基于行为经济学的法经济学效用函数建构
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摘要
法经济学是运用经济学的方法和理论考察、研究法律规则和法律制度的形成、结构、效果及对经济影响的学科,它是法学和经济学科际整合的边缘学科。从学科整合的一般规律和要求来说,它应该包含所整合各学科的最基本理念,是其最基本理念的综合和精炼。由于法经济学最初由经济学界创立,自然所秉持的是效率理念,这与法学的公平正义理念发生了根本冲突。理查德·波斯纳将效率与公平正义统合为效率的解决方案并未被主流法学界认可,因为抛开公平正义价值的法经济学分析丧失了法学意义上的合法性。法经济学要真正进入法律实践而实现其学科目的,其基本理念必须涵括公平正义。
必须寻找新的分析范式重构法经济学的价值,使其同时注重公平正义和效率,并在此基础上建立新的法经济学效用函数。行为经济学因而进入了法经济学学者的视野。行为经济学是以心理学、生理学、伦理学为基石,以实验的方法研究经济现象的学科。由于其理论更接近经济社会现实,从而对经济社会具有更好的解释力和预测力。
行为经济学的经典实验“最后通牒”博弈及其进一步细化的独裁者博弈和公共品博弈试验实证了公平与效率都是人类的内生偏好,这对法经济学具有重大意义。以公平和效率并重的人类偏好为前提重新构建效用函数,不但能修正仅以效率为人类偏好的主流法经济学效用函数的不足,而且还为重新构筑整个法经济学提供了理论基础。因为综合了经济学和法学的最基本理念,这种基于行为经济学而建构的新的法经济学效用函数既取得了经济学上的实证性,又取得了法学意义上的合法性。
本文从行为经济学理论中概括出公平的内涵和外延,将纷繁复杂的公平统一为规则公平和分配公平。并在此基础上展开论述其对法经济学效用函数的影响。
通过实证规则公平对效率的影响,解析效率概念的内涵及价值判断、批驳以波斯纳为首的主流法经济学的“效率至上论”的逻辑矛盾,本文论证了效率是规则公平的函数,并总结出规则公平对法经济学效用函数的影响:规则公平不但直接影响法经济学的效用,而且通过对效率的决定作用间接影响法经济学的效用函数。
分配公平对法经济学效用函数的影响表现在三个方面:分配差别的大小直接影响法经济学的效用函数;通过影响经济效率而间接影响法经济学的效用函数;通过影响规则公平而影响法经济学的效用函数。所以,规则公平虽然对分配公平具有支配作用,但分配公平也会影响规则公平,分配公平与规则公平是一对矛盾体。本文结合罗尔斯的正义两原则与阿马蒂亚·森的能力平等理论解决了分配公平与规则公平的矛盾,实现了分配公平与规则公平的平衡,即基本能力的保障和能力发展所需条件的平等是分配公平和规则公平的平衡点。
通过规则公平、分配公平对法经济学效用函数的影响的分析论证,本文认为基于行为经济学的法经济学的效用函数是由三个变量决定的:规则公平、分配公平与效率。其中,规则公平是起决定性作用的变量,分配公平是起重要作用的变量,而效率除自然因素外,是由规则公平与分配公平决定的。故在此基础上建立了基于行为经济学的法经济学效用函数,并通过分析作为公共物品的公平在供给上具有短缺的趋势,以及对“效率优先,兼顾公平”的述评而提出了政策建议:公平至上,效率自在其中。
Law and Economics is an interdisciplinary subject combining economics with law. By applying economics methods and theoretical, it focuses on the formation, structure and effectiveness of both the legal systems and legal rules and their impacts on economy. From the general rules and requirements of disciplines integration, it should include the basic ideas which are integrated and refined from the basic concepts of the various disciplines. Law and Economics was first studied in the economic field, so naturally, it should comply with the concept of efficiency. However, this is contradiction with the concept of fairness and justice in law. Richard Posner tries to solve this contradiction by melting fairness and justice into efficiency. Richard’s solution gives up fairness and justice which lost the sense of legitimacy, so it has not been accepted by the mainstream of jurisprudence. Therefore, Law and Economics must cover fairness and justice in its basic value in order to enter the legal practice and achieve its discipline purpose.
It is necessarily to look for new analytical paradigm of the reconstruction of value in Law and Economics. That should emphasize fairness and justice and efficiency simultaneously and establish a new utility function of Law and Economics on this basis. Thus Behavioral Economics entered the vision of law and economics scholars. It is based on psychology, physiology, ethics and using experimental methods to analyze the economic phenomena. Behavioral Economics is closer to real economic and social world, so it has more powerful ability in explaining and predicting.
