基于双边市场理论的电子商务平台竞争规制研究
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摘要
在经济交易活动中,有些市场交易活动必须在某个平台(platform)上进行,这个平台通过一定的价格策略向交易双方(如消费者和商户)出售平台产品或服务,并努力促成它们在平台上实现交易,我们把具有这种特征的产业市场归属于“双边市场(two-sided markets)"。具有上述特征产业市场中的平台企业类型很多,如计算机操作系统生产商,向两类消费群体(消费者和软件开发商)提供计算机操作系统平台,消费者使用计算机操作系统来运行软件开发商的应用程序,而软件开发商也必须借助于计算机操作系统才能吸引消费者；再如电子商务平台厂商,它为交易双方提供交易服务,交易双方通过平台相互了解,促进交易的达成。
经济学所讨论的不完全竞争市场大多基于传统工业经济中单边市场的理论,实际上在双边市场中,企业之间的竞争也会导致垄断的发生。目前,反垄断规制的政策都是针对传统单边市场中企业而制定的,对于具有双边市场特征的平台厂商,由于理论的缺失,如果贸然依照单边市场规制理论来判断,则势必会造成判断的失误。基于此,本文主要研究内容就是针对具有双边市场特征的电子商务平台厂商的竞争与规制问题。
随着互联网信息产业的兴起,中国电子商务得到了迅猛的发展,经过10多年的发展已进入高速增长期。从1999年8月易趣网的创立开始,我国的C2C市场就一直处于寡头垄断的格局中。目前该市场已不再是eBay易趣与淘宝网“两强对峙”的情形,而主要由淘宝网、TOM易趣、腾讯拍拍和百度有啊四家企业组成的寡头垄断市场结构。由此,展开对电子商务平台运行的竞争机制和电子商务平台产业规制研究,具有重要的现实意义。
从产业特征来看,电子商务平台是具有典型的双边市场特征的产业,但是它也有自己独特的产业特点,比如说,第三方支付平台也是具有双边市场特征的,有其核心业务,但它往往会被企业是一体化于电子商务平台。那么一体化效率是否高于非一体化,非一体化是否有利于市场竞争,其社会福利是否能够改善,这些重大理论问题都有待于进一步研究解释。此外,交易积分制提高了消费者对网络价值的评价,但由于网络不能互联,增加了交易的多平台接入倾向。交易积分制对消费者来说增加了转移成本,对产业来讲提高了进入壁垒。从目前已有的文献来看,对双边市场的研究大多拘泥于研究双边不对称的价格结构和定价机制,对于不同平台之间的竞争与合作,特别是不同平台之间的非一体模块化生产还鲜有系统的研究。同时,已有对电子商务平台的研究大多把它当做一个普通网络企业,研究内容局限在产业结构和盈利模式等方面。而把它当做一个双边网络平台的研究对象,以及对其竞争机制和规制对策的研究,目前还没有出现系统的研究文献。
本文选题正是在此背景下,遵循产业组织理论的SCP研究范式,运用博弈论等分析工具和案例分析方法,探究电子商务平台产业的运行机制和定价的内在机理,分析其市场结构,研究厂商在市场竞争中的策略行为,并分析比较其企业绩效和社会福利,最后对电子商务产业规制提出相应的对策思路。本文旨在为电子商务平台产业运行机制和竞争策略的研究做出理论探索,也为电子商务平台产业规制政策提供理论支持,这是本文研究的重大意义,也是价值所在。
全文主体共分八章,主要研究内容和成果概述如下：
第一章绪论,主要介绍了本文研究的背景和意义,通过提出问题,确定了研究内容、研究方法和研究的基本框架。最后提出了本文的创新点。
第二章对双边市场的基本理论进行了详细的理论综述。首先对基本概念进行了界定,接着从外部性理论入手,介绍了直接网络外部性和间接网络外部性以及和经济学传统外部性的区别。在特征与分类中,从需求和供给等方面阐述了双边市场的基本特征。通过平台厂商的定价策略和平台偏好差异化与平台竞争引出目前反垄断规制的内容,从理论研究的角度看,尚缺乏一个判断双边市场反垄断的理论体系。接下来是本文对双边市场的经济学解释,也是本部分的一个创新。本文运用制度经济学原理对双边市场的产生、市场和平台的关系、以及平台的集中交易进行了经济学的分析,解释了交易双方为什么会集中在平台上,平台如何保证生产以及平台服务由谁生产的问题。最后本部分对双边市场的市场结构类型进行了科学的划分,分别是基本结构、存在中间商的结构、用户多平台接入结构、平台互联互通结构、多平台服务结构。
第三章对双边市场平台定价模式进行了分析和研究。通过对已有的垄断竞争定价模型分析和总结,得出无论是垄断平台还是竞争平台,其价格结构的设计目的是一致的,都是为了吸引双边的成员到平台上来。随后,本部分研究从影响电子商务平台定价模式的需求价格弹性、用户多平台接入行为、网络外部性强度、平台竞争、信誉和模块化治理等方面入手,对电子商务平台厂商价格效应做出分析,为后续模型假设做出理论的铺垫。
