财政分权与中国基本公共服务供给研究
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摘要
本文在财政分权体制背景下研究了中国转轨动态过程中的基本公共服务提供问题,尝试从外部环境、内在激励和制度设计三个视角思路对现有的财政分权体制在基本公共服务供给上的体制性约束进行研究。由于中国的财政分权体制仍处于动态完善过程中,通过本文的研究可以为财政分权体制提供改善和改进的政策建议,从而为公共服务供给水平提供制度保障。该论文试图说明：中国当前的财政分权体制是不完善的,无论从外部环境的制约、激励形式上的偏差或扭曲还是制度设计上的缺陷等方面来评价,并不存在有助于基本公共服务供给的理论内涵,如果不从财政分权制度层面做系统性的调整,必然出现基本公共服务供给普遍缺失的现象。即由于当前财政分权体制内生的财政激励被放大,基本公共服务的供给受到抑制,而在转移支付不完善、财力事权不匹配等制度设计不完备的情形下,被放大的财政激励不能得到调整,反而会加大激励偏差和激励扭曲,所以应该同时从适度调节财政激励的作用和系统化改革财政制度两个方面着手对财政分权体制进行改进。
一般意义上的财政分权的优点在于其能够提供的公共服务能够更精确符合居民的不同偏好,但是中国当前的现实情况是基本公共服务严重缺失,更多强调的是基本公共需求的满足,这样看来,似乎集权更有优势。但是本文想强调的是,由于分权已经成为世界各国经济运行的一种常态,无论分权的效果如何,分权的形式似乎已经不可逆转,以及集权的弊端过于严重,目前为止找不到比分权更好的方式来纠正集权经济的不利的地方,所以即使分权有这样或者那样的缺点,更多的政策选择仍在于调整分权的程度,并且通过其他配套的政策和制度设计来改善分权的效果。
本文首先对探讨财政分权与公共服务供给之间关系的文献进行了综述。从当前的文献资料看,主流学者对当前公共服务缺失原因以及改良方案的研究分别集中于中国1994年分税制的优劣判断和公共财政制度改革,但本文认为此类研究过于直白地强调了如何改革,而没有令人信服的解释中国财政分权与公共服务供给之间的关系,缺乏理论深度,从而也就缺乏实践指导性。如果对于财政分权的系统性考虑不足,单纯从某一方面或者某一领域开展改革,效果将受抑制或者不明显。
本文不仅对已有探讨财政分权理论与公共服务供给之间关系的相关文献进行了较为细致的综述和梳理,也集中讨论了中国财政分权体制对基本公共服务供给的体制性约束问题。财政分权在基本公共服务供给上的系统性失灵问题在当前中国改善基本公共服务供给机制的设计与实施的实践中未能得到足够的关注,并导致了改善基本公共服务供给的政策措施的效果不足。自中国实行改革开放以来,基本公共服务供给水平一度滞后于经济增长水平,到了当前经济发展阶段,基本公共服务供给问题不断地积累形成了沉重的改革成本,但是,当前采取的很多政策措施,普遍倾向于单纯地转移支付,而忽略了对当前基本公共服务缺失的体制性原因做出正确的判断和合理的解释,从而基本公共服务供给的激励偏差和低效率仍没有消除,事实上通过深化体制改革来建立、完善和保障中国的基本公共服务供给才是根本所在。本文依托于财政分权理论尝试从外部环境、内在激励和制度设计三个视角思路分析了中国基本公共服务供给缺失的体制性原因。以此为理论框架,本文的理论模型部分通过放松对政府职能界定的假设和加入考核机制变量,对Basley (2003)的集权分权与公共服务供给模型进行了拓展,运用数理方法对中国基本公共服务供给缺失的财政分权体制原因进行了数学证明和推导,从模型中可以推导出考核机制、税收激励以及财政制度设计的不同设置能够影响财政分权供给基本公共服务的效果。
进一步地,本文运用中国1999-2007年间的省级面板数据实证分析了财政分权对基本公共服务供给的影响,以及考核机制、税收激励和财政制度设计等变量对财政分权效果的影响。实证分析采取了空间误差模型估计方法,考虑了随机扰动项可能存在空间依存性的特征,由此进行的估计能有效去除由于忽略空间相依性而导致模型的错误设定,提高了实证估计结果的有效性,回归估计结果验证了本文提出的假设。最后提出了相关的可行性政策建议。
从理论意义而言,本文的研究能丰富公共经济学和财政学的经济理论,对发展和完善中国的公共财政理论做出贡献,从实践意义而言,本文的研究有助于从体制上转变政府职能,为弥补中国基本公共服务的普遍缺失,制定有针对性的政策措施。
The paper researches the provision of basic public services in the dynamic processes of China's transition under the institutional background of fiscal decentralization, and tried to analyze the institutional constraints on the provision of basic public services by the existing system of fiscal decentralization from three perspectives ideas on the external environment, internal incentive and institutional design. As China's fiscal decentralization system still being in the dynamic process of improvement, the research can provide policy recommendations on the improvement of fiscal decentralization system, so as to provide institution protection of the level of the provision level of public services. The paper attempts to explain:China's current financial decentralization system is imperfect, in terms of the external environment constraints, bias or distortions in the form of incentives or the system design flaws, etc. to assess, and there is not the theory meaning of contributing to the provision of basic public services. If does not systematic adjust the fiscal decentralization from the institutional level, there would be exist the widespread lack of of basic public services phenomenon. The provision of basic public services is suppressed because of the fiscal incentives within the current fiscal decentralization has been magnified. The circumstances that the design of the system is not perfect that the imperfections in the transfer payments, and affair right and control over wealth is not matching,and financial incentives that have been amplified could not be adjusted, but would increase the incentive bias and incentive distortions. Therefore, both appropriately changing financial incentives and systematically reforming the financial system should be two-pronged improve the fiscal decentralization system.
