私人之间的监控与惩罚
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摘要
本文致力于研究私人之间的监控与惩罚,尤其关注私人监控和私人惩罚的社会控制功能。这一论题涉及法律经济学中的两个论域:“规范与法律的互动”以及“私人执法与公共执法的分工”。全文共有十五章(另加绪论和附论),分上下两篇,上篇(第一章到第十二章)侧重于理论研究,下篇(第十三章到第十五章)是实证研究。作者在绪论部分主要介绍其问题意识、分析工具以及写作思路,而在附论部分,作者利用前文的理论成果并通过学术批评的方式提出一个关于中国法治建设和法律实施的假说。
在第一章到第六章,作者主要讨论私人之间的监控和惩罚在何种程度上可以建立并维持一种制度,以及哪些制度可以独立于公共权力。借助前人的理论成果,作者企图论证,即便在没有任何公共权力的无政府状态,仅仅依靠私人之间的监控和惩罚也能促成一些低交易成本的社会合作,并能维持一些初级形态的社会制度。但因受阻于高昂的交易成本,私人之间的监控和惩罚无力促成一些高难度的社会合作,也无力维持高层次的、复杂的社会制度,公共惩罚由此应运而生(第一、二、三、四章)。但国家并非形成于众人之间的约定,而是起源于一个“私营暴力组织”(第六章)。作者试图把私人惩罚和公共惩罚纳入到一个逻辑上的时间顺序之中,通过分析它们各自的逻辑起源以及由此及彼的逻辑演进,可以清楚地审视私人惩罚与公共惩罚的结构和功能以及二者之间相生相克的关系。
在这一部分,作者利用霍布斯、奥尔森和艾克塞罗德三位理论家的思想成果讨论“集体行动的困境”这个古老难题,进而提出一种区别于哈耶克的“社会秩序二元论”,即把社会秩序区分为“自控型秩序”和“受控型秩序”。二者的区别是,“自控型秩序”可以发端于一小撮个体之间缔结的初始契约,然后以这个初始契约为起点自然扩展为被众人遵守的普遍规则,因此,“自控型秩序”可以独立于公共权力而自发形成;而“受控型秩序”却只能依靠公共权力来克服必然存在于众人约定中的“搭便车”和高昂交易费用(第五章)。
在第七章到第十二章,作者试图阐明,私人惩罚与公共惩罚既相互排斥又相互补充,二者的互动可以作为一个分析法律制度的研究范式。国家为维持法律实施的垄断,通常会对私人惩罚手段(尤其是私人暴力)进行限制,但为节省公共
This dissertation focuses on the social-controlled function of the supervision and punishment among individuals. The thesis refers to two theoretical areas in law and economics, that is to say "the interaction between law and social norms" and "the division between private enforcement and public enforcement". There are fifteen chapters in this dissertation. The pure theoretical analysis is presented particularly from chapter 1 to chapter 6, system analysis is emphasized from chapter 7 to chapter 12, and positive studies are displayed from chapter 13 to chapter 15. At the introduction, the author present his composing intention, reasoning approach and analyzing tool about the topic. At the end of this dissertation, a hypothesis concerning legality building and legal implementation in china is proposed on the basis of the conclusion of the preamble.The main discussion from chapter 1 to chapter 6 is that to what extent the institution of the private supervision and punishment can be established and sustained and what kinds of institution can be isolated from public power. Recurring to the theoretical fruits of the predecessors, the author attempts to demonstrate that, even under the anarchy without any public power, some social cooperation with low exchange costs can be pushed through only by the supervision and punishment among individuals and some primary social orders can be maintained too. However, because of the expensive exchange costs, the supervision and punishment among individuals can neither bring about some complicated social co-operations, nor establish any advanced and complex social systems. As a result, the public punishment has emerged as it required. The private punishment and the public punishment are tried by this dissertation to bring into one logical temporal order. By analyzing the respective logical origin of the both sides and the logical evolution from the former to the latter, we can see the structures and functions of the private punishment and the public punishment and the interaction between them clearly.In this part, the author discusses the old puzzle of "the dilemma of collective action" through the ideological achievements of the three theorists: Thomas Hobbes, Mancur Olson and Robert Axelrod, then puts forward "a theory of dualism of social order", which is different from Hayek's, that is to divide the social order into "automatic-control order" and "control-bound order". The difference between them is, "automatic-control order" can originate from the original contact which concluded among some clusters of individuals, later take it as a starting point to expand naturally into the general rules obeyed by the public. Therefore, "automatic-control order" can be isolated from the public power and formed spontaneously. However, "control-bound order" only depends on public power to overcome the free-rider and expensive exchange cost certainly existing in public agreements.
