基于联盟视角的上下游厂商R&D行为研究
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摘要
研发联盟是指在经济活动中,多个厂商间为了各自特定的技术创新目标,而建立的一种竞争与合作并存的特殊经济关系。近年来随着经济的发展,全球化进程的加快,研发联盟的数量急剧增加,正成为一种新型的产业组织形式。在这种背景下,研发联盟的研究也越加深入和丰富,已经成为管理学和产业经济学的重要研究领域。关于研发联盟的研究多数是针对横向的研发合作,涉及的研究领域包括：A-J模型体系的扩展、非对称、合作制度的比较、Know-how的分析等方面。虽然在实践中纵向研发联盟是很重要的研发合作形式,但是这方面的研究并未引起太多的关注。
本文在对研发联盟研究文献综述的基础上,将纵向关系引入到合作研发的分析框架中,从研发联盟模式选择机制和运行机制两个方面对上下游厂商的R&D行为进行研究,得出了一些具有理论和实践意义的结论。
本文主要完成了以下六个方面的研究工作：
(1)以管理学和经济学领域的大量文献为研究起点,从合作研发的动机和优势、合作研发中的冲突管理、合作研发绩效、合作研发过程中的技术学习、合作研发组织对产业或社会福利影响等角度对文献进行梳理,并简要评述了既有研究文献中存在的不足。
(2)在界定相关概念的基础上,基于交易费用理论、博弈理论、非合作寡占理论,构建起了总领全文研究范围和思路的逻辑分析框架。
(3)考虑了双头垄断的上下游产业结构,将纵向关系纳入到经典的A-J模型中,采用了博弈论、比较静态分析以及模拟的方法,通过对比不同研发联盟内厂商研发投资水平、研发绩效以及利润的差异,发现上下游厂商可能在合作研发形式选择上存在矛盾。
(4)以上下游产业为双寡头垄断结构的产品随机创新为背景,对R&D竞争模型进行扩展,分析了在上下游厂商独立研发、纵向合作研发以及横向合作研发条件下,技术溢出和专利保护变化对厂商利润和社会福利的影响。
(5)对现有成本分担机制进行了扩展,采用两阶段动态博弈的方法研究了不同成本分担机制对厂商期望RJV规模的影响,并在综合相关因素对产业收益和社会福利影响的基础上,分析了上下游厂商和政策制定者的RJV研发成本分担机制选择问题。
(6)分析寡头垄断市场条件下上游产业结构变化对RRC效应的影响,并通过对具有RRC效应的变动中间产品价格契约和不具有该效应的固定中间产品价格契约下的厂商研发投资水平、厂商利润以及消费者剩余比较,得出RRC效应对下游厂商具有创新激励作用的条件。
最后对全文进行总结,指出主要创新之处和未来研究方向。
A strategic technology alliance is a special economic relationship established by firms to achieve their certain technologic innovation goals. In this relationship competition and cooperation coexist. With the development of economy and the accelerated pace of globalization, strategic technology alliances increase sharply and are becoming a new pattern of industrial organization. In this context, the study on strategic technology alliance, which is profounder and more profuse day by day, has become an indispensable part of management and industrial economics. At present, on the research of strategic technology alliance mostly concern horizontal technology alliance, involve with expansion of the A-J modeling, comparison of cooperation institution and analysis of Know-how. Although vertical strategic technology alliance is an important form of R&D research, the research on it has not attracted much attention.
On the basis of literature review, this paper introduces vertical relationship into the analysis frame of R&D cooperation, and studies R&D action of up-downstream firms from two aspects including the technology alliance selecting and operating mechanisms. The paper draws some significant theoretical and practical conclusions
The study in this paper mainly contributes in the following 6 fields.
(1) According to lots of literatures in the filed of management and economics, this paper reviews the literatures along the advantage and motivation of cooperation R&D, and conflict management of cooperation R&D, and performance of cooperation R&D, as well as learning process of cooperation R&D and industry or welfare influence of cooperation R&D. The paper also illustrates the deficiencies of current literatures.
(2) On the basis of relative definition, the research sets a logic analysis frame involving study scope and clue about full paper, which is primarily constructed on transaction cost, game theory, and non-cooperative oligopoly theory.
(3) Considering the duopoly structure of up-down industry, this paper introduces vertical relationship into classical A-J model, and contrast the discrepancy of R&D level, R&D performance, and profit in different R&D modes by the means of game theory and comparative static analysis and simulation. It makes conclusion that there maybe exists conflict in selecting the R&D cooperation mode between up-downstream firms.
(4) Under the background of random R&D based on duopoly structure of up-down industry, this paper expands the R&D race model, and analyzes the influence on the profit and welfare of firms under the different R&D mode because of the changes in technology spillovers and patent protect.
(5) Expanding the cost-sharing mechanism, this paper studies the influence of different cost-sharing mechanism on the expected RJVs scale by the means of two-stage dynamic game theory. The paper also analyzes the R & D cost-sharing mechanism choice of firms and policy maker on the basis of considering influence on industrial profit and welfare.
