会计透明度影响因素研究
|
摘要
如何提高上市公司会计透明度,多年来一直是理论界和实务界着力探讨的问题。笔者认为,解决该问题的前提是要理清影响会计透明度的多方面因素。本文结合中国制度背景对上市公司会计透明度的影响因素展开研究。在对比和借鉴相关研究的基础上,本文确定以会计盈余相关质量特征来构建会计透明度指数,并使该指数及其子指数便于从整体、短期和长期趋势等角度来衡量上市公司会计透明度;基于信息观、不完全契约理论和投资者保护观等理论视角,剖析影响会计透明度的深层次原因,并结合现有研究和中国制度背景,将影响会计透明度的因素划分为内部和外部因素;应用中国上市公司数据,分别检验了制度环境、外部治理机制、董事会有效性和股权结构特征对会计透明度的影响;在分别检验各因素影响效果的基础之上,最后将会计透明度的内部和外部影响因素置于一个统一框架内,采用因子分析模型检验我国上市公司会计透明度的主导影响因素。本文主要研究结论如下:
对制度环境、外部治理机制与会计透明度关系的实证检验结果表明,市场监管、会计准则执行和债权人约束等外部治理机制对于我国上市公司会计透明度的提高具有重要作用;执行独立审计的CPA与上市公司管理层可能存在短期“合谋”行为,但长期趋势上能够提高会计透明度;垄断性行业上市公司的会计透明度要高于竞争性行业上市公司的会计透明度;地区制度环境差异对会计透明度不具显著影响。
对董事会有效性与会计透明度关系的实证检验结果发现,董事长与总经理两职合一、董事勤勉性均有助于会计透明度的提高;整体来看独立董事对会计透明度的作用有限;在有效的外部治理环境下,董事长同时在股东单位任职可以提高公司会计透明度;审计委员会未能有效履行“审核公司的财务信息及其披露”的职责,其设立反而降低了会计透明度。
对股权结构与会计透明度关系的实证检验结果发现,会计透明度与第一大股东持股比例负相关,其他股东对第一大股东起到一定制衡作用,但该作用并不稳定;法人股比例的增加有助于提高会计透明度;第一大股东的国有性质降低会计透明度,且在长期趋势上表现明显。
通过对上市公司会计透明度的内、外部影响因素采用主成份分析法提取和识别因子、并用识别因子进行回归的二阶段模型检验结果表明:外部治理机制是影响我国上市公司会计透明度的主导因素,作为主要内部治理机制的董事会功能存在一定程度的弱化,“一股独大”的股权结构是导致会计透明度低下的重要因素,宏观制度环境对会计透明度影响甚微。
本文的主要贡献:
1.在会计透明度指数构建上,基于现有研究和我国制度背景进行方法选择,使用反映盈余质量的特征指标——盈余激进度、盈余平滑度及二者的加总分别从短期、长期和综合趋势等角度衡量会计透明度。
2.基于理论分析和已有研究,将影响会计透明度的因素划分为外部和内部治理因素,并分别检验制度环境、外部治理机制、董事会有效性和股权结构特征对我国上市公司会计透明度的影响。
3.将影响上市公司会计透明度的内、外部因素置于统一框架下,采用主成份分析方法和回归分析的二步骤估计程序,发现治理机制对我国上市公司会计透明度的影响存在“外强内弱”的特征,国有股“一股独大”导致会计透明度低下,宏观制度环境对会计透明度影响甚微。
本文的主要局限和研究展望:
1.会计透明度衡量方法有待进一步改进,尤其应当考虑加入更多反映我国上市公司盈余质量特征的指标,使之对会计透明度的衡量更为全面和准确。
2.本文未考虑会计披露的动态特征,故采用动态计量经济模型研究上市公司会计透明度的影响因素是今后进一步研究的方向。
Improving accounting transparency of listed companies has been discussed over decades both by academia and practitioners. Sorting out the determinants of accounting transparency will be helpful to solve the problem. The author studies the determinants of accounting transparency on the background of China's institution in this paper. Firstly the author constructs three accounting transparency indices using two earning quality attributes and the sum of them, which can measure the accounting transparency from the views of short-term, long-term and overall tendency seperately. Secondly, the author analyzes the fundamental factors influencing accounting transparency based on the underlying theories of information economics, incomplete contract and investor protection, and then groups these factors into internal and external ones. Thirdly, this paper tests the effects of the institutional environment, the external governance mechanisms, effectiveness of Board, and ownership structure on accounting transparency respectively using the data of China’s listed companies. Finally, all these internal and external factors are tested under a unified framework using factor analysis, in order to find out the dominant factors influencing the accounting transparency of China's listed companies.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
For the relationship between institutional environment, external governance mechanisms and accounting transparency, the results indicate that the supervision of markets, the implementation of accounting standards and creditors’constrains do play an important role in enhancing accounting transparency in China. Although the independent auditors can improve accounting transparency of listed companies in the long run, there may exist short-term "conspiracy" between auditors and listed companies. Accounting transparency of listed companies in monopolistic industries is higher than that of listed companies in competitive industries. But the regional difference of the institutional environment is not a significant influencing factor on accounting transparency.
For the relationship between effectiveness of the Board of Directors and accounting transparency, the empirical evidence shows that on one hand, the duality of chairman and CEO, and the diligence of directors can improve the accounting transparency, and under an effective external governance environment, the accounting transparency will be increased if the CEO works in shareholders’enterprises at the same time; on the other hand, independent directors play a limited role and the existing of auditor committee reduces accounting transparency, which means that it fails to perform the duties of "reviewing company's financial information and its disclosure".
For the relationship between the ownership structure and accounting transparency, the test results show that the correlation between accounting transparency and the equity ratio of the first major shareholder is negative, and other shareholders can oversight the first major shareholder in some extent, but such influence is not stable. More corporate shares help to improve accounting transparency; and the accounting transparency decrease if the first major shareholders are State owners, which is evident in the long run.
Through the principal component analysis and regression tests, the author finds that external governance mechanisms are the dominant factors of accounting transparency; the function of the board of directors as an principle internal control mechanism is weak in some extent; inappropriate ownership structure is an important factor leading to low-level accounting transparency; and the macro-environment has little effect on accounting transparency.
