论心理的具身性功能模块观
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摘要
本文首先梳理了心理模块性理论的理论发展历程,之后解析、论证了当代三大经典的心理模块性理论的理论内容与理论困境,最后创新性地提出了一个新的“具身性功能模块理论”的建构策略。全文共包含七章。
在今天的认知心理学界,每当人们谈起“心理模块”的问题,几乎未有例外地会提起福多的“心理的模块性”理论,也正是福多系统而全面地提出了心理模块理论,这就使他的模块理论具有了标志性的意义,其心理模块理论的发展之路对我们建构新的心理模块理论具有重要的参考价值,所以我们在第一章前一部分首先对福多的心理模块性理论的理论成形之路做了专门的梳理,考察他如何由对20世纪主流心灵哲学的批判来立论自己新的理论思想,同时,我们也将考察他的标志性模块理论得以立论的背景理论。
心理模块理论的肇始是乔姆斯基的“先天语法”命题,乔姆斯基率先论证了可能存在某种先天性的、独立的语言机制,这正是后来的心理模块理论的概念基础；之后,福多创设了心理模块论,普遍性地论证了心理模块性的理论可能性；平克明确了模块化的“语言本能”,使得“语言模块”这个概念真正进入理论家的视野。本文在第一章的后一部分则对当代三大经典心理模块理论之间的理论承袭与争论进行了详细分析。
我们认为,目前现有的这三大经典模块理论各自都遭遇了自身的理论困境,并影响了“心理模块理论”对整个脑机制以及认知活动的解释力。在第二章中,我们对散布于乔姆斯基各著述中的模块思想进行了系统的梳理,并指出乔姆斯基模块的困境源自其用以界定模块的理论预设：(1)在结构心智观视野下,将模块看作是一种结构性存在；(2)在离身心智观视野下,将模块看作是一种“离身”的心理机制。在第三章中,分析了福多的心理模块理论的构成要素,并指出：在低级与高级的“二元”划分,以及在认知机制划分标准上的不合理都将会导致其在认知解读上的失真。在第四章中,将梳理平克于《语言本能》之后的模块论观念,厘清其语言模块的论证逻辑和理论嬗变,并从中指出他和进化心理学模块论所共同遭受的理论困难。至此,三大经典模块理论的难解之困,意味着提出建构新的理论范式的必要。
从第五章到第七章,是本论文的核心部分,在这三个核心章节里,我们试图论证了心理模块理论应有的理论走向和建构方案,并提出和建构了新的心理模块性理论——心理的具身性功能模块观。
在第五章中,我们论证了可以把无形的功能当作逻辑上的先在,而把有形的结构看作功能的逻辑结果。如果功能在逻辑上先于结构,关于心理模块讨论的重点就从结构性特征转移到了功能性特征,我们也由此提出了心理模块理论应有的功能模块论的建构思路。第六章则论证了功能性模块必然是具身性的,反过来,具身性心智也一定是模块性的。也就是说,功能性模块假说与具身心智假说分别代表了从心灵哲学和认知神经科学两个方面对第二代认知科学新进路的规划,而两种研究思路的结合则能够形成更有效能的理论,由此,我们需要回归到“脑-身体-环境相互作用的统一体上”。在第七章中,我们将上面论证的功能性模块观和具身性模块观有机地统一起来,按“范式”(Paradigms)的要求建构了新理论的基本理论框架,比如重新设定了心理模块的理论假设和核心标准,调整了心理模块的概念框架,修订和拓展了心理模块的方法论思路。至此,一个新的心理模块理论——“心理的具身性功能模块观”得以建构。
This dissertation first reviewed the development of the theory of Mind Modularity, and then analysed and demonstrated the dilemma of the three contemporary classical theories of Mind Modularity, and finally put forward an innovative new theory of Mind Modularity which is suggested from a functional and embodied perspective. The Full Text contains seven chapters.
In today's cognitive psychology, when people talk about "mind modularity", Fodor's theory on "mind modularity"will be mentioned almost with no exception. It was Fodor that put forward a systematic and comprehensive theory on "mind modularity", which made his theory a symbolic significance. To comb his theory, therefore, has important reference value in the construction of an enhanced theory and in chapter1we started with a review of the development of Fodor's theory on "mind modularity".
The onset of "mind modularity" is Chomsky's proposition of "innate grammar". Chomsky pioneered to demonstrate that there may be some innate, independent language mechanism, which is the conceptual basis of the later psychological theories of mind modularity. And then, on the creation of "mind modularity", Fodor argued for the theoretical possibility of universal mind modularity, while Pinker cleared modularized "language instinct", which actually led the concept of "language module" into the view of theorists. In the second half of Chapter l,we detailed the inherition and the argument among the three contemporary classical theories of Mind Modularity.