第四章研究了电子商务厂商横向差异化竞争和互联互通对福利的影响。本部分首先用经济学理论解释了间接网络外部性和直接网络外部性的经济学意义,区分了金钱外部性和技术外部性,并指出无论网络外部性直接还是间接,在双边市场上,通过平台交易都可以内在于价格机制。本部分通过垄断和竞争的数理模型对电子商务厂商定价做出辨析,得出网络外部性差异是导致电子商务平台双边价格结构不均衡的主要因素,一边可能高于边际成本定价,另一半可能会给予补贴。通过电子商务平台厂商的社会福利比较分析,本章研究表明：竞争平台之间网络的互联互通,实现用户之间跨平台交易,可以降低市场进入壁垒,使市场重新恢复到竞争性垄断的市场结构,有助于技术创新和社会福利改善,这是本部分的一个创新之处。
第五章从转移成本的角度研究了电子商务平台厂商中存在用户多平台接入行为的厂商竞争机制。本章系统分析了电子商务平台兼容的两个层次,这是本部分的一个创新点。第一层次是交易数据库的共享,第二层次的兼容是在第一层次交易数据库共享的基础上实现网络互连,用户可以跨平台交易。通过对不同转移成本下电子商务平台定价及利润的分析得出,当转移成本存在时,用户单平台接入效用要大于多平台接入效用,高级用户将被锁定在原平台上。从整个市场来看,被划为两个层次,即垄断市场和寡头市场。在第一层次兼容条件下,交易信用所形成的转移成本将不存在。此时,对网络评价较高的用户将选择多平台接入。在实现两个层次兼容的条件下,用户可以跨平台交易,用户将不存在多平台接入行为。从社会福利角度来分析,后者要大于前者。
第六章主要研究电子商务平台模块化网络治理的可能性。利用交易费用理论分析了电子商务平台非一体化治理的条件和可能性,认为电子商务搜索平台是其系统的主导企业,其模块供应商应当是支付平台、银联和物流平台。在主导企业电子商务搜索平台制定规则和标准下,价值模块之间进行“背对背”的竞争。研究表明,模块化比一体化有效率,对于消费者来说模块化能带来更多消费者剩余。电子商务平台选择一体化而非模块化的原因是系统模块之间的间接网络外部效应,即能够为厂商带来更大的进入壁垒和市场势力。
第七章主要研究电子商务平台的规制与对策。从结构壁垒和行为壁垒两个影响因素提出了规制电子商务平台的建议。一是互联互通。作为以促进交易为主要目的平台服务,由于网络外部效应和不兼容因素使双边客户不能跨平台交易,成为制约竞争和降低社会福利的主要因素。因此,互联互通可以降低市场进入壁垒,使市场重新恢复到竞争性垄断的市场结构,有助于技术创新和社会福利改善。是模块化网络生产。一体化会提高市场的进入壁垒,在位厂商可以采取交叉补贴打击潜在进入者。而采用非一体化生产可以提高生产效率,降低进入壁垒,促进竞争,有利于消费者剩余的提高和改善社会福利。
第八章简要归纳了本文的基本结论,提出了不足之处,并对后续研究进行了展望。
At present, the research on two-sided markets is in the ascendant, in the transaction, some trading activitis in market must be conducted on a platform. This platform Develop a pricing strategy to sell the platform product or service to the traders (such as consumers and businesses), and try to make them achieve transaction on the platform. We call the industry markets with these characters two-sided markets. There are many industries with above characteristics. For example Computer operating systems manufacturers, to provide a computer operating system platform To the two consumer groups (consumers and software developers), Consumers use computer operating system to run developers' software applications, and software developers must also be by means of computer operating system to attract customers; E-commerce platform is also the case, it provides trading services for both parties, both parties through trade platform can promote mutual understanding and trade agreement.