From chapter 7 to chapter 12, the author has tried to clarify that the interaction of private enforcement and public enforcement both repulsing and complementing each other can be an approach of interpreting legal system. The nation, in order to keep implementing legal monopoly, often restricts or even prohibits the private enforcement means (especially private violence); but to save the expenditure of the public enforcement resources, the nation must also put up with or even take full advantage of the private enforcement on some occasions. The limit of public enforcement resources forces the nation to take the private monitor and punishment as important social controlled resources. The design of legal system should give full play to the comparative superiority of public enforcement and private enforcement, fairly divide public controlled area and private controlled area, and strive to seek minimum of social controlled total cost. It embodies this principle to a certain degree by the Classic Liberalism of western modern politics, passive doctrine of Inactivity of Chinese ancient politics and the division of public and private laws.By this study approach, the author enunciates the new views about some traditional jurisprudence problems, including the social-controlled function of law, the division of civil and public laws, the division of private enforcement and public enforcement, and have also brought some new interpretations to several legal rules, including the property right, the rules of marriage, the rules of transaction, presumption, privacy, strict responsibility, collective responsibility, and so on. In this section, the author will prove that the interaction of the private enforcement and the public enforcement determines the bourn between law and social norms and the coincidence of them, which also influences the appearance and transitional history of many legal rules profoundly.Involved some legislative cases and judicature cases, the positive studies of this part (from chapter 13 to chapter 15) are inspections and applications for the former theoretical analysis of preceding paragraphs. In order to reveal the economic meaning of these social norms and the social-controlled function of the supervision and punishment among individuals on sustaining these social norms, the mutual cooperation social norms in country areas of Shandong province is analyzed in chapter 13. Furthermore, there is a racketeering case that looks like an adultery case in chapter 14. By analyzing this case, in which the author has tried to indicate that why the law can't place itself above all kinds of unofficial rules just because of law itself. In the trial of strength of laws, customs and "latent-rules", the key to determine "win" or "lose" is that which kind of rules own the stronger power to sustain itself. By analyzing the two legislative cases, which stick to short messages of mobile phone, the question of enforceability of law, especially how to make full use of unofficial restriction mechanics to implement law, is discussed in chapter 15.Such conclusions as follows are diffused in many chapters and centralized in the chapter 7. The implement of law must depend on some kind of enforcement mechanics but enforcement isn't non-cost. The maintenance of an effective enforcement mechanics needs the input of all kinds of resources, such as human power, financial power and so on. Private enforcement needs private investment, and public enforcement needs national investment. The latter one is an important expense
for the government fiscal budget, As we can see, a lot of public enforcement resources of nation will be consumed when any law is issued, which means legislation must be restricted by fiscal budget. The insufficient in supply of resources would lead to that parts of the laws are failed to be obeyed, or some people don't observe laws, because of which the honor of law and the reputation of public enforcement will be damaged. Depend on these conclusion, some explorative suggestions on legislation are attempted to propose as follows.(a). As a result, before a law has been formulated, the legislators should give a general budget about the number of public resources, and the sum the nation can pay for that, which can prevent the great discount of actual effect of law, or even the situation the law perform practically no function, caused by serious overdraw of public enforcement resources. Actually, however justice they are, it is improper for the nation to formulate laws that are substantially failed to enforce. Therefore, the nation need not punish the behaviors she is unable to punish; even the behaviors are obviously harmed to the society and people.(b). The anticipation of benefit to the society is not a sufficient reason for formulating the law, the legislator also must consider that how much public enforcement resources will be consumed and how much benefit can be produced when the saved resources are put into other fields (being used to support another law). Therefore, reasonable nation must maximize the efficiency of public resources: put limited public enforcement resources into the fields that can receive the largest incomes.(c). Although the nation failed to control private enforcement resource directly, by the means of the addition, reduction or withdrawal of input of public enforcement resources at a particular social-controlled field, the nation is able to control the specific distribution of private enforcement resources indirectly. The legislator must think of the respective comparative advantage of private and public enforcement, which can determine whether or what extent public resources will be put in a particular social-controlled field. If private enforcement can consume lower cost but produce more effects, the law should make more use of private enforcement, even to leave a legal blank to lay it to private-controlled field entirely. But what must be pointed out is that although national fiscal expenditure should be saved, it is improper to let individuals bear too much social-controlled expenditure, because the excessive shrink of public control field will also lead to the reduction of the whole social welfare. In a word, when laws are formulated, the legislators should try their best, taking the social benefit as a criterion, to seek for the minimization of the total cost (the sum of public cost and private cost) of social control.At the end of the theory in this dissertation, a hypothesis of legality building and legal implementation in china is proposed: the most important reason for Chinese legality building not being very successful and modern legal system not acclimatizing in Chinese society is not because of the native resources being paid no enough attention to, but because of insufficient supply in social resources (mutual trust of social members which is sustained by supervision and punishment among individuals), after all, is because of the present Chinese society facing the serious crisis of trust.
