中国电信市场的结构演变、产品创新与效率评价
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摘要
基于技术创新的产业理论和“结构-行为-绩效”范式,采用DEA技术效率分析、动态计量经济分析、经济福利测算以及策略行为分析等方法,以中国电信市场为具体对象,从产业层面研究了技术创新问题,考察了技术创新与市场结构之间的互动关系,评估了技术创新对于市场效率的增进效应。
研究得出了以下的理论结论:第一,把技术创新作为市场中最重要的战略行为,导入到“结构-行为-绩效”范式,在产业层面建立了市场结构、技术创新与市场效率之间的逻辑关系框架,从而促进了技术创新与市场结构之间关系研究的程式化和系统化。第二,在分析技术创新的市场效率时,采用了动态的市场效率,而不是传统的新古典经济学的静态市场效率,以此强调了技术创新的本质在于推动经济的发展和市场的扩张,从而改进了传统的SCP效率观。第三,运用SCP框架,分析了中国电信市场的产品创新行为,从移动通信市场的小灵通,固定电话市场的IP电话,即时通信市场的QQ,宽带接入市场的ADSL,到未来电信市场的3G,考察了多个细分市场的产品创新效应,证实了市场的去垄断过程对于产品创新具有显著的推进效应,同时产品创新对于市场结构的进一步优化亦具有显著的促进作用。第四,从产业技术进步、消费者福利增进、运营商经营绩效和市场外部性效应等多个角度,建立了对市场效率的多角度分析框架;以此框架分析了中国电信市场的绩效变化,证实了随着市场结构的不断优化和产品创新的不断加强,产业的技术前沿在不断地前移,消费者的福利在不断地增进,运营商的核心能力在不断地提升,市场的外部性效应在不断地扩展,整个市场的综合绩效得到了显著的改善,市场化改革的效果十分突出。第五,依据电信市场行业统计数据,运用规范的需求函数估计方法——两阶段固定效应法,估计了中国电信市场的需求关系,取得了对于中国电信市场需求关系的经验认识,并澄清了以往对中国电信市场需求关系的误估。
研究还得出了以下的实证结论:第一,最近10多年来,在国际大环境和国内小环境的双重作用下,中国电信市场经历了一个巨大的市场变革。这种变革以1994年“中国联通”的组建为发端,以1998年国家信息产业部的成立为转折,最终形成了目前“5+1”的电信市场格局。第二,回顾中国电信市场的发展历史,特别是最近10余年来的变革历程,可以说,集中体现了一个主旨,那就是市场结构的持续优化。通过市场结构的不断优化,激励了市场的创新行为,电信市场的创新能力得到了显著的提升,进而显著地改善了市场的绩效。第三,电信市场创新能力的提升,主要表现在电信产品的推陈出新上面。最具有典型意义的电信产品创新当属小灵通的出现。小灵通以相对落后的技术,成功地进入到中国的移动电话市场,并显著地促进了中国移动电话市场的竞争,使得移动电话市场的效率得到了空前的提升。第四,有重要影响的电信产品创新还有,替代传统固定长途电话市场的IP电话,基于互联网的即时通信技术,基于固定电话网的宽带接入技术等,这些产品的出现都具有划时代的创新意义。第五,3G作为一种全新的移动通信技术,属于剧烈的综合性复杂技术创新,它带动了一系列相关技术的创新,同时也受制于配套技术的不完善,至今仍然处于前商业化时期,但是3G无疑代表了未来电信产品创新的方向。第六,电信市场的绩效改善,首先表现在电信产业的技术进步上面。近年来,中国的电信产业经历了一个持续的技术进步过程,这具体表现在电信市场DEA有效前沿的持续前移上面。电信市场持续的技术进步,带来了电信市场持续的繁荣与发展。第七,消费者福利的巨大增进,也是电信市场绩效改善的重要表现。电信市场消费者福利的增进,主要体现在电信产品价格的持续下降和产品品种花色的日益多样化。第八,由于竞争的引入,电信企业的获利空间会有所下降,但是,竞争给企业带来了创新的动力,企业的竞争实力和独立生存能力在不断的创新过程中得到了显著的提升,这对于WTO之后的企业来说无疑是一种福利的净提升。第九,电信市场是具有巨大外部性的市场,如对GDP和就业的贡献,对相关产业的辐射带动作用,电信普遍服务等。
研究结果对于理解中国电信产业的市场化改革道路,特别是中国电信市场的去垄断过程,探讨中国电信市场的发展规律,具有重要的应用价值和政策意义,对于政府部门制订相关的电信产业发展政策,引导中国电信产业的健康快速发展亦有裨益。对于电信产品创新的研究,还将有助于促进电信企业的技术创新和产品营销,有利于提升电信企业的综合竞争能力。研究所揭示的规律,对于其他类似的行业如交通、邮政、广播电视、公用事业等的市场化改革亦具有参考作用。
The dynamic relationships among innovation, market structure and market performance in Chinese telecom market were studied with DEA models, econometric analysis and game theory methods based on SCP paradigm. It is showed theoretically that the systematic approaches to the relations among innovation, market structure and market performance were boosted through inducing innovation to SCP paradigm and establishing a logic framework about innovation, market structure and market performance. And the dynamic efficiencies instead of static efficiencies were adopted in SCP market performance analysis, which emphasizes the ipmpacts of innovation on economic growth and market expanding and hence improves the traditional SCP efficiency concepts.