In economics, the discussion of monopoly in most based on the single market. For Platform in the two-sided markets, free competition will also cause the monopoly. But at present, anti-trust regulations are formulated for the unilateral enterprises which in the free market. Due to the lack of theory, if making judgments in accordance with unilateral market, it will result in errors in judgment inevitably. Just based on this, this thesis'research contents are the competition and regulation about the E-commerce platform enterprise in two-sided market.
With the rise of the Internet information industry, the Chinese E-commerce has seen rapid development, after 10 years of development it has entered a period of rapid growth. Since August 1999, when eBay was founded, China's C2C market has been in a pattern of oligopoly. So far as concerned, the market has not only eBay and Taobao, but is now mainly composed of four oligarchs:Taobao, Tom eBay, Tencent and Baidu. Study of the operation of E-commerce platform competition mechanism and E-commerce platform issue of Industry Regulation, has become a major topic in economics.
From the view of industrial characteristics, E-commerce platform is typically some kind of two-sided market, but it also has its own unique features of the industry, for example,third-party payment authentication platform and logistics platform are also have the feature of two-sided market, But it is integrated in E-commerce platform. Whether the relationship between them is competition or cooperation, whether integration' efficiency is higher than the non-integrated? Whether can improve the social welfare? In addition, the trading JiFenZhi increased consumers' value evaluation of network. But due to the network can't be interconnected; it increased the tendency of the multi-platform transaction. JiFenZhi transaction increased transfer costs for consumers, and increased entry barriers to the industry. From the perspective of the existing literature, most of the researches on two-sided market are two-sided asymmetric price structure and pricing mechanism, for the competition and cooperation between different platforms, especially the systematic research on non-integrated Modular Production System between different platforms is few. Most studies of E-commerce platform, using it as a normal network enterprise, the study confined to the industrial structure and profit model, etc. And to leave it as an object of study of two-sided networking platform, as well as their competition and regulatory countermeasures research, yet there is no systematic research literature.
The topics of this paper are under such background, using SCP paradigm of Industry organization, game theory and the case analysis, explore the internal operating mechanism and pricing mechanism of E-commerce platform industry, Analysis of its market structure, researching firms strategy behavior In the competitive market, And to analyze their performance and social welfare, Finally puts forward corresponding countermeasures on E-commerce regulation. This paper aims at making theoretical exploration on operation mechanism and competition strategy of E-commerce platform industry, aslo to provide theoretical support for principles of industry Regulation about E-commerce platform. This is the significance and value of this study.
There are eight chapters in this paper. Research contents and achievements are as following:
Chapter 1 is introduction; mainly introduces background and significance of research, establishs contents and methods, and puts forward innovations of this paper.
