公共物品供给机制与政府定位研究
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摘要
西方公共物品理论的不断发展深刻地影响着我国公共物品理论的发展。随着对这一学术问题的深入分析,学术界越来越关注研究公共物品的供给问题,而这势必又要涉及到政府的角色定位问题。在我国实行计划经济体制的时期,公共物品由政府统一供给。改革开放以来,由于体制转轨与社会转型,政府逐渐将公共物品的供给让渡于市场,由市场来进行资源配置。政府与私人经济主体不同的契约合作方式,决定了公共物品供给决策权可以部分地让渡给市场。对于转轨国家的政府而言,改善公共物品供给决策的路径选择应当是构建制度环境,建立市场导向的决策机制,以克服政府因内生性的制度缺陷而导致决策行为效率低下的问题。然而,近年来公共物品供给不足的问题愈演愈烈,于是政府在公共物品供给问题上的角色定位又一次成为社会各界关注的焦点。
传统的经济理论在研究公共物品供给问题的过程中,往往从行为人完全自利的假设出发,得出较为消极的结论。而实际经验表明,对行为人完全自利的假设所得出结论往往并不一定与真实的行为人的实际决策情况相符合,有时甚至存在较大的误差,而与此同时,采用统计数据的实证手段又往往由于数据有限与噪音过多等原因而无法较好地支撑理论研究的进一步深入。这说明传统经济理论及其研究方法在现实的公共物品供给问题中的解释能力还比较有限。而实验经济学的出现正好解决了这些问题。
本文采用跨学科的研究角度,通过实验经济学的研究方法,在中国的环境中,设计了一组包括自愿贡献机制(对照实验)、领导者先行机制、强力领导者惩罚机制与一种新型混合机制——奖惩规约机制在内的公共物品供给机制实验,考察了不同机制设计对公共物品贡献与收益水平的影响；并将各机制与对照实验进行比较以考察各机制对公共物品贡献与收益水平是否有改善作用及作用大小；而后进一步将混合机制进行比较,以寻找出本次实验设计中公共物品贡献与收益水平结果最好的机制,以及领导者(即政府)这一因素对于公共物品贡献的作用。
本文通过对实验数据的分析,检验了在中国的环境中的各种公共物品供给机制的作用,发掘了参与者的行为特征,进而通过实验结果分析出何种公共物品供给机制更有利于提高我国公共物品供给效率、改善整体福利水平,以及政府在公共物品供给中应该如何定位问题。本文的研究成果对于我国规范和完善公共物品供给机制具有非常重要的现实意义,且在理论上具有一定的创新意义。
The development of foreign public good theory has profoundly influenced the development of domestic public good theory. With the development of the study, the issue of public good provision receives more and more attention in the economics literature. The issue also includes the positioning of the government in the field of public good. In the age of planned economy, Chinese government plays the only role of the public good supplier. Since the economic reform, the provision of public good depends more on market than on government. In recent years, however, the increasingly serious problem of the under-provision of public good makes the positioning issue back in the spotlight.
In the field of public good provision, traditional economic theory always makes negative conclusions on the basis of the hypothesis that all behaviors are completely selfish. However, the experience and facts are not always the same as these theoretic conclusions. Meanwhile, traditional empirical analysis always depends on the statistical data which can not support the study properly due to its scarcity and noises. These facts show that traditional economic theory and its method are not fully capable of explaining the public good provision problem. However, the experimental economics could solve these problems.
Through the interdisciplinary research perspective and the research method of experimental economics, this paper designs a set of public good provision mechanisms, including voluntary contribution (control experiment), the leader mechanism, strong leadership mechanism and a new type of hybrid mechanism-incentive regulatory mechanism. In the environment of China, this paper explores the different impacts of the mechanisms to the contribution level to the public goods and the payoff level from the public goods projects. Furthermore, this paper studies the improvement level of different mechanisms compared with the control experiment and the hybrid mechanism. Last but not least, this paper tries to find out the relatively effective mechanism for the public good provision problem and makes an effort to locate the position of the leader (government) in the same situation.
Based on the analysis of the experimental data, this paper tests the effects of a variety of public goods provision mechanisms in the environment in China, explores the behavioral characteristics of the participants of the experiment, and then analyzes by experimental results which public goods provision mechanism may be more helpful to improve the efficiency of public goods provision, enhance the overall welfare level, and find out what role the government should play in the public goods provision problem. The results of this study will be useful for the regulation and perfection of China's public goods provision mechanism and of practical significance in the innovation of the related theoretic field.