The main academic contributions of this paper are provided as follows. Firstly, the accounting transparency indicies chosen and constructed in this paper can measure accounting transparency from the angles of overall quality, short-term and long-term tendency seperately. Secondly, the determinants of accounting transparency are grouped into external and internal ones, and the influences of institutional environment, external governance mechanisms, effectiveness of Board, and ownership structure on accounting transparency are tested on China's institutional background. Finally, putting all the factors into a unified framework and using principal component analysis and regression test, the paper finds that the influencing effect of external factors is strong and the internal ones is weak, and dominance of state shares has negative effect and macro-environment system has weak effect on accounting transparency.
However, the paper has two main limitations. Firstly, the measurement methods of accounting transparency need to be improved, especially by adding more earning quality attributes into the index to make it more comprehensive and accurate. Secondly, this paper does not consider the dynamic character of accounting disclosure; therefore, in the future we can use a dynamic model to study the problem of accounting transparency.
对制度环境、外部治理机制与会计透明度关系的实证检验结果表明,市场监管、会计准则执行和债权人约束等外部治理机制对于我国上市公司会计透明度的提高具有重要作用;执行独立审计的CPA与上市公司管理层可能存在短期“合谋”行为,但长期趋势上能够提高会计透明度;垄断性行业上市公司的会计透明度要高于竞争性行业上市公司的会计透明度;地区制度环境差异对会计透明度不具显著影响。
对董事会有效性与会计透明度关系的实证检验结果发现,董事长与总经理两职合一、董事勤勉性均有助于会计透明度的提高;整体来看独立董事对会计透明度的作用有限;在有效的外部治理环境下,董事长同时在股东单位任职可以提高公司会计透明度;审计委员会未能有效履行“审核公司的财务信息及其披露”的职责,其设立反而降低了会计透明度。
对股权结构与会计透明度关系的实证检验结果发现,会计透明度与第一大股东持股比例负相关,其他股东对第一大股东起到一定制衡作用,但该作用并不稳定;法人股比例的增加有助于提高会计透明度;第一大股东的国有性质降低会计透明度,且在长期趋势上表现明显。
通过对上市公司会计透明度的内、外部影响因素采用主成份分析法提取和识别因子、并用识别因子进行回归的二阶段模型检验结果表明:外部治理机制是影响我国上市公司会计透明度的主导因素,作为主要内部治理机制的董事会功能存在一定程度的弱化,“一股独大”的股权结构是导致会计透明度低下的重要因素,宏观制度环境对会计透明度影响甚微。
本文的主要贡献:
1.在会计透明度指数构建上,基于现有研究和我国制度背景进行方法选择,使用反映盈余质量的特征指标——盈余激进度、盈余平滑度及二者的加总分别从短期、长期和综合趋势等角度衡量会计透明度。
2.基于理论分析和已有研究,将影响会计透明度的因素划分为外部和内部治理因素,并分别检验制度环境、外部治理机制、董事会有效性和股权结构特征对我国上市公司会计透明度的影响。
3.将影响上市公司会计透明度的内、外部因素置于统一框架下,采用主成份分析方法和回归分析的二步骤估计程序,发现治理机制对我国上市公司会计透明度的影响存在“外强内弱”的特征,国有股“一股独大”导致会计透明度低下,宏观制度环境对会计透明度影响甚微。
本文的主要局限和研究展望:
1.会计透明度衡量方法有待进一步改进,尤其应当考虑加入更多反映我国上市公司盈余质量特征的指标,使之对会计透明度的衡量更为全面和准确。
2.本文未考虑会计披露的动态特征,故采用动态计量经济模型研究上市公司会计透明度的影响因素是今后进一步研究的方向。
Improving accounting transparency of listed companies has been discussed over decades both by academia and practitioners. Sorting out the determinants of accounting transparency will be helpful to solve the problem. The author studies the determinants of accounting transparency on the background of China's institution in this paper. Firstly the author constructs three accounting transparency indices using two earning quality attributes and the sum of them, which can measure the accounting transparency from the views of short-term, long-term and overall tendency seperately. Secondly, the author analyzes the fundamental factors influencing accounting transparency based on the underlying theories of information economics, incomplete contract and investor protection, and then groups these factors into internal and external ones. Thirdly, this paper tests the effects of the institutional environment, the external governance mechanisms, effectiveness of Board, and ownership structure on accounting transparency respectively using the data of China’s listed companies. Finally, all these internal and external factors are tested under a unified framework using factor analysis, in order to find out the dominant factors influencing the accounting transparency of China's listed companies.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
For the relationship between institutional environment, external governance mechanisms and accounting transparency, the results indicate that the supervision of markets, the implementation of accounting standards and creditors’constrains do play an important role in enhancing accounting transparency in China. Although the independent auditors can improve accounting transparency of listed companies in the long run, there may exist short-term "conspiracy" between auditors and listed companies. Accounting transparency of listed companies in monopolistic industries is higher than that of listed companies in competitive industries. But the regional difference of the institutional environment is not a significant influencing factor on accounting transparency.
For the relationship between effectiveness of the Board of Directors and accounting transparency, the empirical evidence shows that on one hand, the duality of chairman and CEO, and the diligence of directors can improve the accounting transparency, and under an effective external governance environment, the accounting transparency will be increased if the CEO works in shareholders’enterprises at the same time; on the other hand, independent directors play a limited role and the existing of auditor committee reduces accounting transparency, which means that it fails to perform the duties of "reviewing company's financial information and its disclosure".
For the relationship between the ownership structure and accounting transparency, the test results show that the correlation between accounting transparency and the equity ratio of the first major shareholder is negative, and other shareholders can oversight the first major shareholder in some extent, but such influence is not stable. More corporate shares help to improve accounting transparency; and the accounting transparency decrease if the first major shareholders are State owners, which is evident in the long run.
Through the principal component analysis and regression tests, the author finds that external governance mechanisms are the dominant factors of accounting transparency; the function of the board of directors as an principle internal control mechanism is weak in some extent; inappropriate ownership structure is an important factor leading to low-level accounting transparency; and the macro-environment has little effect on accounting transparency.
