大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护
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摘要
我国上市公司股权分置的特殊结构造成了上市公司的大股东与中小股东之间存在广泛的利益冲突。由于保护中小股东利益机制的不健全,加之约束大股东行为的市场机制尚未真正建立,大股东往往会通过各种“利益输送”方式侵害上市公司和中小股东的利益,其中大股东侵占上市公司资金的行为就是一种非常典型的手段,这已成为制约我国资本市场健康稳定发展的障碍和上市公司面临的最大风险。
从本质上说,我国上市公司中广泛存在的大股东侵害中小股东利益行为,除了与我国上市公司股权分置的特殊结构所造成的大股东与中小股东的利益目标相互冲突有关以外,也与我国所处的新兴转轨经济的市场环境有关。而分权化的市场化改革发展之路,造成了我国区域经济发展的不平衡,不同地区的市场化进程、政府对企业的干预程度以及投资者的保护力度也出现了较大的差别。由此,可能影响到不同区域的上市公司质量及大股东与中小股东之间的博弈。
大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突及所可能造成的大股东通过资金侵占等方式对上市公司和中小股东的利益侵害,不仅会影响上市公司的整体质量,而且可能影响到作为资本市场基石的上市公司的透明度,其中就包括作为资本市场透明度重要内容的信息披露的准确性。
作为中介机构的外部独立审计,其主要以自己的独立性为保证,通过对上市公司信息披露的鉴证和审查,起信息过滤和传输功能,维护整个资本市场的透明度,并缓解代理冲突,约束管理当局和大股东的行为。但外部独立审计功能的有效发挥,还取决于整个独立审计市场的竞争环境和有效的外部监管等外部条件。
以上都是需要经过理论分析和经验研究加以探讨的课题。基于此,本文以大股东的资金占用作为大股东侵害上市公司和中小股东利益的直接衡量指标,通过理论分析与经验数据,首先从我国分权化改革的现实出发,考察了不同地区的治理环境,包括市场化进程、政府对企业的干预程度以及投资者的保护力度,对所处区域上市公司的股东内部的博弈及大股东侵害上市公司和中小股东利益行为的影响;在此基础上,以会计盈余质量作为上市公司信息披露准确性的衡量指标,考察了股东内部博弈及大股东对上市公司和中小股东的利益侵害行为对资本市场透明度影响的经济后果;最后从外部独立审计的目的和功能出发,分析了独立审计在抑制大股东的利益输送行为和维护整个资本市场透明度上的作用。
我们的研究发现:
(1)上市公司所处地区的治理环境与大股东的资金占用行为呈显著的负相关关系,上市公司所处地区的市场化进程越快、政府对企业的干预程度越低,则大股东资金侵占程度越低;此外,治理环境对大股东的影响程度还受到控股股东产权性质和组织形式的影响;但没有发现上市公司所处地区的法治化水平对大股东资金侵占行为有显著影响;
(2)大股东资金侵占越严重的上市公司,操控性应计数的绝对值越大;同时会计盈余的价值相关性越低。表明股东之间的博弈及大股东对中小股东的利益输送行为具有降低资本市场透明度的经济后果;
(3)从需求方面来说,大股东资金占用越严重的公司越没有动机聘请高质量的外部审计;从供给方面来说,独立审计师在出具审计意见时会考虑大股东对上市公司的资金占用,即大股东对上市公司资金占用越严重,越有可能被出具非标准的审计意见报告。经验结果显示,在我国转轨经济的市场环境下,外部独立审计能够在一定程度上抑制大股东的自利行为并维护整个资本市场的透明度;但是由于独立审计市场竞争的不完全,高质量的外部审计需求的缺乏,以及事务所之间的恶性竞争,使独立审计的外部治理功能的发挥受到一定的制约。
In our country, the special corporate ownership in listed companies has created agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Because the market mechanisms to protect minority investors are not perfect and mechanisms to hold in controlling shareholder haven’t been constructed fully, controlling shareholder often tunnel listed companies and minority shareholders through many kinds of ways. Among them, embezzling funds of listed companies is an outright mean which has impeded our country’s securities market’s development and becomes the main risk of listed companies.