The author thinks the hypothesis about social resources can partly replace the hypothesis of native resources on the interpretation and operability.
在第一章到第六章,作者主要讨论私人之间的监控和惩罚在何种程度上可以建立并维持一种制度,以及哪些制度可以独立于公共权力。借助前人的理论成果,作者企图论证,即便在没有任何公共权力的无政府状态,仅仅依靠私人之间的监控和惩罚也能促成一些低交易成本的社会合作,并能维持一些初级形态的社会制度。但因受阻于高昂的交易成本,私人之间的监控和惩罚无力促成一些高难度的社会合作,也无力维持高层次的、复杂的社会制度,公共惩罚由此应运而生(第一、二、三、四章)。但国家并非形成于众人之间的约定,而是起源于一个“私营暴力组织”(第六章)。作者试图把私人惩罚和公共惩罚纳入到一个逻辑上的时间顺序之中,通过分析它们各自的逻辑起源以及由此及彼的逻辑演进,可以清楚地审视私人惩罚与公共惩罚的结构和功能以及二者之间相生相克的关系。
在这一部分,作者利用霍布斯、奥尔森和艾克塞罗德三位理论家的思想成果讨论“集体行动的困境”这个古老难题,进而提出一种区别于哈耶克的“社会秩序二元论”,即把社会秩序区分为“自控型秩序”和“受控型秩序”。二者的区别是,“自控型秩序”可以发端于一小撮个体之间缔结的初始契约,然后以这个初始契约为起点自然扩展为被众人遵守的普遍规则,因此,“自控型秩序”可以独立于公共权力而自发形成;而“受控型秩序”却只能依靠公共权力来克服必然存在于众人约定中的“搭便车”和高昂交易费用(第五章)。
在第七章到第十二章,作者试图阐明,私人惩罚与公共惩罚既相互排斥又相互补充,二者的互动可以作为一个分析法律制度的研究范式。国家为维持法律实施的垄断,通常会对私人惩罚手段(尤其是私人暴力)进行限制,但为节省公共
This dissertation focuses on the social-controlled function of the supervision and punishment among individuals. The thesis refers to two theoretical areas in law and economics, that is to say "the interaction between law and social norms" and "the division between private enforcement and public enforcement". There are fifteen chapters in this dissertation. The pure theoretical analysis is presented particularly from chapter 1 to chapter 6, system analysis is emphasized from chapter 7 to chapter 12, and positive studies are displayed from chapter 13 to chapter 15. At the introduction, the author present his composing intention, reasoning approach and analyzing tool about the topic. At the end of this dissertation, a hypothesis concerning legality building and legal implementation in china is proposed on the basis of the conclusion of the preamble.The main discussion from chapter 1 to chapter 6 is that to what extent the institution of the private supervision and punishment can be established and sustained and what kinds of institution can be isolated from public power. Recurring to the theoretical fruits of the predecessors, the author attempts to demonstrate that, even under the anarchy without any public power, some social cooperation with low exchange costs can be pushed through only by the supervision and punishment among individuals and some primary social orders can be maintained too. However, because of the expensive exchange costs, the supervision and punishment among individuals can neither bring about some complicated social co-operations, nor establish any advanced and complex social systems. As a result, the public punishment has emerged as it required. The private punishment and the public punishment are tried by this dissertation to bring into one logical temporal order. By analyzing the respective logical origin of the both sides and the logical evolution from the former to the latter, we can see the structures and functions of the private punishment and the public punishment and the interaction between them clearly.In this part, the author discusses the old puzzle of "the dilemma of collective action" through the ideological achievements of the three theorists: Thomas Hobbes, Mancur Olson and Robert Axelrod, then puts forward "a theory of dualism of social order", which is different from Hayek's, that is to divide the social order into "automatic-control order" and "control-bound order". The difference between them is, "automatic-control order" can originate from the original contact which concluded among some clusters of individuals, later take it as a starting point to expand naturally into the general rules obeyed by the public. Therefore, "automatic-control order" can be isolated from the public power and formed spontaneously. However, "control-bound order" only depends on public power to overcome the free-rider and expensive exchange cost certainly existing in public agreements.