The main academic contributions of this paper are provided as follows. Firstly, the accounting transparency indicies chosen and constructed in this paper can measure accounting transparency from the angles of overall quality, short-term and long-term tendency seperately. Secondly, the determinants of accounting transparency are grouped into external and internal ones, and the influences of institutional environment, external governance mechanisms, effectiveness of Board, and ownership structure on accounting transparency are tested on China's institutional background. Finally, putting all the factors into a unified framework and using principal component analysis and regression test, the paper finds that the influencing effect of external factors is strong and the internal ones is weak, and dominance of state shares has negative effect and macro-environment system has weak effect on accounting transparency.
However, the paper has two main limitations. Firstly, the measurement methods of accounting transparency need to be improved, especially by adding more earning quality attributes into the index to make it more comprehensive and accurate. Secondly, this paper does not consider the dynamic character of accounting disclosure; therefore, in the future we can use a dynamic model to study the problem of accounting transparency.
引文
① 买卖价差(bid-ask spread)通常用于衡量信息不对称程度。
① 最典型的案例是创造“中国第一蓝筹股”神话的银广夏,其在 1999 年和 2000 年虚构利润达 7.45 亿元,2001 年 8 月其谎言被揭穿后股价从 20 多元一泻千里跌至 2 元钱,致使上千万大小股东血本无归。
② 具体参见:全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查《中华人民共和国证券法》实施情况的报告(2001 年 6月 28 日),http://www.law-lib.com。
③ 2006 年 11 月,我国加入 WTO 过渡期已正式结束。
④ 由于“会计是一个以提供财务信息为主的经济信息系统”(葛家澍和李翔华,1986),故本文认为“会计透明度”即“会计信息透明度”,下文若无特别说明,二者不作区分。
① 该评级是由 AIMR 下属公司信息委员会(Association for Investment Management and Research Corporate
① 参见上海证券交易所研究中心关于“我国上市公司董事会运作情况”的问卷调研结果。(上海证券交易所,2004)
① 2002 年 1 月中国证监会颁发的《上市公司治理准则》是我国第一部针对上市公司治理结构的规章制度,
① 例如,安然公司的 17 位董事中,除董事长和 CEO 外,其余都是地位显赫的独立董事;世界通讯、莱得艾德、施乐等公司董事会中,独立董事比例分别达到了 9/11、7/9 和 7/9。再如,深交所总经理张育军在 2004年底曾透露,共有 54 名上市公司的独立董事因未能勤勉尽责和保护中小股东权益而受到深交所处分。(参见:http://finance.news.tom.com/1008/1009/20041221-127758.html)
① 由于本章只以总会计透明度(Transp)为被解释变量进行测试,故控制变量的选择上仅考虑对总会计透明度(Transp)具有显著影响的变量。
① 以上统计数据根据本文所使用的 2001-2005 年 5 年的样本数据计算得到,可参见表 5-2。
[1] Agion, P., and P.Bolton. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59: 473-494.
[2] Alford, A., J. Jones, R. Leftwich, and M. Amijewsk. The Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosures in Different Countries [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31(Supplement):183-223.
[3] Ball, R., A. Robin, and J.S.Wu. Incentives versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Countries [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2003, 36:235-270.
[4] Ball, R., S.P. Kothari, and A. Robin. The Effect of International Institutional Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 29:1-51.
[5] Bao, B. H., and L. Chow. The Usefulness of Earning and Book Value in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Listed Companies in The People’s Republic of China [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 1999, 10: 85-104.
[6] Barth, M.E., J.A.Elliott, and M.W.Finn. Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of Increasing Earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1999 (Autumn), 37: 387-413.
[7] Bartov, E., Gul, Ferdinand A., and Judy S.L. Tsui. Discretionary-Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 30:421-452.
[8] Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Enhancing Bank Transparency[R]. 1998, September.
[9] Basu, S.The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1997, 24:3-37.
[10] Beasley, M. S. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, October 1996, 71:443-465.
[11] Beasley, Mark S., Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson, and Paul D. Lapides. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms [J]. Accounting Horizons, December 2000, 14:441-454.
[12] Becker, C., M. DeFond, J.Jiambalvo, and K. Subramanyam. The Effect of Audit on Earnings Management [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998, 15:1-24.
[13] Berle, A., and G. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. 1932, Mc-Millan, New York.
[14] Bhattacharya, U., H. Daouk, and M. Welker. The World Price of Earnings Opacity [J].TheAccounting Review Jul 2003, 78: 641-678.
[15] Biddle, G., G. Seow, and A. Siegel. Relative versus Incremental Information Content [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1995, 12: 1-23.
[16] Bloch, F., and U. Hege. Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [EB/01]. 2001.Working Paper
[17] Botosan C. Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital [J]. The Accounting Review, 1997, 72:323-349.
[18] Botosan, C., and M. Plumlee. A Re-Examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40: 21-40.
[19] Boyd, B. K. CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model [J], Strategic Management Journal, 1995, 16:301-312.
[20] Bushman R., and A. Smith. Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 32 : 237-333.
[21] Bushman R., Q. Chen, E. Engel, and A. Smith. Financial Accounting Information, Organizational Complexity and Corporate Governance Systems [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004, 37: 167-201.
[22] Bushman, R. M., and A. J. Smith. Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate Governance [J]. Economic Policy Review. Apr 2003. 9: 65-87.
[23] Bushman, R. M., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith. What Determines Corporate Transparency?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, May 2004, 42:207-252.
[24] Carcello, J. V., and Terry L. Neal. Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting [J].The Accounting Review, Oct 2000, 75:453-467.
[25] Chaney, P., and C. Lewis. Earnings Management and Firm Valuation Under Asymmetric Information [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1995, 1:319-345.
[26] Chen, C.J.P., and B. Jaggi. Association between Independent Non-Executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2000, 19:285-310.
[27] Cheung, Steven N. S. The Contractual Nature of the Firm [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26: 1-21.
[28] Chtourou, S.M., J.Bedard, and L.Courteau. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management [EB/01]. 2001, working paper.
[29] Clinch, G., and Robert E. Verrecchia. Competitive Disadvantage and Discretionary Disclosure in Industries [J]. Australian Journal Of Management, December 1997, 22:125-137.
[30] Core, J.E. A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion [J]. Journal ofAccounting&Economics, 2001, 31:441-456.
[31] DeAngelo, L.E. Auditor Size and Auditor Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3: 183-199.
[32] Dechow, P.M., R.G.Sloan, and A.P.Sweeney.Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(Spring): 1-36.
