监狱企业性质及制度变迁
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摘要
监狱是国家的刑罚执行机关，监狱企业是因监狱的产生而出现的特殊企业，是监狱的重要组成部分，具有改造罪犯和创造经济增量的二重属性。本文在国内首次运用现代企业理论和其分析范式解释了财政投入失败引起监狱企业二重属性权重结构严重失衡，从而导致监狱职能异化的成因：二重属性权重交替上升导致交易成本变化，当经济属性权重大于改造属性权重时，监狱企业性质发生变化，“企业化演进”为一般国有企业，有损于监狱刑罚执行效率的提高；当改造属性权重大于经济属性权重时，资产专用性程度高，表明政府加大了财政投入并可使监狱企业充分发挥为罪犯改造服务的功能，有益于监狱刑罚执行效率的提高。罪犯和资产的纵向一体化下监狱企业交易成本最低，对应的企业治理结构和企业组织形式最优，治理成本最小，据此，可将监狱企业定位于公营企业。监狱企业制度是会变迁的，制度设计与选择的依据就是交易成本的大小，当一种制度能带来较低的交易成本时，该制度是较优的；当制度不均衡带来获利机会时，监狱企业会发生有损于监狱刑罚执行效率提高的诱致性制度变迁，当政策失败影响到政府效用最大化时，消除政策失败原因的欲望导致强制性制度变迁的发生。
The jail is the legal penalty machinery of the country. The jail enterprise is a kind of special enterprise, it bechances along with the jail generation, and it is one of important component of the jail, it is different from the state-sponsored enterprise, it is founded, in order to provide enough reclaiming locations for criminals. The jail enterprise has the double attribute, that is, the reclaiming attribute and the economical attribute. Firm Theory can explain the reason how the heterogeneous proportion of the double attribute within the jail enterprise that is caused by the government financial investment defeat and leads the dissimilation of the jail function, the change of proportion of the double attribute between the reclaiming and the economy will cause the transaction cost to change, the nature of the jail enterprise will change when the proportion of economical attribute is more bigger than the proportion of reclaiming attribute, the jail enterprise will transform common stat-sponsored enterprise, instead of reducing the jail efficiency, on the other hand, when the proportion of reclaiming attribute is more bigger than the proportion of economical attribute, the asset specificity will be higher, it shows that the government financial investment can buy the opportunity cost of the economical attribute, while the economical attribute of the jail enterprise adheres the reclaiming attribute, which causes the lowest transaction cost of the jail enterprise in the condition of the criminals within the asset in terms of vertical integration, then the governing structure of the firm is optimal, it causes the lowest transaction cost and the highest efficiency, accordingly, jail enterprise should be delimited to the public enterprise.
The institution will be changed, the definition of institutional vicissitude depends on the magnitude transaction cost, the institution causes the lowest transaction cost, and then it is the best one. When the heterogeneous institution causes profits, the jail enterprise will arise to institutional spontaneity -vicissitude, which would reduce higher efficiency of the penalty of the jail, when the police defeat impacts the maxim avail of the government, the government wishes that it would sublate the ingredient of the police defeat and lead the institutional mandatory vicissitude through the extraordinary law.
The jail is the legal penalty machinery of the country. The jail enterprise is a kind of special enterprise, it bechances along with the jail generation, and it is one of important component of the jail, it is different from the state-sponsored enterprise, it is founded, in order to provide enough reclaiming locations for criminals. The jail enterprise has the double attribute, that is, the reclaiming attribute and the economical attribute. Firm Theory can explain the reason how the heterogeneous proportion of the double attribute within the jail enterprise that is caused by the government financial investment defeat and leads the dissimilation of the jail function, the change of proportion of the double attribute between the reclaiming and the economy will cause the transaction cost to change, the nature of the jail enterprise will change when the proportion of economical attribute is more bigger than the proportion of reclaiming attribute, the jail enterprise will transform common stat-sponsored enterprise, instead of reducing the jail efficiency, on the other hand, when the proportion of reclaiming attribute is more bigger than the proportion of economical attribute, the asset specificity will be higher, it shows that the government financial investment can buy the opportunity cost of the economical attribute, while the economical attribute of the jail enterprise adheres the reclaiming attribute, which causes the lowest transaction cost of the jail enterprise in the condition of the criminals within the asset in terms of vertical integration, then the governing structure of the firm is optimal, it causes the lowest transaction cost and the highest efficiency, accordingly, jail enterprise should be delimited to the public enterprise.
The institution will be changed, the definition of institutional vicissitude depends on the magnitude transaction cost, the institution causes the lowest transaction cost, and then it is the best one. When the heterogeneous institution causes profits, the jail enterprise will arise to institutional spontaneity -vicissitude, which would reduce higher efficiency of the penalty of the jail, when the police defeat impacts the maxim avail of the government, the government wishes that it would sublate the ingredient of the police defeat and lead the institutional mandatory vicissitude through the extraordinary law.
