知识产权保护、吸引FDI与东道国创新
摘要
自上个世纪90年代以来,世界知识产权体系(尤其是发展中国家的知识产权体系)正在逐步形成和完善。在国际贸易领域,知识产权体系建设具有里程碑意义的事件就是已经于1995年1月1日生效的与贸易相关的知识产权协议(TRIPS Agreement)的签订。严格的知识产权保护无疑对于身为知识产权主要持有者的发达国家有着巨大的经济利益,但与此同时全球知识产权保护体系能够得以建立的前提是它必须也可能有利于发展中国家的发展。一般的观点认为,因为发展中国家加强知识产权保护可以吸引发达国家的知识产权持有者更多地将技术转移到发展中国家,因而加强知识产权保护将有助于发展中国家的技术进步和创新。实际上,很多发展中国家之所以参与各种知识产权保护协议,不断的加强知识产权保护无非是希望通过这种方式得到更多的技术转移,从而最终有利于本国的创新和技术进步。
然而,加强知识产权保护对发展中国家国内的负面影响也是十分明显的。发展中国家加强知识产权保护增加了跨国公司的市场势力,跨国公司将通过制定一个高的垄断价格来获取垄断利润。同时严格的知识产权保护也会限制发展中国家的技术模仿行为,从而不利于发展中国家的技术进步和模仿创新。很多学者都认为技术落后国通过模仿性的创新能够以较低的成本实现技术进步。在现实当中,很多发展中国家的政府将FDI作为重要的模仿创新途径。然而,跨国公司在发展中国家的投资决策不仅仅考虑生产成本节约效应,还会考虑由于技术转移所带来的诸如被东道国厂商低成本模仿等负面影响。东道国的知识产权保护状况便是影响跨国公司模仿风险的重要因素。基于这样的原因,东道国的知识产权保护策略将直接影响到跨国公司的技术转移决策,因而该策略也就在一定程度上影响着发展中国家“市场换技术”战略的成功与否。因此对于落后国家的政策制定者而言,在什么时间、通过何种方式以及执行多强的知识产权保护程度是一个严峻而迫切需要解决的问题。
基于上述的研究背景,本文在梳理和回顾以往理论和经验文献的基础上,对发展中国家的知识产权保护、FDI与创新进行理论探讨和经验分析,明确东道国知识产权保护对FDI引致创新的作用机制以及该机制的各种影响因素,从而为发展中国家制定知识产权保护政策提供一定的理论依据和经验证据。本文各章的主要内容如下:
第一章是导论部分。这一章首先介绍了本文的研究背景;然后,阐述了研究的动因、目的以及所研究问题的理论和现实意义;最后,笔者交代了研究思路、研究方法以及本文的创新和不足之处。
第二章着重对我国的FDI、知识产权保护以及创新的历史发展、特点和经验事实进行了梳理和概括性的介绍。
第三章是理论回顾部分。理论回顾部分又分为基础理论回顾、相关研究文献回顾和理论分析框架回顾三大部分。基础理论部分主要介绍了FDI、知识产权和创新的有关的基础理论。相关研究文献回顾则着重于介绍与本文理论和经验检验密切相关的文献。理论分析框架回顾则从建模的技术角度来介绍在前人的研究当中使用最多的几种相关的分析框架。
第四章是理论研究部分。本文的理论研究部分通过运用南北产品周期模型、博弈模型以及博弈对比模型着重探讨了知识产权保护对FDI引致东道国创新的FDI知识溢出引致创新机制、FDI竞争引致创新机制以及FDI关联引致创新机制的影响。简而言之,理论模型表明,东道国知识产权保护可以对三种FDI引致创新机制产生重要的影响,并且这种影响很可能是非线性的复杂的影响。
第五章是经验检验部分。经验研究部分主要是对本文的理论研究进行经验检验,但是本文的经验检验并没有完全局限于本文的理论部分的探讨,在进行经验检验时尽可能地考虑了实际经济中存在而本文模型尚难涉及的影响因素,力求能够更真实地反映知识产权保护、FDI和东道国创新的相互关系。本文综合利用90多个国家的宏观数据、美国的海外投资数据以及中国的产业数据,从国际比较层面、我国的宏观层面和产业层面三个层面检验了知识产权保护、FDI和东道国创新的关系。简而言之,本文的经验检验结果支持了本文主要的理论推论,并且还发现知识产权保护对FDI引致创新的影响会受到东道国的发展阶段、国家特征以及引进FDI所在行业的特征的非线性的复杂影响。
第六章是结论和建议部分。本章首先对全文进行了概括性的总结,然后针对本文理论研究和经验检验所发现的问题并结合中国目前所处的特殊阶段和发展现状,本文尝试性的提出了一些相关的政策建议。
The global system of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is changing profoundly. Many developing countries have undertaken significant strengthening of their IPRs regimes. Most significant is the introduction of the agreement on trade related intellectual property rights, or TRIPs, within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under TRIPs, WTO members must adopt and enforce strong and nondiscriminatory minimum standards of protection for intellectual property. It is no doubt that strong intellectual property rights would benefit the countries which have lots of intellectual property rights. But the premise of building the global system of intellectual property rights is that the system must also benefits the developing countries. On one side, many policymakers believe that this mandated policy change will work against their national economic interests, transferring rents to multinational corporate patent holders headquartered in the world's most advanced countries, especially the United States. Advocates for strong IPR believe that strengthening IPR will accelerate the transfer of technology between countries, ensuring a relatively equal distribution of gains from this policy change. The general opinion believes that the strong intellectual property rights of the developing countries would bring more technology transfer from the developed countries or multinational corporations. The more technology transfer would promote technology progress and innovation of the developing countries. One of purposes of TRIPS is to promote the global technology transfer. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement put forward that the protection of IPR should benefit the global technology transfer and spillover; and Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement also put forward that the developed countries should encourage multinational corporation transfer technology to the developing countries.
