基于纳税人行为的税务稽查制度研究
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摘要
根据公共财政理论,税收体现为公共产品的“价格”,围绕税款的征集和使用就形成了纳税人、征税人与用税人三种社会角色,而贯穿于三者之间的就是公共产品。其中:国家使用税款,向社会公众提供公共物品和服务;人民纳税,以换取公共产品的消费权;征税人则是受国家委托,向民众征集税收的具体执行者,其征税行为为供给公共产品提供了资金来源。三者的关系表现为:纳税人与国家之间形成一种利益交换的契约关系;国家与征税人呈现一种委托——代理关系;征税人和纳税人是税收征纳过程中直接对立的双方,二者权利与义务虽不相同,但各自的行为都受到税法的制约。它们既有共同的集体利益,又有独立的个体利益。因此纳税人在享受公共产品的同时不可避免地希望能够通过“免费搭车”避免个人利益受到损害。伴随着纳税不遵从行为的产生,税务稽查行为就作为征税人查错防弊的一种手段应运而生。同时,由于国家与征税人之间存在代理层次多且委托人多的特点,“内部人控制”问题难以避免,使得税务稽查行为可能会偏离最终委托人的利益,不能保证国家利益和纳税人利益完全实现。这样,社会公众的个体理性和集体理性就存在着矛盾与冲突。“解决个体理性与集体理性之间冲突的办法不是否认个体理性,而是设计一种机制,在满足个体理性的前提下达到集体理性。”“如果一种制度安排不能满足个体理性的话,就不可能实行下去。”1由此产生了税务稽查制度。笔者从博弈论的角度提出:税务稽查制度是一套在多次博弈之后形成的,使征纳双方在发生互动关系时能确定地了解税务稽查行为方式的行为准则。
由于国家、征税人、纳税人三个具有独立利益主体之间的互动影响及复杂的外部税收环境,要想保证国家税收利益的完全实现不具可能性。因此,税务稽查制度的实际目标不应是单纯增加国家税收,而应是规范税务稽查行为。这一方面能抑止纳税人的不遵从行为,另一方面通过制度安排解决个体理性与集体理性的冲突,使国家、征税人与纳税人三者实现利益均衡,减少税收交易成本。而税务稽查制度绩效受到纳税人行为、稽查行为及国家法律约束三方面因素的影响。就稽查行为来看,稽查行为不当(稽查不力与过度稽查)会破坏均衡,增加成本。稽查不力会导至国家税收减少;过度稽查会增加稽查成本,损害国家利益,同时对被查的纳税人增加经济负担,造成法理不公平。导致稽查行为不当的原因可能有稽查人员的素质、稽查政策的选定、激励与约束机制不健全、信息不完全等主客观因素。
基于此,本论文以提高税务稽查制度绩效为设想目标,以稽查制度与纳税人行为之间的相互影响为主线,将理论和实证的结论应用于实际,并对未来税务稽查制度改革的政策取向进行探讨。循着上述思路,正文部分共分为七章:
第一章,分别对国内外税务稽查制度及纳税遵从行为相关研究进行简要述评。主要包括制度的内涵及起源、税务稽查制度,以及纳税人遵从行为的理论研究和实证研究。
第二章,税务稽查制度的基本理论基础。首先,对公共财政理论视角下的税收征纳关系及税收的交易成本构成进行分析。然后,从博弈论的角度研究税务稽查制度的起源,进而分析稽查制度的构成。最后,从税务稽查与征收管理各组织的不同分工出发,分析稽查组织在税务管理体系中的地位,指出稽查制度的三大功能及其对构建和谐征纳关系的重要性。
第三章,运用新制度经济学的制度变迁理论,分析我国税务稽查制度的变迁过程。在对有关税收征管制度的历史文献分析基础上,分析我国税务稽查制度的变迁路径,并指出我国税务稽查制度变迁是以征税人为初级行动团体,以税收的交易成本最低为原则,不断重新配置税务组织、调整各组织权利义务和变革相关的征纳税程序的过程。
第四章,运用预期效用理论分析税务稽查制度对纳税人不遵从行为的影响。本章假设纳税人与税务稽查人员都是“经济人”,他们追求预期效用最大化。在此前提下,从一个简单的纳税人不遵从行为基本模型开始,逐一增加影响纳税人遵从的因素:包括纳税人对税法的理解度、税务稽查概率政策、税务稽查能力以及法律约束,从而分析总结出税务稽查制度对抑止纳税人不遵从行为的功效。
第五章,通过对纳税人和税务人员分别进行问卷调查,检验第四章的数学模型结论的适用性,以及调查征纳双方对当前的税务稽查制度的评价。调查结果显示:(1)第四章的结论在我国具有适用性;(2)税务稽查组织与纳税人双方的交易成本对于他们各自的行为都将产生影响;(3)尽管征纳双方对现行税务稽查制度进行了肯定,但也认为其抑止纳税人不遵从行为及激励和约束稽查人员行为的功效还应该有更大的发挥空间。
第六章,对我国税务稽查制度进行绩效评价。笔者首先提出在无法获得相关数据的条件下,将税务稽查选案的有效性作为稽查制度绩效评价的标准,即将能否优选稽查最不遵从的纳税人作为判定稽查选案政策有效性的标志。然后,利用概率论构造了一个稽查选案政策与纳税人不遵从行为关系的模型。通过对1996-2002年的统计数据进行实证分析,笔者发现:这一时期我国税务稽查选案政策缺乏有效性,稽查选案优先选择的是最遵从的纳税人。
第七章,在前面各章分析的基础上,展望未来稽查制度环境的变化。由于正在发生或即将发生的制度环境变化将影响稽查制度的需求,为了避免制度供需失衡,笔者认为必须未雨绸缪,并指出,我国应在税务稽查组织结构、实施机制及人力资源管理三方面进行改革,以适应变化的制度环境。
本文在前人的丰硕成果基础上,从如下几方面做了有益的尝试,力图有所突破:
(1)研究视角的创新。本文始终把税务稽查制度放到国家、征税人、纳税人三者互动的关系中去进行考察。这种研讨拓宽了研究视角,把过去主要研究税务稽查的工作程序和相关的法律法规,拓展到对主体“人”的研究,并对纳税人最容易产生不遵从行为的情况进行了数量分析,并通过实证和规范研究分析了如何提高税务稽查绩效等问题,不仅尝试拓宽了理论的深度和广度,由于提出的结论具有较大的可操作性,对我国的政策实践也具有重要的现实意义。
(2)研究内容的创新。研究视角的创新必然带来研究内容的创新。笔者创新地从制度演化和纳税人行为变化的角度对影响税务稽查制度变迁的因素进行了动态考察。通过对税务稽查制度供需进行分析,提出改革开放以来,纳税人的“经济人”性质逐渐加强,机会主义行为增加,税务稽查的制度需求增加;国家、税务稽查组织及纳税人都是税务稽查制度变迁的主体,但征税人是初级行动团体,它推动了税务稽查制度的创新。因此不论是当初的制度建立还是将来的制度完善,都要以征税人为主体来推动。
(3)研究方法创新,本文是国内较早运用实证方法分析税务稽查制度绩效的一项研究。本文运用问卷调查及计量分析方法,从个体和整体两个层次对我国税务稽查制度绩效进行了评价,并得出结论:当前我国税务稽查制度的激励与约束机制弱,且征纳双方在税务稽查中的交易成本过大,因此现行稽查制度急需改进。
(4)计量模型创新,本文创新地利用概率论构造了一个评价稽查选案政策有效性的数学模型。该模型的理论依据是,税务稽查的功能首先是抑制纳税人不遵从行为,如果能优先选择最不遵从的纳税人就会使稽查绩效提高。因此稽查选案是否随机,是否能优先选择最不遵从的纳税人,则成为了评价稽查选案政策有效性和判断税务稽查制度绩效的标准。该模型的设计思路是,鉴于稽查是对全体纳税人中抽出一部分纳税人进行稽查,所以笔者采用了抽样统计的概念建立模型测试税务稽查非随机选案的可能性。又由于纳税人不遵从水平的信息不易获得,本模型允许估计被稽查的纳税人和未被稽查的纳税人的不遵从水平。同时本模型还考察了影响纳税人跨时期不遵从水平的因素,包括纳税人感觉到的被稽查的可能的变化及其它系统因素。当然,本文也存在一些缺陷与不足。今后需要进一步研究的主要有以下两方面:
(1)税务稽查制度包括正式约束与非正式约束两方面。正式约束主要是指税务稽查制度的立法设计和稽查体制的具体选择。非正式约束是指采取相应的措施,提高纳税人的纳税意识及税务稽查人员的服务意识,树立双方的信用意识。非正式约束对提高我国税务稽查人员与纳税人的税收意识、提高税务稽查组织与纳税人的制度需求程度、降低道德风险和逆选择等都具有非常重要的意义。因此可以说,非正式约束的供给充足与否,将直接影响正式约束的供给和实施。但提高纳税人的纳税意识、税务稽查人员的服务意识和双方的信用意识,要真正在实践中收到实效还存在较大困难。由于时间关系以及的确尚未找到较好的思路,本文对非正式约束的供给未进行深入研究,这是论文的一大缺憾。
(2)由于我国关于税务稽查工作评价标准主要还是在检查面、处罚率、入库率等几率,还缺乏其它指标如结案日期,工作时数等的配合,受数据资料所限,本文只选用了选案的有效性这一指标作为我国税务稽查制度绩效的标准,因此可能导致分析不够全面。
According to theories in public finance, tax is the price of public products based on which the relationship among the taxpayer, the tax collector and tax user is formed. The state is the tax user who provides public products and services to the public while citizens pay tax in exchange for the right to consume public products. The tax collectors are agents of the state to collect tax from citizens, whose tax collecting behavior provides capital for public products. The relationship between the state and the taxpayer is in fact a benefit exchange relationship based on contract. In the tax collection process, the taxpayer and the tax collector are standing on two opposite sides, whose rights and obligations differ but behaviors are restricted by the taxation law. The taxpayer and collector share common collective interest with independent individual benefits in the same time. Therefore, the taxpayer inevitably hopes to enjoy“free riding”to avoid infringement of individual benefits