引文
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[2] 王国顺等．企业理论：契约理论[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2006．106-107
[3] 王戍生主编．罪犯劳动概论[M]．北京：法律出版社．2001．171
[4] 毛曾余．斯蒂格利茨与转轨经济学-从“华盛顿共识”到“后华盛顿共识”再到“北京共识”[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2005．76
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[18] 黄华生．论刑罚轻缓化[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2006．137-182
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[22] 郭建安．联合国监狱管理规范概述[M]．北京：法律出版社，2001．151
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[25] 盛洪．中国的过渡经济学[C]．上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，2006．38．39．94
[26] 魏杰．中国企业制度创新[M]．北京：中国发展出版社，2006．284
[27] 中国社会科学院科研局．蒋一苇集[M]．北京：中国社会科学出版社，2006．201-208
[28] [美]Y.巴泽尔，费方域，段毅才译．产权的经济分析[M]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，2006．9
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[30] [美]R.科斯，A.阿尔钦，D.诺斯等．财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与制度学派译文集[C]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，2005．61．68．371．373．252
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[32] [南]斯维托扎尔．平乔维奇，蒋琳琦译．产权经济学[M]．北京：经济科学出版社，2004．72
[33] [日]青木昌彦，周黎安译．比较制度分析[M]．上海：上海远东出版社，2004．274
[34] [日]今井贤一，伊丹敬之，小池河南，金洪云译．内部组织的经济学[M]．北京：生活．读书．新知三联书店，2004．84
[35] 覃海波．“监企合一”体制对贵州监狱企业发展影响的思考[J]．贵州工业大学学报(社科版)，2006．第8卷．160．161
[2] 王国顺等．企业理论：契约理论[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2006．106-107
[3] 王戍生主编．罪犯劳动概论[M]．北京：法律出版社．2001．171
[4] 毛曾余．斯蒂格利茨与转轨经济学-从“华盛顿共识”到“后华盛顿共识”再到“北京共识”[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2005．76
[5] 刘小玄．中国转轨过程中的产权和市场[M]．上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，2006．13
[6] 刘国光主编．中国十个五年计划研究报告[M]．北京：人民出版社．2006．185
[7] 刘世锦．经济体制效率分析导论[M]．上海：三联书店上海分店出版社，1993．325
[8] 刘津．两难抉择下监狱企业的对策[J]．中國监狱学刊，2006-2．118
[9] 林毅夫，蔡防，李周．中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革[M]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社．2006．2．137-138
[10] 林毅夫，蔡昉，李周．充分信息与国有企业改革[M]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人人出版社，1997．44
[11] 李维安，武立东．公司治理教程[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2002．13-15．310．311
[12] 纪坡民．产权与法[M]．北京：生活．读书．新知三联出版社，2005．196
[13] 张维迎．产权、激励与公司治理[M]．北京：经济科学出版社，2005．88
[14] 张维迎．企业理论与中国企业改革[M]．北京：北京大学出版社．2006．1．67
[15] 张曾芳，张明之．21世纪初国有企业的制度创新[M]．南京：南京师范大学出版社，2002．2-3．24
[16] 钱津．特殊法人-公营企业研究[M]．北京：社会科学文献出版社．2000．19-24．26．27．77
[17] 杨瑞龙．国有企业治理结构创新的经济学分析[M]．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2003．66
[18] 黄华生．论刑罚轻缓化[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2006．137-182
[19] 程恩富．西方产权理论评析——兼论国有企业改革[M]．北京：当代中国出版社．1997．27．3
[20] 秦春元．试论监狱体制改革与监企分开[J]．中国监狱学刊，2006-4．．133
[21] 费方域．企业的产权分析[M]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，2006．21．116．118
[22] 郭建安．联合国监狱管理规范概述[M]．北京：法律出版社，2001．151
[23] 夏宗素．《监狱法》颁行的社会价值及完善思考[J]．中国监狱学刊，2004，(6)：52
[24] 施岳群，袁恩桢，程恩富．二十世纪中国社会科学理论经济学卷[M]．上海：世纪出版集团，上海人民出版社，2005．374-377
[25] 盛洪．中国的过渡经济学[C]．上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，2006．38．39．94
[26] 魏杰．中国企业制度创新[M]．北京：中国发展出版社，2006．284
[27] 中国社会科学院科研局．蒋一苇集[M]．北京：中国社会科学出版社，2006．201-208
[28] [美]Y.巴泽尔，费方域，段毅才译．产权的经济分析[M]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，2006．9
[29] [美]戴维．韦默，费方域，朱宝钦译．制度设计[C]．上海：上海财经大学出版社，2004．14-24
[30] [美]R.科斯，A.阿尔钦，D.诺斯等．财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与制度学派译文集[C]．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，2005．61．68．371．373．252
[31] [美]路易斯·普特曼，兰德尔·克罗茨纳编．企业的经济性质(中译本)[C]．上海：上海财经大学出版社，2003．4-5．83．86．88
[32] [南]斯维托扎尔．平乔维奇，蒋琳琦译．产权经济学[M]．北京：经济科学出版社，2004．72
[33] [日]青木昌彦，周黎安译．比较制度分析[M]．上海：上海远东出版社，2004．274
[34] [日]今井贤一，伊丹敬之，小池河南，金洪云译．内部组织的经济学[M]．北京：生活．读书．新知三联书店，2004．84
[35] 覃海波．“监企合一”体制对贵州监狱企业发展影响的思考[J]．贵州工业大学学报(社科版)，2006．第8卷．160．161