In essence, expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling sharehoder is relevant to the institutional environment of our economy besides the special splitting ownership structure in our country’s listed companies. Since the evolvement of marketization in our country is through empowerment by central government to local government, our different local economic development appears non-equilibrium and differences are also significant including evolvement of marketization, government disturbance on enterprises and legal protection of minority shareholders, which will influence agency conflicts between controlling sharedholder and minority shareholders, and the quality of listed companies in different aspects.
Agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and potential expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder not only will influence listed company’s quality, but also will affect the transparency of capital market including truth of information disclosure, which is the foundation of the development of securities market.
As a media, the main role of external auditors is to transmit and safeguard of accounting information by assuring it, employed as monitors and bonding mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts and limit controlling shareholder’s abilities to hold up minority shareholders. But effective governing of external auditors depends on competitive environment of audit markets and valid monitoring by government.
Using embezzling funds of listed companies by controlling shareholder as proxy for expropriation of minority shareholders from controlling shareholder, this dissertation first investigates the relationship between institutional environment and expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder. Institutional environment consists of evolvement marketization, government disturbance on firms and legal protection of minority investors. Then, we test the influence entrenchment of the controlling shareholder on the capital market’s transparency through proxy the earnings quality for truth of information disclosure. Finally, we test the corporate governance role of external auditors in holding in the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder and alleviating the agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.
We find that listed companies are more subject to the agency problem embedded in their embezzlement of listed company’s funds, the lower of value relevance of accounting earnings and the more severely of listed company’s earnings management. Our results also suggest significant improvement of institutional environment can mitigate controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds. As to the governance role of external auditors, our results show that firms are less to employ high quality auditors when they are subject to the agency problem embedded in their embezzlement of listed company’s funds. In addition, auditor will more likely set a‘not clean’audit opinion.
从本质上说,我国上市公司中广泛存在的大股东侵害中小股东利益行为,除了与我国上市公司股权分置的特殊结构所造成的大股东与中小股东的利益目标相互冲突有关以外,也与我国所处的新兴转轨经济的市场环境有关。而分权化的市场化改革发展之路,造成了我国区域经济发展的不平衡,不同地区的市场化进程、政府对企业的干预程度以及投资者的保护力度也出现了较大的差别。由此,可能影响到不同区域的上市公司质量及大股东与中小股东之间的博弈。
大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突及所可能造成的大股东通过资金侵占等方式对上市公司和中小股东的利益侵害,不仅会影响上市公司的整体质量,而且可能影响到作为资本市场基石的上市公司的透明度,其中就包括作为资本市场透明度重要内容的信息披露的准确性。
作为中介机构的外部独立审计,其主要以自己的独立性为保证,通过对上市公司信息披露的鉴证和审查,起信息过滤和传输功能,维护整个资本市场的透明度,并缓解代理冲突,约束管理当局和大股东的行为。但外部独立审计功能的有效发挥,还取决于整个独立审计市场的竞争环境和有效的外部监管等外部条件。
以上都是需要经过理论分析和经验研究加以探讨的课题。基于此,本文以大股东的资金占用作为大股东侵害上市公司和中小股东利益的直接衡量指标,通过理论分析与经验数据,首先从我国分权化改革的现实出发,考察了不同地区的治理环境,包括市场化进程、政府对企业的干预程度以及投资者的保护力度,对所处区域上市公司的股东内部的博弈及大股东侵害上市公司和中小股东利益行为的影响;在此基础上,以会计盈余质量作为上市公司信息披露准确性的衡量指标,考察了股东内部博弈及大股东对上市公司和中小股东的利益侵害行为对资本市场透明度影响的经济后果;最后从外部独立审计的目的和功能出发,分析了独立审计在抑制大股东的利益输送行为和维护整个资本市场透明度上的作用。
我们的研究发现:
(1)上市公司所处地区的治理环境与大股东的资金占用行为呈显著的负相关关系,上市公司所处地区的市场化进程越快、政府对企业的干预程度越低,则大股东资金侵占程度越低;此外,治理环境对大股东的影响程度还受到控股股东产权性质和组织形式的影响;但没有发现上市公司所处地区的法治化水平对大股东资金侵占行为有显著影响;
(2)大股东资金侵占越严重的上市公司,操控性应计数的绝对值越大;同时会计盈余的价值相关性越低。表明股东之间的博弈及大股东对中小股东的利益输送行为具有降低资本市场透明度的经济后果;
(3)从需求方面来说,大股东资金占用越严重的公司越没有动机聘请高质量的外部审计;从供给方面来说,独立审计师在出具审计意见时会考虑大股东对上市公司的资金占用,即大股东对上市公司资金占用越严重,越有可能被出具非标准的审计意见报告。经验结果显示,在我国转轨经济的市场环境下,外部独立审计能够在一定程度上抑制大股东的自利行为并维护整个资本市场的透明度;但是由于独立审计市场竞争的不完全,高质量的外部审计需求的缺乏,以及事务所之间的恶性竞争,使独立审计的外部治理功能的发挥受到一定的制约。
