考虑委托代理冲突的公司治理与盈余管理研究
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摘要
随着中国经济的持续快速发展以及中国上市公司股权分置改革的完成,中国资本市场迎来了重要的发展机遇期,上市公司正在成为中国经济运行中最具发展优势的群体;而在新的全流通的资本市场环境下,上市公司盈余管理动机和形式更加趋于复杂,广大投资者对上市公司会计信息质量也提出了更高的要求,如何维护市场的公平,切实保障中小投资者的合法权益成为中国资本市场发展面临的严峻挑战。在监管层完善外部法规监管的同时,推动上市公司从全体股东利益最大化的角度出发,健全和完善公司治理,有效约束盈余管理行为,提高上市公司会计信息的透明度,成为维护中国资本市场持续健康发展的基础。在此背景之下,本文选择从中国上市公司委托代理冲突角度对公司治理以及盈余管理行为进行研究,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文全文分为七章。第一章为绪论,介绍了本文选题的背景和研究意义、相关研究进展、研究内容、研究方法和技术路线;第二章采用两步聚类分析方法对上市公司委托代理冲突进行了聚类研究;第三章基于委托代理冲突差异对上市公司治理进行了研究;第四章使用修正的截面Jones模型对上市公司盈余管理的程度进行了计量;第五章对公司治理与盈余管理的关系进行了实证检验;第六章对盈余管理的约束机制进行了研究;第七章为结论与未来研究展望。本文研究取得以下主要研究成果:
(1)基于潜在委托代理冲突程度的差异对研究样本进行了有效聚类。
本文选取2004年-2006年期间沪深两市上市公司作为研究样本,设定用以反映潜在委托代理冲突程度的研究变量,采用两步聚类分析方法,对研究样本进行聚类分析,并将研究样本划分为两类。基于这一分类结果,本文通过独立样本t检验的实证研究方法证实,两类研究样本之间反映潜在委托代理冲突程度的研究变量的均值存在显著差异,本文确定的高委托代理冲突程度样本组中上市公司规模、债务水平、经营风险和盈利水平均显著的高于低委托代理冲突程度样本组。
(2)研究证实了上市公司治理机制设置的完善程度以及盈余管理程度与其潜在的委托代理冲突程度有关。
本文从股权结构、董事会机制、监事会机制、高管人员激励以及财务信息透明度等五个方面设定公司治理评价研究变量,采用因子分析的方法,对研究样本公司治理机制设置的完善程度进行了评价;采用分行业应用的修正的截面Jones模型对研究样本的盈余管理程度进行了计量。然后本文采用独立样本t检验的实证研究方法,在不同委托代理冲突程度样本组之间,就公司治理综合评价结果以及盈余管理程度的均值差异进行了实证检验,研究证实相对于潜在委托代理冲突程度较低的上市公司,潜在委托代理冲突程度较高的上市公司中公司治理机制的设置更为完善,盈余管理的程度更低。
(3)通过对上市公司治理与盈余管理的关系的实证检验,证实了委托代理冲突、公司治理机制与盈余管理之间的内在联系。
本文从股权结构、董事会机制、监事会机制、高管人员激励四个方面,设定公司治理机制代理变量,通过建立多元回归分析模型,对公司治理与盈余管理的关系进行实证检验。研究证实在潜在委托代理冲突程度较高的上市公司中,公司治理机制对盈余管理行为具有显著的约束作用;而在潜在委托代理冲突程度较低的上市公司中,公司治理机制对盈余管理行为的约束作用有限。
(4)确定了盈余管理的有效约束机制,阐释了约束机制的作用机理和内在联系,构建了盈余管理约束效率综合评价模型。
基于实证研究的结果,本文以对盈余管理具有显著约束作用的公司治理机制代理变量为基础,采用因子分析的方法,分析抽象出了盈余管理的四个约束机制,并对各约束机制的约束效率进行了实证检验和评价;在此基础上通过定性分析,阐释了盈余管理约束机制的作用机理和内在联系;最后基于盈余管理约束机制的研究结果,构建了盈余管理约束效率综合评价模型,并通过实证检验证实了模型评价结果的有效性。
With the fast and constant development of China economy and the completion of the Nontradable Shares Reform in Chinese listed companies, China capital market receives an important period of development opportunity and listed companies have been becoming the group which holds the best development advantages in the economic operations of China. But, under the new market conditions that all shares of listed companies can be traded, the motivations and forms of listed companies' earnings management have been became more complex, and the investors also need the listed companies report high-quality accounting information. How to maintain the fairness of the market and actually protect the legal interests of small and median investors has become the most severe challenge facing the development of China capital market. As the same time that the government completes laws and regulations to warden the financial reports of listed companies, how to promote the listed companies effectively constrain earnings management and improve the transparency of accounting information through completing corporate governance structure from the angel of maximizing the interests of whole shareholders has become the ground to maintain the constant and healthy development of China capital market. Under the conditions, the empirical study conducted by the dissertation on the agent-principal conflicts, corporate governance and earnings management holds important theoretical and realistic significances.
