长,但同时也带来许多问题,造成东部沿海经济比较发达,广大的中西部地区则相对欠佳的区域发展不平衡。
②由科尔奈(Kornai,1986)首次提出,它描述的是社会主义经济中一个普遍存在的现象,即政府不能承诺不去解救亏损的国有企业,这些解救措施包括财政补贴、贷款支持等等。现指向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行)未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它的当期收益的范围。
③赵合云： 《省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析》,载《中央财经大学学报》2006年第3期,第4页。
①战略性政策负担,是指在传统的赶超战略的影响下,投资于我国不具备比较优势的资本密集型产业或产业区段所形成的负担；社会性政策负担,则是指由于国有企业承担过多的冗员和工人福利等社会性职能而形成的负担。
②林毅夫、李志赞： 《政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束》,载《经济研究》,2004年第2期,第19页。
①北京华经纵横经济信息中心： 《2007年中国盐行业发展分析报告》,第37页。
①王晓晔： 《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版,第10-11页。
①林毅夫、李志： 《政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束》,载《经济研究》2004年第2期,第19页。
①贾文水：《发展食盐专营保护人民健康构建社会主义和谐社会》,载《中国盐业》2005年第5期,第12页。
①北京华经纵横经济信启、中心： 《2007年中国盐行业发展分析报告》,第43页。
①龙超：《论我国食盐专营体制及其未来变革》,载《经济问题探索》,2005年第12期,第126页。
②胡庆康： 《现代公共财政学》,复旦大学出版社,2004年版,第180页。
③董志凯：《当代中国盐业产销的变迁》,载《中国经济史研究》,2006年第3期,第13页。
①张素琴： 《财政学》,立信会计出版社,2005年版,第52-53页。
①赵合云： 《省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析》,载《中央财经大学学报》2006年第3期,第4页。
②奥尔森： 《国家兴衰探源》,商务印书馆,2000年版,第43页。
①王晓晔： 《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版,第10-11页。
①参见《中华人民共和国反垄断法》第51条。
①贺卫： 《人类行为的成本——收益分析假说》,载《昆明理工大学学报》1997年第5期。
①赵万一： 《中国竞争保护法律制度研究》,重庆大学出版社,1996年版,第17页。
①洪银兴、曹勇： 《经济体制转轨时期的地方政府功能》,载《经济研究》1996年第5期。
②洪银兴、曹勇： 《经济体制转轨时期的地方政府功能》,载《经济研究》1996年第5期。
①中共中央党校研究室课题组： 《建设公共服务和社会管理型的政府》,载《经济研究参考》2004年第65期。
①王晓峰： 《试论社会主义市场经济条件下我国地方政府的经济职能》,载《广西大学学报》(社会科学版),2003年4期。
① Steven D. Sklivas.1987.The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives.Rand Journal of Economics 18 (3),452-458.
②张维迎：《控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍》,载《经济研究》1998年第7期。
③科斯定理告诉我们,只要交易成本为零,所有权归谁都无所谓。
①张艳： 《国有企业退出理论研究综述》,载《经济纵横》2001年第5期,第61页。
①汤吉军： 《国有企业制度变迁中路径依赖的内生性分析》,载《经济体制改革》,2007年第4期,第7页。
[1]曲振涛、杨恺钧.规制经济学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006.
[2]奥尔森.国家兴衰探源[M].北京：商务印书馆,2000.
[3]张素琴.财政学[M].北京：立信会计出版社,2005.
[4]胡庆康.现代公共财政学[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2004.
[5]北京华经纵横经济信息中心： 《2007年中国盐行业发展分析报告》[R].2007.
[6]俆士英.竞争法论[M].北京：世界图书出版社,2003.
[7]杨伯华、缪一德.西方经济学原理[M].北京：西南财经大学出版社,第3版,2004.
[8]吕福玉、曾凡英.垄断转型——当代盐产业组织优化进路[M].四川:四川出版集团,2009.
[9]徐晓霞、王云霞.规制经济学[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2009.
[10]刘志彪.现代产业经济学[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2003.
[11]苏东水.产业经济学[M].第2版.北京：高等教育出版社,2006.
[12]于立、王洵.产业组织学[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2006.
[13]赵万一.中国竞争保护法律制度研究[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社,1996.
[14]王晓晔.竞争法研究[M].北京：中国法制出版社,1999.
[15]史普博.管制与市场[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1999.
[16]王保树.经济法律概论[M].北京：中国经济出版社,1997.
[17]植草益著,卢东斌译.产业组织论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,1988.
[18]施蒂格勒著,潘振民译.产业组织与政府管制[M].上海：三联书店,1989.
[19]汤吉军.国有企业制度变迁中路径依赖的内生性分析[J].经济体制改革,2007(4)
[20]张艳.国有企业退出理论研究综述[J].经济纵横,2001(5)
[21]张维迎.控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究.1998(7)
[22]王晓峰.试论社会主义市场经济条件下我国地方政府的经济职能[J].广西大学学报(社会科学版).2003(4)
[23]赵合云.省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析[J].中央财经大学学报.2006(3)
[24]龙超.论我国食盐专营体制及其未来变革[J].经济问题探索.2005(12)
[25]董志凯.当代中国盐业产销的变迁[J].中国经济史研究.2006(3)
[26]林毅夫、李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究.2004(2).
