社会偏好与不完备市场的治理
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摘要
市场理论是新古典经济学的核心。在新古典经济学中,所有与资源配置有关的经济活动都是由完备契约治理下、理性个体之间的非人格化市场交换完成的。“完备契约”意味着,一切与交易及交易各方相关联的、当前或未来状态下的权利和义务都可以被一个完备契约所覆盖,并且可以无成本地被中立的第三方完美执行;“理性个体”表明市场参与人的偏好序完备地定义在与其自身相关的稀缺资源束上,与他人的资源配置结果无关,并且他会按照基于此偏好序的效用函数采取行动,以使得该效用函数趋于最大化。一般均衡理论证明,如果市场上的商品和服务交易都满足完备契约假设,那么理性个体之间的竞争性交易所导致的所有均衡都是帕累托最优的。新古典经济学从来不考虑市场运行的制度基础,它只是理所当然地认为由政府提供的、能够保证交易契约完美执行的市场制度是天然存在并运转良好的,无需关注。
然而,随着信息经济学和新制度经济学的发展,越来越多的经济学家认识到完备契约假设过于脱离现实,现实世界中几乎所有的市场活动都是不可完全契约化的,如贵重商品交易、资本交易、劳动力交易、技术交易等等。同时,大量的实验研究和实证研究证明:经济人的偏好类型是异质的,部分经济人具有强烈的自利偏好,部分经济人具有强烈的社会偏好,而不同偏好类型经济人之间的互动会影响整体的社会结果,所以激励契约的设计与治理需要将社会偏好人的存在以及自利偏好人与社会偏好人之间的交互作用考虑在内,最优的激励契约应该充分地利用社会偏好作为一种治理机制的互补作用,同时尽量避免对社会偏好治理作用的挤出。
本研究试图在比较制度实验范式的基础上探讨社会偏好及其与自利偏好的交互作用对不完备契约的治理以及市场设计的重要影响。
首先,我们对社会偏好的概念作了一个比较清晰的阐释,回答了社会偏好的本质是什么,其与传统经济学中的偏好假设有什么不同;社会偏好在市场交易中会发生什么作用,其与市场竞争机制的关系为何;社会偏好在组织合作中会发生什么作用,其是否有利于合作关系的建立和强化;社会偏好在契约治理中有什么作用,其是否有利于提高契约的治理效率。
然后,在对社会偏好综述的基础上,我们考察社会偏好与不完备契约的关系,尤其是互惠、信任等偏好形式对交易者之间契约关系的影响。制度缺失、固定分成契约、所有权契约与激励性契约是我们重点进行考察的四种契约形式,我们重点分析互惠和信任是如何影响这四种不完备契约的治理情形的。我们所使用的研究方法为比较制度实验。
随后就是本研究最核心的内容,即社会偏好与市场治理之间的关系。在上述不完备契约研究的基础上,我们提炼出了一个最具代表意义的不完备契约,然后把它植入几种不同的市场治理模式中,分析各种治理模式的治理效率。我们还将市场的治理划分为偏好与信念治理、关系治理、规则治理等三个典型的治理层次,分析各治理层次之间的交互作用,探讨它们是否会互相补充或者互相挤出。
最后我们给出了上述研究结果对于市场治理层次构建的指导意义。
本研究存在的创新如下:
1、将社会偏好及其作用机制融入对契约治理结构以及市场治理结构的考察,在国际上,相关方面的研究刚刚兴起,而在国内同类研究还没有起步。本研究较早地考察了社会偏好在四种典型不完备契约治理中的作用,并将此作用进一步推广到市场研究中,探讨了社会偏好对市场治理的影响。
2、在行为博弈论的框架下对所探讨的问题进行了分析,行为博弈理论对传统博弈理论的修正主要针对三个方面:自利偏好、标准信念、决策中完美的推理能力。本研究关注社会偏好对传统经济学自利偏好的修正,尤其是互惠与信任两种社会偏好对契约治理和市场治理的作用,并使用F-S效用函数对实验结果进行了分析。
3、本研究还将偏好和信念治理以及关系治理引入到了经典的市场设计理论,在机制设计理论以及Alvin Roth(2002)和John McMillan(2003)的市场设计理论中,均没有考虑偏好和信念对市场交往的影响。
Lots of researchs show that people's preference types are heterogeneous. Some people exhibit self-interest preference; some people have social preference. The interactions between people with different preference types have an impact on social outcomes, and which type of preference will dominate social outcomes depends on explicit institutional environment. So the design of incentive contract must take account of the existence of social preference and the interactions between self-interest preference and social preference, which are very important for us to understand people's competition and cooperation behavior and governance of contracts. The first part of this paper is a non-technical survey for recent research on competition, cooperation and contracts governance under social preference.
