我国上市公司可转换债券融资研究
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摘要
可转换债券(Convertible Bond ),全称为可转换公司债券,又简称为可转债。在我国1997年颁布的《可转换公司债券管理暂行办法》(后文简称《暂行办法》)中,可转债是指发行人依照法定程序发行、在一定期间内依据约定的条件可以转换成股份的公司债券。简单地说,它是一张比相同期限相同信用等级的普通公司债券利率低的纯债券附上一个转换权,也就是,可转债投资人以牺牲一些利息为代价,换取未来一定时间内股价大幅上扬时,以事先约定的转股价格转换成股票,从而获取价差利益的机会。与普通债券相比,可转债可以视作一种附有“约定条件”的公司债券。“约定条件”的实质就是期权(Options)的一种变异形式,与股票认股权证(Warrants)较为类似,因此我们可以把可转债视做“债券”与“认股权证”相互融合的一种创新型金融工具(“混合工具”,Hybrid Instruments )。
可转换债券是一种极其复杂的金融衍生产品,除了一般的债权之外,它还包含着很多的期权。这些期权主要有:投资者按照一定价格在一定期限内将债券转换成公司股票的期权(转股权),投资者在一定条件下将债券按照一定价格回售给公司的期权(回售权),公司在一定条件下调整转股价格的期权(转股价格调低权),以及公司在一定条件下赎回可转债的期权(赎回权)。其中转股权和回售权属于投资者的期权,而转股价调低权和赎回权则属于发行公司的期权。投资者和发行公司在行使各自的期权时存在着复杂的博弈过程,而且这些期权的行使都有一定的条件。
在我国可转债市场快速发展、股权分置改革基本完成的背景下,可转换债券发行公司的最优决策将有所改变。本文通过理论与实证相结合的方法力图找出我国上市公司发行可转换债券的动机,并利用成本收益法,希望通过解析融资成本的构成,以投资价值衡量融资成本的高低,为规范我国上市公司可转换债券融资行为提供依据,并给出相应地对策和建议。
本文的主要内容如下:
第一章从可转债的定义出发,介绍可转债的基本要素,包括基准股票,票面利率,转换价格,转换期,赎回条款,回售条款、可转换调整条件以及可转债的分类。接着介绍了国外的可转债融资现状,最近的几年时间里,由于各国利率水平的不断下调,可转债的融资成本大幅下降,全球可转债券融资规模不断创出新的纪录。然后介绍了我国可转债融资的现状,虽融资规模不断新高,但是发行公司对可转债的创新不足。最后通过对国电转债的案例分析引出下文对可转债融资的分析。
第二章主要阐述了可转债与公司资本结构、公司治理结构之间的关系以及和其他再融资工具之间的比较。可转债在本质上仍然属于企业债券范畴,因此具有税盾价值,从而可以达到公司资本结构最佳,实现公司市场价值最大。可转债能够在一定程度上缓解股东和债权人之间以及股东与管理层之间的代理问题,降低代理成本,进而完善公司的治理结构。可转债相对于再融资的其他工具,具有低成本、减缓发行人股东权益稀释速度、向社会公众募集增量资金量大、灵活性等优势。
第三章首先总结了国内外可转债的发行动机研究的文献综述,从国内几个学者的文献中,大部分认为国内公司发行可转债都有轻债重股的特性。其次从理论上分析了我国可转债的发行动机。从发行条件,发行条款设计都说明上市公司发行的可转债呈现出较强的股性特征。最后通过计算33只可转债发行时的预期转股率后发现,我国上市公司发行可转换债存在明显的股权融资动机,绝大部分上市公司都是将可转换债券作为一种股权融资工具来使用。可转换债券的发行动机中存在明显的股权融资倾向具有很多原因,既包括我国现行的制度、政策和市场环境的原因,也包括公司融资非理性的原因。要解决这一问题,我个人的观点主要是从宏观上完善制度,从微观上理顺国有股权和中小股权的关系,真正做到以提高公司价值为目标。
第四章从成本上度量上市公司发行可转债。上市公司在发行可转债时往往关注了其低成本的优势,然而利用可转债融资的发行企业在获得好处的同时,也承担了一定的隐性成本。隐性成本包括:
1、发布可转债发行公告对股价表现的负面影响,或者说这是稀释效应的提前释放。
2、由于可转债在未来的转换,将伴随着股价的上扬(否则投资者不会转换),这样就会把一部分应由原有股东享有的收益转移给可转债的投资者,这部分成本可以视做原有股东承担的机会成本。
3、如果可转债持有者不是公司原有股东,可转债转股后公司的控制权可能改变。
接着通过推导出融资成本的模型我们可以得到,隐性融资成本由转股价格、转股密度分布、转股期间、票面利率等发行条件和公司未来股票市场价格共同决定。
为了验证可转债发行公告对股价表现的影响,选取了沪深两市2002年—2006年发行的33个可转债作为样本,采用事件研究法,对可转债的公告效应进行了实证研究。得出的结果是:在我国可转换债券发行公告当日,标的股票超额收益率显著为负,这说明,市场把公司发行可转债的公告看作是一个坏消息,可转债的发行在短期内对公司市场价值的影响是负向的。但通过一段时间后,累计超额收益率又显著为正,募集资金的投向和使用效率会慢慢增强投资者对该公司未来发展前景的信心。
第五章对公司发行可转债的策略提出了些意见,选择宏观经济由谷底开始启动、股市由熊走牛为最佳可转债发行时机,规模小、成长快、风险大的公司适合发可转债。
最后一章对我国上市公司发展可转债融资提出了一些意见和建议。本文的特色在于紧紧抓住经济学最基本的成本—收益这一分析方法,理论联系实际,详细地分析了可转债的优势及其成本,并通过一个案例来具体说明公司可转债融资的影响因素。本文以融资理论为指导,系统分析、总结和创新了可转债的融资策略,为可转债的发行提供了参考。
本文的创新之处在于:
1,关于可转换债券发行动机的研究多集中在可转换债券的可转换性对公司资本结构调节的作用上。本文从新的研究视角进行考虑,将我国上市公司的股权融资偏好与可转换债券发行动机联系起来,并借鉴Lewis, Rogalski和Seward的研究方法来计算我国上市公司发行的可转换债券在发行时的预期转股率来判断可转换债券的类型。
2,把可转债的宣告效应作为公司发行可转债的成本进行考虑。通过实证发现市场把发行可转债当成“坏消息”来看待。