In our country, the special corporate ownership in listed companies has created agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Because the market mechanisms to protect minority investors are not perfect and mechanisms to hold in controlling shareholder haven’t been constructed fully, controlling shareholder often tunnel listed companies and minority shareholders through many kinds of ways. Among them, embezzling funds of listed companies is an outright mean which has impeded our country’s securities market’s development and becomes the main risk of listed companies.
In essence, expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling sharehoder is relevant to the institutional environment of our economy besides the special splitting ownership structure in our country’s listed companies. Since the evolvement of marketization in our country is through empowerment by central government to local government, our different local economic development appears non-equilibrium and differences are also significant including evolvement of marketization, government disturbance on enterprises and legal protection of minority shareholders, which will influence agency conflicts between controlling sharedholder and minority shareholders, and the quality of listed companies in different aspects.
Agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and potential expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder not only will influence listed company’s quality, but also will affect the transparency of capital market including truth of information disclosure, which is the foundation of the development of securities market.
As a media, the main role of external auditors is to transmit and safeguard of accounting information by assuring it, employed as monitors and bonding mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts and limit controlling shareholder’s abilities to hold up minority shareholders. But effective governing of external auditors depends on competitive environment of audit markets and valid monitoring by government.
Using embezzling funds of listed companies by controlling shareholder as proxy for expropriation of minority shareholders from controlling shareholder, this dissertation first investigates the relationship between institutional environment and expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder. Institutional environment consists of evolvement marketization, government disturbance on firms and legal protection of minority investors. Then, we test the influence entrenchment of the controlling shareholder on the capital market’s transparency through proxy the earnings quality for truth of information disclosure. Finally, we test the corporate governance role of external auditors in holding in the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder and alleviating the agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.
We find that listed companies are more subject to the agency problem embedded in their embezzlement of listed company’s funds, the lower of value relevance of accounting earnings and the more severely of listed company’s earnings management. Our results also suggest significant improvement of institutional environment can mitigate controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds. As to the governance role of external auditors, our results show that firms are less to employ high quality auditors when they are subject to the agency problem embedded in their embezzlement of listed company’s funds. In addition, auditor will more likely set a‘not clean’audit opinion.
引文
①《关于提高上市公司质量的意见》,证监会,2005
②《关于提高上市公司质量的意见》,证监会,2005
① FASB , 1980.5.”Qualitative Characteristic of Accounting Information”,Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2,New York :AICPA.
① 来源于美国代伦咨询集团的统计,摘自吴晓求的《股权分置改革后的中国资本市场》,2006。
得低于是 6%,新上市公司发行后的第一个会计年度必须是 10%,两年平均 10%
① 本文中不区分注册会计师与审计师,二者在后文中将交互使用。
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②《关于提高上市公司质量的意见》,证监会,2005
① FASB , 1980.5.”Qualitative Characteristic of Accounting Information”,Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2,New York :AICPA.
① 来源于美国代伦咨询集团的统计,摘自吴晓求的《股权分置改革后的中国资本市场》,2006。
得低于是 6%,新上市公司发行后的第一个会计年度必须是 10%,两年平均 10%
① 本文中不区分注册会计师与审计师,二者在后文中将交互使用。
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