盈余质量与企业投资行为研究
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摘要
投资是企业诞生的起点,也是企业存续、扩张的杠杆。有关企业投资行为的研究主要是解释何种因素影响企业投资行为。1958年,Modigliani和Miller在《资本成本、企业理财和投资理论》一文中提出MM定理,对企业投融资决策问题做出了开创性研究。自此以后,国外学者在放松MM定理假设的条件下提出了各种影响企业投资行为的理论,并进行了大量的实证检验,试图解释公司特征对企业投资决策的影响。目前大陆学者从内部现金流量、股权结构、预算软约束和金融发展等方面对我国上市公司企业投资行为进行了大量实证研究,但是从财务报告质量、尤其是从盈余质量与企业投资及企业投资效率这一角度进行研究的文章还不多见,也不够深入。
     本文即从盈余质量这一视角出发,在考虑现有企业投资行为影响因素研究的基础上,分别从总体投资规模、投资-现金流敏感度以及非效率投资等方面考察我国上市公司企业投资行为,试图为上市公司盈余质量影响企业投资行为提供经验证据。本文得到如下研究结果:
     第一,研究发现随着盈余质量的提高,当期的企业投资与上一期的会计盈余之间更敏感,这一结论与企业在进行投资决策中更为依赖会计信息假说一致,也与Chen(2005)文中假说一致,为研究企业投资行为提供了一个新的视角。
     第二,借鉴Biddle和Hilary(2006)衡量投资-现金流敏感度的方法,发现随着盈余质量的提高,内部现金流与企业投资之间的关系变弱,高质量的会计信息降低了企业投资-现金流敏感度。
     第三,发现盈余管理影响企业非效率投资,即盈余管理程度与非效率投资之间存在正相关关系。股票回报与非正常投资呈负相关关系,盈余管理水平的提高增加了股票市场回报与非效率投资之间的敏感度。
     以上研究结果表明,在我国目前对投资者法律保护较弱的制度环境下,提高上市公司的盈余质量能够提高企业投资决策水平,降低投资-现金流敏感度,改善企业投资效率。这一研究成果不仅有助于我们更好地理解和拓展现有企业投资行为影响因素研究,而且对提高我国上市公司投资效率具有重要的理论与现实意义。
     全文共分为七章,各章的主要内容如下:
     第一章引言部分介绍本文的研究意义,本领域的研究现状,本文的研究目标、内容和拟解决的关键问题以及本文的主要贡献。
     第二章为国内外盈余质量与企业投资行为研究文献进展。首先回顾了盈余质量、企业投资和投资效率的衡量方法,在此基础上,对国内外近期盈余质量与企业投资规模和企业投资效率的文献进行了回顾和简要的述评。第三章试图为盈余质量影响企业投资规模和投资效率的假说提供深层次的理论依据,认为改善我国企业过度投资等问题不仅要从宏观调控和公司治理等方面着手,还应从源头上提高上市公司盈余质量,为企业投资决策提供真实、可靠的会计信息,从而确保企业投资的高收益和低风险。
     第四章以应计质量作为盈余质量的替代变量,研究企业投资规模与会计信息之间的敏感性,具体考察了管理者在资本投资决策中如何使用会计信息,以及会计信息质量如何影响企业投资行为。第五章考察了投资-现金流敏感度与企业盈余质量之间的关系。第六章研究了企业非效率投资与盈余管理之间的关系,发现高质量财务报告对提高投资效率的作用主要体现在缓解逆向选择等方面。
     第七章为全文总结,具体包括研究的主要结论与启示,研究的局限性以及今后需要进一步研究的问题。
Investment behavior is the starting point of enterprises, and also the leverage of enterprises’existence and development. Research on corporate investment is mainly to explain which factors influence the behavior of corporate investment. MM model brought forward by Modigliani and Miller (1958) has made the initiative study on the decision of enterprises’investment and financing. Hereafter, because MM model hypothesis premise is not accordance with the fact, many foreign scholars have put forward the theory about which factors influence corporate investment decision. The domestic scholars also research the influence factors of corporate investment behavior, such as the internal cash flows, shareholder structure, soft-budget, financial development and so on, but few study the relationship between financial reporting quality and corporate investment, especially about the influence of earnings quality to investment efficiency.
     This paper chooses public listed companies in China as research objects, and systematically analyzes whether accounting information quality influences corporate capital investment behavior. Especially, it investigates how earnings management influences investment efficiency of China’s listed companies. As a result, this paper gets some important findings just as follows:
     Firstly, we are concerned with the influence mechanism of earnings quality on corporate investment in listed companies. We find the sensitivities of capital investments to lagged accounting signals increase as earnings quality increases. The conclusion that enterprises rely on the accounting information when investment decisions are made is the same with Chen’s hypothesis (2005) and this offers a new visual angle to study investment behavior.
     Secondly, after referring to the methods used by Biddle and Hilary (2006), we find that with the increase of earnings quality, the relevance between the internal cash flows and the corporate investment decreases, which means that the higher accounting quality reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity at the firm level.
     Thirdly, we find that abnormal investment activities are correlated with discretionary accruals, that is investment inefficiency is positively correlated with earnings management. We also find that increases in abnormal corporate investment or in discretionary accruals reduce subsequent stock returns, higher-level earnings management increases the sensitivity of stock returns to inefficient investment.
     All of above, the research indicate that under the current institutional environment in China, which is of relative poor law protection for investors, higher earnings quality can alleviate agency cost problem, improve corporate investment decision-making and investment efficiency. These findings not only help us to better understand and expand the existing research on corporate investment behavior, but also have important theoretical and realistic implications to improve China’s listed companies’investment efficiency.
     This paper consists of seven chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are outlined as follows:
     Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background and issues, contents and framework, as well as the contributions of the paper. Chapter 2 is the literature review. Since our focus is on the relationship between corporate investment and earnings quality, this paper reviews related literature in this research field about measurement of earnings quality, corporate investment and investment efficiency, which concise analysis and discussion are also undertaken for corresponding literature, and chapter 3 tries to find theoretical evidence that accounting information can improve the investment decision-making and investment efficiency.
     Chapter 4 investigates the sensitivities of corporate investment and accounting signals, focuses on the use of accounting information by managers in investment decision and how accounting information quality affects these activities. Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between accounting quality and the sensitivity of investment-cash flows. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between abnormal investment behavior and earnings management. Here we find that financial reporting quality can improve investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry and adverse selection.
     Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings of the paper, including the research conclusions, suggestions, limitations, and the directions of future research.
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