Convertible bond is a kind of complicated derivatives , in addition to general creditor's right, it still includes a lot of options: conversion option , granting the investors the right to converts companies' bonds to stocks according to the certain price and the certain term; put provision , granting the investors the right to sell the bond back to the companies according to the certain price and under the certain condition; lower conversion price , granting the issuer the right to adjust the conversion price under the certain condition; call provision, granting the issuer the right to buy back all or part of an issue prior to the maturity date under the certain condition; conversion option and put provision are investors’rights, lower conversion price and call provision are issuers’rights. There is a complicated process of the game that investors and issuers in the exercise of their respective option
At the background of rapid development of China's convertible bonds market and the share reform basically completed, the optimal decision that listed companies how to issue convertible bonds will be changed. In this paper we try to identify the convertible bonds issued motivation combining theory and empirical methods, and at the base of cost-benefit law we measure the value of investment in the level of financing costs through analyzing the costs forms .For the sake of standardizing China's listed companies’convertible bonds financing acts, and gives the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions. The main contents of this paper are as follows:
ChapterⅠis devoted to the basic elements of convertible bonds, foreign and domestic convertible bonds financing status. Relatively speaking abroad, the innovation of Chinese issued convertible bonds is inadequate
ChapterⅡmainly expounded the relationship between convertible bonds with the company's capital structure, corporate governance structure. Compared with other tools of refinance, convertible bonds have many advantages.
ChapterⅢfirstly summarizes the literature about the issuers’motivation of convertible bonds at home and abroad. Several domestic literatures indicate that the majority of the domestic companies have issued convertible bonds Light debt heavy stocks. Secondly we analyze the issuers’motivation theoretically. It is showed that convertible bonds have strong stock characteristics both from issue conditions and its designed provisions. Finally we calculate the 33 convertible bonds’anticipated conversion rate and find that Chinese listed companies that issuing convertible bonds have obvious Equity Financing motivation.
