中国民航业市场结构、竞争行为与绩效研究
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摘要
中国民航业如今所取得的令世人瞩目的成绩来之不易,浸透了几代人的汗水与辛劳。在中国民航业高速发展的同时,一些问题也随之显现出来。针对行业“异象”,学者们之前通过孜孜不倦的研究,做出了很多开创性的工作,并纷纷为促进民航快而又好的发展献言献策。然而,对比西方学者对民航产业的相关研究,国内学者对民航产业研究在关注的重点与研究方法上所存在的差异还是很明显的。例如,我国与美国民航业均呈现寡头垄断的结构特征,对此国外学者较多运用计量经济学方法,并主要从航空公司合并和航线网络结构选择两个方面,将其与市场势力结合起来进行分析、探讨；国内学者则侧重于从行政因素的角度解释其成因。诚然,国家间民航市场的不同发展阶段决定了学者们分析的重点存在“天然”差异,并且从严格管制到相对宽松,我国民航管制政策对行业嬗变过程的影响举足轻重,但除此以外,我们就不能够对自2002年民航总局推动的民航重组,在十余年的时间里依然保持稳定的寡头垄断市场结构找到其它的原因吗?
同时需要看到的是,在过去三十多年的时间里,世界各国航空公司为在竞争日益激烈的客运市场上占有一席之地,逐步对自身战略规划做出了调整,在这一过程中突出的变换概括起来有三点：一是有实力的大型航空公司纷纷建立自己的轴心—轮辐式(Hub-and-Spoke,简写为HS)网络型航线结构；二是航空联盟的迅速发展；三是航空公司“常旅客”计划的推出。以上变化与航空网络经济存在密切关系,国内也有学者对其进行了讨论,但大多限于理论介绍,对这些变化如何影响我国民航业竞争尚缺乏数学分析,与之相关的实证研究亦十分稀少。本文认为,不结合行业最新形势变化的行业研究如无源之水,是难以为行业发展及有关政策建议提供理论支持的。
鉴于此,本文立足已有研究,以航空网络经济为逻辑出发点,在SCP研究框架内,对我国民航市场结构、行为与绩效分别予以理论与实证分析,并依据现实情况与研究结论为民航业进一步改革提出建设性建议。本文的研究内容主要分为以下几个部分：
第一,对航空网络经济概念的梳理。我们习惯站在航空企业的角度讨论航空运输的网络经济性。在综合学者们对航空网络经济定义的基础上,本文认为航空运输业的网络经济性表现为：就单个航空公司而言,增加航空网络节点、开辟新的航班线路可为其扩大市场需求,提升客运量,有利于企业更好地调节各线路载运率,进而提高整个网络的利用程度和效率。当航线网络从空间上超过单个航空公司的有效经营范围时,在更大的市场区域内,每家航空公司之间的相互连接必将形成更加庞大的运输网络,在为乘客带来便捷服务的同时,也因市场容量的迅速扩大,使整个产业的总成本得到节约。尽管在一定情况下,点对点的航线结构成本可能更低,但大多数时候,轴心—轮辐式航线网络结构被认为是航空企业实现网络经济的最直接的方式,并且对航空网络经济性的研究也主要围绕轴辐式网络结构展开。然而,作为行业市场上另一重要参与者——消费者从中获得的消费者网络外部性本质上也是一种与网络相关的经济特性,航空市场消费者的网络外部性产生的原因在于地理节点间的互补性,体现在网络链接过程中享受到的各项乘务服务。本文认为上述两种角度不同,意义不同,但却均来自于网络的经济性质一起构成了航空业中存在的网络经济,它们结合在一起,共同影响着航空产业的发展。
第二,对民航市场结构的测度与形成原因的分析。赫芬达尔指数HHI与行业集中度CRn是两种测算市场结构的常用指标,本文借此从整体上完成了对我国民航2002-2012年间市场结构特征的判断。但与测算结构相比,本文还是重点分析了民航市场结构形成的原因,并且从优势航空公司对枢纽机场的控制及消费者网络外部性两个角度为民航业市场结构形成原因提供了新的注解。借助轴心—轮辐式航线网络结构,利用自身影响力达成对枢纽机场的控制是航空公司实现网络经济的便捷途径,但这同时也赋予了航空公司一种人为的设置机场收费差值的能力。当这一差值抵消掉其它中小航空公司在局部市场的成本优势时,优势航空公司可以利用价格战吞噬枢纽机场与非枢纽机场间的航线市场,从而逼退竞争对手或者潜在进入者。此外,本文通过模型分析还发现,航空公司网点覆盖范围越广消费者基础越牢,对新进入市场的消费者吸引力越强,在特设条件下,市场当中消费者基于网络外部性的自主选择会成为部分航空公司无法逾越的无形壁垒,而这种壁垒又不像资本壁垒一般,在一定时间内可以依靠金融融资工具予以攻破,仅就时间成本而言,对部分航空公司来说也是一项极大的消耗。
第三,对联盟问题与“常旅客”计划的探讨。一家航空企业网络经营范围总有一定限度,更多时候需要借助联盟伙伴的力量才能打破各种因素的束缚,从而获得额外的市场需求。但如此一来,很容易激发起人们对联盟是否影响企业竞争行为的好奇。本文选择研究的竞争行为主要指企业的定价行为,这样一是因为人们习惯以对企业定价行为的分析作为了解认识行业竞争程度的切入口,二是方便将问题纳入SCP范式,连同结构对行为的作用一并验证。在此,本文将国际与国内市场分开进行探讨。对于国际航线,考虑到市场上航空公司自身实力及联盟后所产生密度经济的差异性,本文对成本函数的形式予以重新设定,并以此写出企业利润函数、求解最大化一阶条件。推导结果显示,在国际市场上,联盟对枢纽机场间机票价格并无显著影响。随后实证分析也进一步验证了这一发现：联盟变量对价格有正向影响,大小为0.16228,但对应的P值为0.4859,系数检验亦不显著；对于国内市场,问题会显得略微复杂一些,这是因为我们要首先界定国内航空市场有没有联盟。借鉴部分学者们之前的研究成果,本文倾向于认同国内航空市场存在联盟,并且该类联盟是以股权关系为纽带。如文中所述,即使对这类股权关系是否可以被称之为联盟存在争议,但一条航线由存在股权关系的多家航空企业共同运营是客观存在的事实,如果我们用设置虚拟变量的方法研究这样股权关系对航线票价的影响,会与接受该类别联盟对票价影响的研究是一致的。此外,考虑到航空业中范围经济为多市场接触竞争提供了天然条件,本文在模型中亦引入了多市场接触竞争。经过对数据的整理,本文最终选取了240条国内航线,航线普遍较为热门,通达城市60余座,具备较强代表性。实证结果显示,股权-联盟亦对国内航线价格无显著影响,而多市场接触竞争表现出明显的季节性变化。
“常旅客”计划是航空企业实现锁定策略的主要手段,锁定与转换成本有关,本文也是在此基础上一步步分析问题——首先,本文完成了包含由“常旅客”计划引致的转换成本在内的基本模型的构建,通过模型分析,我们发现：“常旅客”计划在一定情况下有可能会拉低航空企业的利润,这也打破了人们对于转换成本单纯有助于企业收益提升的认识；此外,我们还构造了一个基于消费者网络外部性的博弈模型,研究发现,与“常旅客”计划有关的转化成本的确可以起到阻碍竞争对手进入市场的目的,但与之相比,彼此参与对方的“常旅客”计划,互相换取更大的市场需求才是双方更为现实的选择。
第四,我国航空企业生产效率的测量。本文分别以2006-2012年上市的五家航空公司的收入、运输总周转为产出指标,以固定资产,年末员工人数为投入指标,并将技术无效率以包括总资产周转率、高素质员工占比、资产负债率等变量在内的线性函数形式加以表示,在利用了Frontier4.1软件进行估算后发现,样本期间,企业间在收入上体现的效率差异并不大,但在运输总周转上的差异有进一步扩大的可能；现阶段我国航空企业产出增长依然需要依靠资本驱动,对劳动力的依赖有所降低；除此以外,资金运用能力对航空企业技术效率有显著促进作用,而技术能力、资本结构的影响则不够明显；样本期间我国航空企业技术无效率每年改善幅度不大,且呈减弱趋势。
第五,政策建议。与欧美国家相比,我国民航业起步晚,行业存在的问题还有不少,我们国家在政府工作层面显然还有待改善。为此,我们将本章分为两个部分,在第一部分,我们将透过所观察到的行业现象—“软政策约束”发现我们国家在法律制定、部门建设等方面存在的问题与不足,并对此提出有关建议。“软政策约束”不是民航业所特有的,其它网络型基础产业也存在,因此本文在论述过程中主要以民航为侧重点,但指出的缺陷与提供的建议对其它行业也有一定借鉴意义。在第二部分,结合先前章节的研究结果,本文提出以下六点建议：1.设置优势航空公司利用枢纽机场排斥竞争的“防火墙”；2.调整扶持民营航空公司发展的政策力度；3.支持我国有实力的航空公司加入全球性的航空联盟；4.综合评价国有航空企业“斑马现象”的利弊；5.对“常旅客计划”可能会引起的企业问的合谋予以重视；6.对民航企业资本的“援助”还要持续
The hard-won development of China civil aviation industry has drawn the attention from worldwide, thanks to the dedication of generations of aviation workers. Some problems, however, comes along with the rapid development. Many domestic scholars, aiming to solve these problems, conducted many pioneering research. In comparison with works by foreign scholars, the focus and methods of research by scholars from China is of significant difference. For instance, in terms of the oligopoly feature in both China and US aviation, foreign scholar, mostly using the methods of econometrics, analyze and investigate the merge of civil aviation companies and the selection of route network structure, combining the market forces; domestic scholar, on the other hand, mostly explain the reasons from the perspective of administrative factors. The different stage of civil aviation market, undoubtedly, decides the difference of research perspective. Besides, the gradual loosening of regulation has also a great influence on the evolution of civil aviation industry. However, are there any other reasons that can explain the oligopoly market structure still existing after the reshuffle of civil aviation industry proposed by CAAC?