In a general sense the merit of fiscal decentralization on the provision of basic public services is that it can provide more accurate in their different preferences in line with population. But the current reality in China is that serious deficiencies of basic public services and that basic public needs being met is greater emphasis on. It seems that the Centralization should be more advantage. However, this article would like to emphasize that, as the decentralization has become a normal operation in the world economy, no matter how effective the decentralization is, the decentralization in the form seems to have irreversible. And the drawbacks of centralized are too serious so far it can not find a better way to correct the negative effective of centralized economy. Therefore, even if the decentralization has one way or another shortcomings, the more policy options are still the adjustment of the degree of decentralization, and through other supporting policies and institutions designed to improve the effectiveness of the decentralization.
The paper firstly reviews the literature on exploring the relationship between the provision of public services and fiscal decentralization. According to the current literature, the mainstream scholars which research on the reasons for the current lack of public services focused on the judge the merits of the tax system in 1994 in China and public finance reform. The paper argues that such a study is too straightforward emphasis on how to reform to put forward the convincing explanation on the relationship between the China's Fiscal Decentralization and the provision of public services, so which is lack of theoretical depth, and thus is also lack of practical guidance. If does not systematically taking into account for fiscal decentralization, and just think over from one aspect or a particular area of reform, the effective would be subject to control or not obvious.
The paper not only has given a more detailed literature review which related the relationship between fiscal decentralization theory and the provision of public services, but also focused on the institutional constraint on the provision of basic public services by China's fiscal decentralization system. The systemic failures in which the basic public services are provided by the Fiscal Decentralization System has not been sufficient attentioned in the mechanism design and implementation of the practice, and has led to the inadequate effects of policy measures improvement. Since China's reform and opening up, the level of basic public services once lag behind the economic growth, and to the current stage of economic development, the provision problems of basic public services continue to accumulate forming a heavy cost of reform. However, many policies and measures adopted incurrent generally tend to transfer payments, and neglect making the right judgments and rational explanation on the institutional reasons, and thus incentives and low bias efficiency on the provision of basic public services is still not eliminated. In fact, the fundamental lies in by deepening the reform to create, improve and protect the system of provision of basic public services in China. On the basis, the paper attempts to the institutional reasons for the lack of basic public services in China relying on the theory of fiscal decentralization from the external environment, internal motivation and design of the system analysis of three perspectives. As the theoretical framework, the paper's theoretical model parts expand the models of Basley (2003) and Lockwood (2002) through relaxing of government functions assumptions and joining the new variable. The theoretical model part used mathematical methods on the institutional causes of the financial decentralization to mathematical proof.
