非公企业参与武器装备科研生产有效竞争研究
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摘要
有效竞争是一种把规模经济和竞争活力相互协调和兼容的理想状态。我国非公企业参与武器装备科研生产的有效竞争是既考虑到国防工业的规模经济的要求,又能满足武器装备科研生产竞争取向的改革要求,是一种竞争收益明显大于竞争成本的适度竞争。从各国国防工业基础转型路线来看,在武器装备科研生产中引入竞争机制已成为提高装备生产效益的有力武器。随着我国社会经济体制转型,装备生产改革不断深化,在武器装备科研生产中引入竞争机制既是历史趋势,也是现实问题。研究非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争的目的,可以通过竞争有效性的研究探索提高竞争有效性的有效途径,对非公企业参与武器装备科研生产的过程实施有效控制,达到优化配置国防经济资源,提高非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争的效率,促进我国国防工业建设的繁荣与发展,改善武器装备质量的目的。文章基于微观经济学的基本原理,信息经济学的一般理论与模型和现代经济学的研究范式,将主体分为理论分析和机制设计两部分。理论分析部分主要运用产业组织理论、博弈论和信息经济学等有关理论系统地考察了引入竞争机制前后武器装备科研生产的市场结构,分析了武器装备科研生产中竞争机制的有效性及引入非公企业参与武器装备科研生产后竞争效率的变化,为提高非公企业参与武器装备科研生产的有效性奠定基础。机制设计部分借鉴发达国家相对成熟的经验和理论,结合我国装备生产实践,从军方主导的视角,运用博弈理论、机制设计理论和装备生产相关理论,探讨了非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争主体的培育、运行环境的完善。重点分析了竞争机制、承包商选择以及承包商的激励和约束机制的设计问题,较为系统的构建了非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争的理论分析框架和实践运行机制。
研究表明,我国非公企业参与武器装备科研生产后竞争效率有所提高。未引入竞争机制之前,由于受自然垄断、行政垄断等因素影响,降低了国防经济领域资源配置的效率。尽管进入者具有相对较高的生产成本,但是竞争仍可以节约生产成本,是最佳的选择。未来,通过进一步强化发展非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争的观念,推进武器装备科研生产供应方竞争主体的培育,完善武器装备科研生产竞争机制运行的制度保障和装备采办制度等方式和手段,可以进一步推动非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争有效性的提高,建立和完善竞争性武器装备科研生产制度,提高武器装备科研生产效益.
The effective competition is an ideal condition that the economies of scale and the competition vigor are coordinated and compatible. In our country the effective competition of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production both considers the demand of the economies of scale in the defense industry, and meets the reform requirement of weaponry research and production competition orientation, it is a moderate competition that the benefits outweigh the costs obviously. Judging from the reforming route of other countries’defense industrial base, introducing competition mechanism into weaponry research and production has become a powerful weapon of improving the cost-effectiveness of weapons and equipment production. Along with the process of our social and economic system transformation, weapons and equipment production reform is being deepened constantly, introducing competition mechanism into weaponry research and production is not only a historical tendency but also a practical question. Through effective competition study, the paper hopes to help optimizing defense economic resource allocation and promoting our country’s defense industry construction and the development of the weapons and equipment’s quality by questing for effective ways to strengthen the efficiency and to control the process of the non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition. Based on the basic logic of microeconomics, general theories and models of the econometrics of information and paradigm of modern economics, the paper is divided into two parts: theoretical analysis and mechanism design. The first part observes the efficiency of oligopoly competition between military and military enterprises systematically both introducing the mechanism of competition into weaponry research and production and not ,in the use of logical reasoning method to analyze the efficiency of the mechanism of competition in weapons and equipment production and the changes of efficiency after introducing non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production.This part lays an important foundation for improving the cost-effectiveness of weaponry research and production. In mechanism design part, with the relatively mature experiences and theories of developed countries and integrating itself with the concrete practice of our weapons and equipment production some problems such as fostering of competitors and perfecting the operation environment are discussed by using game theory, mechanism design theory and weapons and equipment production theory from the perspective of military-leading. This part analyzes the mechanism of competition and contractor selection emphatically and focuses on design of the incentive and restraint mechanisms for contractors, establishes the theoretical framework and practical operational mechanism of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition.
Research suggests that the efficiency of competition increases after introducing non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition in our country. Before introducing competition mechanism into weaponry research and production, affected by a number of factors such as natural monopoly and administrative monopoly, the efficiency of resource allocation in defense economy declined. Although the entrants have relatively high cost, the optimal choice is still competition, because through competition the cost can be cut down. In the future, we can further improve the efficiency of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production, establish and perfect competitive weapons and equipment production competitive mechanism through means such as further strengthening the development of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition, promoting the fostering of competitors of weapons and equipment supply, perfecting the system of ensuring weapons and equipment production competitive mechanism operates smoothly and weapon and equipment procurement system.