From chapter 7 to chapter 12, the author has tried to clarify that the interaction of private enforcement and public enforcement both repulsing and complementing each other can be an approach of interpreting legal system. The nation, in order to keep implementing legal monopoly, often restricts or even prohibits the private enforcement means (especially private violence); but to save the expenditure of the public enforcement resources, the nation must also put up with or even take full advantage of the private enforcement on some occasions. The limit of public enforcement resources forces the nation to take the private monitor and punishment as important social controlled resources. The design of legal system should give full play to the comparative superiority of public enforcement and private enforcement, fairly divide public controlled area and private controlled area, and strive to seek minimum of social controlled total cost. It embodies this principle to a certain degree by the Classic Liberalism of western modern politics, passive doctrine of Inactivity of Chinese ancient politics and the division of public and private laws.By this study approach, the author enunciates the new views about some traditional jurisprudence problems, including the social-controlled function of law, the division of civil and public laws, the division of private enforcement and public enforcement, and have also brought some new interpretations to several legal rules, including the property right, the rules of marriage, the rules of transaction, presumption, privacy, strict responsibility, collective responsibility, and so on. In this section, the author will prove that the interaction of the private enforcement and the public enforcement determines the bourn between law and social norms and the coincidence of them, which also influences the appearance and transitional history of many legal rules profoundly.Involved some legislative cases and judicature cases, the positive studies of this part (from chapter 13 to chapter 15) are inspections and applications for the former theoretical analysis of preceding paragraphs. In order to reveal the economic meaning of these social norms and the social-controlled function of the supervision and punishment among individuals on sustaining these social norms, the mutual cooperation social norms in country areas of Shandong province is analyzed in chapter 13. Furthermore, there is a racketeering case that looks like an adultery case in chapter 14. By analyzing this case, in which the author has tried to indicate that why the law can't place itself above all kinds of unofficial rules just because of law itself. In the trial of strength of laws, customs and "latent-rules", the key to determine "win" or "lose" is that which kind of rules own the stronger power to sustain itself. By analyzing the two legislative cases, which stick to short messages of mobile phone, the question of enforceability of law, especially how to make full use of unofficial restriction mechanics to implement law, is discussed in chapter 15.Such conclusions as follows are diffused in many chapters and centralized in the chapter 7. The implement of law must depend on some kind of enforcement mechanics but enforcement isn't non-cost. The maintenance of an effective enforcement mechanics needs the input of all kinds of resources, such as human power, financial power and so on. Private enforcement needs private investment, and public enforcement needs national investment. The latter one is an important expense
for the government fiscal budget, As we can see, a lot of public enforcement resources of nation will be consumed when any law is issued, which means legislation must be restricted by fiscal budget. The insufficient in supply of resources would lead to that parts of the laws are failed to be obeyed, or some people don't observe laws, because of which the honor of law and the reputation of public enforcement will be damaged. Depend on these conclusion, some explorative suggestions on legislation are attempted to propose as follows.(a). As a result, before a law has been formulated, the legislators should give a general budget about the number of public resources, and the sum the nation can pay for that, which can prevent the great discount of actual effect of law, or even the situation the law perform practically no function, caused by serious overdraw of public enforcement resources. Actually, however justice they are, it is improper for the nation to formulate laws that are substantially failed to enforce. Therefore, the nation need not punish the behaviors she is unable to punish; even the behaviors are obviously harmed to the society and people.(b). The anticipation of benefit to the society is not a sufficient reason for formulating the law, the legislator also must consider that how much public enforcement resources will be consumed and how much benefit can be produced when the saved resources are put into other fields (being used to support another law). Therefore, reasonable nation must maximize the efficiency of public resources: put limited public enforcement resources into the fields that can receive the largest incomes.(c). Although the nation failed to control private enforcement resource directly, by the means of the addition, reduction or withdrawal of input of public enforcement resources at a particular social-controlled field, the nation is able to control the specific distribution of private enforcement resources indirectly. The legislator must think of the respective comparative advantage of private and public enforcement, which can determine whether or what extent public resources will be put in a particular social-controlled field. If private enforcement can consume lower cost but produce more effects, the law should make more use of private enforcement, even to leave a legal blank to lay it to private-controlled field entirely. But what must be pointed out is that although national fiscal expenditure should be saved, it is improper to let individuals bear too much social-controlled expenditure, because the excessive shrink of public control field will also lead to the reduction of the whole social welfare. In a word, when laws are formulated, the legislators should try their best, taking the social benefit as a criterion, to seek for the minimization of the total cost (the sum of public cost and private cost) of social control.At the end of the theory in this dissertation, a hypothesis of legality building and legal implementation in china is proposed: the most important reason for Chinese legality building not being very successful and modern legal system not acclimatizing in Chinese society is not because of the native resources being paid no enough attention to, but because of insufficient supply in social resources (mutual trust of social members which is sustained by supervision and punishment among individuals), after all, is because of the present Chinese society facing the serious crisis of trust.