Chapter 2 is the summarization of two-sided markets theory. Based on the theory of two-sided markets, making economical explains to the two-sided markets. Giving the economical analysis from emerge of two-sided markets, and the relationship between platform and market, and the centralized transaction by using the theory of institutional economics,to explain why the two sides will focus on platform, how to ensure the production and who Provide the platform Services. Using the urbanization theory of new classical economics, the reason of concentrated exchange is focusing on trading platform can improve the efficiency of the transaction or that transaction costs can be reduced. Finally, give a scientific division to the market structure type of two-sided markets.
Chapter 3 analyzes the pricing model of platform. By the analysis of monopolistic competition pricing models and summary from Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2004) and other literature, the basic assumption has made to Pricing Model of E-commerce. Using economics theory to explain the indirect network externalities and direct the economics network externalities, distinguished money externalities and technology externalities. According to the derivation of theoretical models, we hold that the interconnection of E-commerce platform could improve the social welfare.
Chapter 4 mainly analyzes horizontal competition in the platform. Horizontal competition in the platform of the study, this view can not be interoperability between platforms are the main factors that led to entry barriers and market forces, the incumbent enterprises have a large client base formed a strong network externalities, forming a larger market for barriers to entry.As the network is not compatible and can not interconnection, so that users can not enjoy the benefits of bilateral market cross-network externalities, resulting in the loss of social welfare. Competitive platform for interconnection between the networks,achieve cross-platform transactions between users, reduce market entry barriers to the market regain monopoly to a competitive market structure,contribute to technological innovation and social welfare improvement.
Chapter 5 discusses swiching cost and multi-homing of two-sided markets. The transfer of costs from the perspective of E-commerce platform vendors exist in the user access behavior of multi-platform vendor competition.The assumption that the cost of the transfer of exogenous circumstances, through the platform is compatible with different levels of the two levels of E-commerce platform for pricing and competition analysisConsidered at different levels compatible platform, E-commerce platform pricing is different, and its level of benefits would change with the transfer of costs. Proposed two levels of E-commerce platform compatible.The first level is the transactional database sharingThe second level of compatibility is based on the first level transactional database the shared network interconnection, users can cross-platform to deal.Through the different transfer cost E-commerce platform, under the analysis of pricing and profits obtained, when the switching costs exist, a single platform to access to utility is greater than the effectiveness of multi-platform access, advanced users will be locked in the original platform.From the whole market, are classified into two levels, a monopoly market and oligopoly market.In the first level of compatibility conditions, the transaction cost of credit will be not exist. At this point, users who have a higher evaluation with the network will select multi-platform access.In the realization of two levels under the conditions of compatibility, users can cross-platform deal.Then, the user would not exist multi-platform access behavior.From social welfare perspective, the latter is larger than the former.
Chapter 6 mainly discusses the possibilities of network governance of E-commerces. With transaction cost theory analyse the conditions and the possibility that E-commerce platform for non-integrated management, the E-commerce search platform is dominant firms in this system and module suppliers should be paid platform, CUP and logistics platform. Under the rules and standards that the leading enterprise search platform to develop E-commerce, between the values of module is competition. With "back to back" compititation, Studies have shown that the modular is more efficiency than the integration and modular can lead to more consumer surplus for consumers, E-commerce platform has choice the integration, rather than the modular, it is because that indirect network externalities between system modules.For E-commerce search platform and business integration of third-party payment platform, expansion of the market of any one will bring even greater barriers to entry and market power.
Chapter 7 is a study of regulation and countermeasures of E-commerce platform. Through the analysis, this paper from the critical capacity, positive feedback, path dependence, switching costs, lock and integration factors, discussed the major E-commerce market entry barriers, proposed regulatory response to E-commerce platformFirst Interconnection. As the primary purpose to promote the trading platform services, due to network externalities and non-compliant factors make the bilateral customers can not cross-platform transaction, as the main factors constraint to more competition and lower social welfare. Therefore, interconnection can reduce market entry barriers to the market regain monopoly to a competitive market structure, contribute to technological innovation and social welfare improvement. Second, the modular network production.Integration will improve market access barriers, after that, the manufacturers want to have the same competitiveness, must enter two or more markets, or face a competitive disadvantage.In particular, if the integration is platform that two complementary, then the barriers to entry would be strengthened due to indirect network externalities. At the same time, the incumbent firms can take cross-subsidies to combat a potential entrant.Non-integrated production can increase productivity, reduce barriers to entry and promote competition and benefit consumers surplus and improve social welfare.