Further, the use of the provincial level panel data in 1999-2007 period empirical analyzed the effect of fiscal decentralization on the provision of basic public services.The empirical analysis method is the spatial error model estimation method, taking into account the disturbance of space-dependence characteristics, as a result of improving the effectiveness of the empirical estimation results. The regression results validate the hypothesis proposed in this paper. Finally, the paper puts forward the relevant feasibility of policy recommendations by drawing on foreign experience.
From the theoretical sense, the research could enrich for Public Economics and Finance of the economic theory, and contributed to the development and improvement of the theory of China's public finance. From the practical sense, the research would help the institutional transformation of government functions, and develop targeted policy measures in order to compensate for China's general lack of basic public services.
一般意义上的财政分权的优点在于其能够提供的公共服务能够更精确符合居民的不同偏好,但是中国当前的现实情况是基本公共服务严重缺失,更多强调的是基本公共需求的满足,这样看来,似乎集权更有优势。但是本文想强调的是,由于分权已经成为世界各国经济运行的一种常态,无论分权的效果如何,分权的形式似乎已经不可逆转,以及集权的弊端过于严重,目前为止找不到比分权更好的方式来纠正集权经济的不利的地方,所以即使分权有这样或者那样的缺点,更多的政策选择仍在于调整分权的程度,并且通过其他配套的政策和制度设计来改善分权的效果。
本文首先对探讨财政分权与公共服务供给之间关系的文献进行了综述。从当前的文献资料看,主流学者对当前公共服务缺失原因以及改良方案的研究分别集中于中国1994年分税制的优劣判断和公共财政制度改革,但本文认为此类研究过于直白地强调了如何改革,而没有令人信服的解释中国财政分权与公共服务供给之间的关系,缺乏理论深度,从而也就缺乏实践指导性。如果对于财政分权的系统性考虑不足,单纯从某一方面或者某一领域开展改革,效果将受抑制或者不明显。
本文不仅对已有探讨财政分权理论与公共服务供给之间关系的相关文献进行了较为细致的综述和梳理,也集中讨论了中国财政分权体制对基本公共服务供给的体制性约束问题。财政分权在基本公共服务供给上的系统性失灵问题在当前中国改善基本公共服务供给机制的设计与实施的实践中未能得到足够的关注,并导致了改善基本公共服务供给的政策措施的效果不足。自中国实行改革开放以来,基本公共服务供给水平一度滞后于经济增长水平,到了当前经济发展阶段,基本公共服务供给问题不断地积累形成了沉重的改革成本,但是,当前采取的很多政策措施,普遍倾向于单纯地转移支付,而忽略了对当前基本公共服务缺失的体制性原因做出正确的判断和合理的解释,从而基本公共服务供给的激励偏差和低效率仍没有消除,事实上通过深化体制改革来建立、完善和保障中国的基本公共服务供给才是根本所在。本文依托于财政分权理论尝试从外部环境、内在激励和制度设计三个视角思路分析了中国基本公共服务供给缺失的体制性原因。以此为理论框架,本文的理论模型部分通过放松对政府职能界定的假设和加入考核机制变量,对Basley (2003)的集权分权与公共服务供给模型进行了拓展,运用数理方法对中国基本公共服务供给缺失的财政分权体制原因进行了数学证明和推导,从模型中可以推导出考核机制、税收激励以及财政制度设计的不同设置能够影响财政分权供给基本公共服务的效果。
进一步地,本文运用中国1999-2007年间的省级面板数据实证分析了财政分权对基本公共服务供给的影响,以及考核机制、税收激励和财政制度设计等变量对财政分权效果的影响。实证分析采取了空间误差模型估计方法,考虑了随机扰动项可能存在空间依存性的特征,由此进行的估计能有效去除由于忽略空间相依性而导致模型的错误设定,提高了实证估计结果的有效性,回归估计结果验证了本文提出的假设。最后提出了相关的可行性政策建议。
从理论意义而言,本文的研究能丰富公共经济学和财政学的经济理论,对发展和完善中国的公共财政理论做出贡献,从实践意义而言,本文的研究有助于从体制上转变政府职能,为弥补中国基本公共服务的普遍缺失,制定有针对性的政策措施。
The paper researches the provision of basic public services in the dynamic processes of China's transition under the institutional background of fiscal decentralization, and tried to analyze the institutional constraints on the provision of basic public services by the existing system of fiscal decentralization from three perspectives ideas on the external environment, internal incentive and institutional design. As China's fiscal decentralization system still being in the dynamic process of improvement, the research can provide policy recommendations on the improvement of fiscal decentralization system, so as to provide institution protection of the level of the provision level of public services. The paper attempts to explain:China's current financial decentralization system is imperfect, in terms of the external environment constraints, bias or distortions in the form of incentives or the system design flaws, etc. to assess, and there is not the theory meaning of contributing to the provision of basic public services. If does not systematic adjust the fiscal decentralization from the institutional level, there would be exist the widespread lack of of basic public services phenomenon. The provision of basic public services is suppressed because of the fiscal incentives within the current fiscal decentralization has been magnified. The circumstances that the design of the system is not perfect that the imperfections in the transfer payments, and affair right and control over wealth is not matching,and financial incentives that have been amplified could not be adjusted, but would increase the incentive bias and incentive distortions. Therefore, both appropriately changing financial incentives and systematically reforming the financial system should be two-pronged improve the fiscal decentralization system.