[27]赵合云.省以下财政体制权责不对称的经济学分析[J].中央财经大学学报.2006(3)
[28]贾文水.发展食盐专营保护人民健康 构建社会主义和谐社会[J].中国盐业.2005(5)
[29]于立.规制经济学学科定位中的几个问题[J].东岳论丛.2005(1)
[30]于立、肖兴志.规制理论发展综述[J].财经问题研究.2001(1)
[31]中共中央党校研究室课题组.建设公共服务和社会管理型的政府[J].经济研究参考.2004(65)
[32]洪银兴、曹勇.经济体制转轨时期的地方政府功能[J].经济研究.1996(5)
[33]贺卫.人类行为的成本——收益分析假说[J].昆明理工大学学报.1997(5)
[34]程龙刚.新中国盐业管理体制50年回眸[J].盐业史研究.2000(1):39-44.
[35]许安拓.盐业专营百弊丛生[J].中国改革.2006(5):49-50.
[36]罗兹.“盐业专营”争议[J].农经.2011(4)：22-25.
[37]贾艳雪.从碘盐风波看我国的盐业专营体制[J].法制与社会.2011(1)：119-120.
[38]董志凯.当代中国盐业产销的变迁明.中国经济史研究.2006(3)
[39]向明甄.食盐产运销规范化管理实用手册[M].中国食品工业出版社.2006年.
[40]毛慧婷.浅析我国的食盐业专营体制[J].中国市场,2010(49)：210.
[41]张国利,陈鹏.双垄断博弈中的行为和选择——盐业专营制度的弊病分析[J].重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版).2010(23)：97-99.
[42]王玉梅.关于我国产权制度改革的思考[J].山西科技,2006(1)
[43]孙晋,范舟,秦丽.我国食盐业专营垄断之变异、危害及其纠补[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2011(4)：9-14.
[44]龙超.论我国食盐专营体制及其未来变革[J].经济问题探索,2005,(12):12-15.
[45]柴进.食盐专营的必要性及其法律规范问题的探讨[J].社科纵横,2004,(10):17-20.
[46]李雪萍,库东方.透析盐业腐败[J].先锋队,2008,(8):23-25.
[47]唐肖霞.第六次行政体制改革浅谈[J].南方论刊.2008,(4):5-8.
[48]朱家贤.反垄断立法与政府管制[M].北京：知识产权出版社,,2007:144-147.
[49]吕福玉.论盐业管理体制改革的可能性[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2007,(1)：35-37.
[50]雷学锋,李晓霞.我国食盐计划管理的问题及对策[J].市场研究,2004,(09).
[51]舒瑜,作为历史过程和观念的“区”与“界”---读黄国信：区与界：清代湘粤赣界邻地区食盐专卖研究[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社科版),2009,(11).
[52]金普森,董振平.论抗日战争时期国民政府盐专卖制度[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2001,(04).
[53]冯海宁.盐业专卖打破后仍需高举反垄断之鞭[N].中国证券报,2010-1-8.
[54]王兴明.盐业专营放开后地方盐业公司面临的问题及出路[J].江苏商论,2010(9)：43-45.
[55]刘建萍.专项整治考量盐业专营制度[J].中国国情国力,2005(10)：38-39.
[56]应奔奔等.食盐专营体制改革对消费者影响分析[J].现代商贸工业,2011(4)
[57]王伟.我国食盐专营体制之历史性反思[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版)2007(2)
[58]罗毅.关于食盐专卖制度弊端的法律思考[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2007(6)
[59]吕福玉.老少边穷地区食盐专营制度改革的探讨[J].经济问题探索,2008(5)
[60]单鑫.食盐专营：企业身份、行政管理与体制改革[J].行政论坛,2009(1)
[61]钟巧玲、李敬鹏.食盐专营体制改革中引入外资的可行性分析[J].中国集体经济,2009(2)
[62]吉晓燕、王东辉.强化食盐专营,创新发展理念[J].当代贵州,2009(6).
[63]张登好.用科学发展观指导食盐专营管理[J].苏盐科技,2009(6)
[64]古力、王霞.食盐专营下盐业公司治理刍议[J].现代商业,2009(9).
[65]王伟、陈于后.我国食盐专营的法律规制研究[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2009(12)
[66]赵紫雄,陈于后.非法经营食盐入罪问题探析[J].甘肃理论学刊,2010(7).
[67]曾绍伦.食盐专营及盐业管理模式比较研究[J].四川理工学院学报(社会科学版),2010(10).
[68]张蕴萍.我国政府规制改革研究[J].理论学刊,2011(7)
[69]鱼曼曼.公用事业民营化中的政府规制失灵分析[J].中国城市经济,2011(6)
[70]金今花、周芹.论政府规制及其程序规范机制[J].四川行政学院学报,2011(4).