Chapter 8 briefly sums up the basic conclusions, put forward some shortcomings, and discusses the further study of this paper.
经济学所讨论的不完全竞争市场大多基于传统工业经济中单边市场的理论,实际上在双边市场中,企业之间的竞争也会导致垄断的发生。目前,反垄断规制的政策都是针对传统单边市场中企业而制定的,对于具有双边市场特征的平台厂商,由于理论的缺失,如果贸然依照单边市场规制理论来判断,则势必会造成判断的失误。基于此,本文主要研究内容就是针对具有双边市场特征的电子商务平台厂商的竞争与规制问题。
随着互联网信息产业的兴起,中国电子商务得到了迅猛的发展,经过10多年的发展已进入高速增长期。从1999年8月易趣网的创立开始,我国的C2C市场就一直处于寡头垄断的格局中。目前该市场已不再是eBay易趣与淘宝网“两强对峙”的情形,而主要由淘宝网、TOM易趣、腾讯拍拍和百度有啊四家企业组成的寡头垄断市场结构。由此,展开对电子商务平台运行的竞争机制和电子商务平台产业规制研究,具有重要的现实意义。
从产业特征来看,电子商务平台是具有典型的双边市场特征的产业,但是它也有自己独特的产业特点,比如说,第三方支付平台也是具有双边市场特征的,有其核心业务,但它往往会被企业是一体化于电子商务平台。那么一体化效率是否高于非一体化,非一体化是否有利于市场竞争,其社会福利是否能够改善,这些重大理论问题都有待于进一步研究解释。此外,交易积分制提高了消费者对网络价值的评价,但由于网络不能互联,增加了交易的多平台接入倾向。交易积分制对消费者来说增加了转移成本,对产业来讲提高了进入壁垒。从目前已有的文献来看,对双边市场的研究大多拘泥于研究双边不对称的价格结构和定价机制,对于不同平台之间的竞争与合作,特别是不同平台之间的非一体模块化生产还鲜有系统的研究。同时,已有对电子商务平台的研究大多把它当做一个普通网络企业,研究内容局限在产业结构和盈利模式等方面。而把它当做一个双边网络平台的研究对象,以及对其竞争机制和规制对策的研究,目前还没有出现系统的研究文献。
本文选题正是在此背景下,遵循产业组织理论的SCP研究范式,运用博弈论等分析工具和案例分析方法,探究电子商务平台产业的运行机制和定价的内在机理,分析其市场结构,研究厂商在市场竞争中的策略行为,并分析比较其企业绩效和社会福利,最后对电子商务产业规制提出相应的对策思路。本文旨在为电子商务平台产业运行机制和竞争策略的研究做出理论探索,也为电子商务平台产业规制政策提供理论支持,这是本文研究的重大意义,也是价值所在。
全文主体共分八章,主要研究内容和成果概述如下：
第一章绪论,主要介绍了本文研究的背景和意义,通过提出问题,确定了研究内容、研究方法和研究的基本框架。最后提出了本文的创新点。
第二章对双边市场的基本理论进行了详细的理论综述。首先对基本概念进行了界定,接着从外部性理论入手,介绍了直接网络外部性和间接网络外部性以及和经济学传统外部性的区别。在特征与分类中,从需求和供给等方面阐述了双边市场的基本特征。通过平台厂商的定价策略和平台偏好差异化与平台竞争引出目前反垄断规制的内容,从理论研究的角度看,尚缺乏一个判断双边市场反垄断的理论体系。接下来是本文对双边市场的经济学解释,也是本部分的一个创新。本文运用制度经济学原理对双边市场的产生、市场和平台的关系、以及平台的集中交易进行了经济学的分析,解释了交易双方为什么会集中在平台上,平台如何保证生产以及平台服务由谁生产的问题。最后本部分对双边市场的市场结构类型进行了科学的划分,分别是基本结构、存在中间商的结构、用户多平台接入结构、平台互联互通结构、多平台服务结构。
第三章对双边市场平台定价模式进行了分析和研究。通过对已有的垄断竞争定价模型分析和总结,得出无论是垄断平台还是竞争平台,其价格结构的设计目的是一致的,都是为了吸引双边的成员到平台上来。随后,本部分研究从影响电子商务平台定价模式的需求价格弹性、用户多平台接入行为、网络外部性强度、平台竞争、信誉和模块化治理等方面入手,对电子商务平台厂商价格效应做出分析,为后续模型假设做出理论的铺垫。
第四章研究了电子商务厂商横向差异化竞争和互联互通对福利的影响。本部分首先用经济学理论解释了间接网络外部性和直接网络外部性的经济学意义,区分了金钱外部性和技术外部性,并指出无论网络外部性直接还是间接,在双边市场上,通过平台交易都可以内在于价格机制。本部分通过垄断和竞争的数理模型对电子商务厂商定价做出辨析,得出网络外部性差异是导致电子商务平台双边价格结构不均衡的主要因素,一边可能高于边际成本定价,另一半可能会给予补贴。通过电子商务平台厂商的社会福利比较分析,本章研究表明：竞争平台之间网络的互联互通,实现用户之间跨平台交易,可以降低市场进入壁垒,使市场重新恢复到竞争性垄断的市场结构,有助于技术创新和社会福利改善,这是本部分的一个创新之处。