Actually, most of the developing countries which attending the agreement hope that the agreement could bring more technology transfer. But the negative effect of strong protection of IPR is also significant. The strong protection of IPR would increase the monopoly power of MNES. MNES can earn monopoly profit through the monopoly power, not transfer their advanced technology. At the same time, the strong protection of IPR would restrict the imitation activities of the developing countries, which would hurt the technology progress and imitation innovation of the developing countries.
Lots of scholars believe that these low technology countries can promote technology progress throng imitation innovation. In fact, most of the developing countries take FDI as a very important path. Nevertheless, MNES not only consider the effect of cutting the cost of production, but also consider the risk of imitation from the local corporation in the host countries. Based on the reasons, the policy of IPR protection of host countries would affect the technology transfer decision of MNES. From above the fact, we could deduce that the policy of IPR protection would affect whether it is success of the strategy of FDI in the developing countries. So, as to the developing countries, how to perform the IPR protection is a very important problem.
Based on the background, this thesis aims to analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship among intellectual property rights protection, FDI and the innovation of the host countries. The analysis tries to clear the effects of IPR protection to the machines of innovation-inducing effect of FDI and some relative factors. It is believe that the thesis would provide some theoretical and empirical evidence. In this paper, the main contents of the chapters are as follows:
Chapter 1 is the introduction that explains the background, purpose, significance, study method, logic structure, the innovation and the inadequate of this thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces generally the historical development, characteristics and the fact evidences of China' FDI, intellectual property protection and innovation.
Chapter 3 introduces the basis theory of intellectual property, FDI and innovation. The chapter is composed of two parts: basis theory review and specific framework for theoretical analysis. The basis theory review introduces mainly the classical theory about intellectual property, FDI and innovation. While the specific framework for theoretical analysis introduces several relative specific analysis models from the view of constructing model.
Chapter 4 is the study of theory in the thesis. Based on North-South product model and game theory model, the chapter discusses the role of intellectual property protection in three machines of innovation-inducing effect of FDI. Generally speaking, theory models show that the machines would be impacted by the level of intellectual property rights protection of host country and the impact is not monotonic linearity, but nonlinearity.
Chapter 5 is empirical analysis of the thesis. The empirical analyses test the theory deduction of chapter 4. But the analyses also consider some very important factors which are not included in the theory study of chapter 4. This would be favor of the discussion of the relationship among intellectual property, FDI and innovation of host countries. Based on 90 countries statistics data, the US' FDI statistics data and the industry statistics data of China, the thesis tests the relationship among the three factors. General speaking, the results show that the evidences support the deduction of chapter 4. And the studies also found that the effect of intellectual property protection to innovation-induced by FDI would be impacted no-linearly by the development phase of host countries, the characters of host countries and the industry features of FDI.
