国家助学贷款担保机制研究
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摘要
目前,国家助学贷款已经成为我国资助高校家庭经济困难学生的主要方式,每年有数十万高校学生通过这种方式获得资助继续学业,从而使社会中的低收入群体子女有条件接受高等教育。但是国家助学贷款在运行过程中遇到诸多问题,其主要问题之一是贷款风险,表现为贷款拖欠率高、银行惜贷,许多符合条件的申请人得不到贷款资助。那么,作为控制贷款风险基本手段之一的担保,是否应该被引入、如何引入就成为本文的研究对象。本文在问卷调查、访谈调查和国际比较研究的基础上,运用信息不对称下的信贷融资担保理论、委托—代理理论,论述将担保引入到国家助学贷款中的必要性,探究担保为何能够解决拖欠率高和银行惜贷问题、哪种担保方式适合国家助学贷款、哪些主体适合为国家助学贷款提供担保以及如何激励担保人做好国家助学贷款担保工作。
国家助学贷款是一项惠及数百万家庭经济困难学生的贷款产品。该贷款为什么拖欠率高?是借款学生的还款能力不足还是还款意愿不足,或者还款的技术环节有问题?本文利用北京大学2003年、2007年的全国高校毕业生就业状况调查数据,对新老机制和生源地信用助学贷款的借款学生还款负担率进行计算,结果显示,随着国家助学贷款政策的不断完善,还款期限的逐渐延长,借款人的还款能力约束被逐步变松。本文对违约学生的访谈分析发现,由于借款学生缺乏信贷常识,对贷款合同和还款责任认识不到位,因而还款意愿不足,所以需要引入担保,以形成信息沟通机制,降低拖欠率。与此同时,本文建立以信用等级—借款额度为横纵坐标的平面坐标系,分析在目前我国政府实行利率管制、国内信贷市场垄断的情况下,银行的信贷配给过程,结果表明,担保是消解银行惜贷的必要条件。因而,本文从降低拖欠率和消解银行惜贷两个角度论证了国家助学贷款引入担保的必要性。
那么,担保为什么是一种信息沟通机制?它何以能够降低贷款拖欠率和银行惜贷?本文通过梳理西方经典担保理论发现,在贷前借款人提供担保的数量间接地向银行透露了关于申请人风险类型的信息,于是银行拒绝贷款给那些高风险的申请人;在贷后担保迫使借款人主动透露自己的相关信息,银行利用这些信息随时监测贷款风险和追讨拖欠贷款。而国家助学贷款担保的主要功能是双向信息服务。它通过向借款学生提供及时有效的信息,帮助借款学生理解贷款合同条款,解决学生在还款过程中遇到的具体问题,提高还款率;通过向银行提供有关借款学生的信息,改变银行的追讨方式和成本,进而增加银行追讨拖欠贷款的可行性,降低拖欠和惜贷。
如果国家助学贷款引入担保,哪种担保方式能够契合其特点?成为国家助学贷款引入担保需要研究的又一个问题。本文在追溯担保发展历史的基础上,分析贷款担保方式之间的异同及其各自特点,分析国家助学贷款额度小、期限长、借款学生流动性大而且难以提供银行认可的抵押物、质物等情况,并对外国(外地区)助学贷款的担保方式进行比较研究,发现助学贷款运作比较成功的国家和地区几乎都是采用的信用担保(英国、澳大利亚等采取按收入比例还款的学生贷款模式除外),认为信用担保契合国家助学贷款特点,是中国可考虑的合适的担保方式。
国家助学贷款如果采用信用担保,对担保人(包括自然人和法人)的筛选是担保成败的关键。本文通过理论推演、问卷调查和访谈调查对潜在担保人的信息优势、代偿能力、担保意愿进行比较分析,对借款学生和贷款银行的担保选择进行逐步筛选,最后认为在目前我国个人征信系统等公共信息系统不完善情况下,学生家长是生源地助学贷款担保的合适人选,高校是校园地助学贷款担保的合适主体。
本文在上述研究的基础上,讨论校园地助学贷款“高校—政府担保”的运行机制。由于政府主导国家助学贷款,所以要对其运行绩效负责。如果政府通过政策手段安排高校为国家助学贷款提供担保,那么政府是委托人,高校是代理人。政府与高校的委托—代理契约表现为国家助学贷款政策中关于高校利益与责任的相关条款。如果国家助学贷款由高校提供担保,政府与高校共同承担赔付责任,实质上就构成了“高校—政府担保”模式。本文运用委托—代理理论,剖析美国联邦家庭教育贷款“机构担保—政府再担保”模式和印度尼西亚助学贷款“高校管理—混合担保”模式,分析案例项目成败的关键因素,提出了国家助学贷款“高校—政府担保”机制的核心内容:政府根据不同高校国家助学贷款的人数获贷率、金额满足度和拖欠率,来确定分担拖欠贷款的比例,并与高校分享追讨回来的拖欠贷款,以此激励高校按照政府的资助目标努力管理国家助学贷款。通过理论推导,本文给出了“高校—政府担保”中,政府分担拖欠贷款比例的计算公式。
At present, the Government-subsidized Student Loan (GSSL) has become the primary means to aid the needy students in higher education institutions out of financial difficulties in China. Annually several hundred thousand college students from low-income families continue their education with the aid of GSSL. However, in the course of implementation there springs up a series of problems. Among them, the major one is loan risk such as high default rate and the bank's Credit Stinting, and consequently many qualified applicants can not receive the loan aid. In view of this situation, whether or not and how guarantee, as one of the basic means of controlling loan risk, ought to be introduced turn out to be the research focus of this dissertation. On the basis of questionnaire survey, interview and comparative studies of domestic and international practices, this dissertation, in terms of the credit financing guarantee theory and the principal-agent theory under asymmetrical information, discusses the necessity of introducing guarantee to GSSL and examines the following questions: why guarantee can solve the problems of high default rate and credit stinting, which kind of guarantee is suitable for GSSL, which body is fit for providing guarantee for GSSL and how to motivate the guarantor to accomplish the guarantee task of GSSL.