[33] Demski, J. Performance Measure Manipulation [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998, 15: 261-285.
[34] Diamond, D., and R. Verrecchia. Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Finance, 1991, 46: 1325-1359.
[35] Eng, L.L., and Y.T. Mak. Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2003, 22:325-245.
[36] Faccio, M., and L.H.P.Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 65: 365-395.
[37] Fama, E.F., and M.C.Jensen. Agency Problems and Residual Claims [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983b: 327-349.
[38] Fama, E.F., and M.C.Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983a: 301-326.
[39] Fan, J.P.H., and T.J. Wong. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics , 2002, 33: 401–425.
[40] Francis, J., E. Maydew, and H. Sparks. The Role of Big6 Auditor in the Credible Reporting of Accruals [J]. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 1999, 18(Fall):17-34.
[41] Francis, J., K. Schipper, and L. Vincent. The Relative and Incremental Explanatory Power of Earnings and Alternative (to Earnings) Performance Measures for Returns [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2003, 20:121-164.
[42] Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. M. Olsson, and K. Schipper. Costs of Equity and Earnings Attributes [J]. The Accounting Review, 2004, 79:967-1010.
[43] Fudenberg, D., and J.Tirole. A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1995, 103:75-93.
[44] Gomes, A. Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. The Journal of Finance, 2000, 55:615-646.
[45] Grossman, S. J., and O. D.Hart. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids [J]. Journal of Finance, May 1980, 35: 323-334.
[46] Healy P. M., and K. G. Palepu. Information Asymmetry,Corporate Disclosure,and theCapital Markets:A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature [J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics, 2001, 31: 405-440.
[47] Healy P. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7:85-107.
[48] Healy P., A. Hutton, and K. Palepu. Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Increases in Disclosure [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999, 16: 435-520.
[49] Ho, S.S. M., and K. S. Wong. A Study of Corporate Disclosure Practice and Effectiveness in Hong Kong [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 2001a, 12 (1): 75-102.
[50] Ho, S.S. M., and K. S. Wong. A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structures and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2001b, 10: 139–156.
[51] Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations [J]. Journal of Finacial Economics, 1988, 20: 317-346.
[52] Holthausen, R.W., and Watts, R.L.The Relevance of Value-relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 31:3-75.
[53] Hope, Ole-Kristian. Accounting Policy Disclosure and Analysis’ Forecasts [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 2003a, 20:295-321.
[54] Hope, Ole-Kristian. Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, May 2003c, 41:235-272.
[55] Hope, Ole-Kristian. Firm-level Disclosures and the Relative Roles of Culture and Legal Origin [J]. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 2003b,14:218–248.
[56] Inchausti, B.G. The Influence of Company Characteristics and Accounting Regulation on Information Disclosed by Spanish Firms [J]. The European Accounting Review, 1997, 6:45-68.
[57] Jensen, M. C. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J]. The Journal of Finance, July 1993, XLVIII:831-880.
[58] Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976 (Oct):305-360.
[59] Johnson, S., R.La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. Tunnelling [J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90:22-27.
[60] Klein, A. Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management [J].Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2002, 33:375-400.
[61] Kurtzman J., G. Yago and T. Phumiwasana. The Opacity Index [J], MIT Sloan Management Review, 2004 (October):1-19.
[62] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. Law and Finance [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106: 1113-1155.
[63] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny.Corporate Ownership Around the World [J]. The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54:471-517.
[64] Lang M., and R. Lundholm. Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior [J]. The Accounting Review, Oct 1996, 71: 467-492.
[65] Lang, M., and Lundholm, R. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analysts Ratings of Corporate Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31: 246–271.
[66] Leftwich, R.W., R.L. Watts, and J.L. Zimmerman. Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: The Case of Interim Reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Research, 1981, 19 (Supplement):50-77.
[67] Leuz C., and Robert E. Verrecchia. The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2000, 38(Supplement): 91-124.
[68] Leuz, C., and F. Oberholzer-Gee. Political Relationships, Global Financing, and Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 81:411–439.
[69] Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P.D. Wysocki. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, September 2003,69 :505-527.
[70] Levine, R., N. Loayza, and T. Beck. Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes [J]. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2000, 46: 31-77.
[71] Liu J., D. Nissim, and J. Thomas. Equity Valuation Using Multiples [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40: 135-172.
[72] Lundholm, R., and L.A.Myers. Bringing the Future Forward: The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-Earnings Relation [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40:809-839.
[73] Meek, Gary K., Clare B. Roberts, and Sidney J. Gray. Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European Multinational Corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 1995, 26:555-572.
[74] Miller G. S. Earning Performance and Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40:173-204.
[75] Mitchell, J.D., C.W.L Chia and A.S. Loh. Voluntary Disclosure of Segment Information: Further Australian Evidence [J]. Accounting and Finance, 1995, 35:1-16.
[76] Morck, R., A.Shleifer, and R.W.Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20:293-315.
[77] Pagano, M., and A.Roell. The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb 1998, 113: 188-225.
[78] Patel, S. A., and G. Dallas. Transparency and Disclosure: Overview of Methodology and Study Results [EB/01]. http://ssrn.com/abstract=422800, 2002.
[79] Peasnell, K.V., P.F. Pope, and S. Young. Accrual Management to Meet Earnings Targets: Did Cadbury Make a Difference? [EB/01].1999, Working paper.
[80] Pincus, K., M. Rusbarsky, and T.J. Wong. Voluntary Formation Of Audit Committees Among NASDAQ Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1989, 8:239-265.
[81] Sengupta, P. Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt [J]. The Accounting Review, Oct 1998, 73:459-474.
[82] Shirley, M.M. and P.Walsh. Public vs. Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate. Working Paper, the World Bank, 2000.
[83] Shivakumar, L. Do Firms Mislead Investors by Overstating Earnings Before Seasoned Equity Offerings? [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 29:339-371.
[84] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94:461-488.
[85] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance, June 1997, 52:737-783.
[86] Singhvi, S.S., and H.B. Desai. An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial Disclosure [J]. The Accounting Review, 1971, (January): 129-138.
[87] Teoh, S.H., and T.J. Wong. Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earning Response Coefficient [J]. The Accounting Review, 1993, 68: 346-367.
[88] Trueman, B., and S. Titman. An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1988, 26(Supplement):127-139.