ChapterⅣwe measure the cost of companies issued convertible bonds.
Listed companies issued convertible bonds are often concerned about their low-cost advantage but neglect the hidden costs. Hidden costs include:
1, There is a bad stock performance when convertible bonds issued notice.
2, Part of the original shareholders’profits should be transferred to the convertible bonds’investors. That is opportunity cost.
3, the control of company may be changed after conversion.
In order to verify stock performance when announcement of convertible bond, we select 33 issued convertible bonds as a sample which from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2002 and 2006, Using event study, and the results is: in the issued notice day, stock prices dropped significantly. Market regards it as a bad news.
ChapterⅤ, we give some advice for the strategy of issued convertible bonds. Though a case, we can further clarify the company's convertible bonds financing decisions.
The last chapter we points out some opinions and suggestions for CSRC.
The innovations in this paper are as follow:
Firstly this paper has a new study perspective, linking Company's financing preference shares to issuers’motivation of convertible bonds. And learn from Lewis, Rogalski and Seward research methods to calculate China's listed companies issued convertible bonds’expected conversion rate to determine the type of convertible bonds.
Secondly considering the announcement effects of convertible bond as a cost and using empirical method we find that Market regards issuing convertible bonds as a bad news.
可转换债券是一种极其复杂的金融衍生产品,除了一般的债权之外,它还包含着很多的期权。这些期权主要有:投资者按照一定价格在一定期限内将债券转换成公司股票的期权(转股权),投资者在一定条件下将债券按照一定价格回售给公司的期权(回售权),公司在一定条件下调整转股价格的期权(转股价格调低权),以及公司在一定条件下赎回可转债的期权(赎回权)。其中转股权和回售权属于投资者的期权,而转股价调低权和赎回权则属于发行公司的期权。投资者和发行公司在行使各自的期权时存在着复杂的博弈过程,而且这些期权的行使都有一定的条件。
在我国可转债市场快速发展、股权分置改革基本完成的背景下,可转换债券发行公司的最优决策将有所改变。本文通过理论与实证相结合的方法力图找出我国上市公司发行可转换债券的动机,并利用成本收益法,希望通过解析融资成本的构成,以投资价值衡量融资成本的高低,为规范我国上市公司可转换债券融资行为提供依据,并给出相应地对策和建议。
本文的主要内容如下:
第一章从可转债的定义出发,介绍可转债的基本要素,包括基准股票,票面利率,转换价格,转换期,赎回条款,回售条款、可转换调整条件以及可转债的分类。接着介绍了国外的可转债融资现状,最近的几年时间里,由于各国利率水平的不断下调,可转债的融资成本大幅下降,全球可转债券融资规模不断创出新的纪录。然后介绍了我国可转债融资的现状,虽融资规模不断新高,但是发行公司对可转债的创新不足。最后通过对国电转债的案例分析引出下文对可转债融资的分析。
第二章主要阐述了可转债与公司资本结构、公司治理结构之间的关系以及和其他再融资工具之间的比较。可转债在本质上仍然属于企业债券范畴,因此具有税盾价值,从而可以达到公司资本结构最佳,实现公司市场价值最大。可转债能够在一定程度上缓解股东和债权人之间以及股东与管理层之间的代理问题,降低代理成本,进而完善公司的治理结构。可转债相对于再融资的其他工具,具有低成本、减缓发行人股东权益稀释速度、向社会公众募集增量资金量大、灵活性等优势。
第三章首先总结了国内外可转债的发行动机研究的文献综述,从国内几个学者的文献中,大部分认为国内公司发行可转债都有轻债重股的特性。其次从理论上分析了我国可转债的发行动机。从发行条件,发行条款设计都说明上市公司发行的可转债呈现出较强的股性特征。最后通过计算33只可转债发行时的预期转股率后发现,我国上市公司发行可转换债存在明显的股权融资动机,绝大部分上市公司都是将可转换债券作为一种股权融资工具来使用。可转换债券的发行动机中存在明显的股权融资倾向具有很多原因,既包括我国现行的制度、政策和市场环境的原因,也包括公司融资非理性的原因。要解决这一问题,我个人的观点主要是从宏观上完善制度,从微观上理顺国有股权和中小股权的关系,真正做到以提高公司价值为目标。
第四章从成本上度量上市公司发行可转债。上市公司在发行可转债时往往关注了其低成本的优势,然而利用可转债融资的发行企业在获得好处的同时,也承担了一定的隐性成本。隐性成本包括:
1、发布可转债发行公告对股价表现的负面影响,或者说这是稀释效应的提前释放。
