耐用品二手市场的存在对供应链企业决策的影响
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摘要
耐用品是指可以重复使用的，或在正常情况下可以持续使用多个时期的商品。常见的耐用品有汽车、家电、教科书、机器设备、办公设备和医疗设备等。这些耐用品一个重要的特点就是在被购买后，经过使用、利用或享受，仍具有使用价值，从而能够重新进入流通领域，形成该商品的二手市场。一方面，由于耐用品通常可以使用多个周期，因而在厂商不断推出新产品的同时，耐用品的二手市场也在不断的积累壮大，从而在流通领域形成了新旧两个子市场并存的局面。另一方面，由于耐用品的旧产品存在一定的残值，因而促使一部分原本打算购买新产品的消费者转向旧产品市场，从而导致旧产品市场对新产品市场存在一定的侵蚀效用。因此这两个子市场之间既紧密联系，又相互影响。
现有关于耐用品二手市场的研究主要是在假设二手市场独立于供应链之外而存在或者二手市场对供应链企业不产生直接收益的基础上，研究二手市场的存在对供应链企业决策的影响，例如：P2P二手市场，忽略了二手市场作为供应链的一部分并对供应链企业的决策产生影响的情景。而在现实经济中，由于旧产品存在一定的残值，在赢取一定差额利润的基础上，从事二手产品的买卖活动已经引起了许多独立的第三方公司，或者从事新产品销售的零售商甚至从事新产品生产的制造商的极大兴趣，例如：零售商二手市场等。因此，本文主要是基于这一背景展开讨论的。
本文在对现有耐用品二手市场，消费者策略行为及产品升级这三方面的理论研究进行综述的基础上，运用博弈论及最优化理论的相关知识，研究了耐用品二手市场的存在对供应链企业决策的影响以及新旧两个市场之间的关系。
第三章假设二手市场是供应链的一部分，并且将旧产品残值，产品质量改进度及耐用品耐用度等因素引入到策略消费者的购买行为中，对市场进一步细分，内生出消费者需求函数。然后基于耐用品市场上垄断制造商不从事旧产品的销售（即垄断制造商与二手市场的进入者是直接的竞争关系）及策略消费者之间不能直接进行产品买卖的假设，建立了一个两周期的动态博弈模型，其中垄断制造商在两周期销售不同代的新产品，即第一周期销售第一代新产品，第二周期由于科学技术的进步，销售第二代更高级的新产品；而进入者在第一周期末回收旧产品并在第二周期市场上将其再次销售给愿意购买旧产品的消费者。运用斯坦伯格博弈及最优化方法研究了耐用品二手市场的存在对制造商新产品更新换代速度的影响。结果表明，耐用品二手市场的存在加速了垄断制造商新产品的更新换代。
受当前耐用品制造商不断的推出升级新产品及耐用品二手市场飞速发展的启发，从二手市场上潜在进入者的角度出发，考察了面对耐用品新产品市场的不断升级，二手市场上的潜在进入者从事二手产品的买卖是否有利，并为进入者提供科学合理的理论指导。在第三章模型假设的基础上，第四章将垄断制造商必定在第二周期上市升级的产品及潜在进入者必定进入二手市场的确定性情景推广到垄断制造商是否愿意在第二周期上市升级产品及潜在进入者是否愿意进入二手市场的不确定情景，研究了耐用品的垄断制造商进行新产品升级对二手市场上潜在进入者的旧产品销售策略的影响。通过建立一个两周期供应链模型，运用博弈论与最优化理论的相关知识求解得出供应链各个成员的最优定价决策及最大利润值。研究发现，对于制造商来说，当进行产品升级的投资成本较低时，制造商具有较强的积极性在第二周期销售升级的新产品；反之，当进行产品升级的投资成本较高时，制造商则更愿意在两周期销售相同版本的产品。特别的，当质量改进程度较小或适中时，制造商进行产品的升级对二手市场上的潜在进入者是有利的；否则，当质量改进程度较大时，制造商对其新产品进行升级对二手市场上的潜在进入者是不利的。
第五章将上述竞争关系的模型推广到竞合关系的模型，基于零售商在销售新书的同时也销售旧书的情景，即零售商与制造商即存在合作关系又存在竞争的关系，构建了包含单一制造商和单一零售商的两周期两级供应链模型，研究了竞合关系下耐用品二手市场的存在对供应链成员决策的影响。主要结果表明，当旧产品的回收成本较小时，零售商开通二手市场对其自身以及制造商都有利；反之，当旧产品的回收成本较大时，零售商开通二手市场对自身是有利的，而对制造商则是不利的。
Durable goods are the products which can be repeated used, or can provide servicemore than one period. Common durable goods are automobile, home appliance,textbooks, machinery and equipment, office equipment, medical equipment and so on.An important characteristic of durable goods is that, after be purchased, used, andenjoyed, they still have useful value, and are able to re-enter circulation field. Therefore,it results in a secondary market. On the one hand, because durable goods usually can beused for multiple periods, it promotes the secondary markets increasing quickly whiledurable goods manufacturers continuously introduce new products, and appears twomarkets in durable goods: new and used product markets, simultaneously. On the otherhand, because the old product has the resale value, it facilitates some consumers whoare going to buy new products turn to the secondary market, and further cannibalizes thesales of new components. Thereby, new and used product markets are closely related,while influenced with each other.