The whole study of the dissertation includes seven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction and introduces the background and scientific significance of the study choice, the progress of related studies, the contents, research methods and technical route of the study. The second chapter conducts an cluster analysis on the agent-principal conflicts existing in the listed companies by using TwoStep Cluster method. The third chapter comprehensively evaluates the corporate governance mechanics of listed companies by using Factor Analysis method. The forth chapter measurers the extent of earnings management of listed companies by using the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model. The fifth chapter conducts empirical examination on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The sixth chapter studies the constraint of earnings management. The seventh chapter is the conclusion and future research prospect. The mainly research findings of the dissertation are shown as follows:
1 The research conducts effectively cluster analysis on research samples based on the potential agency-princial conflicts.
The dissertation chooses listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen during the period through 2004 to 2006 as research samples, sets research variables to reflect the degree of potential agency-princial conflicts, and uses two-step cluster analysis method to classify the research samples into two groups. Based on the result of analysis, the dissertation uses independent sample t test method to testify there are significant differences on the means of research variables between the sample groups, and the levels of firm size, debt, business risk and earnings capacity in the high agency-principal conflicts sample group are all higher than the low agency-principal conflicts sample group.
2 The research testifies the arrangement of corporate govenace mechanism and earnings management are all related to the agency-principal conflicts.
The dissertaton sets research variables of corporate governance from five aspects, including ownership structure, board of directors, board of supervisors, the incentive mechanism of top executives and the transparency of financial information, uses factor analysis method to evaluate the perfection of corporate governance; and the dissertation uses the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model to calculate the earnings management. Then, the dissertation uses the independent samples t test method to analyze the means differences of the corporate governance evaluating results and the earngings management, and proves that the corporate governace mechanism of high agency-principal conflicts samples is more perfect than that of low agency-principal conflicts samples and the degree of earnging management of high agency-principal conflicts samples is lower than that of low agency-principal conflicts samples.
3 The dissertation proves that there is an interrelationship between the agency conflicts, corporate governance and earning management.
From ownership structure, board of directors, board of supervisors, and the incentives of top executives, the dissertation sets research variables as the proxies of corporate governance, and establishes multiregression model to conduct the empirical examinations on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The dissertation proves that the corporate governance mechanisms holds effeicient constraints on earnings management in high agency-principal conflicts samples, but the corporate governance mechanisms hold little constraints on earnings management in low agency-principal conflicts samples.
4 Confirm effective constraint mechanisms of earnings management, explain the functions and interrelationship of the constraint mechanisms, establish earnings management constraint efficiency evaluation model.
The dissertation uses comprehensive statistic methods to extract constraint mechanisms from the angle of effectively constraining earnings management, and conducts empirical examinations and evaluation on the efficiency of each constraint mechanisms. On the basis, through the theoretical analysis, the dissertation explains the function and interrelationship of the constrain mechanisms and establish the comprehensive evaluation model on the constraint efficiency of earnings management; through empirical examination the dissertation testifies the effectiveness of the model and the evaluating results obtained by using the model.
本文全文分为七章。第一章为绪论,介绍了本文选题的背景和研究意义、相关研究进展、研究内容、研究方法和技术路线;第二章采用两步聚类分析方法对上市公司委托代理冲突进行了聚类研究;第三章基于委托代理冲突差异对上市公司治理进行了研究;第四章使用修正的截面Jones模型对上市公司盈余管理的程度进行了计量;第五章对公司治理与盈余管理的关系进行了实证检验;第六章对盈余管理的约束机制进行了研究;第七章为结论与未来研究展望。本文研究取得以下主要研究成果:
(1)基于潜在委托代理冲突程度的差异对研究样本进行了有效聚类。
本文选取2004年-2006年期间沪深两市上市公司作为研究样本,设定用以反映潜在委托代理冲突程度的研究变量,采用两步聚类分析方法,对研究样本进行聚类分析,并将研究样本划分为两类。基于这一分类结果,本文通过独立样本t检验的实证研究方法证实,两类研究样本之间反映潜在委托代理冲突程度的研究变量的均值存在显著差异,本文确定的高委托代理冲突程度样本组中上市公司规模、债务水平、经营风险和盈利水平均显著的高于低委托代理冲突程度样本组。
(2)研究证实了上市公司治理机制设置的完善程度以及盈余管理程度与其潜在的委托代理冲突程度有关。
本文从股权结构、董事会机制、监事会机制、高管人员激励以及财务信息透明度等五个方面设定公司治理评价研究变量,采用因子分析的方法,对研究样本公司治理机制设置的完善程度进行了评价;采用分行业应用的修正的截面Jones模型对研究样本的盈余管理程度进行了计量。然后本文采用独立样本t检验的实证研究方法,在不同委托代理冲突程度样本组之间,就公司治理综合评价结果以及盈余管理程度的均值差异进行了实证检验,研究证实相对于潜在委托代理冲突程度较低的上市公司,潜在委托代理冲突程度较高的上市公司中公司治理机制的设置更为完善,盈余管理的程度更低。
(3)通过对上市公司治理与盈余管理的关系的实证检验,证实了委托代理冲突、公司治理机制与盈余管理之间的内在联系。
本文从股权结构、董事会机制、监事会机制、高管人员激励四个方面,设定公司治理机制代理变量,通过建立多元回归分析模型,对公司治理与盈余管理的关系进行实证检验。研究证实在潜在委托代理冲突程度较高的上市公司中,公司治理机制对盈余管理行为具有显著的约束作用;而在潜在委托代理冲突程度较低的上市公司中,公司治理机制对盈余管理行为的约束作用有限。
(4)确定了盈余管理的有效约束机制,阐释了约束机制的作用机理和内在联系,构建了盈余管理约束效率综合评价模型。
基于实证研究的结果,本文以对盈余管理具有显著约束作用的公司治理机制代理变量为基础,采用因子分析的方法,分析抽象出了盈余管理的四个约束机制,并对各约束机制的约束效率进行了实证检验和评价;在此基础上通过定性分析,阐释了盈余管理约束机制的作用机理和内在联系;最后基于盈余管理约束机制的研究结果,构建了盈余管理约束效率综合评价模型,并通过实证检验证实了模型评价结果的有效性。