The standard contract theory assumes that all people are self-interested, but lots of experimental and empirical researches show that people exhibit social preference, which will have an important impact on people's competition, co-operation and contracts enforcement behavior. The second part of this paper focuses on investigating the influence of social preference on governance efficiency of explicit governance structure by comparative institutional experimental approach. The experiment results argue that the explicit governance structure which is complementary with social preference will improve the governance efficiency, but the explicit governance structure which is crowding out social preference will undermine governance efficiency.
Market theory is the core of economics. In New Classical Economics, all markets have perfect information conditions, complete property protection and contract enforcement system. However, with the development of neo-institutional economics and information economics, more and more researchers realize the hypothesis of complete contracting is too unrealistic, almost all market behaviors are un-contractible. In the incomplete markets, transactions never stop because of the dysfunction of formal contract enforcement system. There spontaneously evolve out many alternative market governance structures governing people's contracting behaviors. This third part of this paper focuses on the characteristics and efficiency of these alternative governance modes, based on the approach of comparative institutional experimentation.
The main innovations of this paper lie in following three aspects:
(1) Incorporating social preference in the studies of contract design and market governance is a new research area in the world. And there are few studies in China focusing on it. In this paper, we firstly introduce social preference into four typical types of incomplete contracts, and then into a typical incomplete market.
(2) We use the behavioral game theory model the problem we study. The behavioral game theory question classic game theory in three aspects: non-standard beliefs, non-selfish preferences, and imperfect reasoning capacity. We think of non-selfish preferences in this paper, and we apply the F-S utility function to analyze our experimental results.
(3) We also introduce social preference into the classic market design theory. There are no influence of social preferences in Roth(2002) and McMillan(2003)'s market design theory.
然而,随着信息经济学和新制度经济学的发展,越来越多的经济学家认识到完备契约假设过于脱离现实,现实世界中几乎所有的市场活动都是不可完全契约化的,如贵重商品交易、资本交易、劳动力交易、技术交易等等。同时,大量的实验研究和实证研究证明:经济人的偏好类型是异质的,部分经济人具有强烈的自利偏好,部分经济人具有强烈的社会偏好,而不同偏好类型经济人之间的互动会影响整体的社会结果,所以激励契约的设计与治理需要将社会偏好人的存在以及自利偏好人与社会偏好人之间的交互作用考虑在内,最优的激励契约应该充分地利用社会偏好作为一种治理机制的互补作用,同时尽量避免对社会偏好治理作用的挤出。
本研究试图在比较制度实验范式的基础上探讨社会偏好及其与自利偏好的交互作用对不完备契约的治理以及市场设计的重要影响。
首先,我们对社会偏好的概念作了一个比较清晰的阐释,回答了社会偏好的本质是什么,其与传统经济学中的偏好假设有什么不同;社会偏好在市场交易中会发生什么作用,其与市场竞争机制的关系为何;社会偏好在组织合作中会发生什么作用,其是否有利于合作关系的建立和强化;社会偏好在契约治理中有什么作用,其是否有利于提高契约的治理效率。
然后,在对社会偏好综述的基础上,我们考察社会偏好与不完备契约的关系,尤其是互惠、信任等偏好形式对交易者之间契约关系的影响。制度缺失、固定分成契约、所有权契约与激励性契约是我们重点进行考察的四种契约形式,我们重点分析互惠和信任是如何影响这四种不完备契约的治理情形的。我们所使用的研究方法为比较制度实验。
随后就是本研究最核心的内容,即社会偏好与市场治理之间的关系。在上述不完备契约研究的基础上,我们提炼出了一个最具代表意义的不完备契约,然后把它植入几种不同的市场治理模式中,分析各种治理模式的治理效率。我们还将市场的治理划分为偏好与信念治理、关系治理、规则治理等三个典型的治理层次,分析各治理层次之间的交互作用,探讨它们是否会互相补充或者互相挤出。
最后我们给出了上述研究结果对于市场治理层次构建的指导意义。
本研究存在的创新如下:
1、将社会偏好及其作用机制融入对契约治理结构以及市场治理结构的考察,在国际上,相关方面的研究刚刚兴起,而在国内同类研究还没有起步。本研究较早地考察了社会偏好在四种典型不完备契约治理中的作用,并将此作用进一步推广到市场研究中,探讨了社会偏好对市场治理的影响。
