家族企业董事会治理、信息透明度与企业价值
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摘要
由于家族股东的“一股独大”以及家族对企业的控制,与非家族企业相比,家族企业内部的委托——代理问题及其治理模式也有别于非家族企业。本文基于家族上市公司中特殊的“双重委托代理”问题,选取了我国2003—2007年沪深两市110家家族控制的上市公司作为样本,从内部治理和外部治理两个角度,分别对我国家族上市公司的董事会治理、信息透明度与企业价值的关系进行了理论分析和实证研究。
理论分析说明,家族大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题是家族上市公司的主要代理问题,家族“利他主义”并没有抵消甚至还会增加家族企业的代理成本。因此家族上市公司治理问题的核心是如何保护中小股东的利益不被家族大股东侵占,并在此基础上,充分提高董事会的运行效率。而董事会治理作为公司内部治理的核心,提高公司信息透明度作为外部治理的依据,都可以发挥保护中小股东利益,提高企业价值的作用。
实证结果发现:上市家族公司的董事会结构、行为及能力、激励水平三个方面都会对企业的价值产生影响。在董事会结构方面:董事会专业委员会设置与企业价值正相关;董事会规模、董事长与总经理两职分离与企业价值存在负相关关系;而家族成员董事比例与企业价值之间呈倒U型关系。董事会行为、能力方面:行业及专业背景董事比例、董事会会议次数、独立董事离职比例与企业价值正相关;而董事会缺席会议比例越高,企业价值越低。董事会激励水平方面:家族成员董事持股比例与企业价值负相关:独立董事的薪酬与企业价值则存在正相关关系。此外,实证研究还发现:信息披露评价、当年的分析师预测人数与企业价值负相关,当年的分析师盈利预测偏差与企业价值之间负相关,但不显著。
在上述研究发现的基础上,提出本文的政策建议:进一步完善我国上市家族企业的董事会治理和信息披露制度,提高董事会的独立性和董事会人员的素质,完善独立董事的激励和约束机制,建立规范的董事会会议制度,以及结构合理、实质重于形式的信息披露制度,促进我国家族企业的长期、健康发展。
Because the new problem "one share big alone" and family=control in family business, the principal-agent relationship and govemance pattern are different between family and non-family business.With the development of Chinese capital market,the number of family-owned listed company increased rapidly in recent years.Based on the "dual-agency problem" of family business,this paper selects 110 family-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2003-2007 as the samples,and studies the relationship between the directorate governance,information transparency and family firm value from internal and external governance two aspects.
As theoretical analysis we find that:the agency conflict between family-controlled majority stockholders and spacious minority stockholders is dominating agency problem in family-owned listed companies,and the "family altruism" does not offsets but increases agency cost of the family company.So the core of corporate governance in family-owned listed company is how to protect the minority stockholders from being exploited and violated by the family majority stockholders.As the core of internal governance, directorate governance and information transparency which is the base of external governance all can realize this purpose and improve firm value.
The result of demonstrate study shows that:the board's structure,director's behavior and capability,stimulation level all can influence firm value.In respect to board's structure: There exist positive correlation between firm value and setting directorate specialty committee;negative correlation between firm value and board scale,separation of the chairman and general manager;but an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm value and the ratio of family- director.In respect to director's behavior and capability:There exist positive correlation between firm value and the ratio of industrial & professional director,the number of board conference and the ratio of independent director dimission; the higher the proportion of director's absence for board conference,the lower firm value would be.In respect to stimulation level:There exist negative correlation between firm value and family- director' share ratio;positive correlation between firm value and independent director' salary.
In addition,the demonstrate study finds that there exist negative correlation between firm value and the information disclosure evaluation,analysts follow of current year and forecast error.But forecast error is not significant.This result indicates that the higher the information transparency of Chinese family-owned listed companies,the lower firm value would be.