In last more than30years, civil aviation companies around the world, hoping to stay in business among fierce competition, made a lot of adjustments to their own strategic planning. The first transformation is that large-scale companies, one after another, established Hub-and-Spoke network route structure. The second is the rapid development of aviation alliances. The third is the advancement of Frequent Flyer Programmed. These adjustments are of great relevance to aviation network economy, which is also investigated by domestic scholars in theory mostly. Mathematical analysis on how these adjustments affect the competition of civil aviation in China is rarely seen, as well as related empirical study. This thesis believes any research without taking the latest changes into consideration is groundless, which is unable to give theoretical support to the development of aviation industry and related policy-making.
In view of the above, this thesis, which bases itself on earlier research, taking aviation network economy as logical starting point, analyzes the market structure, competitive behaviors and performance of China civil aviation, both theoretically and empirically, within SCP framework. In accordance with actual situation and research results, this thesis also proposes constructive advices to the further reform of civil aviation. This thesis comprises of five parts:
First, carding the conception of aviation network economy. We have been used to investigate the network economy of air transportation from the perspective of aviation industry. This thesis believes, after synthesizing the definitions of various researchers, the network economy of air transportation means, for certain aviation company, increasing the number of aviation network nodes and opening up new routes will expand market demands and raise passenger volume, which is favorable to adjust the load ratio of different routs and increase the usage rate and efficiency of the entire network. When the network stretches dimensionally beyond the effective management range, the interconnection between the networks of different companies will form even larger transportation network, which, besides providing convenience for passengers, reduces the overall cost of the industry due to the rapid expansion of the market. Although under certain circumstances, Point-to-Point route structure may be even lower in cost, Hub-and-Spoke is considered the most viable way of realizing network economy, and is also the center of network economy relate research. The consumption externality of customers, the other import participant of the market, is also an economic feature related toe network economy, which originates from the complementarity between geographic nodes, and is presented as all the crew services during the connecting of networks. This thesis believes, these two different economic features, which both stem from the economy of network, form the network economy in aviation industry, and influence its development collectively.
Second, analyzing the measure of civil aviation market and its reasons. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Concentration Ration are the frequently-used indices for calculating market structure. This thesis uses these indices to complete the calculation of the structural features of civil aviation market of China from2002to 2012. Rather than the calculation of structure, this thesis emphasizes on the reason of the structure of civil aviation market in China, and gives new explanations for the formation of civil aviation market from the control of dominate aviation companies over hub airports and the network externality of customers. It is a convenient way for aviation companies to control hub airports using Hub-and-Spoke structure with their own influence, which, at the same time, endows aviation companies with capability to set charging difference. When this difference neutralizes the cost advantage of aviation companies of smaller scale in regional market, dominant aviation companies are able to wage price wars to seize the market between hub airports and non-hub airports. Through model analysis, this thesis has discovered that the foundation of customers becomes more solid, and the attraction of to new customers becomes stronger with the expansion of nodes. Under certain conditions, the freedom of choice of customers based on network externality will become an invisible barrier insurmountable for many aviation companies, which is not, unlike capital barrier, breakable using financing tools in certain period of time. Time cost alone is a great consumption of many aviation companies.