The loan product, GSSL, benefits millions of students from needy families. However, what are the reasons for its high default rate? Is it due to the students' incapacity or lack of willing to repay the loan, or is there defect in the technical link of repay? The dissertation, using the Beijing University 2003 and 2007 national survey statistics about undergraduate employment, calculated the student borrower's repayment burden rate under the new and old mechanism and student-origin non-guarantee loan. The result shows that, with the progressive improvement of the GSSL policy and the gradual prolonging of return deadline, the restraint on the borrower's repay capacity loosens gradually. In addition, the interviews with defaulting students find out that because the student borrowers are deficient in common knowledge of credit loan and do not have thorough understanding of the loan contract and repayment obligation, they lack repayment willing. Therefore guarantee is needed to establish information communication mechanism and to reduce default rate. The dissertation set up the plane coordinate with credit rating as abscissa and granted money as ordinate, analyzed the bank's credit rationing procedure under the circumstance of government's control of interest rate and the domestic monopoly of credit market. The conclusion is that guarantee is the necessary condition for eliminating bank's credit stinting. Then the dissertation proves the necessity of introducing guarantee to GSSL in terms of reducing default rate and eliminating credit stinting.
Next, why is guarantee a kind of information communication mechanism? How can it reduce default rate and credit stinting? After reviewing the classic western guarantee theory, the dissertation comes to the conclusion that before credit the amount of guarantee provided by the applicant discloses to the bank indirectly information of his risk type, so the bank refuses to grant loan to the high-risk applicants; after credit, guarantee compels the borrower to disclose his own information voluntarily, so the bank can use the information to monitor the loan risk and to get the default back at any time. The main function of GSSL is its two-way information service. By providing them with timely information, the service helps the student borrowers understand the articles of loan contract, settles the specific problems that they confront in the course of repayment and increases repayment rate; conversely, by providing bank with information about student borrower, the service alters the approach to and cost of collecting, increases the bank's availability of collecting defaulted loan and thus reduces default and credit stinting.
Given the introduction of guarantee into GSSL, which kind of guarantee forms is suitable for its characteristics? This is another question worth studying in the introduction of guarantee into GSSL . The dissertation, after tracing back to the history of guarantee development and analyzing the similarities, differences, and the respective features of the loan guarantee forms, discusses the manifold factors concerning GSSL like the small amount, long return term, student borrowers' high mobility and inability to provide mortgage and pledge acknowledged by the bank; besides, the dissertation also makes comparative studies about the guarantee forms used in foreign countries and regions, and discovers that where student loans operate smoothly, credit guarantee has been adopted (to the exclusion of the U.K. and Australia where the mode of repayment in proportion to student's income is in practice). Based on all this, the dissertation concludes that guarantee agrees with the characteristics of GSSL and is an available form for China.
Once credit guarantee is chosen by GSSL, the selection of guarantors (both natural person and legal person) is vital for a successful guarantee. On the basis of theoretical deduction, questionnaire and interview survey, the dissertation, after comparing and analyzing the potential guarantor's information superiority, compensation capacity, willing to provide guarantee and sifting steadily both student borrower's and lender bank's guarantee selections, eventually proposes that student's parents are the appropriate guarantor for Student-Origin-Based Loans while higher education institutions are the appropriate body of guarantor for Campus-Based Student Loans on condition that the personal credit consulting system needs improving at present in our country.
Based on the preceding research, the dissertation discusses the operating mechanism of "higher education institutions-government guarantee" of Campus-based Student Loans. As it is in charge of the GSSL, the government must take responsibility for the GSSL's performance. If the government appoints higher education institutions to provide guarantee for GSSL by way of policy, then the government is the principal and the higher education institutions are agent. The principal-agent contract between government and higher education institutions manifests as the related articles concerning the institutions' benefits and obligations in GSSL. If higher education institutions provide guarantee, both government and the institutions will undertake the compensation obligation, which in essence forms the "institutions-government guarantee" mode. In light of Principal-Agent Theory, the dissertation explores the "institution guarantee-government reguarantee " mode under Federal Family Education Loan Program(FFELP) and the Indonesian mode of "institution administration-mixed guarantee", analyzes the essential factors affecting the success of case programs and proposes the core contents of GSSL "higher education institutions-government guarantee" mechanism, which are: By referring to the GSSL coverage, loan amount and default rate in various higher education institutions, the government decides the proportion of taking default loan and shares with the institutions the collected default so as to motivate them to manage the GSSL in accordance with its goal of financial aid. The dissertation proposes the formula for calculating government's share in defaulted loan in the mode of "higher, education institutions-government guarantee" through theoretical deduction and simulation.