With the fast and constant development of China economy and the completion of the Nontradable Shares Reform in Chinese listed companies, China capital market receives an important period of development opportunity and listed companies have been becoming the group which holds the best development advantages in the economic operations of China. But, under the new market conditions that all shares of listed companies can be traded, the motivations and forms of listed companies' earnings management have been became more complex, and the investors also need the listed companies report high-quality accounting information. How to maintain the fairness of the market and actually protect the legal interests of small and median investors has become the most severe challenge facing the development of China capital market. As the same time that the government completes laws and regulations to warden the financial reports of listed companies, how to promote the listed companies effectively constrain earnings management and improve the transparency of accounting information through completing corporate governance structure from the angel of maximizing the interests of whole shareholders has become the ground to maintain the constant and healthy development of China capital market. Under the conditions, the empirical study conducted by the dissertation on the agent-principal conflicts, corporate governance and earnings management holds important theoretical and realistic significances.
The whole study of the dissertation includes seven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction and introduces the background and scientific significance of the study choice, the progress of related studies, the contents, research methods and technical route of the study. The second chapter conducts an cluster analysis on the agent-principal conflicts existing in the listed companies by using TwoStep Cluster method. The third chapter comprehensively evaluates the corporate governance mechanics of listed companies by using Factor Analysis method. The forth chapter measurers the extent of earnings management of listed companies by using the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model. The fifth chapter conducts empirical examination on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The sixth chapter studies the constraint of earnings management. The seventh chapter is the conclusion and future research prospect. The mainly research findings of the dissertation are shown as follows:
1 The research conducts effectively cluster analysis on research samples based on the potential agency-princial conflicts.
The dissertation chooses listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen during the period through 2004 to 2006 as research samples, sets research variables to reflect the degree of potential agency-princial conflicts, and uses two-step cluster analysis method to classify the research samples into two groups. Based on the result of analysis, the dissertation uses independent sample t test method to testify there are significant differences on the means of research variables between the sample groups, and the levels of firm size, debt, business risk and earnings capacity in the high agency-principal conflicts sample group are all higher than the low agency-principal conflicts sample group.
2 The research testifies the arrangement of corporate govenace mechanism and earnings management are all related to the agency-principal conflicts.
The dissertaton sets research variables of corporate governance from five aspects, including ownership structure, board of directors, board of supervisors, the incentive mechanism of top executives and the transparency of financial information, uses factor analysis method to evaluate the perfection of corporate governance; and the dissertation uses the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model to calculate the earnings management. Then, the dissertation uses the independent samples t test method to analyze the means differences of the corporate governance evaluating results and the earngings management, and proves that the corporate governace mechanism of high agency-principal conflicts samples is more perfect than that of low agency-principal conflicts samples and the degree of earnging management of high agency-principal conflicts samples is lower than that of low agency-principal conflicts samples.
3 The dissertation proves that there is an interrelationship between the agency conflicts, corporate governance and earning management.
From ownership structure, board of directors, board of supervisors, and the incentives of top executives, the dissertation sets research variables as the proxies of corporate governance, and establishes multiregression model to conduct the empirical examinations on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The dissertation proves that the corporate governance mechanisms holds effeicient constraints on earnings management in high agency-principal conflicts samples, but the corporate governance mechanisms hold little constraints on earnings management in low agency-principal conflicts samples.
4 Confirm effective constraint mechanisms of earnings management, explain the functions and interrelationship of the constraint mechanisms, establish earnings management constraint efficiency evaluation model.
The dissertation uses comprehensive statistic methods to extract constraint mechanisms from the angle of effectively constraining earnings management, and conducts empirical examinations and evaluation on the efficiency of each constraint mechanisms. On the basis, through the theoretical analysis, the dissertation explains the function and interrelationship of the constrain mechanisms and establish the comprehensive evaluation model on the constraint efficiency of earnings management; through empirical examination the dissertation testifies the effectiveness of the model and the evaluating results obtained by using the model.
引文
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