The existing literature on secondary markets for durable goods typically assumesthat used goods are sold outside the standard channel, or do not produce direct profitsfor the partners in the supply chain, studies the effect of the secondary markets on thestrategies of members in supply chain. However, they igores the impact of thesecondary market, as one member of supply chain, on the strategies of firms in supplychain, for instance, P2P secondary market. In real life, because the old product has somecertain residual value, it facilitates some independent third party companies, retailersand even some new product manufacturers engaging in the used products tradingactivity for a profit in markets, for example, retailers’ secondary markets. Therefore, onthe basis of this background, this article mainly focuses on the effect of the secondarymarket on the strategies of firms in supply chain.
Based on the review of current researches of the secondary market in durablegoods and strategic consumers’ buying behavior and product upgrade detailedly, thisthesis studies the effect of the secondary market on the strategies of firms in supplychain by using game theory and optimization theory, from two perspectives of perfectand cooperation competition between new and used product markets.
Chapter3assumes that the secondary market is a part of the supply chain, andintegrates the old product surplus value and new product upgrade and durability of durable goods into the strategies of the consumers’ buying behavior to further marketsegmentation, and derive the consumer demand function. Based on the assumptions ofthe monopoly manufacturer does not engage in the old product sales （i.e., themonopoly manufacturer and the entrant in the secondary market are direct perfectcompetition）, and consumers can not directly sell used products to each other, wedevelop a two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer launches a higherquality product in the second period for the technological innovation and sells its newdurable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while an entrant operates areverse channel selling used products in the secondary market. We address how thesecondary market affects the strategy of the manufacturer’s new product introduction byusing the optimization method and game theory, and find that the secondary market canactually drives the new product introduction in the second period.
Inspired by firms’ frequent introduction of upgraded products and the secondarymarket increasing quickly, from the perspectives of the entrant, this study exploreswhether the entrant engaging in the secondary market is beneficial. Based on the modelassumptions in Chapter3, the model in this chapter4assumes that the manufacturerwhether releases a new upgrade product in the second period and the entrant whetherengages in the secondary market are not certain, and examines the impact ofmanufacturers’ frequent upgrading of new products in the durable goods market on thedecision of the entrant in a secondary market. To do so, we develop a two-period model,and derive the optimal price and profit of every partner in the supply chain by using theoptimization method and game theory. We find that when the investment cost ofupgrading new product is low, the manufacturer prefers to release an upgraded productin the second period; otherwise, when the investment cost of upgrading new product ishigh, the manufacturer prefers to sell the same version new products in both periods.Specially, in industries in which upgrades are typically minor or moderate, manufacturerupgrading of new products can increase the entrant’s profitability in the secondarymarket but that it does not benefit the entrant in industries in which upgrades aretypically major.
Extending the perfect competion model to the cooperative competition model, andtaking the example of the textbooks market in universities, Chapter5investigates theeffect of the secondary market on the strategies of the supply chain members, based on atwo-period supply chain model consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer and a retailer,in which the secondary market operated by the retailer. We find that when the recovery cost of used products is lower, the secondary market operated by the retailer isbeneficial for both the manufacturer and the retailer; in contrast, when the recovery costof used products is higher, it is not beneficial for the manufacturer, but benefits theretailer. In other words, the retailer can block the manufacturer’s monopoly position byoperating a secondary market.
