产品市场竞争、公司治理结构对盈余信息透明度的影响研究
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摘要
我国上市公司盈余信息透明度低是一个普遍现象,政府管理机构也试图借鉴国外先进理论和经验提高我国上市公司治理水平,以发挥公司治理在提高盈余信息透明度方面的作用,但收效甚微,由于盈余信息不透明带来的资本市场的财务丑闻仍接连不断。那么,我们是否可另辟蹊径,在把目光集中于公司治理对盈余信息透明度影响的同时,考虑公司所处的外部市场竞争环境对盈余信息透明度的影响。
现代竞争理论认为,产品市场竞争作为基本的外部公司治理机制之一,直接影响着上市公司的信息披露。同时,产品市场竞争还将通过对公司治理的影响而间接影响信息披露。本文在现有研究基础上,结合信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、现代竞争理论以及我国企业的现实背景,将产品市场竞争、公司治理结构、盈余信息透明度置于一个逻辑严密的框架内进行研究。论文从理论上研究了产品市场竞争、公司治理结构对公司盈余信息透明度的直接影响,以及产品市场竞争通过公司治理结构间接影响盈余信息透明度的机理。同时,利用中国证券市场上市公司2004-2008年非平衡面板数据,实证检验了股权治理、董事会治理、经理层激励、监事会监督对上市公司盈余信息透明度的影响,以及在适度产品市场竞争的作用下,公司治理结构如何得到改善,并对提高盈余信息透明度起到促进作用。
本文研究发现：(1)我国上市公司股权治理作为所有者“自保”手段的综合结果,起到了降低信息不对称,提高盈余信息透明度的作用。其中,流通股比例是提高股权治理效果的重要原因之一,但股权的分布不均衡,大股东间更易合谋是造成盈余信息不透明的重要原因；(2)董事会没有起到提高盈余信息透明度的作用,反而导致盈余信息更不透明。独立董事、审计委员会等国外行之有效的制度设置在我国并没有起到预期作用。(3)总体上经理层激励对盈余信息透明度的作用不明显。但不同的激励手段对不同产权上市公司盈余信息透明度的影响不同。具体为,现金薪酬激励手段对国有上市公司盈余信息透明度的治理效果较好,而在非国有上市公司,股权激励的效果好于现金薪酬。随着企业外部产品市场竞争的增加,国有上市公司更偏好于通过提高经理层的现金薪酬进而改善盈余信息透明度,而非国有上市公司更偏好于通过增加经理人的持股比例,进而改善盈余信息透明度；(4)监事会发挥了提高盈余信息透明度的作用,监事人数和股东监事是监事会能够改善盈余信息透明度的主要原因；(5)适度产品市场竞争不仅能够直接提高盈余信息透明度,还可以通过改善股权治理、经理层激励、监事会监督效果,间接提高盈余信息透明,但是产品市场竞争对董事会治理的影响不大,并不能通过改善董事会治理来提高盈余信息透明度,我国上市公司董事会更多地表现为外生性特征。
本文的研究结果表明,适度的产品市场竞争和合理的公司治理机制能够降低企业的信息不对称、提高盈余信息透明度,同时适度的产品市场竞争还通过改善公司治理结构,进而提高信息透明度。这一研究结论意味着,在中国资本市场公司治理整体上存在诸多问题、而相应改革进展缓慢这一既定的前提下,要想有效解决资本市场上盈余信息不透明的问题,通过降低进入壁垒等方式加强产品市场竞争,是一可行途径。
Transparent earnings information helps investors know more about a company's operating condition, determine investment value, is necessary precondition of investors protection and rational allocation of resources in security market. But that earnings information of our listed companies is not transparent high is an indisputable fact.In order to manage information disclosure of listed companies, China Securities Regulatory Commission has set up a series of rules and regulations. After the internal methods used up, security market problems caused by earnings information lack of transparency happened one after another. This let us to think over that focusing on internal corporate governance, listed companies should be taking into account the external competitive environment of product market at the same time.
New competition theory suggests that product market competition as one of the basic external corporate governance mechanisms has direct impact on information disclosure of listed companies, and indirect impact to information disclosure of listed companies through affecting internal corporate governance structure. This paper based on existing research, combined with incomplete contract theory, agency theory, competition theory and the reality of our business background, study the impact of corporate governance structure of listed companies to earnings information transparency and the direct impact of product market competition to transparency of earnings information, and the path that product market competition act to corporate governance structure using theoretical analysis and empirical research method. Using unbalanced panel data,2004-2008 China's stock market listed companies, we test the impact of equity management, board governance, Manager Incentives, Board of Supervisors governance of listed companies to earnings information transparency, and the effects of product markets competition to corporate governance.