2、由于可转债在未来的转换,将伴随着股价的上扬(否则投资者不会转换),这样就会把一部分应由原有股东享有的收益转移给可转债的投资者,这部分成本可以视做原有股东承担的机会成本。
3、如果可转债持有者不是公司原有股东,可转债转股后公司的控制权可能改变。
接着通过推导出融资成本的模型我们可以得到,隐性融资成本由转股价格、转股密度分布、转股期间、票面利率等发行条件和公司未来股票市场价格共同决定。
为了验证可转债发行公告对股价表现的影响,选取了沪深两市2002年—2006年发行的33个可转债作为样本,采用事件研究法,对可转债的公告效应进行了实证研究。得出的结果是:在我国可转换债券发行公告当日,标的股票超额收益率显著为负,这说明,市场把公司发行可转债的公告看作是一个坏消息,可转债的发行在短期内对公司市场价值的影响是负向的。但通过一段时间后,累计超额收益率又显著为正,募集资金的投向和使用效率会慢慢增强投资者对该公司未来发展前景的信心。
第五章对公司发行可转债的策略提出了些意见,选择宏观经济由谷底开始启动、股市由熊走牛为最佳可转债发行时机,规模小、成长快、风险大的公司适合发可转债。
最后一章对我国上市公司发展可转债融资提出了一些意见和建议。本文的特色在于紧紧抓住经济学最基本的成本—收益这一分析方法,理论联系实际,详细地分析了可转债的优势及其成本,并通过一个案例来具体说明公司可转债融资的影响因素。本文以融资理论为指导,系统分析、总结和创新了可转债的融资策略,为可转债的发行提供了参考。
本文的创新之处在于:
1,关于可转换债券发行动机的研究多集中在可转换债券的可转换性对公司资本结构调节的作用上。本文从新的研究视角进行考虑,将我国上市公司的股权融资偏好与可转换债券发行动机联系起来,并借鉴Lewis, Rogalski和Seward的研究方法来计算我国上市公司发行的可转换债券在发行时的预期转股率来判断可转换债券的类型。
2,把可转债的宣告效应作为公司发行可转债的成本进行考虑。通过实证发现市场把发行可转债当成“坏消息”来看待。
Convertible bond is a kind of complicated derivatives , in addition to general creditor's right, it still includes a lot of options: conversion option , granting the investors the right to converts companies' bonds to stocks according to the certain price and the certain term; put provision , granting the investors the right to sell the bond back to the companies according to the certain price and under the certain condition; lower conversion price , granting the issuer the right to adjust the conversion price under the certain condition; call provision, granting the issuer the right to buy back all or part of an issue prior to the maturity date under the certain condition; conversion option and put provision are investors’rights, lower conversion price and call provision are issuers’rights. There is a complicated process of the game that investors and issuers in the exercise of their respective option
At the background of rapid development of China's convertible bonds market and the share reform basically completed, the optimal decision that listed companies how to issue convertible bonds will be changed. In this paper we try to identify the convertible bonds issued motivation combining theory and empirical methods, and at the base of cost-benefit law we measure the value of investment in the level of financing costs through analyzing the costs forms .For the sake of standardizing China's listed companies’convertible bonds financing acts, and gives the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions. The main contents of this paper are as follows:
ChapterⅠis devoted to the basic elements of convertible bonds, foreign and domestic convertible bonds financing status. Relatively speaking abroad, the innovation of Chinese issued convertible bonds is inadequate
ChapterⅡmainly expounded the relationship between convertible bonds with the company's capital structure, corporate governance structure. Compared with other tools of refinance, convertible bonds have many advantages.