while enjoys public products. However, the unique features of non-exclusiveness and non-competitiveness of public products inevitably brings about the problems of free riding and prisoner’s dilemma in taxpaying behaviors. Although tax collection is related with everyone’s welfare, still people have strong motivations to evade tax. Therefore, tax auditing is a means for tax collection organizations to monitor taxpayers’tax paying behaviors with the aim to punish those who do not behave properly in order to ensure justice in tax collection process and that the state can collect as much tax as possible. Tax auditing is not only a means for tax collectors to manage the taxpayer’s behaviors, but also a relationship of interest allocation between the collector and the payer. By analysis with the game theory, the author has concluded that tax auditing institution is a set of institution formed after many times of games, a set of behavioral mode for the tax collector and payer to obey in interaction..
Since the state, the tax collector and taxpayer are three independent benefit entities with interactive influences and the exterior environment is complicated, it is impossible to fully ensure the taxation benefit of the state. Therefore, the practical objective of the taxation auditing institution should be not only purely increase national tax revenue, but also regulate tax auditing behavior. This can on the one hand check the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer and on the other hand solve the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality through institutional arrangement in order to ensure the benefit balance among the state, the tax collector and the taxpayer, thus reducing tax collection transaction cost. The performance of the tax auditing institution is liable to taxpayer behavior, tax auditing behavior and national legislation restrictions. Judging from the tax auditing behavior, improper tax auditing behavior would break the balance and increase cost. Inadequate tax auditing will lead to the reduction of state tax revenue while excess tax auditing will not only increase audit cost and lead to harm the state interests, but also increase taxpayer burden and lead to legal unfair. There are some factors which lead to improper auditing behavior: auditors’quality, audit policy, imperfect incentive and restrictive mechanism, incomplete information, and etc.
Based on this, the author discussed the future policy orientation for tax auditing institution reform assuming the improvement of tax auditing institution performance as objective and taking the interactive relation between tax auditing institution and taxpayer behaviors as main clue, applying theories in practice in the same time. The main body is divided into seven chapters as follows:
In chapter one, the author briefly reviewed the research literature on institution and taxpayer compliance behavior, including the connotation and origin of institution, domestic research on functions of tax auditing, theoretical and empirical studies on taxpayer compliance behavior.
In the second chapter, the author generalized the fundamental theories in tax auditing institution. Firstly, I analyzed the tax paying and collecting relationship from the perspective of public finance theories and the components of transaction cost in tax collection process. Then, the thesis studied the origin of tax auditing institution from the perspective of the game theory and further analyzed the structure of tax auditing institution on this basis. Finally, from the perspective of division of labor between the tax auditing organization and other organizations in the tax administration system, the thesis points out the position of tax auditing organization in the tax collection management system, the three basic functions of tax auditing institution and their importance in constructing a harmonious relationship between the tax collector and the taxpayer.
In the third chapter, the author adopted the transformation theory in New Institutional Economics to analyze the transformation process of China’s tax auditing institution. Based on literature analysis on tax collection and administration institution, the thesis has pointed out the transformation path of Chinese tax collection institution and argues that the Chinese tax auditing institution transformed in a process of continuously restructuring tax organization, adjusting the rights and obligations of various organizations and related procedures based on the principle of minimum transaction cost with the pay collector as the initial action group.
