面向承运人的集装箱运输系统协作管理
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摘要
随着国际贸易的进一步发展，航运业中的集装箱运输在世界经济中的地位也越来越重要，预计到2015年全球贸易的70%由集装箱运输服务来完成。集装箱运输服务链包含多个主体，如：货主、货代、承运人、租箱公司，还包括直销市场、港口、陆地车场、政府等参与者。首先，基于各个主体的独立性和利己性，他们各自为政，制定以自身利益最优为目标的集装箱运输服务决策。而此类分散式服务链所固有的双重边际性，以及信息不对称性，导致了服务链整体绩效的低下。其次，集装箱资源作为集装箱运输服务链中各主体运作协调的重要传递资源，在分散模式下也无法从服务链整体出发进行有效规划，最终造成集装箱资源和信息都无法共享，由此形成空箱率居高不下、运力资源浪费严重、利润率始终保持低位的严重后果。
针对集装箱运输服务链所面临的困扰，本研究试图通过集装箱运输服务链上各个主体之间的有效协作，来保持服务链整体最优的空集装箱量，并实现集装箱运输服务链各个主体的最优协作绩效。本研究不仅通过博弈论、运筹学等方法进行数学建模，而且涉及到经济学、金融学等相关学科理论。本文的主要研究内容为：
(1)承运人与上游租箱公司之间的纵向协作问题研究。本文引入了金融期权的相关理论，进行承运人与上游租箱公司的集装箱租赁期权契约设计。具体的决策过程分为两阶段：第一阶段，承运人根据预测信息，签订租箱契约并采购一定数量的看涨/看跌期权；第二阶段，基于集装箱需求信息的不断更新，承运人在其采购的期权范围内，执行期权。并扩展应用有约束的非线性规划方法推导分析了有上限或者下限约束的承运人最优租箱策略。
(2)承运人与下游货代之间的纵向协作问题研究。异质合作能够实现承运人与货代之间的合理分工，因此研究了基于异质合作的集装箱能力动态协调问题；并通过加深条件，面向集装箱运输系统中的三个参与者：承运人、货代、直销市场进行问题扩展研究。在引入下游直销市场以后，构建了集装箱运输系统的网络模型，并采用系统动力学仿真来分析。同时采用信息甄别原理设计了在直销市场参与下的承运人与货代之间的集装箱能力协调机制。
(3)多承运人之间的横向协作问题研究。运用进化博弈理论，研究多个集装箱承运人之间的横向协作问题，建立主体之间基于集装箱资源共享的横向联盟进化模型。研究中引进了进化博弈的渐变思路，对联盟之间的协作进行有效的监督和管控，从而保证空集装箱资源的共享机制长期稳定有效。
本研究将集装箱承运人的利润最大化为基本出发点，以集装箱数量为基本决策变量，对集装箱运输服务链中主体间的协作进行数学建模和优化求解，实现了集装箱运输服务链上各个主体之间的有效协作，并使用数值分析的方式证明了各种协调方式的高效性。
With the further development of international trade, containershipping industry is becoming more important in the world economy,which is expected that70%of global trade will be done by the containertransport at by2015. The container transportation service chain aremainly composed of shippers, freight forwarders, carriers, the containerleasing company, and also the spot market, ports, depots and thegovernment. And the relationship among them is complicated. Firstly,they often make the optimal solution from their own point of view,because they are all independent and selfish. So, the joint effect of doublemarginalization and the information asymmetry in the decentralizedcontainer transportation chain have caused the inefficiency of thecontainer transportation service chain. Secondly, the container as animportant resource in the container transportation service chain cannot beused effectively. In the decentralized container transportation chain, thecontainer capacity planning can only be made by the independentoperators, which always ignore the comprehensive planning of thetransportation chain, like sharing the empty containers among owners.The consequences are: the high rate of empty containers, the waste ofcapacity and resources, and the low profit margin.
Therefore, the different cooperation methods are proposed toimprove the profit of the container transportation service chain by thecontainer capacity planning. The research analyses the container transport service system operation mechanism: the coordination with otheroperators by the container capacity planning, the carrier can improveprofit more efficiently. The paper not only involves game theory andoptimization theory, but also concerns about the microeconomics andfinance. Standing by the side of the carrier, some interdisciplinaryresearch are done, that is the coordination mechanisms between the rentalcompany and the carrier, the carrier and the freight forwarder, the spotmarket. The brief summarize of the paper is as follows.
(1) The cooperation problem between the carrier and the containerleasing company. The concept of financial options is introduced in to thesingle-period two-stage system. The decision processes are divided intotwo stages. Stage1: The carrier places the initial leasing order andpurchases options at the first stage according to the forecastedinformation; Stage2: Options exercised decision is made based on theupdated demand information towards that at the first stage. That is to say,the carrier can exercise a part of options or all of the options at the secondstage. The problems are formulated as nonlinear programs withconstraints, afterwards, the inductions are made and correspondinganalysis is done.
(2) The cooperation problem between carrier, the downstreamforwarder and the spot market. The heterogeneous cooperation model isdeveloped to improve the profit of both carrier and forwarder. However,the capacity management and coordination model is hardly to be solvedwhen the spot market is involved. So, we introduce the system dynamicsas a critical instrument into the research and simulate dynamism of thecontainer transportation service system. Basing on information economics,a highly efficient two-stage empty container capacity planning and allocation mechanism is built.