ChapterⅢfirstly summarizes the literature about the issuers’motivation of convertible bonds at home and abroad. Several domestic literatures indicate that the majority of the domestic companies have issued convertible bonds Light debt heavy stocks. Secondly we analyze the issuers’motivation theoretically. It is showed that convertible bonds have strong stock characteristics both from issue conditions and its designed provisions. Finally we calculate the 33 convertible bonds’anticipated conversion rate and find that Chinese listed companies that issuing convertible bonds have obvious Equity Financing motivation.
ChapterⅣwe measure the cost of companies issued convertible bonds.
Listed companies issued convertible bonds are often concerned about their low-cost advantage but neglect the hidden costs. Hidden costs include:
1, There is a bad stock performance when convertible bonds issued notice.
2, Part of the original shareholders’profits should be transferred to the convertible bonds’investors. That is opportunity cost.
3, the control of company may be changed after conversion.
In order to verify stock performance when announcement of convertible bond, we select 33 issued convertible bonds as a sample which from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2002 and 2006, Using event study, and the results is: in the issued notice day, stock prices dropped significantly. Market regards it as a bad news.
ChapterⅤ, we give some advice for the strategy of issued convertible bonds. Though a case, we can further clarify the company's convertible bonds financing decisions.
The last chapter we points out some opinions and suggestions for CSRC.
The innovations in this paper are as follow:
Firstly this paper has a new study perspective, linking Company's financing preference shares to issuers’motivation of convertible bonds. And learn from Lewis, Rogalski and Seward research methods to calculate China's listed companies issued convertible bonds’expected conversion rate to determine the type of convertible bonds.
Secondly considering the announcement effects of convertible bond as a cost and using empirical method we find that Market regards issuing convertible bonds as a bad news.
引文
[1]刘立六著可转换公司债券上海财经大学出版社. 1999年
[2]陈守红著.可转换债券投融资—理论于事务.上海财经大学出版社. 2005年
[3] Pilcher, C. Raising Capital with Convertible Securities. Michigan Business Studies. 1955,21
[4] Hoffmeister, J. Use of Convertible Debt in the Early 1970s: A reevaluation of Corporate Motives. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. 1977,17pp23-32
[5] Brigham, E. An Analysis of Convertible Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance. 1966,21pp35-54
[6] Billingsley, R.S,Smith, D.M.. Why Do Firms Issue Convertible Debt?. Financial Management .1996,25pp91-97
[7] David Mayers. Why Firms Issue Convertible Bonds: The Matching of Financial and Investment Options. Journal of Financial Economics. 1998,47pp83-102
[8] Nobuyuki Isagawa. Convertible debt: An Effective Financial Instrument to Control Managerial Opporunism. Review of Financial Economics. 2000,9pp15-26
[9] Nobuyuki Isagawa. Callable Convertible Debt under Managerial Entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2002,8.pp255-270
[10] Jensen, M,Meckling, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 1976,4pp305-360
[11] Jeremy Stein. Convertible Bonds As "Back door" Equity Financing. Journal of Financial Economics. 1998,32pp3-21
[12] Green, R.. Investment Iincentives, Debt and Warrants. Journal ofFinancial Economics.1984,13pp115-136
[13] Jung, K , Y, Stulz, R.. Timing, Investment Opportunities, Managerial Discretion, and the Security Issue Decision. Journal of Financial Economics. 1996,42pp159-185
[14] Jalan, P. and G. Barone-Adesi. Equity Finacing and Corporate Convertible Bond Phcy. Journal of Banking&Finance.1995,19pp187-206
[15] Brennan Michael j .,Eduardo S.,Schwartz. Analyzing Convertible bonds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 1980,15pp907-929
[16] Campbell, J. Y., A. W. Lo, and A. C. MacKinlay. The Econometrics of Financial Markets. Princeton University Press, 1997.