[89] Tucker, J.W. and P.A. Zarowin. Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness?[J]. The Accounting Review, Jan 2006, 81: 251-270.
[90] Verrecchia, R. Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1983, 5,179-194.
[91] Volpin, P.F. Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover In Italy [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 64:61-90.
[92] Wallace R.S.O., Naser K., and A.Mora. The Relationship between Comprehensiveness of Corporate Annual Reports and Firm Characteristics in Spain [J]. Accounting and Business Research, 1994, 25: 41–53.
[93] Welker, M. Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1995, 11(Spring ):801-827.
[94] Zhang, Tianyu. Corporate Layers and Corporate Transparency in a Transition Economy: Evidence from China [D]. A thesis submitted to the HKUSTf, 2004.
[95] 陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000,(1):30-36.
[96] 陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革[J].经济研究,2005,(4):77-86.
[97] 陈郁编.所有权、控制权与激励——代理经济学文选[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998.
[98] 崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响――来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004,(8):72-80.
[99] 樊纲、王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2004年度报告[R].北京:经济科学出版社,2004.
[100] 方军雄,洪剑峭.信息披露透明度与会计盈余的价值相关性[A].中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2005:1037-1048.
[101] 高雷,何少华,黄志忠.公司治理与掏空[J].经济学(季刊),2006,第五卷(4):1157-1178.
[102] 葛家澍,陈守德.财务报告质量评估的探讨[J].会计研究,2001,(11):9-18.
[103] 葛家澍,李翔华.论会计是一个经济信息系统(下)[J].财经研究,1986,(10):42-46.
[104] 葛家澍.建立中国财务会计概念框架的总体设想[J].会计研究,2004,(1):9-19.
[105] 何佳.中外信息披露制度及实际效果比较研究[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究,2002.
[106] 黄娟娟,肖珉.信息披露、收益不透明度与权益资本成本[J].中国会计评论,2006,4(1):69-84.
[107] 李常青,管连云.股权结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].商业研究,2004,(19):48-53.
[108] 李弢.核准制与 IPO 公司利润操纵问题研究[D].福州大学硕士论文打印稿,2003.
[109] 李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(11):3-13.
[110] 李志辉,罗平.SPSS for Windows 统计分析教程(第 2 版).北京:电子工业出版社,2005.
[111] 梁杰,王璇,李进中.现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004,7(6):47-51.
[112] 刘斌,刘星,黄永红.中国上市公司可持续增长的主因素分析[J].重庆大学学报,2003,26(1)111-115.
[113] 刘峰,吴风,钟瑞庆.会计准则能提高会计信息质量吗——来自中国股市的初步证据[J].会计研究,2004,(5):8-19.
[114] 刘向东,张海文.关于上市公司“特别处理”作用的研究[J].会计研究,2001,(8):15-21.
[115] 美国注册会计师协会.改进企业报告——着眼于用户(中译本)(R).陈毓圭译.北京:中国财政经济出版社,1997.
[116] 潘琰,陈凌云,林丽花.会计准则的信息含量:中国会计准则与IFRS之比较[J].会计研究,2003(7):7-15.
[117] 潘琰,程小可.上市公司经营业绩的主成份评价方法[J].会计研究,2000,(1):31-35.
[118] 潘琰,辛清泉.所有权、公司治理结构与会计信息质量——基于契约理论的现实思考[J].会计研究,2004,(4):19-23.
[119] 漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳.事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究,2004,(3):59-65.
[120] 上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2004):董事会独立性与有效性[R].上海:复旦大学出版社,2004.
[121] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999,(12):23-39.
[122] 孙铮,刘凤委,汪辉.债务、公司治理与会计稳健性[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005,7(2):112-142.
[123] 谭劲松,吴立扬.我国上市公司透明度影响因素分析――来自深交所的证据[EB/01].工作底稿,2005.
[124] 田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的 U 型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].经济研究,2005,(10):48-58.
[125] 汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值[J].经济研究,2003,(8):28-35.
[126] 汪炜,蒋高峰. 信息披露、透明度与资本成本[J]. 经济研究,2004,(7):107-114.
[127] 汪炜.公司信息披露:理论与实证研究[M].浙江:浙江大学出版社,2005.
[128] 王俊秋.投资者保护与会计信息披露:一个互动的分析框架[J].财会通讯,2005,(10):58-60.
[129] 王立彦,刘军霞. A-H股双重报告差异与公司治理[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[130] 王利娜.制度环境、公司治理与稳健性财务报告动机[D].厦门大学博士论文打印稿, 2006.
[131] 王艳艳,陈汉文.审计质量与会计透明度――来自中国上市公司的检验数据[J]. 会计研究,2006,(4):9-15.
[132] 魏明海,刘峰,施鲲翔.论会计透明度[J].会计研究,2001,(9):16-20.
[133] 夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003,第 5 卷(2):94-122.
[134] 肖星,宋衍蘅.会计准则与会计信息质量——基于“新四项计提”的经验证据[EB/01].工作底稿,2004.
[135] 肖作平.中国上市公司资本结构影响因素研究——理论和证据[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005年11月.
[136] 谢碧琴,蒋义宏.法律体系、上市规则与关联交易——以H股公司和A股公司为例[EB/01].工作底稿,2005.
[137] 徐晓东.公司治理与第一大股东的所有权[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2006.
[138] 杨之曙,彭倩.中国上市公司收益透明度实证研究[J].会计研究,2004,(11):62-70.
[139] 于东智,王化成.独立董事与公司治理:理论、经验与实践[J].会计研究,2003,(8):8-13.
[140] 于东智.董事会、公司治理与绩效——对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003,(3):29-41.
[141] 曾颖,陆正飞.信息披露质量与股权融资成本[J]. 经济研究,2006,(2):69-79.
[142] 张程睿,王华. 公司信息透明度:经验研究与未来展望[J]. 会计研究,2006,(12):54-60.
[143] 张程睿,王华.公司信息透明度的市场反应――来自中国A股市场的经验证据(A). 中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2005:139-154.
[144] 张程睿.什么决定了中国上市公司信息透明度?[EB/01].工作底稿,2006.
[145] 张灵芝.会计透明度的理论视角、信息约束及其实现[J].商业经济与管理,2005,(7):72-75.
[146] 张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托代理关系[J].经济研究,1996,(9):3-15.
