基于异质策略消费者的订货与质量决策问题研究
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摘要
在产品更新换代速度越来越快的今天,消费者们也变得越来越聪明,越来越有策略性。策略消费者会考虑商品的未来效用,并选择相应的时机进行购买。针对这样一种消费者的出现,供应链中各成员企业不得不采取相应的应对措施。本文研究了在策略消费者存在的前提下,零售商的订货决策和生产商的质量决策问题。
首先,本文从策略消费者的定义、行为机理、主要特点等方面对消费者进行了刻画。然后,文章针基于市场中存在策略消费者的前提下,对不允许补货以及快速响应机制两种情形分别建立了最优订货决策模型与最优质量决策模型。
本文研究发现,策略消费者的存在给零售商和生产商的收益会带来不良影响,且这种不良影响会随着策略消费者占消费者中所占比例的增加而变大。零售商的最优订货量、生产商的最优质量水平则会因策略消费者的比例增加而减小。在供应链中引入快速响应机制,一方面可以有效缓解策略消费者的不良影响,但快速响应的缓解作用会随着策略消费者在消费群中比例的提升而减弱;另一方面,零售商的订货量会稍有下降,但生产商提供的商品的质量水平更高。另外,我们发现,廉价品消费者并非“一无是处”,当市场上存在一定数量的廉价品消费者会提高整个供应链的收益,同时还会提高市场中商品的供给量,并提高商品的质量水平,使得生产商、零售商以及消费者的福利都得到提升。
Nowadays, the speed of the product replacement is becoming faster and faster, while the consumers are getting more sophisticated and more strategic. The strategic consumers would consider the future utility of the goods, and select the appropriate time to make their purchase. For the emergence of such kind consumer, the supply chain member companies have to take the appropriate measures to response. This thesis studies the retailer's ordering decision and the manufacturer's quality decision problem in the presence of strategic consumers.
First of all, we have portrayed the strategic consumers from the perspective of definition, behavior mechanism and the main characteristics. And then, considering the presence of strategic consumers, we develop ordering decision model and quality decision model under two different situations. One situation is second order is not allowed, while the other one
is the quick response system. This study shows that strategic consumers will have an adverse effect on the profits of the retailer and manufacturer, and the power of the effect will grow with proportion of the strategic consumers. The retailer's optimal order quantity and the manufacturer's optimal level of quality will be reduced due to the increase in the proportion of strategic consumers. The introduction of the quick response, on the one hand, can effectively mitigate the adverse effect from the strategic consumers, but this mitigation will be weakened when the proportion becomes bigger. On the other hand, the optimal order quantity will be slightly decreased, but the level of quality of goods provided will be enhanced. In addition, we find that the bargain hunter is not "useless at all". A certain amount of bargain hunter on the market can improve the whole profits, the supply of goods and the level of the product quality level, making the welfare of retailer, manufacturer and consumers be raised.
首先,本文从策略消费者的定义、行为机理、主要特点等方面对消费者进行了刻画。然后,文章针基于市场中存在策略消费者的前提下,对不允许补货以及快速响应机制两种情形分别建立了最优订货决策模型与最优质量决策模型。
本文研究发现,策略消费者的存在给零售商和生产商的收益会带来不良影响,且这种不良影响会随着策略消费者占消费者中所占比例的增加而变大。零售商的最优订货量、生产商的最优质量水平则会因策略消费者的比例增加而减小。在供应链中引入快速响应机制,一方面可以有效缓解策略消费者的不良影响,但快速响应的缓解作用会随着策略消费者在消费群中比例的提升而减弱;另一方面,零售商的订货量会稍有下降,但生产商提供的商品的质量水平更高。另外,我们发现,廉价品消费者并非“一无是处”,当市场上存在一定数量的廉价品消费者会提高整个供应链的收益,同时还会提高市场中商品的供给量,并提高商品的质量水平,使得生产商、零售商以及消费者的福利都得到提升。
Nowadays, the speed of the product replacement is becoming faster and faster, while the consumers are getting more sophisticated and more strategic. The strategic consumers would consider the future utility of the goods, and select the appropriate time to make their purchase. For the emergence of such kind consumer, the supply chain member companies have to take the appropriate measures to response. This thesis studies the retailer's ordering decision and the manufacturer's quality decision problem in the presence of strategic consumers.