传统的经济理论在研究公共物品供给问题的过程中,往往从行为人完全自利的假设出发,得出较为消极的结论。而实际经验表明,对行为人完全自利的假设所得出结论往往并不一定与真实的行为人的实际决策情况相符合,有时甚至存在较大的误差,而与此同时,采用统计数据的实证手段又往往由于数据有限与噪音过多等原因而无法较好地支撑理论研究的进一步深入。这说明传统经济理论及其研究方法在现实的公共物品供给问题中的解释能力还比较有限。而实验经济学的出现正好解决了这些问题。
本文采用跨学科的研究角度,通过实验经济学的研究方法,在中国的环境中,设计了一组包括自愿贡献机制(对照实验)、领导者先行机制、强力领导者惩罚机制与一种新型混合机制——奖惩规约机制在内的公共物品供给机制实验,考察了不同机制设计对公共物品贡献与收益水平的影响；并将各机制与对照实验进行比较以考察各机制对公共物品贡献与收益水平是否有改善作用及作用大小；而后进一步将混合机制进行比较,以寻找出本次实验设计中公共物品贡献与收益水平结果最好的机制,以及领导者(即政府)这一因素对于公共物品贡献的作用。
本文通过对实验数据的分析,检验了在中国的环境中的各种公共物品供给机制的作用,发掘了参与者的行为特征,进而通过实验结果分析出何种公共物品供给机制更有利于提高我国公共物品供给效率、改善整体福利水平,以及政府在公共物品供给中应该如何定位问题。本文的研究成果对于我国规范和完善公共物品供给机制具有非常重要的现实意义,且在理论上具有一定的创新意义。
The development of foreign public good theory has profoundly influenced the development of domestic public good theory. With the development of the study, the issue of public good provision receives more and more attention in the economics literature. The issue also includes the positioning of the government in the field of public good. In the age of planned economy, Chinese government plays the only role of the public good supplier. Since the economic reform, the provision of public good depends more on market than on government. In recent years, however, the increasingly serious problem of the under-provision of public good makes the positioning issue back in the spotlight.
In the field of public good provision, traditional economic theory always makes negative conclusions on the basis of the hypothesis that all behaviors are completely selfish. However, the experience and facts are not always the same as these theoretic conclusions. Meanwhile, traditional empirical analysis always depends on the statistical data which can not support the study properly due to its scarcity and noises. These facts show that traditional economic theory and its method are not fully capable of explaining the public good provision problem. However, the experimental economics could solve these problems.
Through the interdisciplinary research perspective and the research method of experimental economics, this paper designs a set of public good provision mechanisms, including voluntary contribution (control experiment), the leader mechanism, strong leadership mechanism and a new type of hybrid mechanism-incentive regulatory mechanism. In the environment of China, this paper explores the different impacts of the mechanisms to the contribution level to the public goods and the payoff level from the public goods projects. Furthermore, this paper studies the improvement level of different mechanisms compared with the control experiment and the hybrid mechanism. Last but not least, this paper tries to find out the relatively effective mechanism for the public good provision problem and makes an effort to locate the position of the leader (government) in the same situation.
Based on the analysis of the experimental data, this paper tests the effects of a variety of public goods provision mechanisms in the environment in China, explores the behavioral characteristics of the participants of the experiment, and then analyzes by experimental results which public goods provision mechanism may be more helpful to improve the efficiency of public goods provision, enhance the overall welfare level, and find out what role the government should play in the public goods provision problem. The results of this study will be useful for the regulation and perfection of China's public goods provision mechanism and of practical significance in the innovation of the related theoretic field.
引文
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1 包括“最后通碟博弈”(ultimatum game)实验(最早由Guth, schmittberger和Schwarze (1982)提出,后由Camerer和Thaler (1995)、Roth (1995)进行了多次重复)、独裁者博弈(dictator game, Forsythe(1994)等)实验、礼物交换博弈(gift exchange game, Fehr (1993)等)实验、信任博弈(trust game, Berg 和 Dickhaut (1995))实验,公共物品博弈(public good game, ledyard (1995))等。
1 重复实验与一次即止实验的不同即在于受试者进行实验的回合数。在一次即止实验中,受试者只进行一次实验,而在重复实验的设计中,受试者则是等同于进行许多次的一次即止实验。
1 实际上,Isaac, McCue and Plott(1985)的实验是在1981年进行的,要早于Kim and Walker (1984),主要是出版商印刷延误所致,因此,在本文中对实验综述的顺序进行了调整。
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1 注：VCM：自愿供给实验；LEADER：领导者先行机制实验；LSTRONG:强力领导者惩罚机制实验;LINSTI:奖惩规约机制实验。后文同
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1 包括“最后通碟博弈”(ultimatum game)实验(最早由Guth, schmittberger和Schwarze (1982)提出,后由Camerer和Thaler (1995)、Roth (1995)进行了多次重复)、独裁者博弈(dictator game, Forsythe(1994)等)实验、礼物交换博弈(gift exchange game, Fehr (1993)等)实验、信任博弈(trust game, Berg 和 Dickhaut (1995))实验,公共物品博弈(public good game, ledyard (1995))等。
1 重复实验与一次即止实验的不同即在于受试者进行实验的回合数。在一次即止实验中,受试者只进行一次实验,而在重复实验的设计中,受试者则是等同于进行许多次的一次即止实验。
1 实际上,Isaac, McCue and Plott(1985)的实验是在1981年进行的,要早于Kim and Walker (1984),主要是出版商印刷延误所致,因此,在本文中对实验综述的顺序进行了调整。
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1 注：VCM：自愿供给实验；LEADER：领导者先行机制实验；LSTRONG:强力领导者惩罚机制实验;LINSTI:奖惩规约机制实验。后文同
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