研究表明,我国非公企业参与武器装备科研生产后竞争效率有所提高。未引入竞争机制之前,由于受自然垄断、行政垄断等因素影响,降低了国防经济领域资源配置的效率。尽管进入者具有相对较高的生产成本,但是竞争仍可以节约生产成本,是最佳的选择。未来,通过进一步强化发展非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争的观念,推进武器装备科研生产供应方竞争主体的培育,完善武器装备科研生产竞争机制运行的制度保障和装备采办制度等方式和手段,可以进一步推动非公企业参与武器装备科研生产竞争有效性的提高,建立和完善竞争性武器装备科研生产制度,提高武器装备科研生产效益.
The effective competition is an ideal condition that the economies of scale and the competition vigor are coordinated and compatible. In our country the effective competition of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production both considers the demand of the economies of scale in the defense industry, and meets the reform requirement of weaponry research and production competition orientation, it is a moderate competition that the benefits outweigh the costs obviously. Judging from the reforming route of other countries’defense industrial base, introducing competition mechanism into weaponry research and production has become a powerful weapon of improving the cost-effectiveness of weapons and equipment production. Along with the process of our social and economic system transformation, weapons and equipment production reform is being deepened constantly, introducing competition mechanism into weaponry research and production is not only a historical tendency but also a practical question. Through effective competition study, the paper hopes to help optimizing defense economic resource allocation and promoting our country’s defense industry construction and the development of the weapons and equipment’s quality by questing for effective ways to strengthen the efficiency and to control the process of the non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition. Based on the basic logic of microeconomics, general theories and models of the econometrics of information and paradigm of modern economics, the paper is divided into two parts: theoretical analysis and mechanism design. The first part observes the efficiency of oligopoly competition between military and military enterprises systematically both introducing the mechanism of competition into weaponry research and production and not ,in the use of logical reasoning method to analyze the efficiency of the mechanism of competition in weapons and equipment production and the changes of efficiency after introducing non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production.This part lays an important foundation for improving the cost-effectiveness of weaponry research and production. In mechanism design part, with the relatively mature experiences and theories of developed countries and integrating itself with the concrete practice of our weapons and equipment production some problems such as fostering of competitors and perfecting the operation environment are discussed by using game theory, mechanism design theory and weapons and equipment production theory from the perspective of military-leading. This part analyzes the mechanism of competition and contractor selection emphatically and focuses on design of the incentive and restraint mechanisms for contractors, establishes the theoretical framework and practical operational mechanism of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition.
Research suggests that the efficiency of competition increases after introducing non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition in our country. Before introducing competition mechanism into weaponry research and production, affected by a number of factors such as natural monopoly and administrative monopoly, the efficiency of resource allocation in defense economy declined. Although the entrants have relatively high cost, the optimal choice is still competition, because through competition the cost can be cut down. In the future, we can further improve the efficiency of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production, establish and perfect competitive weapons and equipment production competitive mechanism through means such as further strengthening the development of non-public ownership enterprises participate in weaponry research and production competition, promoting the fostering of competitors of weapons and equipment supply, perfecting the system of ensuring weapons and equipment production competitive mechanism operates smoothly and weapon and equipment procurement system.
引文
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5学者呼吁中国实施“民转军”战略推动国防现代化,http://news.tom.com/1002/20040806-1172219.html
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9卢周来.现代国防经济教程.北京:石油工业出版社,2006.12
11杜人淮,国防工业市场化改革的历史沿革,《中国军转民》2005年第4期
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4肖玉蓉.民营企业参与国防工业整合中利益相关者博弈分析.2006
5学者呼吁中国实施“民转军”战略推动国防现代化,http://news.tom.com/1002/20040806-1172219.html
6王俊豪.中国垄断性产业结构重组、分类管制与协调政策.商务印书馆.2006.12
7数据来源于Http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/aprod/concentration_ratios.ntml
8国防科学技术工业委员会.国防科工委发展改革委国资委关于推进军工企业股份制改造的指导意见[EB/OL].[2007-06-22]. http://www.costind.gov.cn/n435777/n497407/n497408/n497413/10631 5.html.
9卢周来.现代国防经济教程.北京:石油工业出版社,2006.12
11杜人淮,国防工业市场化改革的历史沿革,《中国军转民》2005年第4期
[1]盖文·肯尼迪.国防经济学[M].北京:解放军出版社,1986:197
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[4]江勇.发达国家推进军民结合、寓军于民的做法和经验[J].中国电子报,2008.08
[5]美国国会技术评价局,军民一体化的潜力报告,中国国防科技信息中心,1995
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