Third, discussion on forming alliance and Frequent Flyer Programme. The business range of an aviation company is limited. As a result, assistance from alliance partners is often needed to acquire extra market. However, this may raise concerns of public on whether alliances will affect competition. Competitive behaviors discussed in this thesis are mainly about pricing, for two reasons. The first is that people are used to understanding the degree of competition of an industry through analyzing the pricing behavior of companies, and the second is that it is easier to be contained in SCP, which can be verified with influence of structure on behavior. This thesis hereby discusses international market and domestic market respectively. For international routes, considering the strength of aviation companies and differences of density economy after alliances are formed, this thesis reset the form of cost function, and then acquire the corporate profit function and the first order conditioning for profit maximization. The result indicates that, for international market, forming alliances has no great influence on the ticket price between hub airports. The following empirical analysis further verifies this result, the alliance variable has a positive influence on price, with a magnitude of0.16228, while the corresponding P value is0.4859, which is insignificant in coefficient test. For domestic market, the problem is more complicated because we must determine beforehand whether alliance exists in domestic civil aviation market. Using previous research results for reference, this thesis assumes alliances exist in domestic aviation market, and are bonded by equity relationships. As discussed in this thesis, even if whether this kind of equity relationships can be called alliances is controversial, the fact that a route is mutually run by many aviation companies is undeniable. If we study the influence of equity relationship on ticket price using the method of setting dummy variables, the result will be consistent with the study on how alliance influence the price. Besides, considering that economies of scope provides natural conditions for multiple-market contact competition, this thesis also introduced this factor into the modeling. After data analysis, this thesis selected240domestic routes, most of which are hot routes, connecting more that60cities, guaranteeing the representativeness of the data. The empirical results indicates that equity-alliance has no significant influence on the price of domestic routes, and multiple-market contact competition shows obvious change with seasons.
Frequent Flyer programme is a major effort for aviation companies to exercise their locking strategies, which is related to conversion cost. This thesis is based on the programme and analyzes the problem step by step. First, this thesis completed the construction of basic model which includes conversion cost arising from Frequent Flyer programme. Through modeling, we discovered that Frequent Flyer programme, under certain circumstances, may lower the profit of aviation companies, which is contradictory to the common notion that conversion cost benefits the profit solely. Second, this thesis constructed a game model based on the externality of consumers. We discovered that conversion cost related to Frequent Flyer programme is able to hinder competitors from entering the market, indeed. However, taking part in the Frequent Flyer programmes of competitors, and in return, getting more market demand, is the realistic option for all the companies.
Fourth, measurement of production efficiency in aviation industry of China. This thesis discovered after estimation finished in Frontier4.1that, using five listed aviation companies'income and total transportation volume as output indicators, and permanent assets and number of employees as input indicators, from2006to2012, presenting technical inefficiency with a linear function which has included variables such as total asset turnover, the proportion of highly qualified staff, asset-liability ratio, the efficiency difference between samples and companies is insignificant. The different on the total transportation volume, however, shows signs of expanding. At the present stage, the output growth of aviation companies relies heavily on capital and less on labor force. Besides, the operational capability of capital has a great influence on the technical efficiency of aviation companies, while technical capability and structure of capital shows otherwise. The improvement of technical inefficiency in sample time is limited and decreasing.
Five, policy recommendations. Compared to developed countries, China's civil aviation industry started late, and many problems are still to solve. Improvement can be made on government level. This chapter is divided into two parts. First, we will search for the problems and deficiencies in legislation and government sector construction through so-called Soft Policy Restraints observed in the industry, and make recommendations. Soft Policy Restraints is not unique in aviation industry. It exists in almost every network economy. Therefore, deficiencies discovered and recommendation made in this thesis can also be used as reference in other industry even the focus is still on aviation industry. Second, combining with the results of previous chapters, six recommendations are made.1. Setting a firewall which can prevent dominant aviation companies from excluding competition using hub airports.2. Enhancing the policy which support private-owned aviation companies.3. Encouraging aviation companies with enough strength to take part in global alliances.4. Evaluating the so-called Zebre phenomenon existing in state-owned aviation companies in a comprehensive manner.5. Paying great attention to conspiracy between companies arising from Frequent Flyer programme.6. Keeping financing civil aviation companies.