现有关于耐用品二手市场的研究主要是在假设二手市场独立于供应链之外而存在或者二手市场对供应链企业不产生直接收益的基础上，研究二手市场的存在对供应链企业决策的影响，例如：P2P二手市场，忽略了二手市场作为供应链的一部分并对供应链企业的决策产生影响的情景。而在现实经济中，由于旧产品存在一定的残值，在赢取一定差额利润的基础上，从事二手产品的买卖活动已经引起了许多独立的第三方公司，或者从事新产品销售的零售商甚至从事新产品生产的制造商的极大兴趣，例如：零售商二手市场等。因此，本文主要是基于这一背景展开讨论的。
本文在对现有耐用品二手市场，消费者策略行为及产品升级这三方面的理论研究进行综述的基础上，运用博弈论及最优化理论的相关知识，研究了耐用品二手市场的存在对供应链企业决策的影响以及新旧两个市场之间的关系。
第三章假设二手市场是供应链的一部分，并且将旧产品残值，产品质量改进度及耐用品耐用度等因素引入到策略消费者的购买行为中，对市场进一步细分，内生出消费者需求函数。然后基于耐用品市场上垄断制造商不从事旧产品的销售（即垄断制造商与二手市场的进入者是直接的竞争关系）及策略消费者之间不能直接进行产品买卖的假设，建立了一个两周期的动态博弈模型，其中垄断制造商在两周期销售不同代的新产品，即第一周期销售第一代新产品，第二周期由于科学技术的进步，销售第二代更高级的新产品；而进入者在第一周期末回收旧产品并在第二周期市场上将其再次销售给愿意购买旧产品的消费者。运用斯坦伯格博弈及最优化方法研究了耐用品二手市场的存在对制造商新产品更新换代速度的影响。结果表明，耐用品二手市场的存在加速了垄断制造商新产品的更新换代。
受当前耐用品制造商不断的推出升级新产品及耐用品二手市场飞速发展的启发，从二手市场上潜在进入者的角度出发，考察了面对耐用品新产品市场的不断升级，二手市场上的潜在进入者从事二手产品的买卖是否有利，并为进入者提供科学合理的理论指导。在第三章模型假设的基础上，第四章将垄断制造商必定在第二周期上市升级的产品及潜在进入者必定进入二手市场的确定性情景推广到垄断制造商是否愿意在第二周期上市升级产品及潜在进入者是否愿意进入二手市场的不确定情景，研究了耐用品的垄断制造商进行新产品升级对二手市场上潜在进入者的旧产品销售策略的影响。通过建立一个两周期供应链模型，运用博弈论与最优化理论的相关知识求解得出供应链各个成员的最优定价决策及最大利润值。研究发现，对于制造商来说，当进行产品升级的投资成本较低时，制造商具有较强的积极性在第二周期销售升级的新产品；反之，当进行产品升级的投资成本较高时，制造商则更愿意在两周期销售相同版本的产品。特别的，当质量改进程度较小或适中时，制造商进行产品的升级对二手市场上的潜在进入者是有利的；否则，当质量改进程度较大时，制造商对其新产品进行升级对二手市场上的潜在进入者是不利的。
第五章将上述竞争关系的模型推广到竞合关系的模型，基于零售商在销售新书的同时也销售旧书的情景，即零售商与制造商即存在合作关系又存在竞争的关系，构建了包含单一制造商和单一零售商的两周期两级供应链模型，研究了竞合关系下耐用品二手市场的存在对供应链成员决策的影响。主要结果表明，当旧产品的回收成本较小时，零售商开通二手市场对其自身以及制造商都有利；反之，当旧产品的回收成本较大时，零售商开通二手市场对自身是有利的，而对制造商则是不利的。
Durable goods are the products which can be repeated used, or can provide servicemore than one period. Common durable goods are automobile, home appliance,textbooks, machinery and equipment, office equipment, medical equipment and so on.An important characteristic of durable goods is that, after be purchased, used, andenjoyed, they still have useful value, and are able to re-enter circulation field. Therefore,it results in a secondary market. On the one hand, because durable goods usually can beused for multiple periods, it promotes the secondary markets increasing quickly whiledurable goods manufacturers continuously introduce new products, and appears twomarkets in durable goods: new and used product markets, simultaneously. On the otherhand, because the old product has the resale value, it facilitates some consumers whoare going to buy new products turn to the secondary market, and further cannibalizes thesales of new components. Thereby, new and used product markets are closely related,while influenced with each other.