The author thinks the hypothesis about social resources can partly replace the hypothesis of native resources on the interpretation and operability.
引文
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38、[美]里德雷,麦特:《美德的起源:人类本能与协作关系的进化》,刘珩译,中央编译出版社2003年版。
39、李檐:《性与法》,河南人们出版社1993年版。
40、李银河等主编:《婚姻法修改论争》,光明日报出版社1999年版。
41、梁漱溟:《中国文化要义》,学林出版社1987年版。
42、梁治平:《清代习惯法:社会与国家》,中国政法大学出版社1996年版。
43、——:“乡土社会中法律与秩序”,载《乡土社会中的秩序、公正与权威》(王铭铭、王斯福主编),中国政法大学出版社1997年版。
44、粱治文:“略论短信立法”,载《电子知识产权》,2004年第3期。
45、林喆:《法律思维学导论》,山东人民出版社2000年版。
46、 [法]卢梭:《论人类不平等的起源和基础》,李常山译,商务印书馆1962年版。
47、——:《社会契约论》,何兆武译,商务印书馆1980年版。
48、[美]洛克:《政府论》下册,叶启芳、瞿菊农译,商务印书馆1996年版。
49、[美]哈特,科斯/斯蒂格利茨等:《契约经济学》,李风圣等译,经济科学出版社1999年版。
50、 [英]哈耶克:《致命的自负》,冯克利等译,中国社会科学出版社2000年版。
51、——:《法律、立法与自由》,邓正来译,中国大百科全书出版社2000年版。
52、——:《个人主义与经济秩序》,贾湛等译,北京经济出版社1991年版。
53、[美]霍贝尔:《初民的法律:法的动态比较研究》,周勇译,中国社会科学出版社1993年版。
54、[英]霍布斯:《利维坦》,黎思复、黎廷弼译,商务印书馆1985年版。
55、[美]马古利斯,琳/萨甘,多雷昂:《神秘的舞蹈》,潘勋译,中国社会科学出版社1999年版。
56、[英]马林诺夫斯基:《原始社会的犯罪与习俗》,原江译,云南人民出版社2002年版。
57、[美]麦克尼尔:《新社会契约论》,中国政法大学出版社1994年版。
58、[美]曼昆,格里高利:《经济学原理》,三联书店、北京大学出版社1999年版。
59、[法]毛斯,马塞尔:《社会学和人类学》,余碧平译,上海译文出版社2003年版。
60、[美]奥尔森,曼瑟尔:《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社1995年版。
61、[法]皮佑,让雅克:《皮佑选集》,陈太先译,商务印书馆1985年版。
62、史尚宽:《民法总论》,中国政法大学出版社1998年版。
63、桑本谦:“论契约的不平等”,《浙江社会科学》2004第1期。
64、——:“契约为何必须遵守”,《法制与社会发展》2004年第4期。
65、——:“推定与汉德过失公式”,载《广东社会科学》2003年第4期。
66、——:“过错责任背后的经济一伦理问题”,《法学》2003第8期。
67、——:“配偶权:一种夫对妻、妻对夫的权利?”,载《山东大学学报》,2004年第1期。
68、——:“强奸何以为罪”,《法律科学》,2003第3期。
69、单民/周洪波:“论‘严打’中的若干问题”,载《法制与社会发展》,2002年第5期。
70、苏力:《阅读秩序》,山东教育出版社1999年版。
71、——:《道路通向城市:转型中国的法治》,法律出版社2004年版。
72、——:《法治及其本土资源》,中国政法大学出版社1996年版。
73、——:《送法下乡:中国基层司法制度研究》,中国政法大学出版社2000年版。
74、——:“制度变迁中的行动者:从粱祝悲剧说起”,载《比较法研究》,2003年第2期。
75、[英]斯密,亚当:《道德情操论》,蒋自强等译,商务印书馆1999年版。
76、——:《国富论》,杨敬年译,陕西人民出版社2001年版。
77、[英]斯坦,彼得/香德,约翰:《西方社会的法律价值》,王献平译,中国人民公安大学出版社1990年版。
78、田中初:《第五媒体:从通信终端到信息终端的演变》,载《中国记者》,2003年第7期。
79、汪丁丁:“制度成本,搏弈均衡与知识结构”,载《在经济学与哲学之间》,中国社会科学出版社1996年版。
80、——:“信誉:在从猿到人转变过程中的意义”,载《浙江大学学报》2003年第2期。
81、[德]韦伯,马克斯:《经济与社会》,林荣远译,商务印书馆1998年版。
82、[美]魏特夫,卡尔:《东方专制主义:对于极权力量的比较研究》,徐式谷等译,中国社会科学出版社1989年版。