In chapter four, the author analyzed the impact of tax auditing institution on the incompliant behavior of taxpayers with the expected utility theory. The thesis assumed that both the taxpayers and the tax auditors are“economic beings”seeking after maximization of expected utilities in new institutional economics. Based on this, starting from the basic model of incompliant behavior of the taxpayer, the thesis added the other factors affecting the incompliant behaviors of the taxpayer step by step: the taxpayer’s comprehension of the taxation stipulations, tax auditing possibility policy, tax auditing competence and legal limitations. Through comparative static analysis of various models, the thesis concluded the effects of tax auditing institution in checking incompliant behavior of the taxpayers.
In chapter five, the author then went on to test the applicability of the mathematical models in practical Chinese environment by conducting field study with questionnaires. The results have shown that the conclusions in chapter four is applicable in China and the transaction cost of both the tax auditing organization and the taxpayer influences their respective behaviors. The results have also shown that there still is room for improvement in checking the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer and motivating and restraining the behaviors of tax auditors.
In chapter six, the study proposed a performance appraisal criterion of the Chinese tax auditing institution. In view of hard access of relevant data, effectiveness of selecting returns in audition process was used as the criterion of evaluate the performance of tax auditing institution. In other words, whether or not the most incompliant taxpayer can be screened and audited by the tax auditors is the symbol for effective tax auditing screening policy. Furthermore, using probability theory the study conducted a model to test the auditing selecting policy and concluded the selecting returns process was not very effective through 1996 to 2002.
In chapter seven, the author looks forward to the future changes in the environment of tax auditing institution. Because the changing institutional environment will surely affect the demand of tax auditing institution, in order to avoid imbalance of demand and supply, the author thinks it is necessary to prepare for the changes and thus making some suggestions on the reforms in tax auditing organizational structure, implementation organism and human resources management.
Based on previous research, the author has made some attempts in innovation as follows:
(1)Innovation in terms of research perspectives: The author always studied the tax auditing institution in the context of the interactive relationship among the state, tax collecting organizations and the taxpayer. This study has broadened the horizon of the research by extending the previous research focused mainly on working procedures of tax auditing and relative regulations to the study on the subject“man”. The author has also conducted quantitative analysis on the situations most likely to generate incompliant behavior, conducted empirical and qualitative research on how to improve the work performance of tax auditing, not only extending the depth and scope of theoretical research, but also providing feasible policy suggestions for the decision makers.
(2)Innovation of research content: New research perspectives surely bring about new research contents. The author innovatively conducted a dynamic research on the influential factors of tax auditing institution transformation from the perspective of institution evolution and behavioral changes of the taxpayer. Through analysis of the demand and supply of tax auditing institution, the author has concluded that the taxpayer’s nature of the“economic being”has been strengthened and opportunistic behavior increased, as a result the demand for tax auditing institution also has been growing since the economic reform. The subject of the tax auditing institution is the state, tax auditing organization and the taxpayer. The tax collector is the initial action group, which pushes forward the institutional innovation in tax auditing. Therefore, the tax collector will still needs to initiate the future improvement measurements.
(3)Innovation of research methods: The author is one of the first to conduct empirical research on tax auditing institution performance. The author has used questionnaires and quantitative analytical instruments to conduct the research from the macro and micro perspectives and has made the conclusion that the motivation and restriction organism are weak in the present Chinese tax auditing institution, the transaction cost of both the tax collector and taxpayer is too high and therefore the present institution needs to be improved.
(4)Innovation of the quantitative model: The author used the probability theory to establish a mathematical model to evaluate the effectiveness of tax auditing case selection policy. The theoretical support for this model is that the function of tax auditing is to check the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer, therefore the performance will be improved if the most incompliant taxpayer can be selected in priority. Thus, the criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of tax auditing case selection and tax auditing institution performance is whether the case selection is random and whether the most incompliant taxpayer can be selected in priority. The design of the model is based on the thinking that tax auditing is a kind of sampling behavior by selecting some taxpayers from all taxpayers. Thus the author used this sampling concept in statistics to establish the model to test the possibility of nonrandom case selection in tax auditing practice. And also because it is not easy to obtain information on the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer, this model allows the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer being audited and the taxpayer not audited to be estimated. Meanwhile, this model also tests the factors affecting the taxpayer incompliant level at different times, including the changes of possibility to be audited by the taxpayer and other systematic factors.
Of course, there are also some limitations in this thesis. Further research needs to be conducted in the following two aspects:
Firstly, research on how to strengthen formal binding on tax auditing institution. Tax auditing institution includes formal and informal bindings. Formal binding mainly refers to the legislation design of the tax auditing institution and selection of tax auditing system. Informal binding refers to improving sense of responsibility in taxpayers and service level of the tax auditors, thus building mutual confidence with proper measures. Informal binding measures are of great significance to improve the behaviors of taxpayer and tax auditors, to improve the degree of institutional demand for tax auditing organization and taxpayers, as well as to reduce moral hazards and reverse selection. Hence, it can be concluded that the supply level of informal binding measures directly decides the supply and implementation of formal binding measures. However, it is easier said than done. It is highly difficult to improve taxpayers’sense of responsibility and service level of the tax auditors. The author felt it’s a great pity not having the time to make more in-depth research into this topic in this thesis.
Secondly, since China only uses several indexes including check coverage, penalty coverage and revenue, it is only possible for the author to adopt one index, which is the validity of return selection as the evaluation criterion for Chinese tax auditing institution. Although the thesis has already tried to make up for the lack of data by using questionnaires, yet it is still not enough for a complete appraisal of tax auditing institution performance.
