上市公司管理层收购（MBO）对公司业绩影响的研究
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摘要
管理层收购(MBO)产生于20世纪70年代,它伴随着欧美国家金融市场的创新之风诞生并迅速成长起来,成为过去二十年来西方国家在公司结构和法人治理方面深刻变革和巨大变化的一股潮流。MBO作为发达市场经济国家企业杠杆收购的一种成熟方式,在强化公司治理结构中的管理层激励等方面被寄予了无限的厚望。
中国的MBO起源可以追溯到20世纪80年代后期,现在已经成为我国企业资产重组和资源重新配置的重要途径。在实践中解决MBO遇到的障碍,探索更适合我国国情、我国资本市场具体环境的MBO模式是目前市场关注的焦点。因此,对管理层收购进行系统研究具有十分重要的现实意义。
本文在系统阐述MBO的定义、理论和发展状况的基础上,以1996年~2004年之间实施MBO的我国上市公司作为研究样本,结合SPSS统计软件和相关性分析、会计指标分析以及因子分析技术,对MBO实施过程的绩效表现进行了系统的实证分析,进而探讨其形成原因,并提出了相应的对策和建议。
本文研究的主要内容及结论如下:
①阐述了MBO的定义、模式等内容,归纳了有关MBO现象的基本理论;介绍了国内外MBO的实践进展情况,并对中外MBO实践差异情况进行了分析比较。
②上市公司MBO经营绩效的实证研究。本文采用了上市MBO公司41个有效样本前后7年的有效数据,从两个角度予以考察,相应的分为独立的两个部分,其中第一部分采用会计指标分析法从赢利能力、经营能力、成长能力和偿债能力四个方面对上市公司实施MBO的前后整体财务绩效进行对比分析,并采用T检验方法来验证分析结果;第二部分引入因子分析法对MBO企业的经营绩效进行综合评分比较来进行实证研究,同时采用T检验和Z检验来验证实证结果。研究发现,样本公司实施MBO前后的经营绩效并没有显著变化。因此本文认为:短期内管理层收购没有改善我国上市公司的经营绩效。
③针对实证研究发现的问题,提出了相应的建议和对策。如做好MBO后的企业整合、改革开放MBO融资渠道、完善MBO信息披露机制、加强MBO制度监管、采用合理方式对MBO目标进行定价等措施,保障和推动上市公司早日实现经营体制的改革和经营效率的提升,促进MBO的发展。
Management Buyout evolved in 1970s. It emerged and grew up with the wind of innovation of financial markets in European countries, and became a strong stream in the revolution of organizational structure and corporate governance in the last twenty years in western countries. As a mature method of Leverage Buy-out in developed market, MBO took a huge hope in the corporate governance structure.
In china, Management Buyout (MBO) has been experiencing for almost one decade, whose implement has become one of the most important forms of asset restructure and resources re-collocation in China. Solve the obstacles and hence explore a more suitable model is the major concern in the market. So a qualitative and quantitative study of MBO in Chinese market will have an important and practical meaning.
In this paper, we took the listed companies as our samples to discuss the MBO’s characteristic in China. The sample companies should have experienced the MBO between 1996-2004. By the qualitative and quantitative methods as well as the SPSS software, and using the analytic approach of the accounting index, Factor Analysis method, we discuss, such as:
①T he definition of MBO, the basic theory of MBO and the main controversies,etc.
②Using the analytic approach of the accounting index, Factor Analysis method to analyze and adopt sure method of inspection ( T examining method and Z examining method) examine results of MBO. Through empirical research, we find that there are no reasons to support the performance of the target companies after MBO superior to which before MBO. It is indicated that the performance of target companies were not improved.
③Corresponding proposal and strategies aimed at improving the MBO’s practice , such as improving the pricing way, opening the channel for nominating the independent director for the board, reforming the mechanism of information releasing, financing as well as the supervision system, etc.