国家助学贷款是一项惠及数百万家庭经济困难学生的贷款产品。该贷款为什么拖欠率高?是借款学生的还款能力不足还是还款意愿不足,或者还款的技术环节有问题?本文利用北京大学2003年、2007年的全国高校毕业生就业状况调查数据,对新老机制和生源地信用助学贷款的借款学生还款负担率进行计算,结果显示,随着国家助学贷款政策的不断完善,还款期限的逐渐延长,借款人的还款能力约束被逐步变松。本文对违约学生的访谈分析发现,由于借款学生缺乏信贷常识,对贷款合同和还款责任认识不到位,因而还款意愿不足,所以需要引入担保,以形成信息沟通机制,降低拖欠率。与此同时,本文建立以信用等级—借款额度为横纵坐标的平面坐标系,分析在目前我国政府实行利率管制、国内信贷市场垄断的情况下,银行的信贷配给过程,结果表明,担保是消解银行惜贷的必要条件。因而,本文从降低拖欠率和消解银行惜贷两个角度论证了国家助学贷款引入担保的必要性。
那么,担保为什么是一种信息沟通机制?它何以能够降低贷款拖欠率和银行惜贷?本文通过梳理西方经典担保理论发现,在贷前借款人提供担保的数量间接地向银行透露了关于申请人风险类型的信息,于是银行拒绝贷款给那些高风险的申请人;在贷后担保迫使借款人主动透露自己的相关信息,银行利用这些信息随时监测贷款风险和追讨拖欠贷款。而国家助学贷款担保的主要功能是双向信息服务。它通过向借款学生提供及时有效的信息,帮助借款学生理解贷款合同条款,解决学生在还款过程中遇到的具体问题,提高还款率;通过向银行提供有关借款学生的信息,改变银行的追讨方式和成本,进而增加银行追讨拖欠贷款的可行性,降低拖欠和惜贷。
如果国家助学贷款引入担保,哪种担保方式能够契合其特点?成为国家助学贷款引入担保需要研究的又一个问题。本文在追溯担保发展历史的基础上,分析贷款担保方式之间的异同及其各自特点,分析国家助学贷款额度小、期限长、借款学生流动性大而且难以提供银行认可的抵押物、质物等情况,并对外国(外地区)助学贷款的担保方式进行比较研究,发现助学贷款运作比较成功的国家和地区几乎都是采用的信用担保(英国、澳大利亚等采取按收入比例还款的学生贷款模式除外),认为信用担保契合国家助学贷款特点,是中国可考虑的合适的担保方式。
国家助学贷款如果采用信用担保,对担保人(包括自然人和法人)的筛选是担保成败的关键。本文通过理论推演、问卷调查和访谈调查对潜在担保人的信息优势、代偿能力、担保意愿进行比较分析,对借款学生和贷款银行的担保选择进行逐步筛选,最后认为在目前我国个人征信系统等公共信息系统不完善情况下,学生家长是生源地助学贷款担保的合适人选,高校是校园地助学贷款担保的合适主体。
本文在上述研究的基础上,讨论校园地助学贷款“高校—政府担保”的运行机制。由于政府主导国家助学贷款,所以要对其运行绩效负责。如果政府通过政策手段安排高校为国家助学贷款提供担保,那么政府是委托人,高校是代理人。政府与高校的委托—代理契约表现为国家助学贷款政策中关于高校利益与责任的相关条款。如果国家助学贷款由高校提供担保,政府与高校共同承担赔付责任,实质上就构成了“高校—政府担保”模式。本文运用委托—代理理论,剖析美国联邦家庭教育贷款“机构担保—政府再担保”模式和印度尼西亚助学贷款“高校管理—混合担保”模式,分析案例项目成败的关键因素,提出了国家助学贷款“高校—政府担保”机制的核心内容:政府根据不同高校国家助学贷款的人数获贷率、金额满足度和拖欠率,来确定分担拖欠贷款的比例,并与高校分享追讨回来的拖欠贷款,以此激励高校按照政府的资助目标努力管理国家助学贷款。通过理论推导,本文给出了“高校—政府担保”中,政府分担拖欠贷款比例的计算公式。
At present, the Government-subsidized Student Loan (GSSL) has become the primary means to aid the needy students in higher education institutions out of financial difficulties in China. Annually several hundred thousand college students from low-income families continue their education with the aid of GSSL. However, in the course of implementation there springs up a series of problems. Among them, the major one is loan risk such as high default rate and the bank's Credit Stinting, and consequently many qualified applicants can not receive the loan aid. In view of this situation, whether or not and how guarantee, as one of the basic means of controlling loan risk, ought to be introduced turn out to be the research focus of this dissertation. On the basis of questionnaire survey, interview and comparative studies of domestic and international practices, this dissertation, in terms of the credit financing guarantee theory and the principal-agent theory under asymmetrical information, discusses the necessity of introducing guarantee to GSSL and examines the following questions: why guarantee can solve the problems of high default rate and credit stinting, which kind of guarantee is suitable for GSSL, which body is fit for providing guarantee for GSSL and how to motivate the guarantor to accomplish the guarantee task of GSSL.