同时需要看到的是,在过去三十多年的时间里,世界各国航空公司为在竞争日益激烈的客运市场上占有一席之地,逐步对自身战略规划做出了调整,在这一过程中突出的变换概括起来有三点：一是有实力的大型航空公司纷纷建立自己的轴心—轮辐式(Hub-and-Spoke,简写为HS)网络型航线结构；二是航空联盟的迅速发展；三是航空公司“常旅客”计划的推出。以上变化与航空网络经济存在密切关系,国内也有学者对其进行了讨论,但大多限于理论介绍,对这些变化如何影响我国民航业竞争尚缺乏数学分析,与之相关的实证研究亦十分稀少。本文认为,不结合行业最新形势变化的行业研究如无源之水,是难以为行业发展及有关政策建议提供理论支持的。
鉴于此,本文立足已有研究,以航空网络经济为逻辑出发点,在SCP研究框架内,对我国民航市场结构、行为与绩效分别予以理论与实证分析,并依据现实情况与研究结论为民航业进一步改革提出建设性建议。本文的研究内容主要分为以下几个部分：
第一,对航空网络经济概念的梳理。我们习惯站在航空企业的角度讨论航空运输的网络经济性。在综合学者们对航空网络经济定义的基础上,本文认为航空运输业的网络经济性表现为：就单个航空公司而言,增加航空网络节点、开辟新的航班线路可为其扩大市场需求,提升客运量,有利于企业更好地调节各线路载运率,进而提高整个网络的利用程度和效率。当航线网络从空间上超过单个航空公司的有效经营范围时,在更大的市场区域内,每家航空公司之间的相互连接必将形成更加庞大的运输网络,在为乘客带来便捷服务的同时,也因市场容量的迅速扩大,使整个产业的总成本得到节约。尽管在一定情况下,点对点的航线结构成本可能更低,但大多数时候,轴心—轮辐式航线网络结构被认为是航空企业实现网络经济的最直接的方式,并且对航空网络经济性的研究也主要围绕轴辐式网络结构展开。然而,作为行业市场上另一重要参与者——消费者从中获得的消费者网络外部性本质上也是一种与网络相关的经济特性,航空市场消费者的网络外部性产生的原因在于地理节点间的互补性,体现在网络链接过程中享受到的各项乘务服务。本文认为上述两种角度不同,意义不同,但却均来自于网络的经济性质一起构成了航空业中存在的网络经济,它们结合在一起,共同影响着航空产业的发展。
第二,对民航市场结构的测度与形成原因的分析。赫芬达尔指数HHI与行业集中度CRn是两种测算市场结构的常用指标,本文借此从整体上完成了对我国民航2002-2012年间市场结构特征的判断。但与测算结构相比,本文还是重点分析了民航市场结构形成的原因,并且从优势航空公司对枢纽机场的控制及消费者网络外部性两个角度为民航业市场结构形成原因提供了新的注解。借助轴心—轮辐式航线网络结构,利用自身影响力达成对枢纽机场的控制是航空公司实现网络经济的便捷途径,但这同时也赋予了航空公司一种人为的设置机场收费差值的能力。当这一差值抵消掉其它中小航空公司在局部市场的成本优势时,优势航空公司可以利用价格战吞噬枢纽机场与非枢纽机场间的航线市场,从而逼退竞争对手或者潜在进入者。此外,本文通过模型分析还发现,航空公司网点覆盖范围越广消费者基础越牢,对新进入市场的消费者吸引力越强,在特设条件下,市场当中消费者基于网络外部性的自主选择会成为部分航空公司无法逾越的无形壁垒,而这种壁垒又不像资本壁垒一般,在一定时间内可以依靠金融融资工具予以攻破,仅就时间成本而言,对部分航空公司来说也是一项极大的消耗。
第三,对联盟问题与“常旅客”计划的探讨。一家航空企业网络经营范围总有一定限度,更多时候需要借助联盟伙伴的力量才能打破各种因素的束缚,从而获得额外的市场需求。但如此一来,很容易激发起人们对联盟是否影响企业竞争行为的好奇。本文选择研究的竞争行为主要指企业的定价行为,这样一是因为人们习惯以对企业定价行为的分析作为了解认识行业竞争程度的切入口,二是方便将问题纳入SCP范式,连同结构对行为的作用一并验证。在此,本文将国际与国内市场分开进行探讨。对于国际航线,考虑到市场上航空公司自身实力及联盟后所产生密度经济的差异性,本文对成本函数的形式予以重新设定,并以此写出企业利润函数、求解最大化一阶条件。推导结果显示,在国际市场上,联盟对枢纽机场间机票价格并无显著影响。随后实证分析也进一步验证了这一发现：联盟变量对价格有正向影响,大小为0.16228,但对应的P值为0.4859,系数检验亦不显著；对于国内市场,问题会显得略微复杂一些,这是因为我们要首先界定国内航空市场有没有联盟。借鉴部分学者们之前的研究成果,本文倾向于认同国内航空市场存在联盟,并且该类联盟是以股权关系为纽带。如文中所述,即使对这类股权关系是否可以被称之为联盟存在争议,但一条航线由存在股权关系的多家航空企业共同运营是客观存在的事实,如果我们用设置虚拟变量的方法研究这样股权关系对航线票价的影响,会与接受该类别联盟对票价影响的研究是一致的。此外,考虑到航空业中范围经济为多市场接触竞争提供了天然条件,本文在模型中亦引入了多市场接触竞争。经过对数据的整理,本文最终选取了240条国内航线,航线普遍较为热门,通达城市60余座,具备较强代表性。实证结果显示,股权-联盟亦对国内航线价格无显著影响,而多市场接触竞争表现出明显的季节性变化。
“常旅客”计划是航空企业实现锁定策略的主要手段,锁定与转换成本有关,本文也是在此基础上一步步分析问题——首先,本文完成了包含由“常旅客”计划引致的转换成本在内的基本模型的构建,通过模型分析,我们发现：“常旅客”计划在一定情况下有可能会拉低航空企业的利润,这也打破了人们对于转换成本单纯有助于企业收益提升的认识；此外,我们还构造了一个基于消费者网络外部性的博弈模型,研究发现,与“常旅客”计划有关的转化成本的确可以起到阻碍竞争对手进入市场的目的,但与之相比,彼此参与对方的“常旅客”计划,互相换取更大的市场需求才是双方更为现实的选择。
第四,我国航空企业生产效率的测量。本文分别以2006-2012年上市的五家航空公司的收入、运输总周转为产出指标,以固定资产,年末员工人数为投入指标,并将技术无效率以包括总资产周转率、高素质员工占比、资产负债率等变量在内的线性函数形式加以表示,在利用了Frontier4.1软件进行估算后发现,样本期间,企业间在收入上体现的效率差异并不大,但在运输总周转上的差异有进一步扩大的可能；现阶段我国航空企业产出增长依然需要依靠资本驱动,对劳动力的依赖有所降低；除此以外,资金运用能力对航空企业技术效率有显著促进作用,而技术能力、资本结构的影响则不够明显；样本期间我国航空企业技术无效率每年改善幅度不大,且呈减弱趋势。
第五,政策建议。与欧美国家相比,我国民航业起步晚,行业存在的问题还有不少,我们国家在政府工作层面显然还有待改善。为此,我们将本章分为两个部分,在第一部分,我们将透过所观察到的行业现象—“软政策约束”发现我们国家在法律制定、部门建设等方面存在的问题与不足,并对此提出有关建议。“软政策约束”不是民航业所特有的,其它网络型基础产业也存在,因此本文在论述过程中主要以民航为侧重点,但指出的缺陷与提供的建议对其它行业也有一定借鉴意义。在第二部分,结合先前章节的研究结果,本文提出以下六点建议：1.设置优势航空公司利用枢纽机场排斥竞争的“防火墙”；2.调整扶持民营航空公司发展的政策力度；3.支持我国有实力的航空公司加入全球性的航空联盟；4.综合评价国有航空企业“斑马现象”的利弊；5.对“常旅客计划”可能会引起的企业问的合谋予以重视；6.对民航企业资本的“援助”还要持续
The hard-won development of China civil aviation industry has drawn the attention from worldwide, thanks to the dedication of generations of aviation workers. Some problems, however, comes along with the rapid development. Many domestic scholars, aiming to solve these problems, conducted many pioneering research. In comparison with works by foreign scholars, the focus and methods of research by scholars from China is of significant difference. For instance, in terms of the oligopoly feature in both China and US aviation, foreign scholar, mostly using the methods of econometrics, analyze and investigate the merge of civil aviation companies and the selection of route network structure, combining the market forces; domestic scholar, on the other hand, mostly explain the reasons from the perspective of administrative factors. The different stage of civil aviation market, undoubtedly, decides the difference of research perspective. Besides, the gradual loosening of regulation has also a great influence on the evolution of civil aviation industry. However, are there any other reasons that can explain the oligopoly market structure still existing after the reshuffle of civil aviation industry proposed by CAAC?