由于国家、征税人、纳税人三个具有独立利益主体之间的互动影响及复杂的外部税收环境,要想保证国家税收利益的完全实现不具可能性。因此,税务稽查制度的实际目标不应是单纯增加国家税收,而应是规范税务稽查行为。这一方面能抑止纳税人的不遵从行为,另一方面通过制度安排解决个体理性与集体理性的冲突,使国家、征税人与纳税人三者实现利益均衡,减少税收交易成本。而税务稽查制度绩效受到纳税人行为、稽查行为及国家法律约束三方面因素的影响。就稽查行为来看,稽查行为不当(稽查不力与过度稽查)会破坏均衡,增加成本。稽查不力会导至国家税收减少;过度稽查会增加稽查成本,损害国家利益,同时对被查的纳税人增加经济负担,造成法理不公平。导致稽查行为不当的原因可能有稽查人员的素质、稽查政策的选定、激励与约束机制不健全、信息不完全等主客观因素。
基于此,本论文以提高税务稽查制度绩效为设想目标,以稽查制度与纳税人行为之间的相互影响为主线,将理论和实证的结论应用于实际,并对未来税务稽查制度改革的政策取向进行探讨。循着上述思路,正文部分共分为七章:
第一章,分别对国内外税务稽查制度及纳税遵从行为相关研究进行简要述评。主要包括制度的内涵及起源、税务稽查制度,以及纳税人遵从行为的理论研究和实证研究。
第二章,税务稽查制度的基本理论基础。首先,对公共财政理论视角下的税收征纳关系及税收的交易成本构成进行分析。然后,从博弈论的角度研究税务稽查制度的起源,进而分析稽查制度的构成。最后,从税务稽查与征收管理各组织的不同分工出发,分析稽查组织在税务管理体系中的地位,指出稽查制度的三大功能及其对构建和谐征纳关系的重要性。
第三章,运用新制度经济学的制度变迁理论,分析我国税务稽查制度的变迁过程。在对有关税收征管制度的历史文献分析基础上,分析我国税务稽查制度的变迁路径,并指出我国税务稽查制度变迁是以征税人为初级行动团体,以税收的交易成本最低为原则,不断重新配置税务组织、调整各组织权利义务和变革相关的征纳税程序的过程。
第四章,运用预期效用理论分析税务稽查制度对纳税人不遵从行为的影响。本章假设纳税人与税务稽查人员都是“经济人”,他们追求预期效用最大化。在此前提下,从一个简单的纳税人不遵从行为基本模型开始,逐一增加影响纳税人遵从的因素:包括纳税人对税法的理解度、税务稽查概率政策、税务稽查能力以及法律约束,从而分析总结出税务稽查制度对抑止纳税人不遵从行为的功效。
第五章,通过对纳税人和税务人员分别进行问卷调查,检验第四章的数学模型结论的适用性,以及调查征纳双方对当前的税务稽查制度的评价。调查结果显示:(1)第四章的结论在我国具有适用性;(2)税务稽查组织与纳税人双方的交易成本对于他们各自的行为都将产生影响;(3)尽管征纳双方对现行税务稽查制度进行了肯定,但也认为其抑止纳税人不遵从行为及激励和约束稽查人员行为的功效还应该有更大的发挥空间。
第六章,对我国税务稽查制度进行绩效评价。笔者首先提出在无法获得相关数据的条件下,将税务稽查选案的有效性作为稽查制度绩效评价的标准,即将能否优选稽查最不遵从的纳税人作为判定稽查选案政策有效性的标志。然后,利用概率论构造了一个稽查选案政策与纳税人不遵从行为关系的模型。通过对1996-2002年的统计数据进行实证分析,笔者发现:这一时期我国税务稽查选案政策缺乏有效性,稽查选案优先选择的是最遵从的纳税人。
第七章,在前面各章分析的基础上,展望未来稽查制度环境的变化。由于正在发生或即将发生的制度环境变化将影响稽查制度的需求,为了避免制度供需失衡,笔者认为必须未雨绸缪,并指出,我国应在税务稽查组织结构、实施机制及人力资源管理三方面进行改革,以适应变化的制度环境。
本文在前人的丰硕成果基础上,从如下几方面做了有益的尝试,力图有所突破:
(1)研究视角的创新。本文始终把税务稽查制度放到国家、征税人、纳税人三者互动的关系中去进行考察。这种研讨拓宽了研究视角,把过去主要研究税务稽查的工作程序和相关的法律法规,拓展到对主体“人”的研究,并对纳税人最容易产生不遵从行为的情况进行了数量分析,并通过实证和规范研究分析了如何提高税务稽查绩效等问题,不仅尝试拓宽了理论的深度和广度,由于提出的结论具有较大的可操作性,对我国的政策实践也具有重要的现实意义。
(2)研究内容的创新。研究视角的创新必然带来研究内容的创新。笔者创新地从制度演化和纳税人行为变化的角度对影响税务稽查制度变迁的因素进行了动态考察。通过对税务稽查制度供需进行分析,提出改革开放以来,纳税人的“经济人”性质逐渐加强,机会主义行为增加,税务稽查的制度需求增加;国家、税务稽查组织及纳税人都是税务稽查制度变迁的主体,但征税人是初级行动团体,它推动了税务稽查制度的创新。因此不论是当初的制度建立还是将来的制度完善,都要以征税人为主体来推动。
(3)研究方法创新,本文是国内较早运用实证方法分析税务稽查制度绩效的一项研究。本文运用问卷调查及计量分析方法,从个体和整体两个层次对我国税务稽查制度绩效进行了评价,并得出结论:当前我国税务稽查制度的激励与约束机制弱,且征纳双方在税务稽查中的交易成本过大,因此现行稽查制度急需改进。
(4)计量模型创新,本文创新地利用概率论构造了一个评价稽查选案政策有效性的数学模型。该模型的理论依据是,税务稽查的功能首先是抑制纳税人不遵从行为,如果能优先选择最不遵从的纳税人就会使稽查绩效提高。因此稽查选案是否随机,是否能优先选择最不遵从的纳税人,则成为了评价稽查选案政策有效性和判断税务稽查制度绩效的标准。该模型的设计思路是,鉴于稽查是对全体纳税人中抽出一部分纳税人进行稽查,所以笔者采用了抽样统计的概念建立模型测试税务稽查非随机选案的可能性。又由于纳税人不遵从水平的信息不易获得,本模型允许估计被稽查的纳税人和未被稽查的纳税人的不遵从水平。同时本模型还考察了影响纳税人跨时期不遵从水平的因素,包括纳税人感觉到的被稽查的可能的变化及其它系统因素。当然,本文也存在一些缺陷与不足。今后需要进一步研究的主要有以下两方面:
(1)税务稽查制度包括正式约束与非正式约束两方面。正式约束主要是指税务稽查制度的立法设计和稽查体制的具体选择。非正式约束是指采取相应的措施,提高纳税人的纳税意识及税务稽查人员的服务意识,树立双方的信用意识。非正式约束对提高我国税务稽查人员与纳税人的税收意识、提高税务稽查组织与纳税人的制度需求程度、降低道德风险和逆选择等都具有非常重要的意义。因此可以说,非正式约束的供给充足与否,将直接影响正式约束的供给和实施。但提高纳税人的纳税意识、税务稽查人员的服务意识和双方的信用意识,要真正在实践中收到实效还存在较大困难。由于时间关系以及的确尚未找到较好的思路,本文对非正式约束的供给未进行深入研究,这是论文的一大缺憾。
(2)由于我国关于税务稽查工作评价标准主要还是在检查面、处罚率、入库率等几率,还缺乏其它指标如结案日期,工作时数等的配合,受数据资料所限,本文只选用了选案的有效性这一指标作为我国税务稽查制度绩效的标准,因此可能导致分析不够全面。
According to theories in public finance, tax is the price of public products based on which the relationship among the taxpayer, the tax collector and tax user is formed. The state is the tax user who provides public products and services to the public while citizens pay tax in exchange for the right to consume public products. The tax collectors are agents of the state to collect tax from citizens, whose tax collecting behavior provides capital for public products. The relationship between the state and the taxpayer is in fact a benefit exchange relationship based on contract. In the tax collection process, the taxpayer and the tax collector are standing on two opposite sides, whose rights and obligations differ but behaviors are restricted by the taxation law. The taxpayer and collector share common collective interest with independent individual benefits in the same time. Therefore, the taxpayer inevitably hopes to enjoy“free riding”to avoid infringement of individual benefits while enjoys public products. However, the unique features of non-exclusiveness and non-competitiveness of public products inevitably brings about the problems of free riding and prisoner’s dilemma in taxpaying behaviors. Although tax collection is related with everyone’s welfare, still people have strong motivations to evade tax. Therefore, tax auditing is a means for tax collection organizations to monitor taxpayers’tax paying behaviors with the aim to punish those who do not behave properly in order to ensure justice in tax collection process and that the state can collect as much tax as possible. Tax auditing is not only a means for tax collectors to manage the taxpayer’s behaviors, but also a relationship of interest allocation between the collector and the payer. By analysis with the game theory, the author has concluded that tax auditing institution is a set of institution formed after many times of games, a set of behavioral mode for the tax collector and payer to obey in interaction..