83、闻均天:《中国保甲制度》,商务印书馆1935年版。
84、吴思:《血酬定律》,中国工人出版社2003年版。
85、——:《隐蔽的秩序:拆解历史弈局》,海南出版社2004年版。
86、夏勇:“民本与民权——中国权利话语的历史基础”,载《中国社会科学》2004年第5期。
87、肖建国/姚建龙:《女性性犯罪与性受害》,华东理工大学出版社2002年 版。
88、谢晖:“当代中国的乡民社会、乡规民约及其遭遇”,载《东岳论丛》2004年第4期。
89、——:“民间规范与人权保障”,载《求是学刊》2004年第6期。
90、[德]雅科布斯,京特:《规范·人格体·社会》,法律出版社2001年版。
91、严励:“‘严打’刑事政策的理性审读”,载《上海大学学报》,2004年第4期。
92、衣家齐/姚华:“从运动到法治:‘严打’刑事政策的理性趋势”,载《甘肃政法学院学报》,2004年第4期。
93、[美]伊特韦尔,约翰等编:《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典》,经济出版社1992年版。
94、张维迎:《博弈论与信息经济学》,上海人民出版社、上海三联书店2002年版。
95、——:《信息、信任与法律》,北京三联书店2003年版。
96、郑成思:《知识产权的起源》,法律思想网。
97、郑也夫:《信任论》,中国广播电视出版社2001年版。
98、郑也夫、彭泗清等:《中国社会中的信任》,中国城市出版社2003年版。
99、朱家麟:《广州“非典”事件中的手机短信——关于“第五媒体”传播特质的思考》,载《当代传播》,2003年第3期。
100、朱秀清:《第五媒体——手机短信》,载《传媒》,2003年Z1期。
101、信息产业部:《关于规范短信息服务有关问题的通知》,2004年4月15日。
102、最高法、最高检、公安部、司法部:《人体轻伤鉴定标准(试行)》,1990年。
103、《邓析子·转辞》
104、《韩非子·饰邪》
105、《吕氏春秋·审分》
106、《管子·禁藏第五十三》
107、《旧约·创世纪》
108、《孟子·公孙丑》
109、《史记·卷六八·商君列传第八》
110、《史记·秦始皇本纪》
111、《诗经·齐风·甫田》
112、《望溪先生全集·集外集》
113、《盐铁论·刑德》
114、《德国民法典》
115、《法国民法典》
116、《瑞士民法典》
117、《御成败式目》
118、《中亚述法典》
119、《汉穆拉比法典》
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2、[美]阿尔钦:“产权:一个经典注释”,载《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店、上海人们出版社2003年版。
3、[美]埃利亚斯,诺贝特:《文明的进程:文明的社会起源和心理起源的研究》(第二卷),王佩莉译,三联书店1998年版。
4、[美]埃里克森,罗伯特:《无需法律的秩序:邻人如何解决纠纷》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
5、艾瑞市场咨询有限公司:《2004年中国短信市场研究报告》(简版),2004年9月17日。
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7、[美]巴泽尔,Y:《产权的经济分析》,费方域等译,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社2003年版。
8、[美]贝克,加里/贝克,吉蒂:《生活中的经济学》,薛迪安译,华夏出版社2003年版。
9、[美]波斯纳:《法律理论的前沿》,武欣等译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
10、——:《正义/司法的经济学》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
11、——:《道德与法律理论的疑问》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版。
12、——:《性与理性》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2002年版。
13、——:《证据法的经济分析》,徐昕等译,中国法制出版社2001年版。
14、——:《超越法律》,苏力译,中国政法大学出版社2001年版。
15、[美]查尔斯·霍顿库利:《人类本性与社会秩序》,包凡一等译,华夏出版社1999年版。