The loan product, GSSL, benefits millions of students from needy families. However, what are the reasons for its high default rate? Is it due to the students' incapacity or lack of willing to repay the loan, or is there defect in the technical link of repay? The dissertation, using the Beijing University 2003 and 2007 national survey statistics about undergraduate employment, calculated the student borrower's repayment burden rate under the new and old mechanism and student-origin non-guarantee loan. The result shows that, with the progressive improvement of the GSSL policy and the gradual prolonging of return deadline, the restraint on the borrower's repay capacity loosens gradually. In addition, the interviews with defaulting students find out that because the student borrowers are deficient in common knowledge of credit loan and do not have thorough understanding of the loan contract and repayment obligation, they lack repayment willing. Therefore guarantee is needed to establish information communication mechanism and to reduce default rate. The dissertation set up the plane coordinate with credit rating as abscissa and granted money as ordinate, analyzed the bank's credit rationing procedure under the circumstance of government's control of interest rate and the domestic monopoly of credit market. The conclusion is that guarantee is the necessary condition for eliminating bank's credit stinting. Then the dissertation proves the necessity of introducing guarantee to GSSL in terms of reducing default rate and eliminating credit stinting.
Next, why is guarantee a kind of information communication mechanism? How can it reduce default rate and credit stinting? After reviewing the classic western guarantee theory, the dissertation comes to the conclusion that before credit the amount of guarantee provided by the applicant discloses to the bank indirectly information of his risk type, so the bank refuses to grant loan to the high-risk applicants; after credit, guarantee compels the borrower to disclose his own information voluntarily, so the bank can use the information to monitor the loan risk and to get the default back at any time. The main function of GSSL is its two-way information service. By providing them with timely information, the service helps the student borrowers understand the articles of loan contract, settles the specific problems that they confront in the course of repayment and increases repayment rate; conversely, by providing bank with information about student borrower, the service alters the approach to and cost of collecting, increases the bank's availability of collecting defaulted loan and thus reduces default and credit stinting.
Given the introduction of guarantee into GSSL, which kind of guarantee forms is suitable for its characteristics? This is another question worth studying in the introduction of guarantee into GSSL . The dissertation, after tracing back to the history of guarantee development and analyzing the similarities, differences, and the respective features of the loan guarantee forms, discusses the manifold factors concerning GSSL like the small amount, long return term, student borrowers' high mobility and inability to provide mortgage and pledge acknowledged by the bank; besides, the dissertation also makes comparative studies about the guarantee forms used in foreign countries and regions, and discovers that where student loans operate smoothly, credit guarantee has been adopted (to the exclusion of the U.K. and Australia where the mode of repayment in proportion to student's income is in practice). Based on all this, the dissertation concludes that guarantee agrees with the characteristics of GSSL and is an available form for China.
Once credit guarantee is chosen by GSSL, the selection of guarantors (both natural person and legal person) is vital for a successful guarantee. On the basis of theoretical deduction, questionnaire and interview survey, the dissertation, after comparing and analyzing the potential guarantor's information superiority, compensation capacity, willing to provide guarantee and sifting steadily both student borrower's and lender bank's guarantee selections, eventually proposes that student's parents are the appropriate guarantor for Student-Origin-Based Loans while higher education institutions are the appropriate body of guarantor for Campus-Based Student Loans on condition that the personal credit consulting system needs improving at present in our country.
Based on the preceding research, the dissertation discusses the operating mechanism of "higher education institutions-government guarantee" of Campus-based Student Loans. As it is in charge of the GSSL, the government must take responsibility for the GSSL's performance. If the government appoints higher education institutions to provide guarantee for GSSL by way of policy, then the government is the principal and the higher education institutions are agent. The principal-agent contract between government and higher education institutions manifests as the related articles concerning the institutions' benefits and obligations in GSSL. If higher education institutions provide guarantee, both government and the institutions will undertake the compensation obligation, which in essence forms the "institutions-government guarantee" mode. In light of Principal-Agent Theory, the dissertation explores the "institution guarantee-government reguarantee " mode under Federal Family Education Loan Program(FFELP) and the Indonesian mode of "institution administration-mixed guarantee", analyzes the essential factors affecting the success of case programs and proposes the core contents of GSSL "higher education institutions-government guarantee" mechanism, which are: By referring to the GSSL coverage, loan amount and default rate in various higher education institutions, the government decides the proportion of taking default loan and shares with the institutions the collected default so as to motivate them to manage the GSSL in accordance with its goal of financial aid. The dissertation proposes the formula for calculating government's share in defaulted loan in the mode of "higher, education institutions-government guarantee" through theoretical deduction and simulation.