Since the state, the tax collector and taxpayer are three independent benefit entities with interactive influences and the exterior environment is complicated, it is impossible to fully ensure the taxation benefit of the state. Therefore, the practical objective of the taxation auditing institution should be not only purely increase national tax revenue, but also regulate tax auditing behavior. This can on the one hand check the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer and on the other hand solve the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality through institutional arrangement in order to ensure the benefit balance among the state, the tax collector and the taxpayer, thus reducing tax collection transaction cost. The performance of the tax auditing institution is liable to taxpayer behavior, tax auditing behavior and national legislation restrictions. Judging from the tax auditing behavior, improper tax auditing behavior would break the balance and increase cost. Inadequate tax auditing will lead to the reduction of state tax revenue while excess tax auditing will not only increase audit cost and lead to harm the state interests, but also increase taxpayer burden and lead to legal unfair. There are some factors which lead to improper auditing behavior: auditors’quality, audit policy, imperfect incentive and restrictive mechanism, incomplete information, and etc.
Based on this, the author discussed the future policy orientation for tax auditing institution reform assuming the improvement of tax auditing institution performance as objective and taking the interactive relation between tax auditing institution and taxpayer behaviors as main clue, applying theories in practice in the same time. The main body is divided into seven chapters as follows:
In chapter one, the author briefly reviewed the research literature on institution and taxpayer compliance behavior, including the connotation and origin of institution, domestic research on functions of tax auditing, theoretical and empirical studies on taxpayer compliance behavior.
In the second chapter, the author generalized the fundamental theories in tax auditing institution. Firstly, I analyzed the tax paying and collecting relationship from the perspective of public finance theories and the components of transaction cost in tax collection process. Then, the thesis studied the origin of tax auditing institution from the perspective of the game theory and further analyzed the structure of tax auditing institution on this basis. Finally, from the perspective of division of labor between the tax auditing organization and other organizations in the tax administration system, the thesis points out the position of tax auditing organization in the tax collection management system, the three basic functions of tax auditing institution and their importance in constructing a harmonious relationship between the tax collector and the taxpayer.
In the third chapter, the author adopted the transformation theory in New Institutional Economics to analyze the transformation process of China’s tax auditing institution. Based on literature analysis on tax collection and administration institution, the thesis has pointed out the transformation path of Chinese tax collection institution and argues that the Chinese tax auditing institution transformed in a process of continuously restructuring tax organization, adjusting the rights and obligations of various organizations and related procedures based on the principle of minimum transaction cost with the pay collector as the initial action group.
In chapter four, the author analyzed the impact of tax auditing institution on the incompliant behavior of taxpayers with the expected utility theory. The thesis assumed that both the taxpayers and the tax auditors are“economic beings”seeking after maximization of expected utilities in new institutional economics. Based on this, starting from the basic model of incompliant behavior of the taxpayer, the thesis added the other factors affecting the incompliant behaviors of the taxpayer step by step: the taxpayer’s comprehension of the taxation stipulations, tax auditing possibility policy, tax auditing competence and legal limitations. Through comparative static analysis of various models, the thesis concluded the effects of tax auditing institution in checking incompliant behavior of the taxpayers.
In chapter five, the author then went on to test the applicability of the mathematical models in practical Chinese environment by conducting field study with questionnaires. The results have shown that the conclusions in chapter four is applicable in China and the transaction cost of both the tax auditing organization and the taxpayer influences their respective behaviors. The results have also shown that there still is room for improvement in checking the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer and motivating and restraining the behaviors of tax auditors.
In chapter six, the study proposed a performance appraisal criterion of the Chinese tax auditing institution. In view of hard access of relevant data, effectiveness of selecting returns in audition process was used as the criterion of evaluate the performance of tax auditing institution. In other words, whether or not the most incompliant taxpayer can be screened and audited by the tax auditors is the symbol for effective tax auditing screening policy. Furthermore, using probability theory the study conducted a model to test the auditing selecting policy and concluded the selecting returns process was not very effective through 1996 to 2002.
In chapter seven, the author looks forward to the future changes in the environment of tax auditing institution. Because the changing institutional environment will surely affect the demand of tax auditing institution, in order to avoid imbalance of demand and supply, the author thinks it is necessary to prepare for the changes and thus making some suggestions on the reforms in tax auditing organizational structure, implementation organism and human resources management.
Based on previous research, the author has made some attempts in innovation as follows:
(1)Innovation in terms of research perspectives: The author always studied the tax auditing institution in the context of the interactive relationship among the state, tax collecting organizations and the taxpayer. This study has broadened the horizon of the research by extending the previous research focused mainly on working procedures of tax auditing and relative regulations to the study on the subject“man”. The author has also conducted quantitative analysis on the situations most likely to generate incompliant behavior, conducted empirical and qualitative research on how to improve the work performance of tax auditing, not only extending the depth and scope of theoretical research, but also providing feasible policy suggestions for the decision makers.
(2)Innovation of research content: New research perspectives surely bring about new research contents. The author innovatively conducted a dynamic research on the influential factors of tax auditing institution transformation from the perspective of institution evolution and behavioral changes of the taxpayer. Through analysis of the demand and supply of tax auditing institution, the author has concluded that the taxpayer’s nature of the“economic being”has been strengthened and opportunistic behavior increased, as a result the demand for tax auditing institution also has been growing since the economic reform. The subject of the tax auditing institution is the state, tax auditing organization and the taxpayer. The tax collector is the initial action group, which pushes forward the institutional innovation in tax auditing. Therefore, the tax collector will still needs to initiate the future improvement measurements.
(3)Innovation of research methods: The author is one of the first to conduct empirical research on tax auditing institution performance. The author has used questionnaires and quantitative analytical instruments to conduct the research from the macro and micro perspectives and has made the conclusion that the motivation and restriction organism are weak in the present Chinese tax auditing institution, the transaction cost of both the tax collector and taxpayer is too high and therefore the present institution needs to be improved.