The classic experimental "ultimatum" game, dictator game and public goods game(which are the further refinement of "ultimatum" game) in Behavioral Economics have demonstrate that fairness and efficiency are human endogenous preferences. This result is of great significance to Law and Economics. Establishing a new utility function of Law and Economics based on both fairness and efficiency can not only revise the utility function of Law and Economics mainstream emphasizing human preferences to efficiency, but also provide a theoretical foundation for Law and Economics reconstruction. By integrating the basic concepts in economics and law, the new utility function based on Behavioral Economics has achieved both empirical correct in economics and the legitimacy in law.
This paper generalizes the connotation and extension of fairness from Behavioral Economics theory. We divide the various fairness into regular fairness and distributive fairness. We also analyze its effect on the utility function of Law and Economics.
Empirical tests focus on regular fairness’s impact on efficiency. We analyze the connotation and value judgments of efficiency. In addition, we argue“Efficiency Supremacy”in the mainstream of Law and Economics represented by Posner. The results demonstrate the efficiency is the function of regular fairness. The relationships between them are: regular fairness not only has a direct impact on the utility of Law and Economics, but also has an indirect impact through its determination on efficiency.
Distributive fairness’effects on utility function of Law and Economics could be divided into three ways. First, the distribution differences have direct impact. Second, it has an indirect effect through its impact on economic efficiency. Third, it has an indirect effect through its impact on regular fairness. Therefore, regular fairness has a dominant role on distributive fairness, but distributive fairness will also affect regular fairness. In some extent, regular fairness and distributive fairness is a pair of contradictions body. By using“Rawls’s two principles of justice”and“Amartya Sen’s ability equality theory”, we solve the contradiction in regular fairness and distributive fairness. Besides, we achieve a balance between them, which could be comprehended that the balance of basic competencies required for the protection and capacity development equality of conditions and rules are the equilibrium point of regular fairness and distributive fairness.
By studying the impacts of regular fairness and distributive fairness on utility function of Law and Economics, we come to the conclusion that the utility function could be determined by three variables: regular fairness, distributive fairness and efficiency. Among them, regular fairness plays a decisive role. Distributive fairness plays an important role. Efficiency except natural factors is determined by regular fairness and distributive fairness. Combing what mentioned above, we set up utility function of Law and Economics based on the Behavioral Economics. Then we analyze the shortage supply trend of fairness which could be regained as public good. And we review the“giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness.”Finally, we come to the policy recommendations: giving priority to fairness with due to efficiency.
必须寻找新的分析范式重构法经济学的价值,使其同时注重公平正义和效率,并在此基础上建立新的法经济学效用函数。行为经济学因而进入了法经济学学者的视野。行为经济学是以心理学、生理学、伦理学为基石,以实验的方法研究经济现象的学科。由于其理论更接近经济社会现实,从而对经济社会具有更好的解释力和预测力。
行为经济学的经典实验“最后通牒”博弈及其进一步细化的独裁者博弈和公共品博弈试验实证了公平与效率都是人类的内生偏好,这对法经济学具有重大意义。以公平和效率并重的人类偏好为前提重新构建效用函数,不但能修正仅以效率为人类偏好的主流法经济学效用函数的不足,而且还为重新构筑整个法经济学提供了理论基础。因为综合了经济学和法学的最基本理念,这种基于行为经济学而建构的新的法经济学效用函数既取得了经济学上的实证性,又取得了法学意义上的合法性。
本文从行为经济学理论中概括出公平的内涵和外延,将纷繁复杂的公平统一为规则公平和分配公平。并在此基础上展开论述其对法经济学效用函数的影响。
通过实证规则公平对效率的影响,解析效率概念的内涵及价值判断、批驳以波斯纳为首的主流法经济学的“效率至上论”的逻辑矛盾,本文论证了效率是规则公平的函数,并总结出规则公平对法经济学效用函数的影响:规则公平不但直接影响法经济学的效用,而且通过对效率的决定作用间接影响法经济学的效用函数。
分配公平对法经济学效用函数的影响表现在三个方面:分配差别的大小直接影响法经济学的效用函数;通过影响经济效率而间接影响法经济学的效用函数;通过影响规则公平而影响法经济学的效用函数。所以,规则公平虽然对分配公平具有支配作用,但分配公平也会影响规则公平,分配公平与规则公平是一对矛盾体。本文结合罗尔斯的正义两原则与阿马蒂亚·森的能力平等理论解决了分配公平与规则公平的矛盾,实现了分配公平与规则公平的平衡,即基本能力的保障和能力发展所需条件的平等是分配公平和规则公平的平衡点。
通过规则公平、分配公平对法经济学效用函数的影响的分析论证,本文认为基于行为经济学的法经济学的效用函数是由三个变量决定的:规则公平、分配公平与效率。其中,规则公平是起决定性作用的变量,分配公平是起重要作用的变量,而效率除自然因素外,是由规则公平与分配公平决定的。故在此基础上建立了基于行为经济学的法经济学效用函数,并通过分析作为公共物品的公平在供给上具有短缺的趋势,以及对“效率优先,兼顾公平”的述评而提出了政策建议:公平至上,效率自在其中。