The existing literature on secondary markets for durable goods typically assumesthat used goods are sold outside the standard channel, or do not produce direct profitsfor the partners in the supply chain, studies the effect of the secondary markets on thestrategies of members in supply chain. However, they igores the impact of thesecondary market, as one member of supply chain, on the strategies of firms in supplychain, for instance, P2P secondary market. In real life, because the old product has somecertain residual value, it facilitates some independent third party companies, retailersand even some new product manufacturers engaging in the used products tradingactivity for a profit in markets, for example, retailers’ secondary markets. Therefore, onthe basis of this background, this article mainly focuses on the effect of the secondarymarket on the strategies of firms in supply chain.
Based on the review of current researches of the secondary market in durablegoods and strategic consumers’ buying behavior and product upgrade detailedly, thisthesis studies the effect of the secondary market on the strategies of firms in supplychain by using game theory and optimization theory, from two perspectives of perfectand cooperation competition between new and used product markets.
Chapter3assumes that the secondary market is a part of the supply chain, andintegrates the old product surplus value and new product upgrade and durability of durable goods into the strategies of the consumers’ buying behavior to further marketsegmentation, and derive the consumer demand function. Based on the assumptions ofthe monopoly manufacturer does not engage in the old product sales （i.e., themonopoly manufacturer and the entrant in the secondary market are direct perfectcompetition）, and consumers can not directly sell used products to each other, wedevelop a two-period model in which a monopolistic manufacturer launches a higherquality product in the second period for the technological innovation and sells its newdurable products directly to end consumers in both periods, while an entrant operates areverse channel selling used products in the secondary market. We address how thesecondary market affects the strategy of the manufacturer’s new product introduction byusing the optimization method and game theory, and find that the secondary market canactually drives the new product introduction in the second period.
Inspired by firms’ frequent introduction of upgraded products and the secondarymarket increasing quickly, from the perspectives of the entrant, this study exploreswhether the entrant engaging in the secondary market is beneficial. Based on the modelassumptions in Chapter3, the model in this chapter4assumes that the manufacturerwhether releases a new upgrade product in the second period and the entrant whetherengages in the secondary market are not certain, and examines the impact ofmanufacturers’ frequent upgrading of new products in the durable goods market on thedecision of the entrant in a secondary market. To do so, we develop a two-period model,and derive the optimal price and profit of every partner in the supply chain by using theoptimization method and game theory. We find that when the investment cost ofupgrading new product is low, the manufacturer prefers to release an upgraded productin the second period; otherwise, when the investment cost of upgrading new product ishigh, the manufacturer prefers to sell the same version new products in both periods.Specially, in industries in which upgrades are typically minor or moderate, manufacturerupgrading of new products can increase the entrant’s profitability in the secondarymarket but that it does not benefit the entrant in industries in which upgrades aretypically major.
Extending the perfect competion model to the cooperative competition model, andtaking the example of the textbooks market in universities, Chapter5investigates theeffect of the secondary market on the strategies of the supply chain members, based on atwo-period supply chain model consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer and a retailer,in which the secondary market operated by the retailer. We find that when the recovery cost of used products is lower, the secondary market operated by the retailer isbeneficial for both the manufacturer and the retailer; in contrast, when the recovery costof used products is higher, it is not beneficial for the manufacturer, but benefits theretailer. In other words, the retailer can block the manufacturer’s monopoly position byoperating a secondary market.
引文
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Chen, J., Esteban, S., Shum, M.2011. How much competition is a secondary market? Working paper,University of California.
Coase, R.1972. Durability and monopoly[J]. Journal of Laws and Economics,15(1):143-149.