In last more than30years, civil aviation companies around the world, hoping to stay in business among fierce competition, made a lot of adjustments to their own strategic planning. The first transformation is that large-scale companies, one after another, established Hub-and-Spoke network route structure. The second is the rapid development of aviation alliances. The third is the advancement of Frequent Flyer Programmed. These adjustments are of great relevance to aviation network economy, which is also investigated by domestic scholars in theory mostly. Mathematical analysis on how these adjustments affect the competition of civil aviation in China is rarely seen, as well as related empirical study. This thesis believes any research without taking the latest changes into consideration is groundless, which is unable to give theoretical support to the development of aviation industry and related policy-making.
In view of the above, this thesis, which bases itself on earlier research, taking aviation network economy as logical starting point, analyzes the market structure, competitive behaviors and performance of China civil aviation, both theoretically and empirically, within SCP framework. In accordance with actual situation and research results, this thesis also proposes constructive advices to the further reform of civil aviation. This thesis comprises of five parts:
First, carding the conception of aviation network economy. We have been used to investigate the network economy of air transportation from the perspective of aviation industry. This thesis believes, after synthesizing the definitions of various researchers, the network economy of air transportation means, for certain aviation company, increasing the number of aviation network nodes and opening up new routes will expand market demands and raise passenger volume, which is favorable to adjust the load ratio of different routs and increase the usage rate and efficiency of the entire network. When the network stretches dimensionally beyond the effective management range, the interconnection between the networks of different companies will form even larger transportation network, which, besides providing convenience for passengers, reduces the overall cost of the industry due to the rapid expansion of the market. Although under certain circumstances, Point-to-Point route structure may be even lower in cost, Hub-and-Spoke is considered the most viable way of realizing network economy, and is also the center of network economy relate research. The consumption externality of customers, the other import participant of the market, is also an economic feature related toe network economy, which originates from the complementarity between geographic nodes, and is presented as all the crew services during the connecting of networks. This thesis believes, these two different economic features, which both stem from the economy of network, form the network economy in aviation industry, and influence its development collectively.
Second, analyzing the measure of civil aviation market and its reasons. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Concentration Ration are the frequently-used indices for calculating market structure. This thesis uses these indices to complete the calculation of the structural features of civil aviation market of China from2002to 2012. Rather than the calculation of structure, this thesis emphasizes on the reason of the structure of civil aviation market in China, and gives new explanations for the formation of civil aviation market from the control of dominate aviation companies over hub airports and the network externality of customers. It is a convenient way for aviation companies to control hub airports using Hub-and-Spoke structure with their own influence, which, at the same time, endows aviation companies with capability to set charging difference. When this difference neutralizes the cost advantage of aviation companies of smaller scale in regional market, dominant aviation companies are able to wage price wars to seize the market between hub airports and non-hub airports. Through model analysis, this thesis has discovered that the foundation of customers becomes more solid, and the attraction of to new customers becomes stronger with the expansion of nodes. Under certain conditions, the freedom of choice of customers based on network externality will become an invisible barrier insurmountable for many aviation companies, which is not, unlike capital barrier, breakable using financing tools in certain period of time. Time cost alone is a great consumption of many aviation companies.
Third, discussion on forming alliance and Frequent Flyer Programme. The business range of an aviation company is limited. As a result, assistance from alliance partners is often needed to acquire extra market. However, this may raise concerns of public on whether alliances will affect competition. Competitive behaviors discussed in this thesis are mainly about pricing, for two reasons. The first is that people are used to understanding the degree of competition of an industry through analyzing the pricing behavior of companies, and the second is that it is easier to be contained in SCP, which can be verified with influence of structure on behavior. This thesis hereby discusses international market and domestic market respectively. For international routes, considering the strength of aviation companies and differences of density economy after alliances are formed, this thesis reset the form of cost function, and then acquire the corporate profit function and the first order conditioning for profit maximization. The result indicates that, for international market, forming alliances has no great influence on the ticket price between hub airports. The following empirical analysis further verifies this result, the alliance variable has a positive influence on price, with a magnitude of0.16228, while the corresponding P value is0.4859, which is insignificant in coefficient test. For domestic market, the problem is more complicated because we must determine beforehand whether alliance exists in domestic civil aviation market. Using previous research results for reference, this thesis assumes alliances exist in domestic aviation market, and are bonded by equity relationships. As discussed in this thesis, even if whether this kind of equity relationships can be called alliances is controversial, the fact that a route is mutually run by many aviation companies is undeniable. If we study the influence of equity relationship on ticket price using the method of setting dummy variables, the result will be consistent with the study on how alliance influence the price. Besides, considering that economies of scope provides natural conditions for multiple-market contact competition, this thesis also introduced this factor into the modeling. After data analysis, this thesis selected240domestic routes, most of which are hot routes, connecting more that60cities, guaranteeing the representativeness of the data. The empirical results indicates that equity-alliance has no significant influence on the price of domestic routes, and multiple-market contact competition shows obvious change with seasons.
Frequent Flyer programme is a major effort for aviation companies to exercise their locking strategies, which is related to conversion cost. This thesis is based on the programme and analyzes the problem step by step. First, this thesis completed the construction of basic model which includes conversion cost arising from Frequent Flyer programme. Through modeling, we discovered that Frequent Flyer programme, under certain circumstances, may lower the profit of aviation companies, which is contradictory to the common notion that conversion cost benefits the profit solely. Second, this thesis constructed a game model based on the externality of consumers. We discovered that conversion cost related to Frequent Flyer programme is able to hinder competitors from entering the market, indeed. However, taking part in the Frequent Flyer programmes of competitors, and in return, getting more market demand, is the realistic option for all the companies.