Law and Economics is an interdisciplinary subject combining economics with law. By applying economics methods and theoretical, it focuses on the formation, structure and effectiveness of both the legal systems and legal rules and their impacts on economy. From the general rules and requirements of disciplines integration, it should include the basic ideas which are integrated and refined from the basic concepts of the various disciplines. Law and Economics was first studied in the economic field, so naturally, it should comply with the concept of efficiency. However, this is contradiction with the concept of fairness and justice in law. Richard Posner tries to solve this contradiction by melting fairness and justice into efficiency. Richard’s solution gives up fairness and justice which lost the sense of legitimacy, so it has not been accepted by the mainstream of jurisprudence. Therefore, Law and Economics must cover fairness and justice in its basic value in order to enter the legal practice and achieve its discipline purpose.
It is necessarily to look for new analytical paradigm of the reconstruction of value in Law and Economics. That should emphasize fairness and justice and efficiency simultaneously and establish a new utility function of Law and Economics on this basis. Thus Behavioral Economics entered the vision of law and economics scholars. It is based on psychology, physiology, ethics and using experimental methods to analyze the economic phenomena. Behavioral Economics is closer to real economic and social world, so it has more powerful ability in explaining and predicting.
The classic experimental "ultimatum" game, dictator game and public goods game(which are the further refinement of "ultimatum" game) in Behavioral Economics have demonstrate that fairness and efficiency are human endogenous preferences. This result is of great significance to Law and Economics. Establishing a new utility function of Law and Economics based on both fairness and efficiency can not only revise the utility function of Law and Economics mainstream emphasizing human preferences to efficiency, but also provide a theoretical foundation for Law and Economics reconstruction. By integrating the basic concepts in economics and law, the new utility function based on Behavioral Economics has achieved both empirical correct in economics and the legitimacy in law.
This paper generalizes the connotation and extension of fairness from Behavioral Economics theory. We divide the various fairness into regular fairness and distributive fairness. We also analyze its effect on the utility function of Law and Economics.
Empirical tests focus on regular fairness’s impact on efficiency. We analyze the connotation and value judgments of efficiency. In addition, we argue“Efficiency Supremacy”in the mainstream of Law and Economics represented by Posner. The results demonstrate the efficiency is the function of regular fairness. The relationships between them are: regular fairness not only has a direct impact on the utility of Law and Economics, but also has an indirect impact through its determination on efficiency.
Distributive fairness’effects on utility function of Law and Economics could be divided into three ways. First, the distribution differences have direct impact. Second, it has an indirect effect through its impact on economic efficiency. Third, it has an indirect effect through its impact on regular fairness. Therefore, regular fairness has a dominant role on distributive fairness, but distributive fairness will also affect regular fairness. In some extent, regular fairness and distributive fairness is a pair of contradictions body. By using“Rawls’s two principles of justice”and“Amartya Sen’s ability equality theory”, we solve the contradiction in regular fairness and distributive fairness. Besides, we achieve a balance between them, which could be comprehended that the balance of basic competencies required for the protection and capacity development equality of conditions and rules are the equilibrium point of regular fairness and distributive fairness.
By studying the impacts of regular fairness and distributive fairness on utility function of Law and Economics, we come to the conclusion that the utility function could be determined by three variables: regular fairness, distributive fairness and efficiency. Among them, regular fairness plays a decisive role. Distributive fairness plays an important role. Efficiency except natural factors is determined by regular fairness and distributive fairness. Combing what mentioned above, we set up utility function of Law and Economics based on the Behavioral Economics. Then we analyze the shortage supply trend of fairness which could be regained as public good. And we review the“giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness.”Finally, we come to the policy recommendations: giving priority to fairness with due to efficiency.
引文
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