[147] 张逸杰,王艳,唐元虎,蔡来兴.上市公司董事会特征和盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].管理评论,2006,(3):14-19.
[148] 张宗新、张晓荣、廖士光.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗[J].经济学季刊,2005,(2):369-386.
[149] 左志民,唐予华.提高会计透明度的若干对策[J].上海会计,2003,(5):11-14.
① 最典型的案例是创造“中国第一蓝筹股”神话的银广夏,其在 1999 年和 2000 年虚构利润达 7.45 亿元,2001 年 8 月其谎言被揭穿后股价从 20 多元一泻千里跌至 2 元钱,致使上千万大小股东血本无归。
② 具体参见:全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查《中华人民共和国证券法》实施情况的报告(2001 年 6月 28 日),http://www.law-lib.com。
③ 2006 年 11 月,我国加入 WTO 过渡期已正式结束。
④ 由于“会计是一个以提供财务信息为主的经济信息系统”(葛家澍和李翔华,1986),故本文认为“会计透明度”即“会计信息透明度”,下文若无特别说明,二者不作区分。
① 该评级是由 AIMR 下属公司信息委员会(Association for Investment Management and Research Corporate
① 参见上海证券交易所研究中心关于“我国上市公司董事会运作情况”的问卷调研结果。(上海证券交易所,2004)
① 2002 年 1 月中国证监会颁发的《上市公司治理准则》是我国第一部针对上市公司治理结构的规章制度,
① 例如,安然公司的 17 位董事中,除董事长和 CEO 外,其余都是地位显赫的独立董事;世界通讯、莱得艾德、施乐等公司董事会中,独立董事比例分别达到了 9/11、7/9 和 7/9。再如,深交所总经理张育军在 2004年底曾透露,共有 54 名上市公司的独立董事因未能勤勉尽责和保护中小股东权益而受到深交所处分。(参见:http://finance.news.tom.com/1008/1009/20041221-127758.html)
① 由于本章只以总会计透明度(Transp)为被解释变量进行测试,故控制变量的选择上仅考虑对总会计透明度(Transp)具有显著影响的变量。
① 以上统计数据根据本文所使用的 2001-2005 年 5 年的样本数据计算得到,可参见表 5-2。
[1] Agion, P., and P.Bolton. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59: 473-494.
[2] Alford, A., J. Jones, R. Leftwich, and M. Amijewsk. The Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosures in Different Countries [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31(Supplement):183-223.
[3] Ball, R., A. Robin, and J.S.Wu. Incentives versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Countries [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2003, 36:235-270.
[4] Ball, R., S.P. Kothari, and A. Robin. The Effect of International Institutional Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 29:1-51.
[5] Bao, B. H., and L. Chow. The Usefulness of Earning and Book Value in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Listed Companies in The People’s Republic of China [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 1999, 10: 85-104.
[6] Barth, M.E., J.A.Elliott, and M.W.Finn. Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of Increasing Earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1999 (Autumn), 37: 387-413.
[7] Bartov, E., Gul, Ferdinand A., and Judy S.L. Tsui. Discretionary-Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 30:421-452.
[8] Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Enhancing Bank Transparency[R]. 1998, September.
[9] Basu, S.The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1997, 24:3-37.
[10] Beasley, M. S. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, October 1996, 71:443-465.
[11] Beasley, Mark S., Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson, and Paul D. Lapides. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms [J]. Accounting Horizons, December 2000, 14:441-454.
[12] Becker, C., M. DeFond, J.Jiambalvo, and K. Subramanyam. The Effect of Audit on Earnings Management [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998, 15:1-24.
[13] Berle, A., and G. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. 1932, Mc-Millan, New York.
[14] Bhattacharya, U., H. Daouk, and M. Welker. The World Price of Earnings Opacity [J].TheAccounting Review Jul 2003, 78: 641-678.
[15] Biddle, G., G. Seow, and A. Siegel. Relative versus Incremental Information Content [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1995, 12: 1-23.
[16] Bloch, F., and U. Hege. Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [EB/01]. 2001.Working Paper
[17] Botosan C. Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital [J]. The Accounting Review, 1997, 72:323-349.
[18] Botosan, C., and M. Plumlee. A Re-Examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40: 21-40.
[19] Boyd, B. K. CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model [J], Strategic Management Journal, 1995, 16:301-312.
[20] Bushman R., and A. Smith. Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 32 : 237-333.
[21] Bushman R., Q. Chen, E. Engel, and A. Smith. Financial Accounting Information, Organizational Complexity and Corporate Governance Systems [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2004, 37: 167-201.
[22] Bushman, R. M., and A. J. Smith. Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate Governance [J]. Economic Policy Review. Apr 2003. 9: 65-87.
[23] Bushman, R. M., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith. What Determines Corporate Transparency?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, May 2004, 42:207-252.
[24] Carcello, J. V., and Terry L. Neal. Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting [J].The Accounting Review, Oct 2000, 75:453-467.
[25] Chaney, P., and C. Lewis. Earnings Management and Firm Valuation Under Asymmetric Information [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1995, 1:319-345.
[26] Chen, C.J.P., and B. Jaggi. Association between Independent Non-Executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2000, 19:285-310.
[27] Cheung, Steven N. S. The Contractual Nature of the Firm [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26: 1-21.
[28] Chtourou, S.M., J.Bedard, and L.Courteau. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management [EB/01]. 2001, working paper.
[29] Clinch, G., and Robert E. Verrecchia. Competitive Disadvantage and Discretionary Disclosure in Industries [J]. Australian Journal Of Management, December 1997, 22:125-137.
[30] Core, J.E. A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion [J]. Journal ofAccounting&Economics, 2001, 31:441-456.
[31] DeAngelo, L.E. Auditor Size and Auditor Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3: 183-199.
[32] Dechow, P.M., R.G.Sloan, and A.P.Sweeney.Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(Spring): 1-36.
[33] Demski, J. Performance Measure Manipulation [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998, 15: 261-285.
[34] Diamond, D., and R. Verrecchia. Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Finance, 1991, 46: 1325-1359.
[35] Eng, L.L., and Y.T. Mak. Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2003, 22:325-245.
[36] Faccio, M., and L.H.P.Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 65: 365-395.
[37] Fama, E.F., and M.C.Jensen. Agency Problems and Residual Claims [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983b: 327-349.