Computer Business Review.2005. Big players emerge in fragmented brokerage market.CBRonline.com (September5),http://www.cbronline.com/news/big_players_emerge_in_fragmented_brokerage_market.
Cornelis, A., Kluyver, D.1977. Innovation and Industrial product Life Cycles[J].CaliforniaManagement Review,1(1):21-33.
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Davis, P.2000. Empirical models of demand for differentiatad products[J]. European EconomicReview,44:993-1005.
Dean, J.1950. Pricing Policies for new products [J]. Harvard Business Review,28(6):45-53.
Desai, P., Purohit, D.1998. Leasing and selling: optimal marketing strategies for a durable goodsFirm[J]. Management Science,44(11):19-34.
Desai, P., Purohit, D.1999. Competition in durable goods markets: the strategic consequences ofleasing and selling[J]. Marketing Science,18(1):42-58.
Desai, P. S., Koenigsberg, O., Purohit, D.2004. Strategic decentralization and channelcoordination[J]. Quantitative Marketing and Economic,2:5-22.
Dhebar, A.1994. Durable-goods monopolists, rational consumers and improving products[J].Marketing Science,13(1):100-120.
Dixit, A. K., Stiglitz, J.E.1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity[J]. TheAmerican Economic Review,67(3):297-308.
Erzurumlu, S.2010. Collaborative product development with competitors to stimulate down-streaminnovation[J]. International Journal of Innovation Management,14(4):573-602.
Esteban, S., Shum, M.2007. Durable-goods oligopoly with secondary markets: the case ofautomobiles[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,38(2):332-354.
Fishman, A., Rob, R.2000. Product innovation by a durable goods monopoly[J]. RAND Journal ofEconomics,31(2):634-657.
Forrester J. W.1958. Industrial Dynamics：a major breakthrough for decision makers[J]. HarvardBusiness Review, July-August37-65.
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.1998. Upgrades, tradeins and reverses[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,29(2):235-258.
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Ghose, A., Telang, R., Krishnan, R.2003. Do secondary market for dururable goods help or hurtsuppliers?[C] Camegie Mellon University, Marketing Science2003Conference.
Goering, G. E.2007. Durability choice with differentiated products[J]. Research in Economics,5(61):105-112.
Goering, G. E.2008. Socially concerned firms and the provision of durable goods [J]. EconomicModelling,3(25):575-583.
Greenstein, S., Ramey, G.1998. Market structure, innovation and vertical product differentiation[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,16,285-311.
Gurnani, H., Erkoc, M.2008. Supply contracts in manufacturer-retailer interactions withmanufacturer-quality and retailer-effort induced demand[J]. Naval Research Logistics,55(3):200-217.
Harabi, N.1998. Innovation through vertical relatiombetween firms, suppliers andcustomers: a study of German firms[J]. Industry Innovation,5:157-179.
Harter, F. R.1993. Differentiated products with R&D[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics,41(1):19-28.
Hendel, I., Lizzeri, A.1999. Interfering with secondary markets[J]. RAND Journal of Economics30(1):1-21.
Hendel, I., Lizzen, A.1999. Adverse selection in durable goods markets[J]. American EconomicReview,89(5):1097-1115.
Hoppe, H. C., Lee, I. H.2003. Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly [J].European Economic Review,47(6):1011-1036.
Huang, S., Yang, Y., Anderson, K.2001. A theory of finitely durable goods monopoly withused-goods market and transaction cost[J]. Management Science,47(11):1515-1532.
Kim, J. C.1989. Trade in used gods and durability choice[J]. International Economic Journal,3(3):53-63.
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Kornish, L. J.2001. Pricing for a Durable-goods monopolist under rapid sequential innovation[J].Management Science,47(11):1552-1561.
Levinthal, D., Purohit, D.1989. Durable goods and product obsolescence[J]. Marketing Science,8(1):35-56.
Levhari, D., Srinivasan, T.1969. Durability of consumption goods: competition versus monopoly[J].American Economic Review,59(1):102-107.
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Low, C. P.1999. Low computer prices reshape secondhand market[J]. Puget Sound Business Journal,July16.
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http://www.sparcproductdirectory.com/view56.html.
Martin, P.2011. On the introduction of upgrades in competitive durable goods markets. Workingpaper, New York University and Trinity College Dublin.