Chapter 6 is the conclusions and suggestions of the thesis. In the chapter, I summary firstly the main conclusions of the full paper; then I try to put forward to some suggestions on the basis of the development phase and the development features of China.
然而,加强知识产权保护对发展中国家国内的负面影响也是十分明显的。发展中国家加强知识产权保护增加了跨国公司的市场势力,跨国公司将通过制定一个高的垄断价格来获取垄断利润。同时严格的知识产权保护也会限制发展中国家的技术模仿行为,从而不利于发展中国家的技术进步和模仿创新。很多学者都认为技术落后国通过模仿性的创新能够以较低的成本实现技术进步。在现实当中,很多发展中国家的政府将FDI作为重要的模仿创新途径。然而,跨国公司在发展中国家的投资决策不仅仅考虑生产成本节约效应,还会考虑由于技术转移所带来的诸如被东道国厂商低成本模仿等负面影响。东道国的知识产权保护状况便是影响跨国公司模仿风险的重要因素。基于这样的原因,东道国的知识产权保护策略将直接影响到跨国公司的技术转移决策,因而该策略也就在一定程度上影响着发展中国家“市场换技术”战略的成功与否。因此对于落后国家的政策制定者而言,在什么时间、通过何种方式以及执行多强的知识产权保护程度是一个严峻而迫切需要解决的问题。
基于上述的研究背景,本文在梳理和回顾以往理论和经验文献的基础上,对发展中国家的知识产权保护、FDI与创新进行理论探讨和经验分析,明确东道国知识产权保护对FDI引致创新的作用机制以及该机制的各种影响因素,从而为发展中国家制定知识产权保护政策提供一定的理论依据和经验证据。本文各章的主要内容如下:
第一章是导论部分。这一章首先介绍了本文的研究背景;然后,阐述了研究的动因、目的以及所研究问题的理论和现实意义;最后,笔者交代了研究思路、研究方法以及本文的创新和不足之处。
第二章着重对我国的FDI、知识产权保护以及创新的历史发展、特点和经验事实进行了梳理和概括性的介绍。
第三章是理论回顾部分。理论回顾部分又分为基础理论回顾、相关研究文献回顾和理论分析框架回顾三大部分。基础理论部分主要介绍了FDI、知识产权和创新的有关的基础理论。相关研究文献回顾则着重于介绍与本文理论和经验检验密切相关的文献。理论分析框架回顾则从建模的技术角度来介绍在前人的研究当中使用最多的几种相关的分析框架。
第四章是理论研究部分。本文的理论研究部分通过运用南北产品周期模型、博弈模型以及博弈对比模型着重探讨了知识产权保护对FDI引致东道国创新的FDI知识溢出引致创新机制、FDI竞争引致创新机制以及FDI关联引致创新机制的影响。简而言之,理论模型表明,东道国知识产权保护可以对三种FDI引致创新机制产生重要的影响,并且这种影响很可能是非线性的复杂的影响。
第五章是经验检验部分。经验研究部分主要是对本文的理论研究进行经验检验,但是本文的经验检验并没有完全局限于本文的理论部分的探讨,在进行经验检验时尽可能地考虑了实际经济中存在而本文模型尚难涉及的影响因素,力求能够更真实地反映知识产权保护、FDI和东道国创新的相互关系。本文综合利用90多个国家的宏观数据、美国的海外投资数据以及中国的产业数据,从国际比较层面、我国的宏观层面和产业层面三个层面检验了知识产权保护、FDI和东道国创新的关系。简而言之,本文的经验检验结果支持了本文主要的理论推论,并且还发现知识产权保护对FDI引致创新的影响会受到东道国的发展阶段、国家特征以及引进FDI所在行业的特征的非线性的复杂影响。
第六章是结论和建议部分。本章首先对全文进行了概括性的总结,然后针对本文理论研究和经验检验所发现的问题并结合中国目前所处的特殊阶段和发展现状,本文尝试性的提出了一些相关的政策建议。
The global system of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is changing profoundly. Many developing countries have undertaken significant strengthening of their IPRs regimes. Most significant is the introduction of the agreement on trade related intellectual property rights, or TRIPs, within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under TRIPs, WTO members must adopt and enforce strong and nondiscriminatory minimum standards of protection for intellectual property. It is no doubt that strong intellectual property rights would benefit the countries which have lots of intellectual property rights. But the premise of building the global system of intellectual property rights is that the system must also benefits the developing countries. On one side, many policymakers believe that this mandated policy change will work against their national economic interests, transferring rents to multinational corporate patent holders headquartered in the world's most advanced countries, especially the United States. Advocates for strong IPR believe that strengthening IPR will accelerate the transfer of technology between countries, ensuring a relatively equal distribution of gains from this policy change. The general opinion believes that the strong intellectual property rights of the developing countries would bring more technology transfer from the developed countries or multinational corporations. The more technology transfer would promote technology progress and innovation of the developing countries. One of purposes of TRIPS is to promote the global technology transfer. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement put forward that the protection of IPR should benefit the global technology transfer and spillover; and Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement also put forward that the developed countries should encourage multinational corporation transfer technology to the developing countries.