Fourth, measurement of production efficiency in aviation industry of China. This thesis discovered after estimation finished in Frontier4.1that, using five listed aviation companies'income and total transportation volume as output indicators, and permanent assets and number of employees as input indicators, from2006to2012, presenting technical inefficiency with a linear function which has included variables such as total asset turnover, the proportion of highly qualified staff, asset-liability ratio, the efficiency difference between samples and companies is insignificant. The different on the total transportation volume, however, shows signs of expanding. At the present stage, the output growth of aviation companies relies heavily on capital and less on labor force. Besides, the operational capability of capital has a great influence on the technical efficiency of aviation companies, while technical capability and structure of capital shows otherwise. The improvement of technical inefficiency in sample time is limited and decreasing.
Five, policy recommendations. Compared to developed countries, China's civil aviation industry started late, and many problems are still to solve. Improvement can be made on government level. This chapter is divided into two parts. First, we will search for the problems and deficiencies in legislation and government sector construction through so-called Soft Policy Restraints observed in the industry, and make recommendations. Soft Policy Restraints is not unique in aviation industry. It exists in almost every network economy. Therefore, deficiencies discovered and recommendation made in this thesis can also be used as reference in other industry even the focus is still on aviation industry. Second, combining with the results of previous chapters, six recommendations are made.1. Setting a firewall which can prevent dominant aviation companies from excluding competition using hub airports.2. Enhancing the policy which support private-owned aviation companies.3. Encouraging aviation companies with enough strength to take part in global alliances.4. Evaluating the so-called Zebre phenomenon existing in state-owned aviation companies in a comprehensive manner.5. Paying great attention to conspiracy between companies arising from Frequent Flyer programme.6. Keeping financing civil aviation companies.
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5 郑雪梅.中国民航业规制对航空运输业效率的影响[D].山东大学硕士学位论文,2010：12-17
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2 Kumbhakar.S.C The Measurement and Decomposition of Cost-Inefficiency: TheTranslog cost system, Oxford Economic Paper, Vol43:667-683
3 David H.Good, M.Ishaq Nadiri, Lars-Hendrik Roller, Robin C. Sickles. Efficiency and Productivity Growth comparisons of European and U.S Air Carriers:A First Look at the Data [J]. The Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vo114:115-125
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5 Tae Hoon Oum and Chunyan Yu. Assessment of recent performance of Canadian Carriers:Focus on quantitative evidence for evaluating Canada's Air Transport Policy options [R]. Research conducted for the Canada Transportation Act Review,2001
6 参见F.M.Scherer and David Ross. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance [M].Houghton Mifflin Company,third edition:3-7
1 Teece.D.J, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise [J].Journal of Economic Behaviour Organization, 1980,Vol 1:223-247
2 Javier Gimeno and Carolyn Y. Woo, Multimarket contact, Economies of Scope, and Firm Performance [J]. The Academy of Management Journal,1999, Vol42, No3:239-259
3 Scott, J. T, Multimarket Contact and Economic Performance [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,1982, Vol64, No3:368-375
1 Karnani, Aneel and Birger Wernerfelt, Multiple Point Competition [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1985,Vol6, No1:87-96
1 B.Douglas Bernheim and Michael.D.Whinston, Multimarket contact and collusive behavior [J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1990, Vol21,Nol:1-26
2 Chen and Miller, Competitive Attack, Retaliation and performance: An Expetancy-Valence Framwork [J]. Strategic Managemant Journal, Vol 12:85-102
1 Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen and Michael W. Tretheway, Economics of Density versus Economies of Scale: Why Trunk and Local Service Airline Costs Differ [J].The Rand Journal of Economics,1984
2 Jan K. Brueckner and Pablo T. Spiller, Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated Airline Industry [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1994. Vol37,No2:379-415
1 Michael Creel and Montserrat Farell, Economies of scale in the US airline industry after deregulation:a Fourier series approximation [J]. Transportation Research,2011, Vol37:321-336
2 Panzar.J.C and Willig.R.D, Economies of scope [J]. American Economic Review,1981, Vol71:268-272
3 E.E. Bailey and A.F. Fridlaender, Market structure and multiproduct industries [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1982,Vol20:1021-1048
4 Kahn.A.E. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions [M]. Cambridge Mass:MIT Press.1998
1 荣朝和.西方运输经济学[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008,6-7
2 姜琪.中国铁路运输业规制效率问题研究[D].山东大学,2010,17-18
3 陈林.航空运输经济学[M].北京：中国民航出版社,2008,76-79
1 Giovanni Nero, A note on the competitive advantage of large hub-and-spoke networks [J]. Transportation Research,1999, Vol35:225-239
1 Oz. Shy, The economics of network industries.London:Cambridge University Press
2 Marco Alderighi, Alessandro Cento, Peter Nijkamp and Piet Rietveld, Network competition——the coexistence of hub-and-spke and point-to-point systems [J].Journal of Air Transport Management,2005, Vol 11:328-334
3 David Gillen, The Evolution of Networks with Changes in Industry Structure and Stratege:Connectivity, Hub-and-Spoke and Alliances [J]. Research in Transportation Economics,2005, Vol13:49-73
1 Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Servive [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1974, Vol15:16-37