(3) Based on the evolutionary game theory, some analysis on thecontainer transportation system with multi-carrier are considered.Monitoring mechanism for the proposed container regional shipping isproved to improve the profit of the carriers. The result shows that themechanism established in this chapter, not only can improve thecollaboration between carriers, but also help to achieve long-termequilibrium.
Based on the different disciplines, the paper presents the differentmodels from the carriers’ perspective, which use the containers quantityas the decision variable. Finally, the numerical example shows that alldecision strategies can effectively increase the profit of carrier.
针对集装箱运输服务链所面临的困扰，本研究试图通过集装箱运输服务链上各个主体之间的有效协作，来保持服务链整体最优的空集装箱量，并实现集装箱运输服务链各个主体的最优协作绩效。本研究不仅通过博弈论、运筹学等方法进行数学建模，而且涉及到经济学、金融学等相关学科理论。本文的主要研究内容为：
(1)承运人与上游租箱公司之间的纵向协作问题研究。本文引入了金融期权的相关理论，进行承运人与上游租箱公司的集装箱租赁期权契约设计。具体的决策过程分为两阶段：第一阶段，承运人根据预测信息，签订租箱契约并采购一定数量的看涨/看跌期权；第二阶段，基于集装箱需求信息的不断更新，承运人在其采购的期权范围内，执行期权。并扩展应用有约束的非线性规划方法推导分析了有上限或者下限约束的承运人最优租箱策略。
(2)承运人与下游货代之间的纵向协作问题研究。异质合作能够实现承运人与货代之间的合理分工，因此研究了基于异质合作的集装箱能力动态协调问题；并通过加深条件，面向集装箱运输系统中的三个参与者：承运人、货代、直销市场进行问题扩展研究。在引入下游直销市场以后，构建了集装箱运输系统的网络模型，并采用系统动力学仿真来分析。同时采用信息甄别原理设计了在直销市场参与下的承运人与货代之间的集装箱能力协调机制。
(3)多承运人之间的横向协作问题研究。运用进化博弈理论，研究多个集装箱承运人之间的横向协作问题，建立主体之间基于集装箱资源共享的横向联盟进化模型。研究中引进了进化博弈的渐变思路，对联盟之间的协作进行有效的监督和管控，从而保证空集装箱资源的共享机制长期稳定有效。
本研究将集装箱承运人的利润最大化为基本出发点，以集装箱数量为基本决策变量，对集装箱运输服务链中主体间的协作进行数学建模和优化求解，实现了集装箱运输服务链上各个主体之间的有效协作，并使用数值分析的方式证明了各种协调方式的高效性。
With the further development of international trade, containershipping industry is becoming more important in the world economy,which is expected that70%of global trade will be done by the containertransport at by2015. The container transportation service chain aremainly composed of shippers, freight forwarders, carriers, the containerleasing company, and also the spot market, ports, depots and thegovernment. And the relationship among them is complicated. Firstly,they often make the optimal solution from their own point of view,because they are all independent and selfish. So, the joint effect of doublemarginalization and the information asymmetry in the decentralizedcontainer transportation chain have caused the inefficiency of thecontainer transportation service chain. Secondly, the container as animportant resource in the container transportation service chain cannot beused effectively. In the decentralized container transportation chain, thecontainer capacity planning can only be made by the independentoperators, which always ignore the comprehensive planning of thetransportation chain, like sharing the empty containers among owners.The consequences are: the high rate of empty containers, the waste ofcapacity and resources, and the low profit margin.
Therefore, the different cooperation methods are proposed toimprove the profit of the container transportation service chain by thecontainer capacity planning. The research analyses the container transport service system operation mechanism: the coordination with otheroperators by the container capacity planning, the carrier can improveprofit more efficiently. The paper not only involves game theory andoptimization theory, but also concerns about the microeconomics andfinance. Standing by the side of the carrier, some interdisciplinaryresearch are done, that is the coordination mechanisms between the rentalcompany and the carrier, the carrier and the freight forwarder, the spotmarket. The brief summarize of the paper is as follows.
(1) The cooperation problem between the carrier and the containerleasing company. The concept of financial options is introduced in to thesingle-period two-stage system. The decision processes are divided intotwo stages. Stage1: The carrier places the initial leasing order andpurchases options at the first stage according to the forecastedinformation; Stage2: Options exercised decision is made based on theupdated demand information towards that at the first stage. That is to say,the carrier can exercise a part of options or all of the options at the secondstage. The problems are formulated as nonlinear programs withconstraints, afterwards, the inductions are made and correspondinganalysis is done.
(2) The cooperation problem between carrier, the downstreamforwarder and the spot market. The heterogeneous cooperation model isdeveloped to improve the profit of both carrier and forwarder. However,the capacity management and coordination model is hardly to be solvedwhen the spot market is involved. So, we introduce the system dynamicsas a critical instrument into the research and simulate dynamism of thecontainer transportation service system. Basing on information economics,a highly efficient two-stage empty container capacity planning and allocation mechanism is built.
(3) Based on the evolutionary game theory, some analysis on thecontainer transportation system with multi-carrier are considered.Monitoring mechanism for the proposed container regional shipping isproved to improve the profit of the carriers. The result shows that themechanism established in this chapter, not only can improve thecollaboration between carriers, but also help to achieve long-termequilibrium.
Based on the different disciplines, the paper presents the differentmodels from the carriers’ perspective, which use the containers quantityas the decision variable. Finally, the numerical example shows that alldecision strategies can effectively increase the profit of carrier.
引文
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