16、陈兴良:“严打利弊之议”,载《河南政法管理干部学院学报》,2004年第5期。
17、——:“刑事法治视野中的刑事政策”,载《江苏社会科学》,2004年第5期。
18、[美]崔瑞德/费正清:《剑桥中国秦汉史》,杨品泉等译,中国社会科学出版社1992年版。
19、[美]戴伊,乔治/雷布斯坦因,戴维/冈特,罗伯特:《动态竞争战略》,孟立慧等译,上海交通大学出版社2003年版。
20、[英]道金斯,理查德:《自私的基因》,卢允中等译,科学出版社1981年版。
21、[法]德萨米,泰:《公有法典》,黄建华等译,商务印书馆1982年版。
22、[美]登姆塞茨,H:“关于产权的理论”,载《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店、上海人们出版社2003年版。
23、[美]恩伯,C/恩伯,M:《文化的变异——现代文化人类学通论》,杜杉杉译,辽宁人民出版社1988年版。
24、[美]法蓝克,罗伯特/普库克,菲力:《赢家通吃的社会》,席玉频译,智库股份有限公司1996年版。
25、[美]菲吕博顿,埃瑞克/瑞切特,鲁道夫:《新制度经济学》,上海财经大学出版社1998年版。
26、[美]弗里德曼,大卫:《经济学语境下的法律规则》,杨欣欣译,法律出版社2004年版。
27、[法]福柯,米歇尔:《性史》,姬旭升译,青海人民出版社1999年版。
28、[美]福山,弗朗西斯:《信任:社会道德与繁荣的建立》,李宛蓉译,远方出版社1998年版。
29、郭建安主编:《犯罪被害入学》,北京大学出版社1993年版。
30、[法]卡贝,埃蒂耶那:《伊加利亚旅行记》第2卷,李雄飞译,商务印书馆1982年版。
31、[美]卡普拉,F:《现代物理学与东方神秘主义》,四川人民出版社1984年版。
32、[美]科斯:“社会成本问题”,载《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学论文集》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社2003年版。
33、[德]康德:《法的形而上学原理》,沈叔平译,商务印书馆1991年版。
34、[美]考特,罗伯特/尤伦,托马斯:《法和经济学》,施少华等译,上海财经大学出版社2002年版。
35、[美]科尔曼,詹姆斯:《社会理论的基础》,邓方译,社会文献出版社1999年版。
36、[美]朗,丹尼斯:《权力论》,陆震纶等,中国社会科学出版社2001年版。
37、李邦友等:《性犯罪的定罪与量刑》,人民法院出版社2001年版。
38、[美]里德雷,麦特:《美德的起源:人类本能与协作关系的进化》,刘珩译,中央编译出版社2003年版。
39、李檐:《性与法》,河南人们出版社1993年版。
40、李银河等主编:《婚姻法修改论争》,光明日报出版社1999年版。
41、梁漱溟:《中国文化要义》,学林出版社1987年版。
42、梁治平:《清代习惯法:社会与国家》,中国政法大学出版社1996年版。
43、——:“乡土社会中法律与秩序”,载《乡土社会中的秩序、公正与权威》(王铭铭、王斯福主编),中国政法大学出版社1997年版。
44、粱治文:“略论短信立法”,载《电子知识产权》,2004年第3期。
45、林喆:《法律思维学导论》,山东人民出版社2000年版。
46、 [法]卢梭:《论人类不平等的起源和基础》,李常山译,商务印书馆1962年版。
47、——:《社会契约论》,何兆武译,商务印书馆1980年版。
48、[美]洛克:《政府论》下册,叶启芳、瞿菊农译,商务印书馆1996年版。
49、[美]哈特,科斯/斯蒂格利茨等:《契约经济学》,李风圣等译,经济科学出版社1999年版。
50、 [英]哈耶克:《致命的自负》,冯克利等译,中国社会科学出版社2000年版。
51、——:《法律、立法与自由》,邓正来译,中国大百科全书出版社2000年版。
52、——:《个人主义与经济秩序》,贾湛等译,北京经济出版社1991年版。
53、[美]霍贝尔:《初民的法律:法的动态比较研究》,周勇译,中国社会科学出版社1993年版。
54、[英]霍布斯:《利维坦》,黎思复、黎廷弼译,商务印书馆1985年版。
55、[美]马古利斯,琳/萨甘,多雷昂:《神秘的舞蹈》,潘勋译,中国社会科学出版社1999年版。
56、[英]马林诺夫斯基:《原始社会的犯罪与习俗》,原江译,云南人民出版社2002年版。
57、[美]麦克尼尔:《新社会契约论》,中国政法大学出版社1994年版。
58、[美]曼昆,格里高利:《经济学原理》,三联书店、北京大学出版社1999年版。
59、[法]毛斯,马塞尔:《社会学和人类学》,余碧平译,上海译文出版社2003年版。