引文
1 马文华(全国学生资助管理中心副主任).在全国高校资助工作交流培训班上的讲话.未发表.2008-07-27.
1 李文利,Bruce Reynolds.个人(家庭)信贷约束与高等教育入学机会[J]北大教育经济研究(电子季刊),2005,3(1):1-14.
2 国务院办公厅.国务院办公厅转发中国人民银行教育部财政部关于国家助学贷款的管理规定(试行)的通知(国办发[1999])58号)[Z].1999.6.
3 蔡闯.北京77所高校郑重承诺不让一个学生因贫困而辍学[N].光明日报,2005-08-27.
4 康宁.国家助学贷款好事不好办[EB/OL].http://finance.people.com.cn/5105244.html.
5 李文利,Bruce Reynolds.个人(家庭)信贷约束与高等教育入学机会[J].北大教育经济研究(电子季刊),2005(3):1-14.
6 国务院办公厅.国务院办公厅转发教育部 财政部 人民银行 银监会关于进一步完善国家助学贷款工作若干意见的通知(国办发[2004]51号)[Z].2004.6.
7 教育部2006年第20次新闻发布会文字实录:国家助学贷款2005年度申请人数为118万人,申请合同金额为95.61亿元:当年审批贷款学生人数92万人,审批合同金额为76.32亿元。由此计算得到金额和申请人获贷率[EB/OL].http://learning.sohu.com/20060914/n245347310.shtml.
8 教育部2006年第4次新闻发布会散发材料(2):国家助学贷款目前进展的情况、存在的问题和下一步拟采取的措施.[EB/OL].http://www.edu.cn/zong_he_news_465/20060307/t20060307_165639.shtml
9 教育部2006年第20次新闻发布会文字实录[EB/OL].http://learning.sohu.com/20060914/n245347310.shtml.
10 教育部2006年第16次新闻发布会文字实录:自2004年6月国家助学贷款新机制实施以来至2006年6月底,全国申请贷款人数211.1万人,银行审批人数154.3万人;申请贷款金额171.8亿元,银行审批金额131.7亿元。由此计算得到金额和申请人获贷率[EB/OL].http://www.jzsz.cn/xsc/Read.asp?id=127.
1 教育部2006年第4次新闻发布会散发材料(2):国家助学贷款目前进展的情况、存在的问题和下一步拟采取的措施[EB/OL].http://www.edu.cn/zong_he_news_465/20060307/t20060307_165639.shtml.
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4 林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2001(1):10-18.
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6 汪玲.中小企业信用担保:他国的模式及借鉴意义[J].国际经济合作,2005(8):23-27.
1 葛丰.中国担保体系有何缺陷[N].国际金融报,2002-11-28.
2 王素莲.论中小企业信用担保体系的组织取向[J].当代经济研究,2005(1):45-47.
3 苏旺胜,施祖麟.信用担保制度提高信贷市场绩效的理论与方案[J].清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版).2003(1):90-99.
4 D.Bruce Johnstone.Student Loans in International Perspective:Promises and Failures,Myths and Partial Truths.[EB/OL].http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance.
1 D.Bruce Johnstone,Pamela Marcucci.Financially Sustainable Student Loan Programs:The Management of Risk in the Quest for Private Capital[C].Washington DC based Global Center on Private Financing of Higher Education at http://ihep.org/gcpf/.
2 Adrian Ziderman & Douglas Albrecht.Financing Universities in Developing Countriees[M].WashingtonDC:Falmer.80.
3 李文利.高校学生贷款运行模式的中外比较和政策分析[J].复旦教育论坛 2004(4):53-56.
4 李红桃.国家助学贷款运行机制研究(博士论文)[D].华中科技大学图书馆,2005.105.
5 刘庆禄.谁来为大学生助学贷款担保[J].瞭望新闻周刊 2000(5):22-23.
6 陈浩.论国家助学贷款中的担保[D].华中科技大学图书馆,2005.
1 见教育部2006年第16次新闻发布会(文字实录) http://www.edu.cn 2006-07-25 15:29:10.
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3 截止2007年12月,河南生有普通本科院校31所,普通高职院校30所;湖北省普通本科院校35所,普通高职院校52所。见两省教育厅网站.
1[美]艾尔·巴比.社会研究方法[M].邱泽奇,译.北京:华夏出版社,2005:255.
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5 沈华,沈红.学生贷款的偿还[M].高等教育出版社,2008:87-89.
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7 沈华,沈红.国家助学贷款还款负担率新旧政策之比较[C].中国教育经济学学术年会会议论文,2004,8.
1 康宁.国家助学贷款好事不好办[EB/OL].http://finance.people.com.cn/105244.html.
2 见国务院办公厅转发中国人民银行等部门关于国家助学贷款管理规定(试行)的通知(国办发[1999]58号)1999.6.17.