First of all, we have portrayed the strategic consumers from the perspective of definition, behavior mechanism and the main characteristics. And then, considering the presence of strategic consumers, we develop ordering decision model and quality decision model under two different situations. One situation is second order is not allowed, while the other one
is the quick response system. This study shows that strategic consumers will have an adverse effect on the profits of the retailer and manufacturer, and the power of the effect will grow with proportion of the strategic consumers. The retailer's optimal order quantity and the manufacturer's optimal level of quality will be reduced due to the increase in the proportion of strategic consumers. The introduction of the quick response, on the one hand, can effectively mitigate the adverse effect from the strategic consumers, but this mitigation will be weakened when the proportion becomes bigger. On the other hand, the optimal order quantity will be slightly decreased, but the level of quality of goods provided will be enhanced. In addition, we find that the bargain hunter is not "useless at all". A certain amount of bargain hunter on the market can improve the whole profits, the supply of goods and the level of the product quality level, making the welfare of retailer, manufacturer and consumers be raised.
引文
[1]. Mc Williams G. Minding the store: Analyzing Customers, Best Buy Decides not All are Welcome [J]. Wall Street Journal, 2004, (8): A1.
[2]. Besanko D, Winston W L. Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers [J].Management Science, 1990, 36(5):555-567.
[3]. Aviv Y, Pazgal A. Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers [J].Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2008, 1(4):1-21.
[4]. Merrick A.2001.Priced to move: Retailers attempt to get a leg up on markdowns with new software [J].Wall Street Journal.2001, 8(7): A1.
[5]. Cachon G P, Swinney R. Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers [J].Management Science, 2009b, 55(3):497-511.
[6]. Sang-Hyun Kim, Swinney R. Product Quality Choice and Inventory Risk with Strategic Consumers.2011, Yale working paper
[7]. Gallego G, Kou S G, Phillips R. Revenue Management of Callable Products[J].Management Science, 2008. 54(3):550-564.
[8]. Anderson C K, Wilson J G. Wait or buy? The strategic consumer: Pricing and profit implications [J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2003.54(3):299-306.
[9]. Silverstein M J, John B. Treasure Hunt: Inside the Mind of the New Consumer[M],Portfolio. 2006.
[10]. Ghemawat P, Nueno J L. ZARA: Fast Fashion Case Study [J].Harvard Business School. 2003.
[11]. Cachon G P, Swinney R. The Impact of Strategic Consumer Behavior on the Value of Operational Flexibility[M]. Operations Management Models with Consumer-Driven Demand. S. Netessine and C. Tang, Springer. 2009a.
[12]. Shaffer G, Zhang Z J. Pay to switch or pay to stay: preference-based price discrimination in markets with switching costs [J] .Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2000. (9),397–424.
[13]. Gans N, Savin S. Pricing and capacity rationing for rentals with uncertain durations [J].Management science, 2007.53(3):390-407.
[14]. Chen Y X, Zhang Z J. Dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009. 27:43–50.
[15]. You P S. Dynamic pricing of inventory with cancellation demand [J].Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2003. 54:1093–1101.
[16]. Su Xuanming, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior [J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(5): 726-741
[17]. Coase R H. Durability and Monopoly [J].Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, 15(1):143-149.
[18]. Stokey N L. Intertemporal Price Discrimination [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979.93(3):355-371.
[19]. Stokey N L. Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing [J].The Bell Journal of Economics, 1981.12(1): 112-128.
[20]. Bulow J I. Durable-Goods Monopolists [J].The Journal of Political Economy, 1982.90(2):314-332.
[21]. Conlisk J, Gerstner E, Sobel J. Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984.99(3):489-505.
[22]. Narasimhan C. Incorporating Consumer Price Expectations in Diffusion Models [J].Marketing Science, 1989.8(4): 343-357.
[23]. Wilson J G, Anderson C K, Sang-Won K. Optimal booking limits in the presence of strategic consumer behavior [J].International Transactions in Operational Research, 2006.13(2):99-110.
[24]. Shen Z J M, Su X M. Customer behavior modeling in revenue management and auctions: a review and new research opportunities [J].Production and Operations Management, 2007.16(6):713-728.
[25]. Peng Z-Q, Xiong Y. Value uncertain in advance selling: the impact of offering refunds for cancellations [A].International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics [C]. 2008.Beijing, China, IEEE.