[17] Frans De Roon,Chris Veld. Announcement effects of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans:an empirical analysis for the Dutch market[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,1998,(22):1481-1506
[18] Smith.G.W, Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, Journal of Financial Econanics 1986, 15 pp.3—29
[19]吕益民.可转换公司债券与国有企业债务重组.财经研究1997,7pp36-39
[20]李学伟,李志毅.我国可转换公司债券设计与融资决策分析.中国软科学. 1998,7p74-77 [ 21]肖沂娃.论我国可转换公司债券市场.南开经济研究1998,1pp57-60
[22]蒋殿春.可转债条款、公司监督机制和证券市场发展南开经济研究2002,Spp68-71
[23]王铁锋.中国可转换公司债券投资价值研究.财贸经济2003,8pp60-64
[24]郑振龙,林海.可转换债券发行公司的最优决策.财经问题研究2004,11pp35-39
[25]刘娥平.中国上市公司可转换债券发行公告财富效应的实证研究.金融研究2005,07 pp45-56
[26]刘力,王汀汀,王震.中国A股上市公司增发公告的负价格效应及其二元股权结构解释.金融研究. 2003,08 pp60-71
[27]牟晖,韩立岩,谢朵,陈之安.中国资本市场融资顺序新证:可转债发行公告效应研究.管理世界. 2006,04 pp19-27
[2]陈守红著.可转换债券投融资—理论于事务.上海财经大学出版社. 2005年
[3] Pilcher, C. Raising Capital with Convertible Securities. Michigan Business Studies. 1955,21
[4] Hoffmeister, J. Use of Convertible Debt in the Early 1970s: A reevaluation of Corporate Motives. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. 1977,17pp23-32
[5] Brigham, E. An Analysis of Convertible Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance. 1966,21pp35-54
[6] Billingsley, R.S,Smith, D.M.. Why Do Firms Issue Convertible Debt?. Financial Management .1996,25pp91-97
[7] David Mayers. Why Firms Issue Convertible Bonds: The Matching of Financial and Investment Options. Journal of Financial Economics. 1998,47pp83-102
[8] Nobuyuki Isagawa. Convertible debt: An Effective Financial Instrument to Control Managerial Opporunism. Review of Financial Economics. 2000,9pp15-26
[9] Nobuyuki Isagawa. Callable Convertible Debt under Managerial Entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2002,8.pp255-270
[10] Jensen, M,Meckling, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 1976,4pp305-360
[11] Jeremy Stein. Convertible Bonds As "Back door" Equity Financing. Journal of Financial Economics. 1998,32pp3-21
[12] Green, R.. Investment Iincentives, Debt and Warrants. Journal ofFinancial Economics.1984,13pp115-136
[13] Jung, K , Y, Stulz, R.. Timing, Investment Opportunities, Managerial Discretion, and the Security Issue Decision. Journal of Financial Economics. 1996,42pp159-185
[14] Jalan, P. and G. Barone-Adesi. Equity Finacing and Corporate Convertible Bond Phcy. Journal of Banking&Finance.1995,19pp187-206
[15] Brennan Michael j .,Eduardo S.,Schwartz. Analyzing Convertible bonds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 1980,15pp907-929
[16] Campbell, J. Y., A. W. Lo, and A. C. MacKinlay. The Econometrics of Financial Markets. Princeton University Press, 1997.
[17] Frans De Roon,Chris Veld. Announcement effects of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans:an empirical analysis for the Dutch market[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,1998,(22):1481-1506
[18] Smith.G.W, Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, Journal of Financial Econanics 1986, 15 pp.3—29
[19]吕益民.可转换公司债券与国有企业债务重组.财经研究1997,7pp36-39
[20]李学伟,李志毅.我国可转换公司债券设计与融资决策分析.中国软科学. 1998,7p74-77 [ 21]肖沂娃.论我国可转换公司债券市场.南开经济研究1998,1pp57-60
[22]蒋殿春.可转债条款、公司监督机制和证券市场发展南开经济研究2002,Spp68-71
[23]王铁锋.中国可转换公司债券投资价值研究.财贸经济2003,8pp60-64
[24]郑振龙,林海.可转换债券发行公司的最优决策.财经问题研究2004,11pp35-39
[25]刘娥平.中国上市公司可转换债券发行公告财富效应的实证研究.金融研究2005,07 pp45-56
[26]刘力,王汀汀,王震.中国A股上市公司增发公告的负价格效应及其二元股权结构解释.金融研究. 2003,08 pp60-71
[27]牟晖,韩立岩,谢朵,陈之安.中国资本市场融资顺序新证:可转债发行公告效应研究.管理世界. 2006,04 pp19-27