1 北京大学课题组.2003届高校毕业生就业状况调查的初步统计[R].北京大学教育经济研究所,2003(26).
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1 北京大学课题组.2007年高校毕业生就业状况的调查统计[R].北京大学教育经济研究所、高等教育研究所简报.2007(6).
1 《关于建立健全普通本科高校高等职业学校和中等职业学校贫困生资助政策体系的意见》(国发[2007]13号).
1 见教育部2007年第12次新闻发布会文字实录[EB/OL].http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/2007-12/25/content_9424657.htm.
1 人民银行征信管理局.大学生征信与相关金融知识手册[M].未出版:14.
1 薛冰,梁健敏.大学生欠款调查:毕业收入不高,无力偿还成要因[N].信息时报.
1 薛冰,梁健敏.大学生欠款调查:毕业收入不高,无力偿还成要因[N].信息时报,2007-12-11.
2 违约不还国家助学贷款223名毕业生被曝光[EB/OL]http://news.shangdu.com/2008/Contents/Channel_3902/2008/0505/107313/content_107313.shtml
1 李庆豪.生源地助学贷款的生成与发展[D].武汉:华中科技大学图书馆,2006:43-44.
1 张维迎.詹姆斯·莫里斯论文精选——非对称信息下的激励理论[M].商务印书馆,1997.4-6.
2 Stigler G J.The Economics of Information[J].Journal of Political Economy.1961:213-225.
3 Akerlof G.The Market for 'Lemons':Quality,Uncertalnty and the Market Mechanism[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1970:488-500.
1 Barro R J.The Loan Market,Collateral,and Rates of Interest[J].Journal of Money,Credit an Banking.1976.
2 J.E.stiglitz & Andrew Weiss.Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information[J].American Economic Review.1981:393-410.
1 Yuk-sheeChan & GeorgeKanatas.Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking.1985:84-95.
2 DonaldD.hester.Customer Relationship and Terms Of Loans:Evidence from a Pilot Survey:Note[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking.1979:349-357.
3 AllenN.berger & GregoryFudell.Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance[J].The Journal of Business.1995:351-381.
4 A.W.a.boot A V T.Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market[J].International Economic Revie.1994:899-920
5 Allen N.berger& GregoryFudell.Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance[J].The Journal of Business.1995:351-381.
6 A.W.a.boot A V T.Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market[J].International Economic Revie.1994:899-920.
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2 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.189.
3 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.192.
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4 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.192.
5 杨振山.罗马法、中国法与民法法典化.物权和债权之研究[M].北京:中国政府大学出版社,2001.323.
6 杨振山.罗马法、中国法与民法法典化.物权和债权之研究[M].北京:中国政府大学出版社,2001.323-324.
7 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.191.
1 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.223.
1 李文利.美国助学贷款经验及其对中国的启示[J].北京大学教育评论,2004(1):17-19.
2 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html 2008-5-26.
3 The Collegeboard of America.Trend in Student Aid 2004[R].The Collegeboard in Washington,2004:5,Table 1.
4 The Smart Student Guide to Financial Aid[EB/OL].http://www.finaid.org/loans/guaranteeagencies.phtml.
1 Federal Student Aid.U.S.What Happens When a Loan Goes Into Default,2002:1-5.
2 National Student Loan Default Rates.http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html.
3 Education-Loan Guarantors Ensure Quality and Accountability[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/guarantor_quality.2008-5-26.
4 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.65-66.
5 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.86.
6 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,2003.254.
1 Scholarship Consultation centers Scholarship Loan Programs for Japannese Students[R]Scholarship Consultation Centers in Tokyo,Nagoya,and Osaka give advice on scholarship loans and repayments:8.
2 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,2003.263.
3 Scholarship Consultation centers.Scholarship Loan Programs for Japanese Students[R]Scholarship Consultation Centers in Tokyo,Nagoya,and Osaka give advice on scholarship loans and repayments:10.
4 Japan[EB/OL].http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/CountryProfiles/Asia/lndonesia_country_profile
1 Adrian Ziderman.Policy options for student loan schemes:lessons from five Asian case studies[M].UNESCO-Bangkok/IIEP,2004.22.
2 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.46.
3 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.47.
4 Chung,Y..The Student Loans Scheme in Hong Kong[M].United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO Bangkok,2003.40.
5 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.49.
6 钟宇平等.香港地区学生贷款:贷款机构的视角[J].高等教育研究,2003(1):45-52.
7 Student Financial Assistance Agency(2001)Annual Report 2001:Statistics on default cases.[R].Office of Federal Student Aid.[EB/OL].http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html.
8 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.49.
1 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,1998:304-307.
2 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,1998:310.
3 Maureen Woodhall,student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.87.
4 A.Mansur.Student Loans in Malaysia with Particular Reference to the Public Service Department's Student Loan Programme.,1990.