[71]赵欣颖.转型时期政府规制失灵与规制改革路径分析[D].吉林大学,2011年。
[72]张炳雷.国有企业承担社会责任的政府规制研究[J].中国行政管理,2011(5)
[73]崔德华.论政府规制的行政性维度[J].福建论坛(人文社会科学版),2011(5).
[74]王静华、刘儒.基于自然垄断经济特性的政府规制探讨[J].商业时代,2011(4).
[75]崔德华.论政府规制的经济性维度[J].江汉论坛,2011(4).
[76]李文斐.自然垄断与政府规制理论综述[J].当代经济,2011(4)
[77]沈宏亮.路径依赖,效率特征与政府规制的边际改进[J].改革,2011(3)
[78]刘素英.中国政府规制研究[D].华东师范大学,2011年。
[79]曹永森.政府规制及其在我国的发展和应用[J].天府新论,2011(1)
[80]刘召.论政府规制有效性的判定标准[J].辽宁行政学院学报,2010(12)
[1]Breyer.1982.Regulationg and Its Reform.MA:Harvard University Press.
[2]Heffron.1983.The Administrative Regulatory Process.New York: Longman.
[3]Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.3.
[4]Meier.1985.Regulationg:Politics, Bureaucracy and Economics, New York:Martins Press.p.8.
[5]Hayek.1973.Law, Legislation and Liberty.Chicago:university of Chicago press.p.4.
[6]Gellhorn and Pierce.1982.Regulated Industries.Paul:West Publishing Co.pp7-8.
[7]Mitnick. B.M.1980.The Political Economy of Regulation.New York:Columbia University Press.pp7.
[8]Ripley and Franklin.1986.Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy.Chicago:Dorsey press.p.1.
[9]Shepherd and Wilcox.1979.Public policies toward Business.6th ed. homewoeed.1L Irwin.
[10]Stigler.1971.The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell journal of Economics, Spring, pp3-21.
[11]JJohn Stuart Mill.1923. Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. Republished by W.J.ashley, ed.lodon:Longmans, Green.p410.
[12]Harold Demsetz.1968.Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1), pp55-65.
[13]Shleifer, A.1985.A Theory of Yardstick Competition.Rand Journal of Economics 16 (3), pp.319-327.
[14]William J.Baumol, John C.Panzar and Robert D.Willing.1982.Contestable Markets and the theory of Industry Structure.New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Ltd.
[15]Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics.5 (Autumn).
[16]Sam Peltzman.1976.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2), pp.211-241.
[17]Skinner, G.William.1985, "Rural Marketing in China:Repression and Revival" The China Quarterly, No.103.
[18]Walder, Andrew G,1995, "Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy", American Journal of Sociology,101.
[19]Gary S.Becker.1983.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (3), pp.371-400.
[20]Gary S.Becker.1985.Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs.Journal of Pubilc Economics 28 (3), pp.329-347.
[21]Fred S.McChesney.1997.Money for Nothing:Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion.cambridge:Harvard University Press.
[22]Jerome Ellig.1991.Endogenous Change and Economic Theory of Re gulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 3 (3), pp.265-274.
[23]William A. Jordan.1972.Producer protection, Prior market structure and the effects of Government Regulation.Journal of law and economics 15 (1), pp.151-176.
[24]Wesley.Magat.Introduction:Managing the Transi-tion to Deregulation.Law and Contemporary Problems,1981.
[25]Bentley,A.F.1908.The process of government.Chicago:university of Chicago Press.
[26]Truman, D.B.1951.The government process:Political Interests and Public Opinion.New York:Knopf.
[27]Richard A. Posner.1974. Theories of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5(2), p336.
[28]George J.Stigler and Claire Friedland.1962. What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity. Journal of Law and Economics 5 (October), pp.1-16.
[29]Richard A. Posner.1974.Theories of Economic regulation.Journal of Economics 5 (Autumn), pp.335-358.
[30]Steven D. Sklivas.1987.The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives.Rand Journal of Economics 18 (3),452-458.
[31]White, HarrisonC.1981, "Where Do Markets Come From?", American Journal of Sociology,87.
[32]Wade. Robert.1982. "System of Administrative and Political Corruption:Canal Irrigation in South India." Journal of Development Studies 18(April 1982):287-328.
[33]Wade, Robert.1985. "The Market for Public Office:Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development?" World Development 13:467-97.
[34]Wade, Robert.1987. "Management of Common Property Resources:Finding a Cooperative Solution." World Bank Research Observer 2(2):219-34.
[35]Zhou, Xueguang,2000, "Reply:Beyond the Debate and toward Substantive Institutional Analysis", American Journal of Sociology,105.
[36]Wilson, James Q.1989. Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do It. New York:Basic Books.
[37]North, Douglass.,1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
[38]Nee, Vietor.2000, "The role of the state in making a market economy". Journal of Institutional and The Theoretical Economics,156(1).
[39]Lin, J.. and Z. Li (2008):"Policy burden, privatization and soft budget constraint,'" Journal of Comparative Economics.36(1),90-102.
[40]Song, M., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2009):"Growing Like China," CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7149.
[41]The Complete World Development Report,1978-2009 (Single User DVD):30th Anniversary Edition World Bank Publications, Washington DC (2009), ISBN 978-0-8213-7270-8.