[38] Fama, E.F., and M.C.Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983a: 301-326.
[39] Fan, J.P.H., and T.J. Wong. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics , 2002, 33: 401–425.
[40] Francis, J., E. Maydew, and H. Sparks. The Role of Big6 Auditor in the Credible Reporting of Accruals [J]. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 1999, 18(Fall):17-34.
[41] Francis, J., K. Schipper, and L. Vincent. The Relative and Incremental Explanatory Power of Earnings and Alternative (to Earnings) Performance Measures for Returns [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2003, 20:121-164.
[42] Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. M. Olsson, and K. Schipper. Costs of Equity and Earnings Attributes [J]. The Accounting Review, 2004, 79:967-1010.
[43] Fudenberg, D., and J.Tirole. A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1995, 103:75-93.
[44] Gomes, A. Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. The Journal of Finance, 2000, 55:615-646.
[45] Grossman, S. J., and O. D.Hart. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids [J]. Journal of Finance, May 1980, 35: 323-334.
[46] Healy P. M., and K. G. Palepu. Information Asymmetry,Corporate Disclosure,and theCapital Markets:A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature [J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics, 2001, 31: 405-440.
[47] Healy P. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7:85-107.
[48] Healy P., A. Hutton, and K. Palepu. Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Increases in Disclosure [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1999, 16: 435-520.
[49] Ho, S.S. M., and K. S. Wong. A Study of Corporate Disclosure Practice and Effectiveness in Hong Kong [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 2001a, 12 (1): 75-102.
[50] Ho, S.S. M., and K. S. Wong. A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structures and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2001b, 10: 139–156.
[51] Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations [J]. Journal of Finacial Economics, 1988, 20: 317-346.
[52] Holthausen, R.W., and Watts, R.L.The Relevance of Value-relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 31:3-75.
[53] Hope, Ole-Kristian. Accounting Policy Disclosure and Analysis’ Forecasts [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 2003a, 20:295-321.
[54] Hope, Ole-Kristian. Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, May 2003c, 41:235-272.
[55] Hope, Ole-Kristian. Firm-level Disclosures and the Relative Roles of Culture and Legal Origin [J]. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 2003b,14:218–248.
[56] Inchausti, B.G. The Influence of Company Characteristics and Accounting Regulation on Information Disclosed by Spanish Firms [J]. The European Accounting Review, 1997, 6:45-68.
[57] Jensen, M. C. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J]. The Journal of Finance, July 1993, XLVIII:831-880.
[58] Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976 (Oct):305-360.
[59] Johnson, S., R.La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. Tunnelling [J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90:22-27.
[60] Klein, A. Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management [J].Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2002, 33:375-400.
[61] Kurtzman J., G. Yago and T. Phumiwasana. The Opacity Index [J], MIT Sloan Management Review, 2004 (October):1-19.
[62] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. Law and Finance [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106: 1113-1155.
[63] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny.Corporate Ownership Around the World [J]. The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54:471-517.
[64] Lang M., and R. Lundholm. Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior [J]. The Accounting Review, Oct 1996, 71: 467-492.
[65] Lang, M., and Lundholm, R. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analysts Ratings of Corporate Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31: 246–271.
[66] Leftwich, R.W., R.L. Watts, and J.L. Zimmerman. Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: The Case of Interim Reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Research, 1981, 19 (Supplement):50-77.
[67] Leuz C., and Robert E. Verrecchia. The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2000, 38(Supplement): 91-124.
[68] Leuz, C., and F. Oberholzer-Gee. Political Relationships, Global Financing, and Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 81:411–439.
[69] Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P.D. Wysocki. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, September 2003,69 :505-527.
[70] Levine, R., N. Loayza, and T. Beck. Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes [J]. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2000, 46: 31-77.
[71] Liu J., D. Nissim, and J. Thomas. Equity Valuation Using Multiples [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40: 135-172.
[72] Lundholm, R., and L.A.Myers. Bringing the Future Forward: The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-Earnings Relation [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40:809-839.
[73] Meek, Gary K., Clare B. Roberts, and Sidney J. Gray. Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European Multinational Corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 1995, 26:555-572.
[74] Miller G. S. Earning Performance and Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002, 40:173-204.
[75] Mitchell, J.D., C.W.L Chia and A.S. Loh. Voluntary Disclosure of Segment Information: Further Australian Evidence [J]. Accounting and Finance, 1995, 35:1-16.
[76] Morck, R., A.Shleifer, and R.W.Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20:293-315.
[77] Pagano, M., and A.Roell. The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb 1998, 113: 188-225.
[78] Patel, S. A., and G. Dallas. Transparency and Disclosure: Overview of Methodology and Study Results [EB/01]. http://ssrn.com/abstract=422800, 2002.
[79] Peasnell, K.V., P.F. Pope, and S. Young. Accrual Management to Meet Earnings Targets: Did Cadbury Make a Difference? [EB/01].1999, Working paper.
[80] Pincus, K., M. Rusbarsky, and T.J. Wong. Voluntary Formation Of Audit Committees Among NASDAQ Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1989, 8:239-265.
[81] Sengupta, P. Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt [J]. The Accounting Review, Oct 1998, 73:459-474.
[82] Shirley, M.M. and P.Walsh. Public vs. Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate. Working Paper, the World Bank, 2000.
[83] Shivakumar, L. Do Firms Mislead Investors by Overstating Earnings Before Seasoned Equity Offerings? [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2000, 29:339-371.
[84] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94:461-488.
[85] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance, June 1997, 52:737-783.
[86] Singhvi, S.S., and H.B. Desai. An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial Disclosure [J]. The Accounting Review, 1971, (January): 129-138.
[87] Teoh, S.H., and T.J. Wong. Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earning Response Coefficient [J]. The Accounting Review, 1993, 68: 346-367.
[88] Trueman, B., and S. Titman. An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1988, 26(Supplement):127-139.
[89] Tucker, J.W. and P.A. Zarowin. Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness?[J]. The Accounting Review, Jan 2006, 81: 251-270.
[90] Verrecchia, R. Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1983, 5,179-194.
[91] Volpin, P.F. Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover In Italy [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 64:61-90.
[92] Wallace R.S.O., Naser K., and A.Mora. The Relationship between Comprehensiveness of Corporate Annual Reports and Firm Characteristics in Spain [J]. Accounting and Business Research, 1994, 25: 41–53.