[26]. Zhang D, Cooper W L. Managing clearance sales in the presence of strategic customers [J].Production and Operations Management, 2008.17(4):416-431.
[27]. Levin Y, McGill J. Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition [J]. Management Science, 2009.55(1):32-46.
[28].李根道,熊中楷,李薇.基于收益管理的动态定价研究综述[J].管理评论, 2010,22(4),97-108
[29].彭志强,熊中楷,李根道.考虑策略性顾客的动态定价和差价返还机制[J].管理工程学报, 2010,24(4), 53-57
[30]. Yin R, Aviv Y,Pazgal A. Optimal Markdown Pricing: Implications of Inventory Display Formats in the Presence of Strategic Customers [J].Management Science, 2009.55(8):1391-1408.
[31]. Liu Q, Van Ryzin G J. Strategic Capacity Rationing to Induce Early Purchases [J].Management Science, 2008, 54(6):1115-1131.
[32]. Ovchinnikov A, Milner J M. Strategic Response to Wait-or-Buy: Revenue Management through Last Minute Deals in the Presence of Customer Learning [J]. 2005. University of Toronto working paper.
[33]. Lai G, Debo L G, Sycara K. Buy now and match later: impact of posterior price matching on profit with strategic consumers[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2009.25(1):1-23.
[34]. Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2002.4(3):171-207.
[35]. Fisher M, Rajaram K, Raman A. Optimizing Inventory Replenishment of Retail Fashion Products[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2001.3(3):230-241.
[36]. Cachon G P, Swinney R. the Value of Fast Fashion: Quick Response, Enhanced Design, and Strategic Consumer Behavior [J]. Management Science. 2011, Articles in Advance, pp.1-18
[37]. Su X, Zhang F. Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance [J].Management Science, 2008, 54(10):1759-1773.
[38]. Cachon G P, A. Gurhan Kok Implementation of the Newsvendor Model with Clearance Pricing: How to (and How Not to) Estimate a Salvage Value [J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2007, 9(3): 276-290
[39].李娟,黄培清,顾锋.基于顾客战略行为下的供应链系统的绩效研究[ J].中国管理科学, 2007, 15( 4): 77-82.
[40].彭志强,熊中楷,李根道.考虑顾客策略行为的易逝品定价与再制造柔性补货机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(2):32-41
[41].刘晓峰.策略型消费者的动态定价机制与返还合同设计[J].中南财经政法大学学报, 2008, 168(3):128-133.
[42].黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑客户战略行为时报童模型定价与库存控制[J].运筹与管理,2010, 19(3):15-22
[43].崔益明,金星,朱道立. Newsboy问题中的供应商质量决策[J].技术交流,2003,12:52-54
[2]. Besanko D, Winston W L. Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers [J].Management Science, 1990, 36(5):555-567.
[3]. Aviv Y, Pazgal A. Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers [J].Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2008, 1(4):1-21.
[4]. Merrick A.2001.Priced to move: Retailers attempt to get a leg up on markdowns with new software [J].Wall Street Journal.2001, 8(7): A1.
[5]. Cachon G P, Swinney R. Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers [J].Management Science, 2009b, 55(3):497-511.
[6]. Sang-Hyun Kim, Swinney R. Product Quality Choice and Inventory Risk with Strategic Consumers.2011, Yale working paper
[7]. Gallego G, Kou S G, Phillips R. Revenue Management of Callable Products[J].Management Science, 2008. 54(3):550-564.
[8]. Anderson C K, Wilson J G. Wait or buy? The strategic consumer: Pricing and profit implications [J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2003.54(3):299-306.
[9]. Silverstein M J, John B. Treasure Hunt: Inside the Mind of the New Consumer[M],Portfolio. 2006.
[10]. Ghemawat P, Nueno J L. ZARA: Fast Fashion Case Study [J].Harvard Business School. 2003.
[11]. Cachon G P, Swinney R. The Impact of Strategic Consumer Behavior on the Value of Operational Flexibility[M]. Operations Management Models with Consumer-Driven Demand. S. Netessine and C. Tang, Springer. 2009a.
[12]. Shaffer G, Zhang Z J. Pay to switch or pay to stay: preference-based price discrimination in markets with switching costs [J] .Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2000. (9),397–424.