2 张铭洪.网络经济学[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2007,36-40
1 黎群.航空公司战略联盟的网络经济性分析[J].北方交通大学学报,2003(2)：20-24
1 荣朝和.关于运输业规模经济和范围经济问题的探讨[J].中国铁道科学,2001(22)：97-103
1 陈学云,江可申.航空运输也规制放松与反行政垄断—基于自然垄断的强度分析[J].中国工业经济,2008(6)：67-76
2 表中HHI均乘以了10000
1 Shih-Lung Shaw, Feng Lu, Jie Chen and Chenghu Zhou, China's airline consolidation and its effects on domestic airline networks and competition [J], Journal of Transport Geography,2009, Vol 17:293-305
22002年8月1日新的《外商投资民用航空业规定》开始执行,《规定》在原来规定外商以合资、合作方式投资民用航空业的基础上,允许外商通过购买股票等方式和“其他经批准的投资方式”参与投资航空业,并放宽了外商投资比例。另外一个放松市场准入的规定是2005年8月15日开始实施的《国内投资民用航空业规定(试行)》,该项规定中的一项重要内容便是,在保证国有经济占主导地位的前提下,允许各种投资主体投资除空中交通管制系统外的所有民用航空领域,包括公共航空运输企业、通用航空企业、民用机场、服务保障及其他民用航空相关项目。此外,在国内、国际航线进入方面,开放的力度较以往也不断加大。这方面的内容可以参见2004年中美双方达成的中美扩展航空服务协议,以及我国2006年3月20日起执行的《中国民用航空国内航线经营许可规定》
1 张建森,谢敏.机场与航空公司的战略关系及其内涵分析[J].航空运输,2008(93)：36-40
1 金凤君,孙炜,萧世伦.我国航空公司重组及其对航空网络结构的影响[J].地理科学进展,2005(2),59-68
2 如前所述,基地航空公司在机场方面的控制力还体现在设施资源利用、航班时刻等业务资源分配等方面,国内外学者对其研究亦较为丰富。本文仅从机场对航空公司收费差异的角度,在HS航空网络结构下研究基地航空公司借此获得的竞争优势。在我国,除非航空性业务其他收费原则上以市场调节为主以外,机场其余两项重要收费,包括航空性业务收费与非航空性业务重要收费标砖均实行政府指导价。民航总局会同国家发展改革委,依据机场管理机构提供设施及服务的合理成本、用户的承受能力等因素核定基准价。两项收费标准基准价一般不作上浮,下浮幅度由机场管理机构或服务提供方根据其提供设施和服务水平的差异程度与用户协商确定。如果航空公司对机场有一定的控制力,往往在机场收费上占据主动,所缴纳的费用相对其他航空公司而言会有所折扣。因此可以说,本文模型中体现的收费标准差异有其现实依据
3 Ming Hsin Lin, Alliance and entry in a simple airline network, Economics Bulletin,2005, Vol12, No2:1-11
1 Brucekner.J.K and Whalen.W.T, The price effects of intermational airline alliances[J]. Journal of law and Economics,2000, Vol53:503-545
2 Ken Hendrick, Michele Piccione and Guofu Tan, Entry and Exit in Hub-Spoke network [J]. The Rand Journal of Economics,1997, Vol28, No2:291-303
3 Florian Allroggen and Robert Malina, Market power of hub airports:The role of lock-in effects and downstream competition,2010
1 在本章附录2中将对此给予推算演示。
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1 Park.J.H. The effects of airline alliances on markets and economics welfare [J]. Logistics and transport Review, 1997. Vol33:181-195
2 Brucekner.J.K and Whalen.W.T, The price effects of intermational airline alliances [J]. Journal of law and Economics,2000, Vol53:503-545
1 Yousslf.and Hausen., The consequences of strategic alliance between international airline,1994,Vol28:415-431
2 Park.J.H and Zhang.A, An empirical analysis of global airline alliances:cases in north Atlantic markets [J]. Review of industrial organization,2000, Vol 16:367-83
2 Jan K.Brueckner, The economics of international codesharing:analysis of airline alliance [J]. International Journal of industrial organization,2011, Vol 19:1475-498
3 Xiang wan, Li zou and Martin Dresner. Assessig the price effects of airline alliances on parallel routes [J]. Transportation research,2009, Vol45:627-641
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1 该数据来自国际航空运输协会.
2 为消除异方差影响,本文在随后分析中对市场规模、人均收入采用了对数形式,相关数据来自http://www.citymayors.com/features/largest cities.html
3 Jan K.Brueckner, International Airfares in the age of Alliance:The Effects of Codesharing and Antitrust immunity [J], The Review of Economics and Statistics,2003, Vol85:105-118
4 同一星,胡智勇.从航空运输看中国城市体系的空间网络结构[J].地理研究，2002(21)：276-286
5 航线距离数据同样采取了对数形式,来自于http://gc.kls2.com/
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1 本文仅列举了样本中涉及到的航空公司间的股权关系,事实上根据年报,四大航空企业还控制着其它—些航空公司,在此不一一列举。
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1 李艳伟,于剑,吴育华在《中美航空公司全要素生产率比较研究》一文中,还曾用“收入客公里”作为产出指标,但他们的样本航空公司中,并不包括海南航空和山东航空,而这两家航空公司在年报中也确实没有提供收入客公里,因此本文对“收入客公里”也不予采用。
1 崔婷，陈俣秀.于剑.基于生命周期的民航运输产业竞争力演化研究[J].北京理工大学学报,2009(6)：38-41
1 Janos Konai, Eric Maskin and Gerard Roland. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2003, Vol41,No4:1095-1136
2 柳学信.信息非对称下中国网络型产业规制问题研究[M].北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社,2006,83-91
2 康自平,杜伟.民航客运价格规制改革研究[M].北京：科学出版社,2008,48-49
1 周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7)：36-50
1 .陈富良.规制政策分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007,32-33
1 William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner. The Independent Judiciary in an interest-group perspective [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1975, Vol18,No3:875-901
1 毕颖.网络型基础产业法律管制研究[M].北京：北京交通大学出版社,2010,167-168
1 郭洁.中国自然垄断产业规制机构独立性的制度选择[J].东北大学学报,2007(2)：148-152
2 曹梓珞.陈松豪.中国民航业政府规制体制重建[J].广西财经学院学报,2008(3)：32-35
1 于良春,葛铸聪.自然垄断产业政府规制机构独立性研究[J].广东社会科学,2005(6)：34-40
1 海南航空最有可能近期加入,但截至目前依然没有公布准确时间
1 该报告由CARNOC. com发放问卷予以调查,南京航空航天大学李雯撰写,详见www. CARNOC. com
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22002年8月1日新的《外商投资民用航空业规定》开始执行,《规定》在原来规定外商以合资、合作方式投资民用航空业的基础上,允许外商通过购买股票等方式和“其他经批准的投资方式”参与投资航空业,并放宽了外商投资比例。另外一个放松市场准入的规定是2005年8月15日开始实施的《国内投资民用航空业规定(试行)》,该项规定中的一项重要内容便是,在保证国有经济占主导地位的前提下,允许各种投资主体投资除空中交通管制系统外的所有民用航空领域,包括公共航空运输企业、通用航空企业、民用机场、服务保障及其他民用航空相关项目。此外,在国内、国际航线进入方面,开放的力度较以往也不断加大。这方面的内容可以参见2004年中美双方达成的中美扩展航空服务协议,以及我国2006年3月20日起执行的《中国民用航空国内航线经营许可规定》
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2 如前所述,基地航空公司在机场方面的控制力还体现在设施资源利用、航班时刻等业务资源分配等方面,国内外学者对其研究亦较为丰富。本文仅从机场对航空公司收费差异的角度,在HS航空网络结构下研究基地航空公司借此获得的竞争优势。在我国,除非航空性业务其他收费原则上以市场调节为主以外,机场其余两项重要收费,包括航空性业务收费与非航空性业务重要收费标砖均实行政府指导价。民航总局会同国家发展改革委,依据机场管理机构提供设施及服务的合理成本、用户的承受能力等因素核定基准价。两项收费标准基准价一般不作上浮,下浮幅度由机场管理机构或服务提供方根据其提供设施和服务水平的差异程度与用户协商确定。如果航空公司对机场有一定的控制力,往往在机场收费上占据主动,所缴纳的费用相对其他航空公司而言会有所折扣。因此可以说,本文模型中体现的收费标准差异有其现实依据
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2 Park.J.H and Zhang.A, An empirical analysis of global airline alliances:cases in north Atlantic markets [J]. Review of industrial organization,2000, Vol 16:367-83
2 Jan K.Brueckner, The economics of international codesharing:analysis of airline alliance [J]. International Journal of industrial organization,2011, Vol 19:1475-498
3 Xiang wan, Li zou and Martin Dresner. Assessig the price effects of airline alliances on parallel routes [J]. Transportation research,2009, Vol45:627-641
1 William N. Evans and Ioannis N. Kessides, Localized Market Power in the US airline industry [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,1993, Vol75:66-75
1 该数据来自国际航空运输协会.