1 E.J.Chuta.Student Loans in Nigeria.Higher Education,Jun 1992,23(4):443-449.
2 Students' Loan of Ghana http://www.ssnit.com/corpDetails n.cfm?EmpID=11&CorpID=5
3 SSNIT.Students' Loan-the borrower or the guarantor[EB/OL].http://www.ssnit.com/corpDetails-n.cfm? EmpID=13&CorpID=5,2006-7-20.
1 周荫清.信息理论基础[M].北京:北京航空航天大学出版社,2002:1.
2 陈瑞华.信息经济学[M].天津:南开大学出版社,2003:38-39.
1 章元.非对称信息下的团体贷款研究[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005:11-20.
2 这是华安保险公司为就学贷款提供保证保险的保费费率,参见《国内首款“学贷险”在江苏亮相》[EB/OL].http://www.huaxia.com/js-tw/2006/00488243.html.
1 见国办发[2000]6号文件:国务院办公厅转发中国人民银行等部门关于助学贷款管理若干意见的通知.
2 王梦奎.和谐社会的治理之道——领导者的讲述[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2006:182-195.
3 以2000年全国本科院校校均规模6,916人(见教育统计年鉴2001年版)计算,234所部委高校有在校生1,616,344人,其中20%为贫困生(教育部的测算),那么当年可以申请国家助学贷款的贫困生323,669人。
1 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html 2008-5-26
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1 康宁.国家助学贷款好事不好办[EB/OL].http://finance.people.com.cn/105244.html.
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1 北京大学课题组.2003届高校毕业生就业状况调查的初步统计[R].北京大学教育经济研究所,2003(26).
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1 北京大学课题组.2007年高校毕业生就业状况的调查统计[R].北京大学教育经济研究所、高等教育研究所简报.2007(6).
1 《关于建立健全普通本科高校高等职业学校和中等职业学校贫困生资助政策体系的意见》(国发[2007]13号).
1 见教育部2007年第12次新闻发布会文字实录[EB/OL].http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/2007-12/25/content_9424657.htm.
1 人民银行征信管理局.大学生征信与相关金融知识手册[M].未出版:14.
1 薛冰,梁健敏.大学生欠款调查:毕业收入不高,无力偿还成要因[N].信息时报.
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2 违约不还国家助学贷款223名毕业生被曝光[EB/OL]http://news.shangdu.com/2008/Contents/Channel_3902/2008/0505/107313/content_107313.shtml
1 李庆豪.生源地助学贷款的生成与发展[D].武汉:华中科技大学图书馆,2006:43-44.
1 张维迎.詹姆斯·莫里斯论文精选——非对称信息下的激励理论[M].商务印书馆,1997.4-6.
2 Stigler G J.The Economics of Information[J].Journal of Political Economy.1961:213-225.
3 Akerlof G.The Market for 'Lemons':Quality,Uncertalnty and the Market Mechanism[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics.1970:488-500.
1 Barro R J.The Loan Market,Collateral,and Rates of Interest[J].Journal of Money,Credit an Banking.1976.
2 J.E.stiglitz & Andrew Weiss.Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information[J].American Economic Review.1981:393-410.
1 Yuk-sheeChan & GeorgeKanatas.Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking.1985:84-95.
2 DonaldD.hester.Customer Relationship and Terms Of Loans:Evidence from a Pilot Survey:Note[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking.1979:349-357.
3 AllenN.berger & GregoryFudell.Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance[J].The Journal of Business.1995:351-381.
4 A.W.a.boot A V T.Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market[J].International Economic Revie.1994:899-920
5 Allen N.berger& GregoryFudell.Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance[J].The Journal of Business.1995:351-381.
6 A.W.a.boot A V T.Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market[J].International Economic Revie.1994:899-920.
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4 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.192.
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7 黄名述,张玉敏.罗马契约制度与现代合同法研究[M].北京:中国检察出版社,2006.191.
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1 李文利.美国助学贷款经验及其对中国的启示[J].北京大学教育评论,2004(1):17-19.
2 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html 2008-5-26.
3 The Collegeboard of America.Trend in Student Aid 2004[R].The Collegeboard in Washington,2004:5,Table 1.
4 The Smart Student Guide to Financial Aid[EB/OL].http://www.finaid.org/loans/guaranteeagencies.phtml.
1 Federal Student Aid.U.S.What Happens When a Loan Goes Into Default,2002:1-5.
2 National Student Loan Default Rates.http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html.
3 Education-Loan Guarantors Ensure Quality and Accountability[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/guarantor_quality.2008-5-26.
4 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.65-66.
5 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.86.
6 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,2003.254.
1 Scholarship Consultation centers Scholarship Loan Programs for Japannese Students[R]Scholarship Consultation Centers in Tokyo,Nagoya,and Osaka give advice on scholarship loans and repayments:8.
2 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,2003.263.
3 Scholarship Consultation centers.Scholarship Loan Programs for Japanese Students[R]Scholarship Consultation Centers in Tokyo,Nagoya,and Osaka give advice on scholarship loans and repayments:10.
4 Japan[EB/OL].http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/CountryProfiles/Asia/lndonesia_country_profile
1 Adrian Ziderman.Policy options for student loan schemes:lessons from five Asian case studies[M].UNESCO-Bangkok/IIEP,2004.22.