(4)Innovation of the quantitative model: The author used the probability theory to establish a mathematical model to evaluate the effectiveness of tax auditing case selection policy. The theoretical support for this model is that the function of tax auditing is to check the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer, therefore the performance will be improved if the most incompliant taxpayer can be selected in priority. Thus, the criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of tax auditing case selection and tax auditing institution performance is whether the case selection is random and whether the most incompliant taxpayer can be selected in priority. The design of the model is based on the thinking that tax auditing is a kind of sampling behavior by selecting some taxpayers from all taxpayers. Thus the author used this sampling concept in statistics to establish the model to test the possibility of nonrandom case selection in tax auditing practice. And also because it is not easy to obtain information on the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer, this model allows the incompliant behavior of the taxpayer being audited and the taxpayer not audited to be estimated. Meanwhile, this model also tests the factors affecting the taxpayer incompliant level at different times, including the changes of possibility to be audited by the taxpayer and other systematic factors.
Of course, there are also some limitations in this thesis. Further research needs to be conducted in the following two aspects:
Firstly, research on how to strengthen formal binding on tax auditing institution. Tax auditing institution includes formal and informal bindings. Formal binding mainly refers to the legislation design of the tax auditing institution and selection of tax auditing system. Informal binding refers to improving sense of responsibility in taxpayers and service level of the tax auditors, thus building mutual confidence with proper measures. Informal binding measures are of great significance to improve the behaviors of taxpayer and tax auditors, to improve the degree of institutional demand for tax auditing organization and taxpayers, as well as to reduce moral hazards and reverse selection. Hence, it can be concluded that the supply level of informal binding measures directly decides the supply and implementation of formal binding measures. However, it is easier said than done. It is highly difficult to improve taxpayers’sense of responsibility and service level of the tax auditors. The author felt it’s a great pity not having the time to make more in-depth research into this topic in this thesis.
Secondly, since China only uses several indexes including check coverage, penalty coverage and revenue, it is only possible for the author to adopt one index, which is the validity of return selection as the evaluation criterion for Chinese tax auditing institution. Although the thesis has already tried to make up for the lack of data by using questionnaires, yet it is still not enough for a complete appraisal of tax auditing institution performance.
引文
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44张馨,税收价格论:理念更新与现实意义,[J],税务研究,2001年(6),第39-41页。
45阿克顿,自由与权力,[M],商务印书馆2001年版,第343页。
46张馨,税收价格论:理念更新与现实意义,[J],税务研究2001年(6),第40页。
47张馨,比较财政学教程(第二版),[M],中国人民大学出版社2004年版,第176页。
48朱明熙,周,文献,征税人、纳税人、用税人法理关系辨析[J] ,金税,2003年(12)
49参见北野弘久著,陈刚等译:税法学原论,[M],中国检察出版社2001年版,第158-165页。
50甘功仁著,纳税人权利专论,[M],中国广播电视出版社2003年版,第34-35页。
51目前有关纳税人权力的论述很多,总的来说法学界人士比较多地集中在宪法权力层次。这里列举的几项纳税人主要是参考了赖勤学的纳税人主权观——新一轮税改的理念精义一文。赖勤学,纳税人主权观——新一轮税改的理念精义[J],经济体制改革,2004年(5)
53施正文,税收征纳法律关系的法理解析,[J],当代法学,2004年(2),第99-105页
54 Matthews R. C. O. The economics of institutions and the sources of growth, [J], Economic Journal,1986,(96):pp.903 -910.
55 Klepper S. ,Nagin D. Tax compliance and perceptions of the risks of detection and criminal prosecution,[J]. Law and Society Review,1989,(23):pp.209 - 240.
56华武,缪柏其,人力资本套牢的不完全契约分析[J],财经研究, 2002年(10)
59亦鸣:税务检查与税务稽查有何区别?[N],中国税务报,2005-11-14。
60此处部分参考了王德平的《税务稽查的职能定位》中有关税务稽查的概念。[J],税务研究,2002年(3),第42页。
63卢现祥,西方新制度经济学(修订版)[M],中国发展出版社2003版,第38页。
64卢现祥,西方新制度经济学(修订版)[M],中国发展出版社2003版,第40页。
66青木昌彦,比较制度分析[M],上海远东出版社2001年版,P97
68黄继忠,省级财政支出制度:委托代理关系下的分析[J],经济社会体制比较,2003(6),第52页。
69陈流明,现代中国税务管理之路,[M],广东人民出版社1992年版,第2一4页。
70诺思,制度变迁理论纲要[A],北京大学经济研究中心:经济学与中国经济改革[C],上海人民出版社1995年版,第1—2页
71周惊涛、邬继宝,现代税收管理[M],中国经济出版社1992年版,第58页。
73参见福建省税务学会调研组,转变观念切实强化税务稽查,[J],税务研究1996年(四),P46-47。
74转引自安体富,王海勇,激励理论与税收不遵从行为研究[J],中国人民大学学报2004(3),第48页。
75 [美]R·科斯A·阿尔钦·D·诺斯等财产权利与制度变迁,上海三联书店1994年版,第274 页。
76制度变迁的主体包括初级行动团体和次级行动团体。初级行动团体是一个决策单位,它们的决策支配制度创新的进程。当他们认识到有潜在利润存在,就会改变制度安排的结构,导
1 T·W·舒尔茨著,制度与人的经济价值的不断提高[A],科斯等财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集[C],上海三联书店1991年版。
2阿克顿,自由与权力,[M],商务印书馆2001年版
3阿维纳什?K?迪克西特,经济政策的制定:交易成本政治学的视角,[M],中国人民大学出版社2004年版
4安体富,王海勇,激励理论与税收不遵从行为研究[J],中国人民大学学报2004(3),
5保罗·阿尔布,经济心理学(中文版),[M],上海译文出版社1992年版
6北野弘久著,陈刚等译:税法学原论,[M],中国检察出版社2001年版
7陈流明,现代中国税务管理之路,[M],广东人民出版社1992年版
8福建省税务学会调研组,转变观念,切实强化税务稽查,[J],税务研究1996年(4)
9甘功仁著,纳税人权利专论,[M],中国广播电视出版社2003年版
10郭庆旺、赵志耘,论纳税成本,[J],税务研究,1993(6)
11国家税务总局税收征管局,新税收征管法及其实施细则释义,[M],中国税务出版社2004年版,
12何红渠,肖瑛,基于期望理论的纳税遵从行为研究,[J],财经科学,2005年(3)
13华武,缪柏其,人力资本套牢的不完全契约分析[J],财经研究,
14黄继忠,省级财政支出制度:委托代理关系下的分析[J],经济社会体制比较,2003(6)
15加里·贝克尔,人类行为的经济分析(中文版),[J],上海三联书店1995年版
16康芒斯;制度经济学(上册),商务印书馆1962年版。
17柯武刚、史漫飞,制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策,[M],商务印书馆2000年版
18赖勤学,纳税人主权观——新一轮税改的理念精义[J],经济体制改革,2004年(5)
19雷根强、沈峰,简论税收遵从成本[J],税务研究,2002(7)
20李胜良,纳税人行为解析,[M],东北财经大学出版社2001年版
21梁朋,税收流失经济分析,[M],中国人民大学出版社,2000年版
22刘剑文,税法学,[M],人民出版社2003年版
23卢现祥著,西方新制度经济学(修订版),中国发展出版社,2003年6月第2版。
24麻勇爱,纳税人遵从理论及其借鉴意义,[J],浙江树人大学学报,2002年(2)
25马国强,纳税人行为方式研究[J],涉外税务.2000(4)
26马国强,税收政策与管理研究论文集[M],经济科学出版社1999年版
27诺思,经济史中的结构与变迁[M],上海三联书店1991年版。