[13]. Gans N, Savin S. Pricing and capacity rationing for rentals with uncertain durations [J].Management science, 2007.53(3):390-407.
[14]. Chen Y X, Zhang Z J. Dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009. 27:43–50.
[15]. You P S. Dynamic pricing of inventory with cancellation demand [J].Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2003. 54:1093–1101.
[16]. Su Xuanming, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior [J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(5): 726-741
[17]. Coase R H. Durability and Monopoly [J].Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, 15(1):143-149.
[18]. Stokey N L. Intertemporal Price Discrimination [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979.93(3):355-371.
[19]. Stokey N L. Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing [J].The Bell Journal of Economics, 1981.12(1): 112-128.
[20]. Bulow J I. Durable-Goods Monopolists [J].The Journal of Political Economy, 1982.90(2):314-332.
[21]. Conlisk J, Gerstner E, Sobel J. Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984.99(3):489-505.
[22]. Narasimhan C. Incorporating Consumer Price Expectations in Diffusion Models [J].Marketing Science, 1989.8(4): 343-357.
[23]. Wilson J G, Anderson C K, Sang-Won K. Optimal booking limits in the presence of strategic consumer behavior [J].International Transactions in Operational Research, 2006.13(2):99-110.
[24]. Shen Z J M, Su X M. Customer behavior modeling in revenue management and auctions: a review and new research opportunities [J].Production and Operations Management, 2007.16(6):713-728.
[25]. Peng Z-Q, Xiong Y. Value uncertain in advance selling: the impact of offering refunds for cancellations [A].International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics [C]. 2008.Beijing, China, IEEE.
[26]. Zhang D, Cooper W L. Managing clearance sales in the presence of strategic customers [J].Production and Operations Management, 2008.17(4):416-431.
[27]. Levin Y, McGill J. Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition [J]. Management Science, 2009.55(1):32-46.
[28].李根道,熊中楷,李薇.基于收益管理的动态定价研究综述[J].管理评论, 2010,22(4),97-108
[29].彭志强,熊中楷,李根道.考虑策略性顾客的动态定价和差价返还机制[J].管理工程学报, 2010,24(4), 53-57
[30]. Yin R, Aviv Y,Pazgal A. Optimal Markdown Pricing: Implications of Inventory Display Formats in the Presence of Strategic Customers [J].Management Science, 2009.55(8):1391-1408.
[31]. Liu Q, Van Ryzin G J. Strategic Capacity Rationing to Induce Early Purchases [J].Management Science, 2008, 54(6):1115-1131.
[32]. Ovchinnikov A, Milner J M. Strategic Response to Wait-or-Buy: Revenue Management through Last Minute Deals in the Presence of Customer Learning [J]. 2005. University of Toronto working paper.
[33]. Lai G, Debo L G, Sycara K. Buy now and match later: impact of posterior price matching on profit with strategic consumers[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2009.25(1):1-23.
[34]. Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2002.4(3):171-207.
[35]. Fisher M, Rajaram K, Raman A. Optimizing Inventory Replenishment of Retail Fashion Products[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2001.3(3):230-241.
[36]. Cachon G P, Swinney R. the Value of Fast Fashion: Quick Response, Enhanced Design, and Strategic Consumer Behavior [J]. Management Science. 2011, Articles in Advance, pp.1-18
[37]. Su X, Zhang F. Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance [J].Management Science, 2008, 54(10):1759-1773.
[38]. Cachon G P, A. Gurhan Kok Implementation of the Newsvendor Model with Clearance Pricing: How to (and How Not to) Estimate a Salvage Value [J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2007, 9(3): 276-290
[39].李娟,黄培清,顾锋.基于顾客战略行为下的供应链系统的绩效研究[ J].中国管理科学, 2007, 15( 4): 77-82.
[40].彭志强,熊中楷,李根道.考虑顾客策略行为的易逝品定价与再制造柔性补货机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(2):32-41
[41].刘晓峰.策略型消费者的动态定价机制与返还合同设计[J].中南财经政法大学学报, 2008, 168(3):128-133.
[42].黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑客户战略行为时报童模型定价与库存控制[J].运筹与管理,2010, 19(3):15-22
[43].崔益明,金星,朱道立. Newsboy问题中的供应商质量决策[J].技术交流,2003,12:52-54