In a general sense the merit of fiscal decentralization on the provision of basic public services is that it can provide more accurate in their different preferences in line with population. But the current reality in China is that serious deficiencies of basic public services and that basic public needs being met is greater emphasis on. It seems that the Centralization should be more advantage. However, this article would like to emphasize that, as the decentralization has become a normal operation in the world economy, no matter how effective the decentralization is, the decentralization in the form seems to have irreversible. And the drawbacks of centralized are too serious so far it can not find a better way to correct the negative effective of centralized economy. Therefore, even if the decentralization has one way or another shortcomings, the more policy options are still the adjustment of the degree of decentralization, and through other supporting policies and institutions designed to improve the effectiveness of the decentralization.
The paper firstly reviews the literature on exploring the relationship between the provision of public services and fiscal decentralization. According to the current literature, the mainstream scholars which research on the reasons for the current lack of public services focused on the judge the merits of the tax system in 1994 in China and public finance reform. The paper argues that such a study is too straightforward emphasis on how to reform to put forward the convincing explanation on the relationship between the China's Fiscal Decentralization and the provision of public services, so which is lack of theoretical depth, and thus is also lack of practical guidance. If does not systematically taking into account for fiscal decentralization, and just think over from one aspect or a particular area of reform, the effective would be subject to control or not obvious.
The paper not only has given a more detailed literature review which related the relationship between fiscal decentralization theory and the provision of public services, but also focused on the institutional constraint on the provision of basic public services by China's fiscal decentralization system. The systemic failures in which the basic public services are provided by the Fiscal Decentralization System has not been sufficient attentioned in the mechanism design and implementation of the practice, and has led to the inadequate effects of policy measures improvement. Since China's reform and opening up, the level of basic public services once lag behind the economic growth, and to the current stage of economic development, the provision problems of basic public services continue to accumulate forming a heavy cost of reform. However, many policies and measures adopted incurrent generally tend to transfer payments, and neglect making the right judgments and rational explanation on the institutional reasons, and thus incentives and low bias efficiency on the provision of basic public services is still not eliminated. In fact, the fundamental lies in by deepening the reform to create, improve and protect the system of provision of basic public services in China. On the basis, the paper attempts to the institutional reasons for the lack of basic public services in China relying on the theory of fiscal decentralization from the external environment, internal motivation and design of the system analysis of three perspectives. As the theoretical framework, the paper's theoretical model parts expand the models of Basley (2003) and Lockwood (2002) through relaxing of government functions assumptions and joining the new variable. The theoretical model part used mathematical methods on the institutional causes of the financial decentralization to mathematical proof.
Further, the use of the provincial level panel data in 1999-2007 period empirical analyzed the effect of fiscal decentralization on the provision of basic public services.The empirical analysis method is the spatial error model estimation method, taking into account the disturbance of space-dependence characteristics, as a result of improving the effectiveness of the empirical estimation results. The regression results validate the hypothesis proposed in this paper. Finally, the paper puts forward the relevant feasibility of policy recommendations by drawing on foreign experience.
From the theoretical sense, the research could enrich for Public Economics and Finance of the economic theory, and contributed to the development and improvement of the theory of China's public finance. From the practical sense, the research would help the institutional transformation of government functions, and develop targeted policy measures in order to compensate for China's general lack of basic public services.
引文
①理查德·A.马斯格雷夫,佩吉·B.马斯格雷夫：《财政理论与实践》,中国财政经济出版社,2003年版。
①《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要》专栏18。
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