Under the SCP framework, the innovation behaviors in Chinese telecom market were reviewed segmentationally from Xiaolingtong in mobile telecom market, IP telephone in long-distant fixed telecom market, QQ in instant messaging market, ADSL in broad band connecting market, to 3G in future telecom market. It is demonstrated that the product innovation processes were advanced remarkably by demonopolization in market structures, and the market structures were notably optimized by product innovation. At the same time, the multangular analyses on the market performance were set up including industrial technic advancement, consumens’surplus enhancement, firms’operative performance and market extenalities, and were used to evaluate the Chinese telecom market performances, which confirm a significant forward moving in productive efficient frontier, a great increase in consumers’welfare, a huge upgrade of operators’core competence and a full expandation of market extenalities, and then prove a distinct jump of market total performance and a fruitfull market reform effects. As a result of the analyses, the demand functions of Chinese telecom market was estimated through two stage fixed effect method, by which the improper understandings about demand relations in Chinese telecom market were corrected.
The research above also demonstrated a world-shaking change for Chinese telecom market whether in its structure or in its product innovation in the latest decade or more, which reveals a typical process from planned economy to market economy. It is showed that the structure transformation of Chinese telecom market started in 1994 when China Unicom was born, and came into turning point in 1998 when the Ministry of Information Industry was set up, and eventually formed the“5+1”market, which incarnates a substance of persisting optimization in the market structure. The innovative activities of the market were promoted and the capabilities of market innovation were upgraded remarkably through the continuous optimization of the market structure, and hence the market performance was improved evidently. The exaltation of innovative capabilities in Chinese telecom market was mostly represented in the product innovation, and one of the most typical product innovations is‘Xiaolingtong’, which, with a relative low-grade technology, has entered into Chinese mobile telephone market triumphantly, and boosted the degree of competition and efficiency in that market observably. The market performance improvement was displayed by the industrial technological progress, the consumers’welfare increase, the enterprises’operative efficiency and the market externalities.
But whether the reforms in Chinese telecom market has been perfect or not? The answer is not in spite of its acquiring a huge success. Firstly, the“5+1”structure consists of very different segmentation markets in which the market powers are still very great and far from efficient competitions. Secondly, there has existed a high degree of regulation in Chinese telecom market, and the licenses given by government have become entering barrier to the market, which blocks the optimization by market itself. Thirdly, it is necessary to search a balance point between foreign technology adoption and independent innovation, and between international intellectual property rights protection and national R&D supports, and it may bring hell and gone negative effects for the future of Chinese telecom market if treated inappropriately.