(6) Through comparing R&D level, profit and welfare between the floating input price contract bringing RRC effect and fixed input price contract without RRC effect, this paper analyzes the influence on RRC effect because of up-downstream changes in industrial structure and then makes a conclusion that RRC effect can incent innovation under some condition.
Finally, the paper makes summary, and shows the shortage, main innovative results and future study.
本文在对研发联盟研究文献综述的基础上,将纵向关系引入到合作研发的分析框架中,从研发联盟模式选择机制和运行机制两个方面对上下游厂商的R&D行为进行研究,得出了一些具有理论和实践意义的结论。
本文主要完成了以下六个方面的研究工作：
(1)以管理学和经济学领域的大量文献为研究起点,从合作研发的动机和优势、合作研发中的冲突管理、合作研发绩效、合作研发过程中的技术学习、合作研发组织对产业或社会福利影响等角度对文献进行梳理,并简要评述了既有研究文献中存在的不足。
(2)在界定相关概念的基础上,基于交易费用理论、博弈理论、非合作寡占理论,构建起了总领全文研究范围和思路的逻辑分析框架。
(3)考虑了双头垄断的上下游产业结构,将纵向关系纳入到经典的A-J模型中,采用了博弈论、比较静态分析以及模拟的方法,通过对比不同研发联盟内厂商研发投资水平、研发绩效以及利润的差异,发现上下游厂商可能在合作研发形式选择上存在矛盾。
(4)以上下游产业为双寡头垄断结构的产品随机创新为背景,对R&D竞争模型进行扩展,分析了在上下游厂商独立研发、纵向合作研发以及横向合作研发条件下,技术溢出和专利保护变化对厂商利润和社会福利的影响。
(5)对现有成本分担机制进行了扩展,采用两阶段动态博弈的方法研究了不同成本分担机制对厂商期望RJV规模的影响,并在综合相关因素对产业收益和社会福利影响的基础上,分析了上下游厂商和政策制定者的RJV研发成本分担机制选择问题。
(6)分析寡头垄断市场条件下上游产业结构变化对RRC效应的影响,并通过对具有RRC效应的变动中间产品价格契约和不具有该效应的固定中间产品价格契约下的厂商研发投资水平、厂商利润以及消费者剩余比较,得出RRC效应对下游厂商具有创新激励作用的条件。
最后对全文进行总结,指出主要创新之处和未来研究方向。
A strategic technology alliance is a special economic relationship established by firms to achieve their certain technologic innovation goals. In this relationship competition and cooperation coexist. With the development of economy and the accelerated pace of globalization, strategic technology alliances increase sharply and are becoming a new pattern of industrial organization. In this context, the study on strategic technology alliance, which is profounder and more profuse day by day, has become an indispensable part of management and industrial economics. At present, on the research of strategic technology alliance mostly concern horizontal technology alliance, involve with expansion of the A-J modeling, comparison of cooperation institution and analysis of Know-how. Although vertical strategic technology alliance is an important form of R&D research, the research on it has not attracted much attention.
On the basis of literature review, this paper introduces vertical relationship into the analysis frame of R&D cooperation, and studies R&D action of up-downstream firms from two aspects including the technology alliance selecting and operating mechanisms. The paper draws some significant theoretical and practical conclusions
The study in this paper mainly contributes in the following 6 fields.
(1) According to lots of literatures in the filed of management and economics, this paper reviews the literatures along the advantage and motivation of cooperation R&D, and conflict management of cooperation R&D, and performance of cooperation R&D, as well as learning process of cooperation R&D and industry or welfare influence of cooperation R&D. The paper also illustrates the deficiencies of current literatures.
(2) On the basis of relative definition, the research sets a logic analysis frame involving study scope and clue about full paper, which is primarily constructed on transaction cost, game theory, and non-cooperative oligopoly theory.
(3) Considering the duopoly structure of up-down industry, this paper introduces vertical relationship into classical A-J model, and contrast the discrepancy of R&D level, R&D performance, and profit in different R&D modes by the means of game theory and comparative static analysis and simulation. It makes conclusion that there maybe exists conflict in selecting the R&D cooperation mode between up-downstream firms.
(4) Under the background of random R&D based on duopoly structure of up-down industry, this paper expands the R&D race model, and analyzes the influence on the profit and welfare of firms under the different R&D mode because of the changes in technology spillovers and patent protect.
(5) Expanding the cost-sharing mechanism, this paper studies the influence of different cost-sharing mechanism on the expected RJVs scale by the means of two-stage dynamic game theory. The paper also analyzes the R & D cost-sharing mechanism choice of firms and policy maker on the basis of considering influence on industrial profit and welfare.
(6) Through comparing R&D level, profit and welfare between the floating input price contract bringing RRC effect and fixed input price contract without RRC effect, this paper analyzes the influence on RRC effect because of up-downstream changes in industrial structure and then makes a conclusion that RRC effect can incent innovation under some condition.
Finally, the paper makes summary, and shows the shortage, main innovative results and future study.
引文
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