2 为消除异方差影响,本文在随后分析中对市场规模、人均收入采用了对数形式,相关数据来自http://www.citymayors.com/features/largest cities.html
3 Jan K.Brueckner, International Airfares in the age of Alliance:The Effects of Codesharing and Antitrust immunity [J], The Review of Economics and Statistics,2003, Vol85:105-118
4 同一星,胡智勇.从航空运输看中国城市体系的空间网络结构[J].地理研究，2002(21)：276-286
5 航线距离数据同样采取了对数形式,来自于http://gc.kls2.com/
1 转自张树义.战略联盟的博弈分析[D].西南交通大学博士学位论文,2002,10-11
2 陈黎琴.企业联盟的实现方式研究[D].中国社会科学院博士.学位论文,2003,14-15
3 Dawna L. Rhoades and Heather Lush, A typology of strategic alliances in the airline industry:Propositions for stability and duration [J]. Journal of Transport Management,1997, Vol3, No3:109-114
1 本文仅列举了样本中涉及到的航空公司间的股权关系,事实上根据年报,四大航空企业还控制着其它—些航空公司,在此不一一列举。
1 Yahua Zhang and David K. Round, The effects of China's airline mergers on priees [J]. Journal of Air Transport Management,2009, Vol15:315-323
1 肖俊极,唐听.中国民航业价格实证分析[J].南开经济研究,2009(2)：80-90
2 Ivette Jans and David I.Rosenbaum, Multimarket contact and pricing:Evidence from the U.S cement industry [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1997, Vol15:391-412
1 Vijay Singal, Airline Mergers and Multimarket Contact [J].Managerial amd Decision Economics,1996, Vol17, No6:559-574
1 斯蒂芬.霍洛维.实用航空经济学[M].北京：中国民航出版社,2009,143-144
1 桑辉,王万化.顾客转换成本研究综述[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2006,8,102-106
2 Thomas A. Burnham, Judy K. Frels, and Vijay Mahajan, Consumer Switching Costs:A Typology, Antecedents and Consequences [J]. Journal of Academy of Marketing Science,2003, Vo131, No2:109-126
1 Leonardo J. Basso, Matthew T. Clements and Thomas W.Ross, Moral Hazard and Customer Loyalty Programs [J]. American Economic Joumal: Microcconomics,2009. Vol1, No1:101-123
1 Oz Shy. A quick and easy method for estimating switching costs [J]. International Journal of Industrial organization,2002, Vol20:71-87
2 Fredrik Carlsson and Asalofgren, Airline choice, switching costs and frequent flyer program,2004, Gothenburg University, working paper.
1 G.E. Battese and T.J. Coelli, Frontier production functions, Technical efficiency and Panel data:with application to Paddy farmers in India [J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis,1992, Vol3:153-169
2 傅晓霞,吴利学.技术效率、资本深化与地区差异——基于随机前沿模型的中国地区收敛分析[J].经济研究,2006(10)：52-61
1 G.E. Battese and GS.Corra, Estimation of a production frontier model:with application to the pastoral zone of eastern Australia [J]. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol21,No3:169-179
1 李艳伟,于剑,吴育华在《中美航空公司全要素生产率比较研究》一文中,还曾用“收入客公里”作为产出指标,但他们的样本航空公司中,并不包括海南航空和山东航空,而这两家航空公司在年报中也确实没有提供收入客公里,因此本文对“收入客公里”也不予采用。
1 崔婷，陈俣秀.于剑.基于生命周期的民航运输产业竞争力演化研究[J].北京理工大学学报,2009(6)：38-41
1 Janos Konai, Eric Maskin and Gerard Roland. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2003, Vol41,No4:1095-1136
2 柳学信.信息非对称下中国网络型产业规制问题研究[M].北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社,2006,83-91
2 康自平,杜伟.民航客运价格规制改革研究[M].北京：科学出版社,2008,48-49
1 周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7)：36-50
1 .陈富良.规制政策分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007,32-33
1 William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner. The Independent Judiciary in an interest-group perspective [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1975, Vol18,No3:875-901
1 毕颖.网络型基础产业法律管制研究[M].北京：北京交通大学出版社,2010,167-168
1 郭洁.中国自然垄断产业规制机构独立性的制度选择[J].东北大学学报,2007(2)：148-152
2 曹梓珞.陈松豪.中国民航业政府规制体制重建[J].广西财经学院学报,2008(3)：32-35
1 于良春,葛铸聪.自然垄断产业政府规制机构独立性研究[J].广东社会科学,2005(6)：34-40
1 海南航空最有可能近期加入,但截至目前依然没有公布准确时间
1 该报告由CARNOC. com发放问卷予以调查,南京航空航天大学李雯撰写,详见www. CARNOC. com
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