中国的MBO起源可以追溯到20世纪80年代后期,现在已经成为我国企业资产重组和资源重新配置的重要途径。在实践中解决MBO遇到的障碍,探索更适合我国国情、我国资本市场具体环境的MBO模式是目前市场关注的焦点。因此,对管理层收购进行系统研究具有十分重要的现实意义。
本文在系统阐述MBO的定义、理论和发展状况的基础上,以1996年~2004年之间实施MBO的我国上市公司作为研究样本,结合SPSS统计软件和相关性分析、会计指标分析以及因子分析技术,对MBO实施过程的绩效表现进行了系统的实证分析,进而探讨其形成原因,并提出了相应的对策和建议。
本文研究的主要内容及结论如下:
①阐述了MBO的定义、模式等内容,归纳了有关MBO现象的基本理论;介绍了国内外MBO的实践进展情况,并对中外MBO实践差异情况进行了分析比较。
②上市公司MBO经营绩效的实证研究。本文采用了上市MBO公司41个有效样本前后7年的有效数据,从两个角度予以考察,相应的分为独立的两个部分,其中第一部分采用会计指标分析法从赢利能力、经营能力、成长能力和偿债能力四个方面对上市公司实施MBO的前后整体财务绩效进行对比分析,并采用T检验方法来验证分析结果;第二部分引入因子分析法对MBO企业的经营绩效进行综合评分比较来进行实证研究,同时采用T检验和Z检验来验证实证结果。研究发现,样本公司实施MBO前后的经营绩效并没有显著变化。因此本文认为:短期内管理层收购没有改善我国上市公司的经营绩效。
③针对实证研究发现的问题,提出了相应的建议和对策。如做好MBO后的企业整合、改革开放MBO融资渠道、完善MBO信息披露机制、加强MBO制度监管、采用合理方式对MBO目标进行定价等措施,保障和推动上市公司早日实现经营体制的改革和经营效率的提升,促进MBO的发展。
Management Buyout evolved in 1970s. It emerged and grew up with the wind of innovation of financial markets in European countries, and became a strong stream in the revolution of organizational structure and corporate governance in the last twenty years in western countries. As a mature method of Leverage Buy-out in developed market, MBO took a huge hope in the corporate governance structure.
In china, Management Buyout (MBO) has been experiencing for almost one decade, whose implement has become one of the most important forms of asset restructure and resources re-collocation in China. Solve the obstacles and hence explore a more suitable model is the major concern in the market. So a qualitative and quantitative study of MBO in Chinese market will have an important and practical meaning.
In this paper, we took the listed companies as our samples to discuss the MBO’s characteristic in China. The sample companies should have experienced the MBO between 1996-2004. By the qualitative and quantitative methods as well as the SPSS software, and using the analytic approach of the accounting index, Factor Analysis method, we discuss, such as:
①T he definition of MBO, the basic theory of MBO and the main controversies,etc.
②Using the analytic approach of the accounting index, Factor Analysis method to analyze and adopt sure method of inspection ( T examining method and Z examining method) examine results of MBO. Through empirical research, we find that there are no reasons to support the performance of the target companies after MBO superior to which before MBO. It is indicated that the performance of target companies were not improved.
③Corresponding proposal and strategies aimed at improving the MBO’s practice , such as improving the pricing way, opening the channel for nominating the independent director for the board, reforming the mechanism of information releasing, financing as well as the supervision system, etc.