[93] Welker, M. Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1995, 11(Spring ):801-827.
[94] Zhang, Tianyu. Corporate Layers and Corporate Transparency in a Transition Economy: Evidence from China [D]. A thesis submitted to the HKUSTf, 2004.
[95] 陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000,(1):30-36.
[96] 陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革[J].经济研究,2005,(4):77-86.
[97] 陈郁编.所有权、控制权与激励——代理经济学文选[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998.
[98] 崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响――来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004,(8):72-80.
[99] 樊纲、王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2004年度报告[R].北京:经济科学出版社,2004.
[100] 方军雄,洪剑峭.信息披露透明度与会计盈余的价值相关性[A].中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2005:1037-1048.
[101] 高雷,何少华,黄志忠.公司治理与掏空[J].经济学(季刊),2006,第五卷(4):1157-1178.
[102] 葛家澍,陈守德.财务报告质量评估的探讨[J].会计研究,2001,(11):9-18.
[103] 葛家澍,李翔华.论会计是一个经济信息系统(下)[J].财经研究,1986,(10):42-46.
[104] 葛家澍.建立中国财务会计概念框架的总体设想[J].会计研究,2004,(1):9-19.
[105] 何佳.中外信息披露制度及实际效果比较研究[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究,2002.
[106] 黄娟娟,肖珉.信息披露、收益不透明度与权益资本成本[J].中国会计评论,2006,4(1):69-84.
[107] 李常青,管连云.股权结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].商业研究,2004,(19):48-53.
[108] 李弢.核准制与 IPO 公司利润操纵问题研究[D].福州大学硕士论文打印稿,2003.
[109] 李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(11):3-13.
[110] 李志辉,罗平.SPSS for Windows 统计分析教程(第 2 版).北京:电子工业出版社,2005.
[111] 梁杰,王璇,李进中.现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004,7(6):47-51.
[112] 刘斌,刘星,黄永红.中国上市公司可持续增长的主因素分析[J].重庆大学学报,2003,26(1)111-115.
[113] 刘峰,吴风,钟瑞庆.会计准则能提高会计信息质量吗——来自中国股市的初步证据[J].会计研究,2004,(5):8-19.
[114] 刘向东,张海文.关于上市公司“特别处理”作用的研究[J].会计研究,2001,(8):15-21.
[115] 美国注册会计师协会.改进企业报告——着眼于用户(中译本)(R).陈毓圭译.北京:中国财政经济出版社,1997.
[116] 潘琰,陈凌云,林丽花.会计准则的信息含量:中国会计准则与IFRS之比较[J].会计研究,2003(7):7-15.
[117] 潘琰,程小可.上市公司经营业绩的主成份评价方法[J].会计研究,2000,(1):31-35.
[118] 潘琰,辛清泉.所有权、公司治理结构与会计信息质量——基于契约理论的现实思考[J].会计研究,2004,(4):19-23.
[119] 漆江娜,陈慧霖,张阳.事务所规模、品牌、价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究,2004,(3):59-65.
[120] 上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2004):董事会独立性与有效性[R].上海:复旦大学出版社,2004.
[121] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999,(12):23-39.
[122] 孙铮,刘凤委,汪辉.债务、公司治理与会计稳健性[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005,7(2):112-142.
[123] 谭劲松,吴立扬.我国上市公司透明度影响因素分析――来自深交所的证据[EB/01].工作底稿,2005.
[124] 田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的 U 型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].经济研究,2005,(10):48-58.
[125] 汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值[J].经济研究,2003,(8):28-35.
[126] 汪炜,蒋高峰. 信息披露、透明度与资本成本[J]. 经济研究,2004,(7):107-114.
[127] 汪炜.公司信息披露:理论与实证研究[M].浙江:浙江大学出版社,2005.
[128] 王俊秋.投资者保护与会计信息披露:一个互动的分析框架[J].财会通讯,2005,(10):58-60.
[129] 王立彦,刘军霞. A-H股双重报告差异与公司治理[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[130] 王利娜.制度环境、公司治理与稳健性财务报告动机[D].厦门大学博士论文打印稿, 2006.
[131] 王艳艳,陈汉文.审计质量与会计透明度――来自中国上市公司的检验数据[J]. 会计研究,2006,(4):9-15.
[132] 魏明海,刘峰,施鲲翔.论会计透明度[J].会计研究,2001,(9):16-20.
[133] 夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003,第 5 卷(2):94-122.
[134] 肖星,宋衍蘅.会计准则与会计信息质量——基于“新四项计提”的经验证据[EB/01].工作底稿,2004.
[135] 肖作平.中国上市公司资本结构影响因素研究——理论和证据[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005年11月.
[136] 谢碧琴,蒋义宏.法律体系、上市规则与关联交易——以H股公司和A股公司为例[EB/01].工作底稿,2005.
[137] 徐晓东.公司治理与第一大股东的所有权[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2006.
[138] 杨之曙,彭倩.中国上市公司收益透明度实证研究[J].会计研究,2004,(11):62-70.
[139] 于东智,王化成.独立董事与公司治理:理论、经验与实践[J].会计研究,2003,(8):8-13.
[140] 于东智.董事会、公司治理与绩效——对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003,(3):29-41.
[141] 曾颖,陆正飞.信息披露质量与股权融资成本[J]. 经济研究,2006,(2):69-79.
[142] 张程睿,王华. 公司信息透明度:经验研究与未来展望[J]. 会计研究,2006,(12):54-60.
[143] 张程睿,王华.公司信息透明度的市场反应――来自中国A股市场的经验证据(A). 中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2005:139-154.
[144] 张程睿.什么决定了中国上市公司信息透明度?[EB/01].工作底稿,2006.
[145] 张灵芝.会计透明度的理论视角、信息约束及其实现[J].商业经济与管理,2005,(7):72-75.
[146] 张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托代理关系[J].经济研究,1996,(9):3-15.
[147] 张逸杰,王艳,唐元虎,蔡来兴.上市公司董事会特征和盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].管理评论,2006,(3):14-19.
[148] 张宗新、张晓荣、廖士光.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗[J].经济学季刊,2005,(2):369-386.
[149] 左志民,唐予华.提高会计透明度的若干对策[J].上海会计,2003,(5):11-14.