第五章从转移成本的角度研究了电子商务平台厂商中存在用户多平台接入行为的厂商竞争机制。本章系统分析了电子商务平台兼容的两个层次,这是本部分的一个创新点。第一层次是交易数据库的共享,第二层次的兼容是在第一层次交易数据库共享的基础上实现网络互连,用户可以跨平台交易。通过对不同转移成本下电子商务平台定价及利润的分析得出,当转移成本存在时,用户单平台接入效用要大于多平台接入效用,高级用户将被锁定在原平台上。从整个市场来看,被划为两个层次,即垄断市场和寡头市场。在第一层次兼容条件下,交易信用所形成的转移成本将不存在。此时,对网络评价较高的用户将选择多平台接入。在实现两个层次兼容的条件下,用户可以跨平台交易,用户将不存在多平台接入行为。从社会福利角度来分析,后者要大于前者。
第六章主要研究电子商务平台模块化网络治理的可能性。利用交易费用理论分析了电子商务平台非一体化治理的条件和可能性,认为电子商务搜索平台是其系统的主导企业,其模块供应商应当是支付平台、银联和物流平台。在主导企业电子商务搜索平台制定规则和标准下,价值模块之间进行“背对背”的竞争。研究表明,模块化比一体化有效率,对于消费者来说模块化能带来更多消费者剩余。电子商务平台选择一体化而非模块化的原因是系统模块之间的间接网络外部效应,即能够为厂商带来更大的进入壁垒和市场势力。
第七章主要研究电子商务平台的规制与对策。从结构壁垒和行为壁垒两个影响因素提出了规制电子商务平台的建议。一是互联互通。作为以促进交易为主要目的平台服务,由于网络外部效应和不兼容因素使双边客户不能跨平台交易,成为制约竞争和降低社会福利的主要因素。因此,互联互通可以降低市场进入壁垒,使市场重新恢复到竞争性垄断的市场结构,有助于技术创新和社会福利改善。是模块化网络生产。一体化会提高市场的进入壁垒,在位厂商可以采取交叉补贴打击潜在进入者。而采用非一体化生产可以提高生产效率,降低进入壁垒,促进竞争,有利于消费者剩余的提高和改善社会福利。
第八章简要归纳了本文的基本结论,提出了不足之处,并对后续研究进行了展望。
At present, the research on two-sided markets is in the ascendant, in the transaction, some trading activitis in market must be conducted on a platform. This platform Develop a pricing strategy to sell the platform product or service to the traders (such as consumers and businesses), and try to make them achieve transaction on the platform. We call the industry markets with these characters two-sided markets. There are many industries with above characteristics. For example Computer operating systems manufacturers, to provide a computer operating system platform To the two consumer groups (consumers and software developers), Consumers use computer operating system to run developers' software applications, and software developers must also be by means of computer operating system to attract customers; E-commerce platform is also the case, it provides trading services for both parties, both parties through trade platform can promote mutual understanding and trade agreement.