60、[美]奥尔森,曼瑟尔:《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社1995年版。
61、[法]皮佑,让雅克:《皮佑选集》,陈太先译,商务印书馆1985年版。
62、史尚宽:《民法总论》,中国政法大学出版社1998年版。
63、桑本谦:“论契约的不平等”,《浙江社会科学》2004第1期。
64、——:“契约为何必须遵守”,《法制与社会发展》2004年第4期。
65、——:“推定与汉德过失公式”,载《广东社会科学》2003年第4期。
66、——:“过错责任背后的经济一伦理问题”,《法学》2003第8期。
67、——:“配偶权:一种夫对妻、妻对夫的权利?”,载《山东大学学报》,2004年第1期。
68、——:“强奸何以为罪”,《法律科学》,2003第3期。
69、单民/周洪波:“论‘严打’中的若干问题”,载《法制与社会发展》,2002年第5期。
70、苏力:《阅读秩序》,山东教育出版社1999年版。
71、——:《道路通向城市:转型中国的法治》,法律出版社2004年版。
72、——:《法治及其本土资源》,中国政法大学出版社1996年版。
73、——:《送法下乡:中国基层司法制度研究》,中国政法大学出版社2000年版。
74、——:“制度变迁中的行动者:从粱祝悲剧说起”,载《比较法研究》,2003年第2期。
75、[英]斯密,亚当:《道德情操论》,蒋自强等译,商务印书馆1999年版。
76、——:《国富论》,杨敬年译,陕西人民出版社2001年版。
77、[英]斯坦,彼得/香德,约翰:《西方社会的法律价值》,王献平译,中国人民公安大学出版社1990年版。
78、田中初:《第五媒体:从通信终端到信息终端的演变》,载《中国记者》,2003年第7期。
79、汪丁丁:“制度成本,搏弈均衡与知识结构”,载《在经济学与哲学之间》,中国社会科学出版社1996年版。
80、——:“信誉:在从猿到人转变过程中的意义”,载《浙江大学学报》2003年第2期。
81、[德]韦伯,马克斯:《经济与社会》,林荣远译,商务印书馆1998年版。
82、[美]魏特夫,卡尔:《东方专制主义:对于极权力量的比较研究》,徐式谷等译,中国社会科学出版社1989年版。
83、闻均天:《中国保甲制度》,商务印书馆1935年版。
84、吴思:《血酬定律》,中国工人出版社2003年版。
85、——:《隐蔽的秩序:拆解历史弈局》,海南出版社2004年版。
86、夏勇:“民本与民权——中国权利话语的历史基础”,载《中国社会科学》2004年第5期。
87、肖建国/姚建龙:《女性性犯罪与性受害》,华东理工大学出版社2002年 版。
88、谢晖:“当代中国的乡民社会、乡规民约及其遭遇”,载《东岳论丛》2004年第4期。
89、——:“民间规范与人权保障”,载《求是学刊》2004年第6期。
90、[德]雅科布斯,京特:《规范·人格体·社会》,法律出版社2001年版。
91、严励:“‘严打’刑事政策的理性审读”,载《上海大学学报》,2004年第4期。
92、衣家齐/姚华:“从运动到法治:‘严打’刑事政策的理性趋势”,载《甘肃政法学院学报》,2004年第4期。
93、[美]伊特韦尔,约翰等编:《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典》,经济出版社1992年版。
94、张维迎:《博弈论与信息经济学》,上海人民出版社、上海三联书店2002年版。
95、——:《信息、信任与法律》,北京三联书店2003年版。
96、郑成思:《知识产权的起源》,法律思想网。
97、郑也夫:《信任论》,中国广播电视出版社2001年版。
98、郑也夫、彭泗清等:《中国社会中的信任》,中国城市出版社2003年版。
99、朱家麟:《广州“非典”事件中的手机短信——关于“第五媒体”传播特质的思考》,载《当代传播》,2003年第3期。
100、朱秀清:《第五媒体——手机短信》,载《传媒》,2003年Z1期。
101、信息产业部:《关于规范短信息服务有关问题的通知》,2004年4月15日。
102、最高法、最高检、公安部、司法部:《人体轻伤鉴定标准(试行)》,1990年。
103、《邓析子·转辞》
104、《韩非子·饰邪》
105、《吕氏春秋·审分》
106、《管子·禁藏第五十三》
107、《旧约·创世纪》
108、《孟子·公孙丑》
109、《史记·卷六八·商君列传第八》
110、《史记·秦始皇本纪》
111、《诗经·齐风·甫田》
112、《望溪先生全集·集外集》
113、《盐铁论·刑德》
114、《德国民法典》
115、《法国民法典》
116、《瑞士民法典》
117、《御成败式目》
118、《中亚述法典》
119、《汉穆拉比法典》
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