McCully, C.2009. Private correspondence. Purchasing Manager. University of California Irvine,Irvine, September.
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Okada, E. M.2001. Trade-ins, mental accounting, and product replacement decisions [J]. Journal ofConsumer Research,27(4):433-446.
Oraiopoulos, N., Ferguson, M. E., Toktay, L. B.2012. Relicensing as a secondary market strategy[J].Management Science,58:1022-1037.
PRWeb.2013. Cisco launches new catalyst switch, secondary market prices on eol units todrop[EB/OL]. Accessed September26,http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/9/prweb11143270.htm.
Reese, B.2009. http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/37900.
Rosenkranz S.1996. Quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog[J]. International Journal ofIndustrial Organization,15(2):243-261.
Sashi, C. M., Stern, L. W.1995. Product differentiation and market performance in Producer GoodsIndustries[J]. JournalofBusinessResearch,33:115-127.
Schiraldi, P., Nava, F.2012. Resale and collusion in a dynamic market or semidurable goods[J]. TheJournal of Industrial Economics2:274-298.
Shaked A, Sutton J.1982. Relaxing price competition through product differentiation[J]. Review ofEconomic Studies,21(1):131-146.
Shlman, J. D., Coughlan, A. T.2007. Used goods, not used bads: profitable secondary market salesfor a durable goods channel[J]. Quantitative Marketing and Economic,5:191-210.
Sieper, E., Swan, P.1973. Monopoly and Competition in the Market for Durable Goods[J]. Reviewof Economic Studies,40(3):333-351.
Souza, G. C.2004. Product introduction decisions in a duopoly[J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,152:745-757.
Spenee, M.1982. Product selection, fixed costs and monopolistic competition[J]. Review ofEconomic Studies,49:3-13.
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Stokey, N.1979. Intertemporal price discrimination[J]. Quantitative Journal of Economics,94:355-371.
Tirole, J.1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization[M]. Cambridge: MIT Press.
U. S. Government Acccountability Office (GAO).2005. College textbooks: Enhanced offeringsappear to drive recent price increases. Report GAO-05-806, GAO, Washington, DC.
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Wauthy, X.1996. Quality choice in models of vertical differentiation[J]. Journal of IndustrialEconomics,44(3):345-353.
Wicksell, K.1934. Lectures on Political Economy, London: Routledge&Kegan Paul,1.
Xiong, Y., Yan, W., Fernandes, K., Xiong, Z. K., Guo, N.2012.“Bricks VS. Clicks”: The impact ofmanufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable Goods[J]. EuropeanJournal of Operational Research,217(1):75-83.
Yin, S.Y., Ray, S., Gurnani, H., Animesh, A.2010. Durable products with multiple used goodsmarkets: product upgrade and retail pricing implication[J]. Marketing Science,29(3):540-560.
Zhao, H., Jagpal, S.2006. The effect of secondhand markets on the firm’s dynamic pricing and newproduct introduction strategies[J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing,23:295-307.
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Bhaskaran, S. R., Gilbert, S. M.2005. Selling and leasing strategies for durable goods withcomplementary products[J]. Management Science,51(8):1278-1290.
Bulow, J.1982. Durable goods monopolists[J]. Journal of Political Economy,90(2):314-332.
Chen, J., Esteban, S., Shum, M.2011. How much competition is a secondary market? Working paper,University of California.
Coase, R.1972. Durability and monopoly[J]. Journal of Laws and Economics,15(1):143-149.
Computer Business Review.2005. Big players emerge in fragmented brokerage market.CBRonline.com (September5),http://www.cbronline.com/news/big_players_emerge_in_fragmented_brokerage_market.
Cornelis, A., Kluyver, D.1977. Innovation and Industrial product Life Cycles[J].CaliforniaManagement Review,1(1):21-33.
Corso, M., Muffatto, M., Verganti, R.1999. Reusability and multi-product development policies: acomparison of approaches in the automotive, motorcycle and earthmoring machineryindustries[J]. Robotics and Computer-Integrated Manufacturing,15:155-165.
Davis, P.2000. Empirical models of demand for differentiatad products[J]. European EconomicReview,44:993-1005.