In economics, the discussion of monopoly in most based on the single market. For Platform in the two-sided markets, free competition will also cause the monopoly. But at present, anti-trust regulations are formulated for the unilateral enterprises which in the free market. Due to the lack of theory, if making judgments in accordance with unilateral market, it will result in errors in judgment inevitably. Just based on this, this thesis'research contents are the competition and regulation about the E-commerce platform enterprise in two-sided market.
With the rise of the Internet information industry, the Chinese E-commerce has seen rapid development, after 10 years of development it has entered a period of rapid growth. Since August 1999, when eBay was founded, China's C2C market has been in a pattern of oligopoly. So far as concerned, the market has not only eBay and Taobao, but is now mainly composed of four oligarchs:Taobao, Tom eBay, Tencent and Baidu. Study of the operation of E-commerce platform competition mechanism and E-commerce platform issue of Industry Regulation, has become a major topic in economics.
From the view of industrial characteristics, E-commerce platform is typically some kind of two-sided market, but it also has its own unique features of the industry, for example,third-party payment authentication platform and logistics platform are also have the feature of two-sided market, But it is integrated in E-commerce platform. Whether the relationship between them is competition or cooperation, whether integration' efficiency is higher than the non-integrated? Whether can improve the social welfare? In addition, the trading JiFenZhi increased consumers' value evaluation of network. But due to the network can't be interconnected; it increased the tendency of the multi-platform transaction. JiFenZhi transaction increased transfer costs for consumers, and increased entry barriers to the industry. From the perspective of the existing literature, most of the researches on two-sided market are two-sided asymmetric price structure and pricing mechanism, for the competition and cooperation between different platforms, especially the systematic research on non-integrated Modular Production System between different platforms is few. Most studies of E-commerce platform, using it as a normal network enterprise, the study confined to the industrial structure and profit model, etc. And to leave it as an object of study of two-sided networking platform, as well as their competition and regulatory countermeasures research, yet there is no systematic research literature.
The topics of this paper are under such background, using SCP paradigm of Industry organization, game theory and the case analysis, explore the internal operating mechanism and pricing mechanism of E-commerce platform industry, Analysis of its market structure, researching firms strategy behavior In the competitive market, And to analyze their performance and social welfare, Finally puts forward corresponding countermeasures on E-commerce regulation. This paper aims at making theoretical exploration on operation mechanism and competition strategy of E-commerce platform industry, aslo to provide theoretical support for principles of industry Regulation about E-commerce platform. This is the significance and value of this study.
There are eight chapters in this paper. Research contents and achievements are as following:
Chapter 1 is introduction; mainly introduces background and significance of research, establishs contents and methods, and puts forward innovations of this paper.
Chapter 2 is the summarization of two-sided markets theory. Based on the theory of two-sided markets, making economical explains to the two-sided markets. Giving the economical analysis from emerge of two-sided markets, and the relationship between platform and market, and the centralized transaction by using the theory of institutional economics,to explain why the two sides will focus on platform, how to ensure the production and who Provide the platform Services. Using the urbanization theory of new classical economics, the reason of concentrated exchange is focusing on trading platform can improve the efficiency of the transaction or that transaction costs can be reduced. Finally, give a scientific division to the market structure type of two-sided markets.