The research results could help us to understand the reform paths especially the demonopolization process of Chinese telecom market, and support government to make industrial policies, and promote the development of the industry. The study on product innovation could also raise the complex competitive abilities of telecom operators. The laws hinted in the paper might be analogous to other markets such as communications, posts, broadcast and television, and public utilities.
研究得出了以下的理论结论:第一,把技术创新作为市场中最重要的战略行为,导入到“结构-行为-绩效”范式,在产业层面建立了市场结构、技术创新与市场效率之间的逻辑关系框架,从而促进了技术创新与市场结构之间关系研究的程式化和系统化。第二,在分析技术创新的市场效率时,采用了动态的市场效率,而不是传统的新古典经济学的静态市场效率,以此强调了技术创新的本质在于推动经济的发展和市场的扩张,从而改进了传统的SCP效率观。第三,运用SCP框架,分析了中国电信市场的产品创新行为,从移动通信市场的小灵通,固定电话市场的IP电话,即时通信市场的QQ,宽带接入市场的ADSL,到未来电信市场的3G,考察了多个细分市场的产品创新效应,证实了市场的去垄断过程对于产品创新具有显著的推进效应,同时产品创新对于市场结构的进一步优化亦具有显著的促进作用。第四,从产业技术进步、消费者福利增进、运营商经营绩效和市场外部性效应等多个角度,建立了对市场效率的多角度分析框架;以此框架分析了中国电信市场的绩效变化,证实了随着市场结构的不断优化和产品创新的不断加强,产业的技术前沿在不断地前移,消费者的福利在不断地增进,运营商的核心能力在不断地提升,市场的外部性效应在不断地扩展,整个市场的综合绩效得到了显著的改善,市场化改革的效果十分突出。第五,依据电信市场行业统计数据,运用规范的需求函数估计方法——两阶段固定效应法,估计了中国电信市场的需求关系,取得了对于中国电信市场需求关系的经验认识,并澄清了以往对中国电信市场需求关系的误估。
研究还得出了以下的实证结论:第一,最近10多年来,在国际大环境和国内小环境的双重作用下,中国电信市场经历了一个巨大的市场变革。这种变革以1994年“中国联通”的组建为发端,以1998年国家信息产业部的成立为转折,最终形成了目前“5+1”的电信市场格局。第二,回顾中国电信市场的发展历史,特别是最近10余年来的变革历程,可以说,集中体现了一个主旨,那就是市场结构的持续优化。通过市场结构的不断优化,激励了市场的创新行为,电信市场的创新能力得到了显著的提升,进而显著地改善了市场的绩效。第三,电信市场创新能力的提升,主要表现在电信产品的推陈出新上面。最具有典型意义的电信产品创新当属小灵通的出现。小灵通以相对落后的技术,成功地进入到中国的移动电话市场,并显著地促进了中国移动电话市场的竞争,使得移动电话市场的效率得到了空前的提升。第四,有重要影响的电信产品创新还有,替代传统固定长途电话市场的IP电话,基于互联网的即时通信技术,基于固定电话网的宽带接入技术等,这些产品的出现都具有划时代的创新意义。第五,3G作为一种全新的移动通信技术,属于剧烈的综合性复杂技术创新,它带动了一系列相关技术的创新,同时也受制于配套技术的不完善,至今仍然处于前商业化时期,但是3G无疑代表了未来电信产品创新的方向。第六,电信市场的绩效改善,首先表现在电信产业的技术进步上面。近年来,中国的电信产业经历了一个持续的技术进步过程,这具体表现在电信市场DEA有效前沿的持续前移上面。电信市场持续的技术进步,带来了电信市场持续的繁荣与发展。第七,消费者福利的巨大增进,也是电信市场绩效改善的重要表现。电信市场消费者福利的增进,主要体现在电信产品价格的持续下降和产品品种花色的日益多样化。第八,由于竞争的引入,电信企业的获利空间会有所下降,但是,竞争给企业带来了创新的动力,企业的竞争实力和独立生存能力在不断的创新过程中得到了显著的提升,这对于WTO之后的企业来说无疑是一种福利的净提升。第九,电信市场是具有巨大外部性的市场,如对GDP和就业的贡献,对相关产业的辐射带动作用,电信普遍服务等。
研究结果对于理解中国电信产业的市场化改革道路,特别是中国电信市场的去垄断过程,探讨中国电信市场的发展规律,具有重要的应用价值和政策意义,对于政府部门制订相关的电信产业发展政策,引导中国电信产业的健康快速发展亦有裨益。对于电信产品创新的研究,还将有助于促进电信企业的技术创新和产品营销,有利于提升电信企业的综合竞争能力。研究所揭示的规律,对于其他类似的行业如交通、邮政、广播电视、公用事业等的市场化改革亦具有参考作用。
The dynamic relationships among innovation, market structure and market performance in Chinese telecom market were studied with DEA models, econometric analysis and game theory methods based on SCP paradigm. It is showed theoretically that the systematic approaches to the relations among innovation, market structure and market performance were boosted through inducing innovation to SCP paradigm and establishing a logic framework about innovation, market structure and market performance. And the dynamic efficiencies instead of static efficiencies were adopted in SCP market performance analysis, which emphasizes the ipmpacts of innovation on economic growth and market expanding and hence improves the traditional SCP efficiency concepts.