Dean, J.1950. Pricing Policies for new products [J]. Harvard Business Review,28(6):45-53.
Desai, P., Purohit, D.1998. Leasing and selling: optimal marketing strategies for a durable goodsFirm[J]. Management Science,44(11):19-34.
Desai, P., Purohit, D.1999. Competition in durable goods markets: the strategic consequences ofleasing and selling[J]. Marketing Science,18(1):42-58.
Desai, P. S., Koenigsberg, O., Purohit, D.2004. Strategic decentralization and channelcoordination[J]. Quantitative Marketing and Economic,2:5-22.
Dhebar, A.1994. Durable-goods monopolists, rational consumers and improving products[J].Marketing Science,13(1):100-120.
Dixit, A. K., Stiglitz, J.E.1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity[J]. TheAmerican Economic Review,67(3):297-308.
Erzurumlu, S.2010. Collaborative product development with competitors to stimulate down-streaminnovation[J]. International Journal of Innovation Management,14(4):573-602.
Esteban, S., Shum, M.2007. Durable-goods oligopoly with secondary markets: the case ofautomobiles[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,38(2):332-354.
Fishman, A., Rob, R.2000. Product innovation by a durable goods monopoly[J]. RAND Journal ofEconomics,31(2):634-657.
Forrester J. W.1958. Industrial Dynamics：a major breakthrough for decision makers[J]. HarvardBusiness Review, July-August37-65.
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.1998. Upgrades, tradeins and reverses[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,29(2):235-258.
Friscia, C.2009. Private correspondence. director, retail business operations[M]. Bowker, NewProvidence, NJ.
Ghose, A., Telang, R., Krishnan, R.2003. Do secondary market for dururable goods help or hurtsuppliers?[C] Camegie Mellon University, Marketing Science2003Conference.
Goering, G. E.2007. Durability choice with differentiated products[J]. Research in Economics,5(61):105-112.
Goering, G. E.2008. Socially concerned firms and the provision of durable goods [J]. EconomicModelling,3(25):575-583.
Greenstein, S., Ramey, G.1998. Market structure, innovation and vertical product differentiation[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,16,285-311.
Gurnani, H., Erkoc, M.2008. Supply contracts in manufacturer-retailer interactions withmanufacturer-quality and retailer-effort induced demand[J]. Naval Research Logistics,55(3):200-217.
Harabi, N.1998. Innovation through vertical relatiombetween firms, suppliers andcustomers: a study of German firms[J]. Industry Innovation,5:157-179.
Harter, F. R.1993. Differentiated products with R&D[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics,41(1):19-28.
Hendel, I., Lizzeri, A.1999. Interfering with secondary markets[J]. RAND Journal of Economics30(1):1-21.
Hendel, I., Lizzen, A.1999. Adverse selection in durable goods markets[J]. American EconomicReview,89(5):1097-1115.
Hoppe, H. C., Lee, I. H.2003. Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly [J].European Economic Review,47(6):1011-1036.
Huang, S., Yang, Y., Anderson, K.2001. A theory of finitely durable goods monopoly withused-goods market and transaction cost[J]. Management Science,47(11):1515-1532.
Kim, J. C.1989. Trade in used gods and durability choice[J]. International Economic Journal,3(3):53-63.
Konstantin, K.2011. Second-hand markets and intrasupply chain competition[J]. Journal ofRetailing,87:489-501.
Koufteros, X., Marcoulides, G. A.2006. Product development practices and performance: astructural equation modeling-based multi-group analysis[J]. International Journal ofProduction Economics,103:286-307.
Kornish, L. J.2001. Pricing for a Durable-goods monopolist under rapid sequential innovation[J].Management Science,47(11):1552-1561.
Levinthal, D., Purohit, D.1989. Durable goods and product obsolescence[J]. Marketing Science,8(1):35-56.
Levhari, D., Srinivasan, T.1969. Durability of consumption goods: competition versus monopoly[J].American Economic Review,59(1):102-107.
Lim, W. S., Tang, C. S.2006. Optimal product rollover strategies[J]. European Journal ofOperational Research,174:905-922.
Liu, Q., Ryzin, G.2008. Strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases[J]. ManagementScience,54(6):1115-1131.