We declared that the existing three classical theories had respectively suffered their own theoretical difficulties and had impacted their explanatory power for the entire brain mechanisms and cognitive activities. Firstly, in the second chapter, we cleared out the scattered ideas of mind modularity from various Noam Chomsky's writings, and pointed out that the plight of Chomsky's mind modules theory came from the predefined conditions of his theory:(1)from a structural perspective, the mind modules would be seen as modularized structural exists;(2) from a disembodied perspective, the mind modules would be regarded as disembodied psychological mechanism. In the third chapter, we analyzed the elements of Fodor's theory of mind modularity, and indicated:"the dual" division of low and high level, as well as the unreasonable criteria for the classification of cognitive mechanisms, would result in distorted interpretation of cognition. In chapter4, Pinker's ideas on modularity after "The Language Instinct" had been cleared out, and therein, we clarified the logic of argumentation and the evolution of " language modules", from which we pointed out the difficulties that the theory and evolutionary psychology were both suffering. So far, three trapped classical theories on mind modularity proposed the necessity to construct a new theoretical paradigm.
Chapter5to Chapter7make the core parts of this dissertation. In these chapters, we had tried to analyse and demonstrate a reasonable developing trend and an innovative program for the theory of mind modularity, and thus constructed a new theory to suggest embodied and functional mind modularity.
In the fifth chapter, the invisible function was demonstrated as a logical preexistence, while the visible structure was regarded as the logical result of function. If function is logically prior to structure, the discussion focus on mind modularity will shift from structural characteristics to the functional ones, we thereout proposed a reasonable turn to functional mind modularity. In Chapter6, we demonstrated the functional module must be embodied in nature, in turn, the embodied mind must be of modularity. In other words, the hypotheses of functional modules and embodied mind respectively represent the new approaches of second-generation cognitive science suggested by the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. And the combination of these two hypotheses or concepts can form a more effective and more reasonable theory, therefore we need to return to the "brain-body-environment" interactions on a continuum. In Chapter7, we organically united the concepts of functional modules and embodied modules, and according to the requirements of a paradigm, rebuilt the basic theoretical framework for a new theory of "functional and embodied mind modularity", such as resetting theoretical assumptions and core standards, adjusting conceptual framework, revising and expanding the idea of methodology. So far, a new theory of Mind modularity had been constructed from a functional and embodied perspective.
在今天的认知心理学界,每当人们谈起“心理模块”的问题,几乎未有例外地会提起福多的“心理的模块性”理论,也正是福多系统而全面地提出了心理模块理论,这就使他的模块理论具有了标志性的意义,其心理模块理论的发展之路对我们建构新的心理模块理论具有重要的参考价值,所以我们在第一章前一部分首先对福多的心理模块性理论的理论成形之路做了专门的梳理,考察他如何由对20世纪主流心灵哲学的批判来立论自己新的理论思想,同时,我们也将考察他的标志性模块理论得以立论的背景理论。
心理模块理论的肇始是乔姆斯基的“先天语法”命题,乔姆斯基率先论证了可能存在某种先天性的、独立的语言机制,这正是后来的心理模块理论的概念基础；之后,福多创设了心理模块论,普遍性地论证了心理模块性的理论可能性；平克明确了模块化的“语言本能”,使得“语言模块”这个概念真正进入理论家的视野。本文在第一章的后一部分则对当代三大经典心理模块理论之间的理论承袭与争论进行了详细分析。
我们认为,目前现有的这三大经典模块理论各自都遭遇了自身的理论困境,并影响了“心理模块理论”对整个脑机制以及认知活动的解释力。在第二章中,我们对散布于乔姆斯基各著述中的模块思想进行了系统的梳理,并指出乔姆斯基模块的困境源自其用以界定模块的理论预设：(1)在结构心智观视野下,将模块看作是一种结构性存在；(2)在离身心智观视野下,将模块看作是一种“离身”的心理机制。在第三章中,分析了福多的心理模块理论的构成要素,并指出：在低级与高级的“二元”划分,以及在认知机制划分标准上的不合理都将会导致其在认知解读上的失真。在第四章中,将梳理平克于《语言本能》之后的模块论观念,厘清其语言模块的论证逻辑和理论嬗变,并从中指出他和进化心理学模块论所共同遭受的理论困难。至此,三大经典模块理论的难解之困,意味着提出建构新的理论范式的必要。
从第五章到第七章,是本论文的核心部分,在这三个核心章节里,我们试图论证了心理模块理论应有的理论走向和建构方案,并提出和建构了新的心理模块性理论——心理的具身性功能模块观。
在第五章中,我们论证了可以把无形的功能当作逻辑上的先在,而把有形的结构看作功能的逻辑结果。如果功能在逻辑上先于结构,关于心理模块讨论的重点就从结构性特征转移到了功能性特征,我们也由此提出了心理模块理论应有的功能模块论的建构思路。第六章则论证了功能性模块必然是具身性的,反过来,具身性心智也一定是模块性的。也就是说,功能性模块假说与具身心智假说分别代表了从心灵哲学和认知神经科学两个方面对第二代认知科学新进路的规划,而两种研究思路的结合则能够形成更有效能的理论,由此,我们需要回归到“脑-身体-环境相互作用的统一体上”。在第七章中,我们将上面论证的功能性模块观和具身性模块观有机地统一起来,按“范式”(Paradigms)的要求建构了新理论的基本理论框架,比如重新设定了心理模块的理论假设和核心标准,调整了心理模块的概念框架,修订和拓展了心理模块的方法论思路。至此,一个新的心理模块理论——“心理的具身性功能模块观”得以建构。