Chapter 3 analyzes the pricing model of platform. By the analysis of monopolistic competition pricing models and summary from Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2004) and other literature, the basic assumption has made to Pricing Model of E-commerce. Using economics theory to explain the indirect network externalities and direct the economics network externalities, distinguished money externalities and technology externalities. According to the derivation of theoretical models, we hold that the interconnection of E-commerce platform could improve the social welfare.
Chapter 4 mainly analyzes horizontal competition in the platform. Horizontal competition in the platform of the study, this view can not be interoperability between platforms are the main factors that led to entry barriers and market forces, the incumbent enterprises have a large client base formed a strong network externalities, forming a larger market for barriers to entry.As the network is not compatible and can not interconnection, so that users can not enjoy the benefits of bilateral market cross-network externalities, resulting in the loss of social welfare. Competitive platform for interconnection between the networks,achieve cross-platform transactions between users, reduce market entry barriers to the market regain monopoly to a competitive market structure,contribute to technological innovation and social welfare improvement.
Chapter 5 discusses swiching cost and multi-homing of two-sided markets. The transfer of costs from the perspective of E-commerce platform vendors exist in the user access behavior of multi-platform vendor competition.The assumption that the cost of the transfer of exogenous circumstances, through the platform is compatible with different levels of the two levels of E-commerce platform for pricing and competition analysisConsidered at different levels compatible platform, E-commerce platform pricing is different, and its level of benefits would change with the transfer of costs. Proposed two levels of E-commerce platform compatible.The first level is the transactional database sharingThe second level of compatibility is based on the first level transactional database the shared network interconnection, users can cross-platform to deal.Through the different transfer cost E-commerce platform, under the analysis of pricing and profits obtained, when the switching costs exist, a single platform to access to utility is greater than the effectiveness of multi-platform access, advanced users will be locked in the original platform.From the whole market, are classified into two levels, a monopoly market and oligopoly market.In the first level of compatibility conditions, the transaction cost of credit will be not exist. At this point, users who have a higher evaluation with the network will select multi-platform access.In the realization of two levels under the conditions of compatibility, users can cross-platform deal.Then, the user would not exist multi-platform access behavior.From social welfare perspective, the latter is larger than the former.
Chapter 6 mainly discusses the possibilities of network governance of E-commerces. With transaction cost theory analyse the conditions and the possibility that E-commerce platform for non-integrated management, the E-commerce search platform is dominant firms in this system and module suppliers should be paid platform, CUP and logistics platform. Under the rules and standards that the leading enterprise search platform to develop E-commerce, between the values of module is competition. With "back to back" compititation, Studies have shown that the modular is more efficiency than the integration and modular can lead to more consumer surplus for consumers, E-commerce platform has choice the integration, rather than the modular, it is because that indirect network externalities between system modules.For E-commerce search platform and business integration of third-party payment platform, expansion of the market of any one will bring even greater barriers to entry and market power.
Chapter 7 is a study of regulation and countermeasures of E-commerce platform. Through the analysis, this paper from the critical capacity, positive feedback, path dependence, switching costs, lock and integration factors, discussed the major E-commerce market entry barriers, proposed regulatory response to E-commerce platformFirst Interconnection. As the primary purpose to promote the trading platform services, due to network externalities and non-compliant factors make the bilateral customers can not cross-platform transaction, as the main factors constraint to more competition and lower social welfare. Therefore, interconnection can reduce market entry barriers to the market regain monopoly to a competitive market structure, contribute to technological innovation and social welfare improvement. Second, the modular network production.Integration will improve market access barriers, after that, the manufacturers want to have the same competitiveness, must enter two or more markets, or face a competitive disadvantage.In particular, if the integration is platform that two complementary, then the barriers to entry would be strengthened due to indirect network externalities. At the same time, the incumbent firms can take cross-subsidies to combat a potential entrant.Non-integrated production can increase productivity, reduce barriers to entry and promote competition and benefit consumers surplus and improve social welfare.
Chapter 8 briefly sums up the basic conclusions, put forward some shortcomings, and discusses the further study of this paper.
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