In this paper we found that:(1) appropriate product market competition can improve the earnings information transparency of listed companies; (2) we studied the effects of governance methods based on equity. we find that controlling shareholders are not the culprit of opaque earnings, uneven equity distribution and collusion between large shareholders is an important factor causing earnings opacity. But through the split share structure reform, increasing proportion of tradable shares can effectively restrict the opaque earnings. General meeting of shareholders, as an important institutional setup for shareholders to exercise their rights, did not play its expected effects to improve the transparency of earnings information; Appropriate product market competition can improve the governance index options, and thus enhance the transparency of earnings information. Product market competition and equity management are complementary in improving earnings information transparency; (3)When we study the effect of Board of Directors to the transparency of earnings information, we found that Board of Directors does not play the role as we expected, had no significant effect to information transparency. But we found some characters of Board of Directors are useful in improving the earnings information transparency, such as stock ratio hold by directors. And independent director and audit committee are not useful as we hope. Product market competition does not influence Board of Directors. Board of Directors is exogenous. But it and Product market competition are complementary to improve earnings information transparency. (4)Different methods to incentive CEO have different influences to earnings information transparency. Cash salary incentive is more effective to improve earnings information transparency in state-owned listed companies than non-state-owned listed companies, while equity incentive is the other way around. As external product market competition increases, state-owned listed companies prefer to incentive managers by raising salaries and thus improve information transparency, while, no-state-owned listed companies prefer to stake CEO by increasing their proportion of stock, thus improving the earnings information transparency; (5) At last, this paper tests board of supervisors'influence to earnings information transparency. We find that board of supervisors can improve earnings information transparency. Members and shareholder supervisor ratio are main reasons improving the transparency of earnings information. Product market competition can improve the level of supervisory oversight, thus enhance the transparency of earnings information;
The conclusion enlighten we that external product market competition and internal corporate governance should be considered together to improve earnings information transparency. Putting product market competition, corporate governance, transparency of earnings information into a unified research framework may be more systematic and comprehensive. Results enrich the content of corporate governance study, and are propositional to information disclosure of listed companies, and has important policy reference to equity reforms implementing.
现代竞争理论认为,产品市场竞争作为基本的外部公司治理机制之一,直接影响着上市公司的信息披露。同时,产品市场竞争还将通过对公司治理的影响而间接影响信息披露。本文在现有研究基础上,结合信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、现代竞争理论以及我国企业的现实背景,将产品市场竞争、公司治理结构、盈余信息透明度置于一个逻辑严密的框架内进行研究。论文从理论上研究了产品市场竞争、公司治理结构对公司盈余信息透明度的直接影响,以及产品市场竞争通过公司治理结构间接影响盈余信息透明度的机理。同时,利用中国证券市场上市公司2004-2008年非平衡面板数据,实证检验了股权治理、董事会治理、经理层激励、监事会监督对上市公司盈余信息透明度的影响,以及在适度产品市场竞争的作用下,公司治理结构如何得到改善,并对提高盈余信息透明度起到促进作用。
本文研究发现：(1)我国上市公司股权治理作为所有者“自保”手段的综合结果,起到了降低信息不对称,提高盈余信息透明度的作用。其中,流通股比例是提高股权治理效果的重要原因之一,但股权的分布不均衡,大股东间更易合谋是造成盈余信息不透明的重要原因；(2)董事会没有起到提高盈余信息透明度的作用,反而导致盈余信息更不透明。独立董事、审计委员会等国外行之有效的制度设置在我国并没有起到预期作用。(3)总体上经理层激励对盈余信息透明度的作用不明显。但不同的激励手段对不同产权上市公司盈余信息透明度的影响不同。具体为,现金薪酬激励手段对国有上市公司盈余信息透明度的治理效果较好,而在非国有上市公司,股权激励的效果好于现金薪酬。随着企业外部产品市场竞争的增加,国有上市公司更偏好于通过提高经理层的现金薪酬进而改善盈余信息透明度,而非国有上市公司更偏好于通过增加经理人的持股比例,进而改善盈余信息透明度；(4)监事会发挥了提高盈余信息透明度的作用,监事人数和股东监事是监事会能够改善盈余信息透明度的主要原因；(5)适度产品市场竞争不仅能够直接提高盈余信息透明度,还可以通过改善股权治理、经理层激励、监事会监督效果,间接提高盈余信息透明,但是产品市场竞争对董事会治理的影响不大,并不能通过改善董事会治理来提高盈余信息透明度,我国上市公司董事会更多地表现为外生性特征。
本文的研究结果表明,适度的产品市场竞争和合理的公司治理机制能够降低企业的信息不对称、提高盈余信息透明度,同时适度的产品市场竞争还通过改善公司治理结构,进而提高信息透明度。这一研究结论意味着,在中国资本市场公司治理整体上存在诸多问题、而相应改革进展缓慢这一既定的前提下,要想有效解决资本市场上盈余信息不透明的问题,通过降低进入壁垒等方式加强产品市场竞争,是一可行途径。
Transparent earnings information helps investors know more about a company's operating condition, determine investment value, is necessary precondition of investors protection and rational allocation of resources in security market. But that earnings information of our listed companies is not transparent high is an indisputable fact.In order to manage information disclosure of listed companies, China Securities Regulatory Commission has set up a series of rules and regulations. After the internal methods used up, security market problems caused by earnings information lack of transparency happened one after another. This let us to think over that focusing on internal corporate governance, listed companies should be taking into account the external competitive environment of product market at the same time.