Actually, most of the developing countries which attending the agreement hope that the agreement could bring more technology transfer. But the negative effect of strong protection of IPR is also significant. The strong protection of IPR would increase the monopoly power of MNES. MNES can earn monopoly profit through the monopoly power, not transfer their advanced technology. At the same time, the strong protection of IPR would restrict the imitation activities of the developing countries, which would hurt the technology progress and imitation innovation of the developing countries.
Lots of scholars believe that these low technology countries can promote technology progress throng imitation innovation. In fact, most of the developing countries take FDI as a very important path. Nevertheless, MNES not only consider the effect of cutting the cost of production, but also consider the risk of imitation from the local corporation in the host countries. Based on the reasons, the policy of IPR protection of host countries would affect the technology transfer decision of MNES. From above the fact, we could deduce that the policy of IPR protection would affect whether it is success of the strategy of FDI in the developing countries. So, as to the developing countries, how to perform the IPR protection is a very important problem.
Based on the background, this thesis aims to analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship among intellectual property rights protection, FDI and the innovation of the host countries. The analysis tries to clear the effects of IPR protection to the machines of innovation-inducing effect of FDI and some relative factors. It is believe that the thesis would provide some theoretical and empirical evidence. In this paper, the main contents of the chapters are as follows:
Chapter 1 is the introduction that explains the background, purpose, significance, study method, logic structure, the innovation and the inadequate of this thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces generally the historical development, characteristics and the fact evidences of China' FDI, intellectual property protection and innovation.
Chapter 3 introduces the basis theory of intellectual property, FDI and innovation. The chapter is composed of two parts: basis theory review and specific framework for theoretical analysis. The basis theory review introduces mainly the classical theory about intellectual property, FDI and innovation. While the specific framework for theoretical analysis introduces several relative specific analysis models from the view of constructing model.
Chapter 4 is the study of theory in the thesis. Based on North-South product model and game theory model, the chapter discusses the role of intellectual property protection in three machines of innovation-inducing effect of FDI. Generally speaking, theory models show that the machines would be impacted by the level of intellectual property rights protection of host country and the impact is not monotonic linearity, but nonlinearity.
Chapter 5 is empirical analysis of the thesis. The empirical analyses test the theory deduction of chapter 4. But the analyses also consider some very important factors which are not included in the theory study of chapter 4. This would be favor of the discussion of the relationship among intellectual property, FDI and innovation of host countries. Based on 90 countries statistics data, the US' FDI statistics data and the industry statistics data of China, the thesis tests the relationship among the three factors. General speaking, the results show that the evidences support the deduction of chapter 4. And the studies also found that the effect of intellectual property protection to innovation-induced by FDI would be impacted no-linearly by the development phase of host countries, the characters of host countries and the industry features of FDI.
Chapter 6 is the conclusions and suggestions of the thesis. In the chapter, I summary firstly the main conclusions of the full paper; then I try to put forward to some suggestions on the basis of the development phase and the development features of China.
引文
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