28诺思,论制度,经济展望杂志,1991年冬季中译本,见经济社会体制比较,1996年第6期
29诺思,制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M],上海三联书店1994年版
30诺思,制度变迁理论纲要[A],北京大学经济研究中心:经济学与中国经济改革[C],上海人民出版社1995年版
31秦兴高,李兵,税务稽查职能的探讨[J],广东农工商职业技术学院学报2003(12),
32青木昌彦著,比较制度分析,[M],上海远东出版社2001年版
33施正文,税收征纳法律关系的法理解析,[J],当代法学,2004年(2)
34王德平,税务稽查的职能定位[J],税务研究2002(3)
35王国清,国家税收,[M],西南财经大学出版社2000年版,
36王国清、沈葳,国家财政与公共财政模式关系辨析,[J],财经科学2005年(1)
37魏朗,税务稽查政策的实证研究,[J],暨南学报2005年第6期
38魏朗,复杂的税法环境下纳税遵从行为的研究,[J],中国财经信息资料2006年第29期
39亦鸣,税务检查与税务稽查有何区别?[N],中国税务报
40易行健,杨碧去,易君健,我国逃税规模的测算及其经济影响分析,[J],财经研究,2004年(1),
41约翰·伊特韦尔、默里·米尔盖特、彼得·纽曼,新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷),[M],经济科学出版社,1996年版
42张文春,郑文辉,国外纳税遵从的理论与方法综述,[J]公共经济评论,2005年(12)
43张馨,比较财政学教程(第二版),[M],中国人民大学出版社2004年版
44张馨,税收价格论——理念更新与现实意义,[J],税务研究,2001年(6)
45张旭昆,单项制度深化方式浅议,[J],制度经济学研究,2003(1),
46周惊涛、邬继宝,现代税收管理[M],中国经济出版社1992年版
47朱明熙,周,文献,征税人、纳税人、用税人法理关系辨析[J] ,金税,2003年(12)
1 Allingham M G,Sandmo,A.“Income tax evasion :A theoretical analysis”[J],Journal of Public Economics,1972,(1)
2 Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein.“Tax Compliance”,[J], Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36 (1998), pp. 818-860.
3 Ann D.Witte, Diane F. Woodbury,“The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax”, [J] , National Tax Journal, 2001(38), pps.1-13
4 Antonides, Gerrit, and Henry Robben. "True Positives and False Alarms in the Detection of Tax Evasion." [J]Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 16 (1995), pp. 617-640.
5 Baldry, J. C.,“Income tax evasion and the tax schedule: Some experimental results”,[J],Public Finance 1987(42)
6 Berthold U. Wigger, 2002.“Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Black Markets”,[J],Journal of Economics , Vol 75,No.3/Apr.
7 Betty R. Jackson and Valerie C. Milliron,“Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems and Prospects”, [J] , Journal of Accounting Literature , 1986(5)
8 D.J.Pyle,“the Economics of Taxpayer Compliance, [J], Journal of Economic Surveys, 1991(5), pps. 163-98.
9 F.A.Cowell,“Tax evasion and inequity”,[J],Journal of Economic Psychology 1992.pp.521-543.
10 Firedland, N.Maital, S. and Rutenberg,A.,“A simulation study of income tax evasion”,[J],Journal of Public Economics,1978(10)
11 Grasmick H. and W. Scott,“Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison With Grand and Petty Theft”,[J],Journal of Economical Psychology, 1982(2),
12 harmila King & Steven Sheffrin,“Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach”, [J],International Tax and Public Finance, 2002(9)
13 James Andreoni, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein,“Tax Compliance”, [J],Journal of Economic Literature 1998(36),
14 Klepper S. ,Nagin D.,“Tax compliance and perceptions of the risks of detection and criminal prosecution”,[J]. Law and Society Review,1989,(23)
15 Kristina Murphy,“Procedural Justice and Tax Compliance”, [J] ,Technical Report Working Paper 2004(.56),pps.379-408
16 Matthews R. C. O.,“The economics of institutions and the sources of growth”, [J], Economic Journal,1986,(96)
17 Paul J.Beck, Jon S.Davis, Woon-Oh Jung,“Experimental Evidence on an Economic Model of Taxpayer Aggression under Strategic and Nonstrategic Audits”[J] , Contemporary Accounting Research 1992(Fall), pp. 86-112
18 Paul J.Beck, Jon S.Davis, Woon-Oh Jung,“Experimental Evidence on Taxpayer Reporting Under Uncertainty”, [J] ,The Accounting Review 1991(7)pps.535-558
19 Schwarz,R. and Orleans, S.,“On legal sanctions”,[J],University of Review 1966(34)
20 Sharmila King & Steven Sheffrin,“Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach”, [J],International Tax and Public Finance, 2002(9)
21 Simon James, John Hasseldine, Peggy Hite and Marika Toumi,“Developing a Tax Compliance Strategy for Revenue Services”, [J],International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, April 2001,
22 Spicer, M. W. and Becker, L. A.,“Fiscal inequity and tax evasion: An experimental approach”,[J],National Tax Journal 1980(33)
23 Thurman,Q.,“Taxpayer non-compliance and attribution theory: An experimental vignette approach”,[J],Public Finance 1988(43)
3约翰·伊特韦尔、默里·米尔盖特、彼得·纽曼,新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第二卷),[M],经济科学出版社,1996年版,第932页,
4卢现祥著,西方新制度经济学(修订版),[M],中国发展出版社,2003年6月第2版,第14页。
5康芒斯;制度经济学(上册),[M],商务印书馆1962年版,第86页。
6同上。
7康芒斯;制度经济学(上册),[M],商务印书馆1962年版,第89页。
8 T·W·舒尔茨著,制度与人的经济价值的不断提高,科斯等财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集,上海三联书店1991年版,第253页。
9 T·W·舒尔茨著,制度与人的经济价值的不断提高,科斯等财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集,上海三联书店1991年版,第253页。
10诺思,经济史中的结构与变迁,[M],上海三联书店1991年版,第3页和第226页。
11诺思,论制度,[J],经济展望杂志,1991年冬季中译本,见经济社会体制比较,1996年第6期
12诺思,制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M],上海三联书店1994年版,第3页。
13诺思,制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M],上海三联书店1994年版,第64页。
14青木昌彦著,比较制度分析,[M],上海远东出版社2001年版,第12页。
15青木昌彦著,比较制度分析,[M],上海远东出版社2001年版,第28页。
16这一部分主要参考卢现祥著,西方新制度经济学(修订版),[M],中国发展出版社,2003年版,第49-64页
17斯科菲尔德,Anarchy, Altruism and Cooperation:A Review, Cocial Ckoice an Welfare,[J],第2期P207-219
18青木昌彦著,比较制度分析,[M],上海远东出版社2001年版,第4页。
19王诚尧,纳税检查,[M],中国经济出版社1994年版,
20王平武,朱青,税务稽查操作与实务,[M],中国税务出版社2000年版,第1页。
21这种说法最为普遍,常见于各类有关税务稽查的文章中,本文此处引自:秦兴高,李兵,税务稽查职能的探讨[J],广东农工商职业技术学院学报2003(12),第57页
22王德平,税务稽查的职能定位[J],税务研究2002(3),第44页
23珠海市地方税务局课题组,构建和谐社会与税务稽查职能定位的思考[J],涉外税务2006(2),第23页
24梁朋,税收流失经济分析,[M],中国人民大学出版社,2000年版,第52-53页。
25美国社会学家墨顿的差异行为理论认为:人们面对一种强制性的指令可能有五种不同的现实反应,即遵从(conformity)、创造(innovation)、形式主义(ritualism)、隐退(retreat)和造反(rebellion)。参见李胜良,纳税人行为解析,[M],东北财经大学出版社2001年版第66页。
26载自麻勇爱,纳税人遵从理论及其借鉴意义,[J],浙江树人大学学报,2002年(2),第9页。
27 Simon James, John Hasseldine, Peggy Hite and Marika Toumi,“Developing a Tax Compliance Strategy for Revenue Services”, [J],International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2001(4), pp158-159.