Low, C. P.1999. Low computer prices reshape secondhand market[J]. Puget Sound Business Journal,July16.
Marion, J.2004. Sun under fire-for fixing Solaris OS costs to reduce competition in used Sun market.Association of Service and Computer Dealers International (ASCDI)(June8),
http://www.sparcproductdirectory.com/view56.html.
Martin, P.2011. On the introduction of upgrades in competitive durable goods markets. Workingpaper, New York University and Trinity College Dublin.
McCully, C.2009. Private correspondence. Purchasing Manager. University of California Irvine,Irvine, September.
Mehegan, D.2003. Turning over an old leaf used-book sales are growing as more people look toweb pages for bargains. Boston Globe, Boston.http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-7791929.html.
Miller, H.1974. On killing off the market for used testbooks and the relationship between marketsfor new and secondhand goods[J]. Journal of Political Economy,82(3):612-619.
Okada, E. M.2001. Trade-ins, mental accounting, and product replacement decisions [J]. Journal ofConsumer Research,27(4):433-446.
Oraiopoulos, N., Ferguson, M. E., Toktay, L. B.2012. Relicensing as a secondary market strategy[J].Management Science,58:1022-1037.
PRWeb.2013. Cisco launches new catalyst switch, secondary market prices on eol units todrop[EB/OL]. Accessed September26,http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/9/prweb11143270.htm.
Reese, B.2009. http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/37900.
Rosenkranz S.1996. Quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog[J]. International Journal ofIndustrial Organization,15(2):243-261.
Sashi, C. M., Stern, L. W.1995. Product differentiation and market performance in Producer GoodsIndustries[J]. JournalofBusinessResearch,33:115-127.
Schiraldi, P., Nava, F.2012. Resale and collusion in a dynamic market or semidurable goods[J]. TheJournal of Industrial Economics2:274-298.
Shaked A, Sutton J.1982. Relaxing price competition through product differentiation[J]. Review ofEconomic Studies,21(1):131-146.
Shlman, J. D., Coughlan, A. T.2007. Used goods, not used bads: profitable secondary market salesfor a durable goods channel[J]. Quantitative Marketing and Economic,5:191-210.
Sieper, E., Swan, P.1973. Monopoly and Competition in the Market for Durable Goods[J]. Reviewof Economic Studies,40(3):333-351.
Souza, G. C.2004. Product introduction decisions in a duopoly[J]. European Journal of OperationalResearch,152:745-757.
Spenee, M.1982. Product selection, fixed costs and monopolistic competition[J]. Review ofEconomic Studies,49:3-13.
Stavins, J.1997. Estimating demand elasticities in a differenfiated product industry: The personalcomputer market[J]. Journal of Eeonomies and Business,49:347-367.
Stokey, N.1979. Intertemporal price discrimination[J]. Quantitative Journal of Economics,94:355-371.
Tirole, J.1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization[M]. Cambridge: MIT Press.
U. S. Government Acccountability Office (GAO).2005. College textbooks: Enhanced offeringsappear to drive recent price increases. Report GAO-05-806, GAO, Washington, DC.
Waldman, M.2003. Durable goods theory for real world[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,17:131-154．
Wauthy, X.1996. Quality choice in models of vertical differentiation[J]. Journal of IndustrialEconomics,44(3):345-353.
Wicksell, K.1934. Lectures on Political Economy, London: Routledge&Kegan Paul,1.
Xiong, Y., Yan, W., Fernandes, K., Xiong, Z. K., Guo, N.2012.“Bricks VS. Clicks”: The impact ofmanufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable Goods[J]. EuropeanJournal of Operational Research,217(1):75-83.
Yin, S.Y., Ray, S., Gurnani, H., Animesh, A.2010. Durable products with multiple used goodsmarkets: product upgrade and retail pricing implication[J]. Marketing Science,29(3):540-560.
Zhao, H., Jagpal, S.2006. The effect of secondhand markets on the firm’s dynamic pricing and newproduct introduction strategies[J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing,23:295-307.
Zhou, Y., Fan, M., Cho, M.2006. On the threshold purchasing behavior of customers facingdynamically priced perishable products[C]. Presentation at Informs Pittsburgh NationalMeeting.