Under the SCP framework, the innovation behaviors in Chinese telecom market were reviewed segmentationally from Xiaolingtong in mobile telecom market, IP telephone in long-distant fixed telecom market, QQ in instant messaging market, ADSL in broad band connecting market, to 3G in future telecom market. It is demonstrated that the product innovation processes were advanced remarkably by demonopolization in market structures, and the market structures were notably optimized by product innovation. At the same time, the multangular analyses on the market performance were set up including industrial technic advancement, consumens’surplus enhancement, firms’operative performance and market extenalities, and were used to evaluate the Chinese telecom market performances, which confirm a significant forward moving in productive efficient frontier, a great increase in consumers’welfare, a huge upgrade of operators’core competence and a full expandation of market extenalities, and then prove a distinct jump of market total performance and a fruitfull market reform effects. As a result of the analyses, the demand functions of Chinese telecom market was estimated through two stage fixed effect method, by which the improper understandings about demand relations in Chinese telecom market were corrected.
The research above also demonstrated a world-shaking change for Chinese telecom market whether in its structure or in its product innovation in the latest decade or more, which reveals a typical process from planned economy to market economy. It is showed that the structure transformation of Chinese telecom market started in 1994 when China Unicom was born, and came into turning point in 1998 when the Ministry of Information Industry was set up, and eventually formed the“5+1”market, which incarnates a substance of persisting optimization in the market structure. The innovative activities of the market were promoted and the capabilities of market innovation were upgraded remarkably through the continuous optimization of the market structure, and hence the market performance was improved evidently. The exaltation of innovative capabilities in Chinese telecom market was mostly represented in the product innovation, and one of the most typical product innovations is‘Xiaolingtong’, which, with a relative low-grade technology, has entered into Chinese mobile telephone market triumphantly, and boosted the degree of competition and efficiency in that market observably. The market performance improvement was displayed by the industrial technological progress, the consumers’welfare increase, the enterprises’operative efficiency and the market externalities.
But whether the reforms in Chinese telecom market has been perfect or not? The answer is not in spite of its acquiring a huge success. Firstly, the“5+1”structure consists of very different segmentation markets in which the market powers are still very great and far from efficient competitions. Secondly, there has existed a high degree of regulation in Chinese telecom market, and the licenses given by government have become entering barrier to the market, which blocks the optimization by market itself. Thirdly, it is necessary to search a balance point between foreign technology adoption and independent innovation, and between international intellectual property rights protection and national R&D supports, and it may bring hell and gone negative effects for the future of Chinese telecom market if treated inappropriately.
The research results could help us to understand the reform paths especially the demonopolization process of Chinese telecom market, and support government to make industrial policies, and promote the development of the industry. The study on product innovation could also raise the complex competitive abilities of telecom operators. The laws hinted in the paper might be analogous to other markets such as communications, posts, broadcast and television, and public utilities.
引文
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