28 Allingham M G,Sandmo,A. Income tax evasion :A theoretical analysis [J],Journal of Public Economics,1972,(1):323～381
29张文春,郑文辉,国外纳税遵从的理论与方法综述,[J]公共经济评论,2005年(12),第10-11页。
30 Grasmick H. and W. Scott,“Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison With Grand and Petty Theft”,[J],Journal of Economical Psychology, 1982(2), pp.213.
31 Betty R. Jackson and Valerie C. Milliron,“Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems and Prospects”, [J] ,Journal of Accounting Literature , 1986(5),pp.125-165.
32 Betty R. Jackson and Valerie C. Milliron,“Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems and Prospects”, [J],Journal of Accounting Literature, 1986(5),pp.125-165.
33何红渠,肖瑛,基于期望理论的纳税遵从行为研究,[J],财经科学,2005年(3),第101页。
34张文春,郑文辉,国外纳税遵从的理论与方法综述,[J]公共经济评论,2005年第12期,第10-11页。
35 Sharmila King & Steven Sheffrin, Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach, [J],International Tax and Public Finance, 2002(9),pp.505-521
36何红渠,肖瑛,基于期望理论的纳税遵从行为研究,[J],财经科学,2005年(3),第103页。
37 James Andreoni, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein,“Tax Compliance”, [J],Journal of Economic Literature 1998(36), pp.818.
38 Schwarz,R. and Orleans, S. ,On legal sanctions,[J],University of Review 1966(34),pp.274-300
39 Firedland, N.Maital, S. and Rutenberg,A. :A simulation study of income tax evasion,[J],Journal of Public Economics,1978(10),pp.107-16
40 Spicer, M. W. and Becker, L. A. : Fiscal inequity and tax evasion: An experimental approach,[J],National Tax Journal 1980(33),pp.171-5
41Baldry, J. C.,Income tax evasion and the tax schedule: Some experimental results,[J],Public Finance 1987(42),pp.355-84
42 Thurman,Q.: Taxpayer non-compliance and attribution theory: An experimental vignette approach,[J],Public Finance 1988(43),pp.147-56
43有关公共财政的内涵及特征辩析详见王国清、沈葳,国家财政与公共财政模式关系辨析,[J],财经科学2005年(1),第153-158页。
44张馨,税收价格论:理念更新与现实意义,[J],税务研究,2001年(6),第39-41页。
45阿克顿,自由与权力,[M],商务印书馆2001年版,第343页。
46张馨,税收价格论:理念更新与现实意义,[J],税务研究2001年(6),第40页。
47张馨,比较财政学教程(第二版),[M],中国人民大学出版社2004年版,第176页。
48朱明熙,周,文献,征税人、纳税人、用税人法理关系辨析[J] ,金税,2003年(12)
49参见北野弘久著,陈刚等译:税法学原论,[M],中国检察出版社2001年版,第158-165页。
50甘功仁著,纳税人权利专论,[M],中国广播电视出版社2003年版,第34-35页。
51目前有关纳税人权力的论述很多,总的来说法学界人士比较多地集中在宪法权力层次。这里列举的几项纳税人主要是参考了赖勤学的纳税人主权观——新一轮税改的理念精义一文。赖勤学,纳税人主权观——新一轮税改的理念精义[J],经济体制改革,2004年(5)
53施正文,税收征纳法律关系的法理解析,[J],当代法学,2004年(2),第99-105页
54 Matthews R. C. O. The economics of institutions and the sources of growth, [J], Economic Journal,1986,(96):pp.903 -910.
55 Klepper S. ,Nagin D. Tax compliance and perceptions of the risks of detection and criminal prosecution,[J]. Law and Society Review,1989,(23):pp.209 - 240.
56华武,缪柏其,人力资本套牢的不完全契约分析[J],财经研究, 2002年(10)
59亦鸣:税务检查与税务稽查有何区别?[N],中国税务报,2005-11-14。
60此处部分参考了王德平的《税务稽查的职能定位》中有关税务稽查的概念。[J],税务研究,2002年(3),第42页。
63卢现祥,西方新制度经济学(修订版)[M],中国发展出版社2003版,第38页。
64卢现祥,西方新制度经济学(修订版)[M],中国发展出版社2003版,第40页。
66青木昌彦,比较制度分析[M],上海远东出版社2001年版,P97
68黄继忠,省级财政支出制度:委托代理关系下的分析[J],经济社会体制比较,2003(6),第52页。
69陈流明,现代中国税务管理之路,[M],广东人民出版社1992年版,第2一4页。
70诺思,制度变迁理论纲要[A],北京大学经济研究中心:经济学与中国经济改革[C],上海人民出版社1995年版,第1—2页
71周惊涛、邬继宝,现代税收管理[M],中国经济出版社1992年版,第58页。
73参见福建省税务学会调研组,转变观念切实强化税务稽查,[J],税务研究1996年(四),P46-47。
74转引自安体富,王海勇,激励理论与税收不遵从行为研究[J],中国人民大学学报2004(3),第48页。
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