2 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.46.
3 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.47.
4 Chung,Y..The Student Loans Scheme in Hong Kong[M].United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO Bangkok,2003.40.
5 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.49.
6 钟宇平等.香港地区学生贷款:贷款机构的视角[J].高等教育研究,2003(1):45-52.
7 Student Financial Assistance Agency(2001)Annual Report 2001:Statistics on default cases.[R].Office of Federal Student Aid.[EB/OL].http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html.
8 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.49.
1 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,1998:304-307.
2 张民选.理想与抉择——大学生资助政策的国际比较[M].北京:人民教育出版社,1998:310.
3 Maureen Woodhall,student loans in higher education 2:Asia[M].Paris:UNESCO-Bankok/IEEP,1991.87.
4 A.Mansur.Student Loans in Malaysia with Particular Reference to the Public Service Department's Student Loan Programme.,1990.
1 E.J.Chuta.Student Loans in Nigeria.Higher Education,Jun 1992,23(4):443-449.
2 Students' Loan of Ghana http://www.ssnit.com/corpDetails n.cfm?EmpID=11&CorpID=5
3 SSNIT.Students' Loan-the borrower or the guarantor[EB/OL].http://www.ssnit.com/corpDetails-n.cfm? EmpID=13&CorpID=5,2006-7-20.
1 周荫清.信息理论基础[M].北京:北京航空航天大学出版社,2002:1.
2 陈瑞华.信息经济学[M].天津:南开大学出版社,2003:38-39.
1 章元.非对称信息下的团体贷款研究[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005:11-20.
2 这是华安保险公司为就学贷款提供保证保险的保费费率,参见《国内首款“学贷险”在江苏亮相》[EB/OL].http://www.huaxia.com/js-tw/2006/00488243.html.
1 见国办发[2000]6号文件:国务院办公厅转发中国人民银行等部门关于助学贷款管理若干意见的通知.
2 王梦奎.和谐社会的治理之道——领导者的讲述[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2006:182-195.
3 以2000年全国本科院校校均规模6,916人(见教育统计年鉴2001年版)计算,234所部委高校有在校生1,616,344人,其中20%为贫困生(教育部的测算),那么当年可以申请国家助学贷款的贫困生323,669人。
1 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html 2008-5-26
2 Sara J.Bauder.How Do Universities Interact with Lending Institutions?[C].International Symposium on Student Loan,Organised by the World Bank Group and China's Bank Regulatory Commission,June 24,2008,Beijing,China.
1 让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷):委托—代理模型[M]胨志俊等,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002:1.
1 根据张五常著,易宪容译的《佃农理论:应用于亚洲的农业和台湾的土地改革》上海:商务印书馆,2000.第39-46页的举例改编.
1 Education-Loan Guarantors Ensure Quality and Accountability[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/guarantor_quality.2008-5-26.
2 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html.2008-5-26.
3 Education-Loan Guarantors Ensure Quality and Accountability[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/guarantor_quality.2008-5-26.
4 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html.2008-5-26.
5 C E.Andrews.US Student Loans and SallieMae[C]International Syroposiuro on Student Loan,Organised by the World Bank Group and China's Bank Regulatory Coromission,June 24,2008,Beijing,China.
1 The Student Guide:Financial Aid from the U.S Department of Education 2005-2006[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program
2 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student_loan_program/FFELP.html 2008-5-26.
3 The Student Guide:Financial Aid from the U.S Department of Education 2005-2006[EB/OL].
4 The Federal Family Education Loan Program[EB/OL].http://www.usafunds.org/about_usa_funds/student loan program/FFELP.html 2008-5-26
1 李文利.美国助学贷款经验及其对中国的启示[J].北京大学教育评论,2004(1):17-19.
2 Office of Federal Student Aid.National Student Loan Default Rates[EB/OL].http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html.
1 Indonesia[EB/OL].http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/CountryPrrofiles/Asia/Indonesia_country_profile.
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1 Indonesia[EB/OL].http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/CountryProfiles/Asia/Indonesia_country_profile.
2 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education,2:Asia[R].Paris:International Institute for Educational Planning,1991.62页注10.
3 International Finance Corporation.IFC's Experience:Unfunded Student Loan Programs in Indunesia[C]International Symposium on Student Loan,Organised by the World Bank Group and China's Bank Regulatory Commission,June 24,2008,Beijing,China.
1 International Finance Corporation.IFC Some Lessons Learned:Sampoerna Case-Indunesia[C]International Symposium on Student Loan,Organised by the World Bank Group and China's Bank Regulatory Commission,June 24,2008,Beijing,China.
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3 Douglas Albrecht and Adrian Ziderman.Student loans and their alternatives:improving the performance of deferred payment programs[J].Higher Education,1992,23,:357-374.
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1 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education,2:Asia[R].Paris:International Institute for Educational Planning,1991.62.
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1 Maureen Woodhall.student loans in higher education,2:Asia[R].Paris:International Institute for Educational Planning,1991.57-63.
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