This dissertation first reviewed the development of the theory of Mind Modularity, and then analysed and demonstrated the dilemma of the three contemporary classical theories of Mind Modularity, and finally put forward an innovative new theory of Mind Modularity which is suggested from a functional and embodied perspective. The Full Text contains seven chapters.
In today's cognitive psychology, when people talk about "mind modularity", Fodor's theory on "mind modularity"will be mentioned almost with no exception. It was Fodor that put forward a systematic and comprehensive theory on "mind modularity", which made his theory a symbolic significance. To comb his theory, therefore, has important reference value in the construction of an enhanced theory and in chapter1we started with a review of the development of Fodor's theory on "mind modularity".
The onset of "mind modularity" is Chomsky's proposition of "innate grammar". Chomsky pioneered to demonstrate that there may be some innate, independent language mechanism, which is the conceptual basis of the later psychological theories of mind modularity. And then, on the creation of "mind modularity", Fodor argued for the theoretical possibility of universal mind modularity, while Pinker cleared modularized "language instinct", which actually led the concept of "language module" into the view of theorists. In the second half of Chapter l,we detailed the inherition and the argument among the three contemporary classical theories of Mind Modularity.
We declared that the existing three classical theories had respectively suffered their own theoretical difficulties and had impacted their explanatory power for the entire brain mechanisms and cognitive activities. Firstly, in the second chapter, we cleared out the scattered ideas of mind modularity from various Noam Chomsky's writings, and pointed out that the plight of Chomsky's mind modules theory came from the predefined conditions of his theory:(1)from a structural perspective, the mind modules would be seen as modularized structural exists;(2) from a disembodied perspective, the mind modules would be regarded as disembodied psychological mechanism. In the third chapter, we analyzed the elements of Fodor's theory of mind modularity, and indicated:"the dual" division of low and high level, as well as the unreasonable criteria for the classification of cognitive mechanisms, would result in distorted interpretation of cognition. In chapter4, Pinker's ideas on modularity after "The Language Instinct" had been cleared out, and therein, we clarified the logic of argumentation and the evolution of " language modules", from which we pointed out the difficulties that the theory and evolutionary psychology were both suffering. So far, three trapped classical theories on mind modularity proposed the necessity to construct a new theoretical paradigm.
Chapter5to Chapter7make the core parts of this dissertation. In these chapters, we had tried to analyse and demonstrate a reasonable developing trend and an innovative program for the theory of mind modularity, and thus constructed a new theory to suggest embodied and functional mind modularity.
In the fifth chapter, the invisible function was demonstrated as a logical preexistence, while the visible structure was regarded as the logical result of function. If function is logically prior to structure, the discussion focus on mind modularity will shift from structural characteristics to the functional ones, we thereout proposed a reasonable turn to functional mind modularity. In Chapter6, we demonstrated the functional module must be embodied in nature, in turn, the embodied mind must be of modularity. In other words, the hypotheses of functional modules and embodied mind respectively represent the new approaches of second-generation cognitive science suggested by the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. And the combination of these two hypotheses or concepts can form a more effective and more reasonable theory, therefore we need to return to the "brain-body-environment" interactions on a continuum. In Chapter7, we organically united the concepts of functional modules and embodied modules, and according to the requirements of a paradigm, rebuilt the basic theoretical framework for a new theory of "functional and embodied mind modularity", such as resetting theoretical assumptions and core standards, adjusting conceptual framework, revising and expanding the idea of methodology. So far, a new theory of Mind modularity had been constructed from a functional and embodied perspective.
引文
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