New competition theory suggests that product market competition as one of the basic external corporate governance mechanisms has direct impact on information disclosure of listed companies, and indirect impact to information disclosure of listed companies through affecting internal corporate governance structure. This paper based on existing research, combined with incomplete contract theory, agency theory, competition theory and the reality of our business background, study the impact of corporate governance structure of listed companies to earnings information transparency and the direct impact of product market competition to transparency of earnings information, and the path that product market competition act to corporate governance structure using theoretical analysis and empirical research method. Using unbalanced panel data,2004-2008 China's stock market listed companies, we test the impact of equity management, board governance, Manager Incentives, Board of Supervisors governance of listed companies to earnings information transparency, and the effects of product markets competition to corporate governance.
In this paper we found that:(1) appropriate product market competition can improve the earnings information transparency of listed companies; (2) we studied the effects of governance methods based on equity. we find that controlling shareholders are not the culprit of opaque earnings, uneven equity distribution and collusion between large shareholders is an important factor causing earnings opacity. But through the split share structure reform, increasing proportion of tradable shares can effectively restrict the opaque earnings. General meeting of shareholders, as an important institutional setup for shareholders to exercise their rights, did not play its expected effects to improve the transparency of earnings information; Appropriate product market competition can improve the governance index options, and thus enhance the transparency of earnings information. Product market competition and equity management are complementary in improving earnings information transparency; (3)When we study the effect of Board of Directors to the transparency of earnings information, we found that Board of Directors does not play the role as we expected, had no significant effect to information transparency. But we found some characters of Board of Directors are useful in improving the earnings information transparency, such as stock ratio hold by directors. And independent director and audit committee are not useful as we hope. Product market competition does not influence Board of Directors. Board of Directors is exogenous. But it and Product market competition are complementary to improve earnings information transparency. (4)Different methods to incentive CEO have different influences to earnings information transparency. Cash salary incentive is more effective to improve earnings information transparency in state-owned listed companies than non-state-owned listed companies, while equity incentive is the other way around. As external product market competition increases, state-owned listed companies prefer to incentive managers by raising salaries and thus improve information transparency, while, no-state-owned listed companies prefer to stake CEO by increasing their proportion of stock, thus improving the earnings information transparency; (5) At last, this paper tests board of supervisors'influence to earnings information transparency. We find that board of supervisors can improve earnings information transparency. Members and shareholder supervisor ratio are main reasons improving the transparency of earnings information. Product market competition can improve the level of supervisory oversight, thus enhance the transparency of earnings information;
The conclusion enlighten we that external product market competition and internal corporate governance should be considered together to improve earnings information transparency. Putting product market competition, corporate governance, transparency of earnings information into a unified research framework may be more systematic and comprehensive. Results enrich the content of corporate governance study, and are propositional to information disclosure of listed companies, and has important policy reference to equity reforms implementing.
引文
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