This paper try to give some proposals based on the above results of theoretical analysis and demonstrate study.It is necessary to perfect the directorate governance and information disclosure institution for Chinese family-owned listed companies,at the same time increase the independence of the board and the quality of the director,improve independent director' incentive and restraint mechanisms.Further more we suggest perfecting the institution of board meeting and legal system of protecting minority shareholders ' benefit,establishing an information disclosure institution with reasonable structure and more essential than formal,in order to promote the development of our family-owned listed company incessantly and healthily.
理论分析说明,家族大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题是家族上市公司的主要代理问题,家族“利他主义”并没有抵消甚至还会增加家族企业的代理成本。因此家族上市公司治理问题的核心是如何保护中小股东的利益不被家族大股东侵占,并在此基础上,充分提高董事会的运行效率。而董事会治理作为公司内部治理的核心,提高公司信息透明度作为外部治理的依据,都可以发挥保护中小股东利益,提高企业价值的作用。
实证结果发现:上市家族公司的董事会结构、行为及能力、激励水平三个方面都会对企业的价值产生影响。在董事会结构方面:董事会专业委员会设置与企业价值正相关;董事会规模、董事长与总经理两职分离与企业价值存在负相关关系;而家族成员董事比例与企业价值之间呈倒U型关系。董事会行为、能力方面:行业及专业背景董事比例、董事会会议次数、独立董事离职比例与企业价值正相关;而董事会缺席会议比例越高,企业价值越低。董事会激励水平方面:家族成员董事持股比例与企业价值负相关:独立董事的薪酬与企业价值则存在正相关关系。此外,实证研究还发现:信息披露评价、当年的分析师预测人数与企业价值负相关,当年的分析师盈利预测偏差与企业价值之间负相关,但不显著。
在上述研究发现的基础上,提出本文的政策建议:进一步完善我国上市家族企业的董事会治理和信息披露制度,提高董事会的独立性和董事会人员的素质,完善独立董事的激励和约束机制,建立规范的董事会会议制度,以及结构合理、实质重于形式的信息披露制度,促进我国家族企业的长期、健康发展。
Because the new problem "one share big alone" and family=control in family business, the principal-agent relationship and govemance pattern are different between family and non-family business.With the development of Chinese capital market,the number of family-owned listed company increased rapidly in recent years.Based on the "dual-agency problem" of family business,this paper selects 110 family-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2003-2007 as the samples,and studies the relationship between the directorate governance,information transparency and family firm value from internal and external governance two aspects.
As theoretical analysis we find that:the agency conflict between family-controlled majority stockholders and spacious minority stockholders is dominating agency problem in family-owned listed companies,and the "family altruism" does not offsets but increases agency cost of the family company.So the core of corporate governance in family-owned listed company is how to protect the minority stockholders from being exploited and violated by the family majority stockholders.As the core of internal governance, directorate governance and information transparency which is the base of external governance all can realize this purpose and improve firm value.
The result of demonstrate study shows that:the board's structure,director's behavior and capability,stimulation level all can influence firm value.In respect to board's structure: There exist positive correlation between firm value and setting directorate specialty committee;negative correlation between firm value and board scale,separation of the chairman and general manager;but an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm value and the ratio of family- director.In respect to director's behavior and capability:There exist positive correlation between firm value and the ratio of industrial & professional director,the number of board conference and the ratio of independent director dimission; the higher the proportion of director's absence for board conference,the lower firm value would be.In respect to stimulation level:There exist negative correlation between firm value and family- director' share ratio;positive correlation between firm value and independent director' salary.
In addition,the demonstrate study finds that there exist negative correlation between firm value and the information disclosure evaluation,analysts follow of current year and forecast error.But forecast error is not significant.This result indicates that the higher the information transparency of Chinese family-owned listed companies,the lower firm value would be.
This paper try to give some proposals based on the above results of theoretical analysis and demonstrate study.It is necessary to perfect the directorate governance and information disclosure institution for Chinese family-owned listed companies,at the same time increase the independence of the board and the quality of the director,improve independent director' incentive and restraint mechanisms.Further more we suggest perfecting the institution of board meeting and legal system of protecting minority shareholders ' benefit,establishing an information disclosure institution with reasonable structure and more essential than formal,in order to promote the development of our family-owned listed company incessantly and healthily.
引文
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