2、在行为博弈论的框架下对所探讨的问题进行了分析,行为博弈理论对传统博弈理论的修正主要针对三个方面:自利偏好、标准信念、决策中完美的推理能力。本研究关注社会偏好对传统经济学自利偏好的修正,尤其是互惠与信任两种社会偏好对契约治理和市场治理的作用,并使用F-S效用函数对实验结果进行了分析。
3、本研究还将偏好和信念治理以及关系治理引入到了经典的市场设计理论,在机制设计理论以及Alvin Roth(2002)和John McMillan(2003)的市场设计理论中,均没有考虑偏好和信念对市场交往的影响。
Lots of researchs show that people's preference types are heterogeneous. Some people exhibit self-interest preference; some people have social preference. The interactions between people with different preference types have an impact on social outcomes, and which type of preference will dominate social outcomes depends on explicit institutional environment. So the design of incentive contract must take account of the existence of social preference and the interactions between self-interest preference and social preference, which are very important for us to understand people's competition and cooperation behavior and governance of contracts. The first part of this paper is a non-technical survey for recent research on competition, cooperation and contracts governance under social preference.
The standard contract theory assumes that all people are self-interested, but lots of experimental and empirical researches show that people exhibit social preference, which will have an important impact on people's competition, co-operation and contracts enforcement behavior. The second part of this paper focuses on investigating the influence of social preference on governance efficiency of explicit governance structure by comparative institutional experimental approach. The experiment results argue that the explicit governance structure which is complementary with social preference will improve the governance efficiency, but the explicit governance structure which is crowding out social preference will undermine governance efficiency.
Market theory is the core of economics. In New Classical Economics, all markets have perfect information conditions, complete property protection and contract enforcement system. However, with the development of neo-institutional economics and information economics, more and more researchers realize the hypothesis of complete contracting is too unrealistic, almost all market behaviors are un-contractible. In the incomplete markets, transactions never stop because of the dysfunction of formal contract enforcement system. There spontaneously evolve out many alternative market governance structures governing people's contracting behaviors. This third part of this paper focuses on the characteristics and efficiency of these alternative governance modes, based on the approach of comparative institutional experimentation.
The main innovations of this paper lie in following three aspects:
(1) Incorporating social preference in the studies of contract design and market governance is a new research area in the world. And there are few studies in China focusing on it. In this paper, we firstly introduce social preference into four typical types of incomplete contracts, and then into a typical incomplete market.
(2) We use the behavioral game theory model the problem we study. The behavioral game theory question classic game theory in three aspects: non-standard beliefs, non-selfish preferences, and imperfect reasoning capacity. We think of non-selfish preferences in this paper, and we apply the F-S utility function to analyze our experimental results.
(3) We also introduce social preference into the classic market design theory. There are no influence of social preferences in Roth(2002) and McMillan(2003)'s market design theory.
引文
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