引文
[1] Joseph Blasi, James W. Gasaway and Douglas L. Kruse, Management Stock Ownership and the performance of Corporations
[2] Corey Rosen, An Overview of ESOPs, Stock Options ,and Employee Ownership/the National Center for Employee Ownership(NECO)
[3] Richard Lambert,Joseph McDonald Professor of Accounting Graduate school of Business, Stock Options: Controversial in Larger Firms
[4] Manohar Singh, Wallace N. Davidson, 2001, “Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms”, Journal of Banking & Finance
[5] Claire E. Crutchley, Marlin R. H. Jesen, John S. Jennie E. Raymond ,1999, “Agency problems and the simultaneity of financial decision making-the role of institutional ownership”, Internatianal Review of Financial Analysis
[6] Jensen, M.And W.Mecking, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial economics. 1976
[7] Jensen, Michael. Agency costs of free cash flow. Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review. 1986(76):323-329
[8] Lowenstein. Management buy-outs[J]. Columbia Law Review. 1986(85):35-68
[9] Smith, Abbie J.. Corporate ownership structure and performance: The case of management buyout[J]. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990.27:143-164
[10] Demsetz, Fama. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983(26):375-390
[11] Richard Harris, Donald Siegel, Mike Wright. Assessing the Impact of Management Buyouts on Economics Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United Kingdom. Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics. 2001(304):1-29
[12] M. Wright. , S. Thompson, K. Robbie, etc. Management Buy-outs in the Short and Long Term. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 1995.22:461-483
[13] Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Donald Siegel. The effect of leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990(27):165-194
[14] Kaplan, Steven. The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989(24):217-254
[15] Lichtenberg, Frank R. , Donald Siegel. The Effect of Ownership Changes on the Employment and Wages of Central Other Personnel. Journal of Law and Economics. 1990(33):383-408
[16] DeAngelo, H DeAngelo, L Rice. Going Private: Minority Freeze outs and Stockholder Wealth[J]. Journal of Law and Economics. 1984(26):307-401
[17] 威斯通等. 兼并. 重组与公司控制. 东北财经大学出版社. 2000
[18] Morck, R., Sheleifer, and R.W.Vishny, Alternative Mechanisms for Cororatecontrol, ms, University of Alberta, February. 1988
[19] Hermalin,Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, Financial Management 20. 1991
[20] Demsetz, H. and Lehn, the structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93:1155~1157
[21] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H. (1976), ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3:305~360
[22] Stulz, R.M. (1988),‘Managerial control of voting rights: financing policies and the market for corporate control’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20:25~54
[23] McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. (1990), Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27:595~612
[24] 朱小斌. 民营化浪潮中的 MBO. 投资研究. 2001.11
[25] 王志勇. 中国企业走近 MBO. 商业研究. 2002.12
[26] 刘兵, 张世英. 企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析. 系统工程理论与实践. 2000.6
[27] 贺小刚. 管理层收购:国外现状、研究及其在中国的发展. 改革. 2002.4
[28] 贺慈浩, 张小蒂. MBO:我国中小企业体制改革的一种可借鉴的模式. 商业研究. 2000.10
[29] 陈江波. MBO 一种有效的长期激励机制. 财经理论与实践. 2002.2
[30] 易宪容. 交易行为与合约选择. 经济科学出版社. 1998.6
[31] 廖成林, 宋福林. 国有中小企业管理者收购探讨. 技术经济与管理研究. 2001.3
[32] 陈晓. 陈小悦. 刘钊. A 股赢余报告的有用性研究—来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据. 经济研究. 1999.6
[33] 于东智. 论代理成本的控制――兼议我国公司治理结构的完善. 烟台大学学报. 2001.7
[34] 张剑文. 企业家激励理论基础与实现路径. 国泰君安证券通讯. 1999.8
[35] 张剑文. 经理融资收购的理论分析. 国泰君安证券通讯. 1999.7
[36] 刘云鹏. 产权问题与我国公司治理结构的选择. 经济导刊. 1999.3
[37] 段文斌. 公司中的委托—代理和治理结构. 中国工业经济. 1998.2
[38] 皇泰岩, 郑江淮. 企业家行为的制度分析. 中国工业经济. 1998.2
[39] 吴东辉, 胡冰冰. 转轨经济下国有企业的代理与管理报酬契约. 会计研究. 1999.9
[40] 袁国良, 王怀芳. 上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题. AMT 网站. 1999
[41] 李甬. 四通变局. 财经. 1999.7
[42] 中国企业家协会. 经营者收入分配制度. 企业管理出版社. 2000.7
[43] 吴叔平. 虞俊健者. 上海远东出版社. 2000.11
[44] 张昕海. 于东科等. 股权激励. 机械工业出版社. 2000.10
[45] 沈晗耀, 魏德俊. 经营者持股操作指南. 华东理工大学出版社. 2000.10
[46] 胡俞越. 经理层革命. 中国财政经济出版社. 2000.11
[47] 皇钟苏, 高晓博. 经理激励与股票期权. 中华工商联和出版社. 2001.1
[48] 叶旭全. 股票期权制理论与实务指南. 企业管理出版社. 2000.12
[49] 焦斌龙. 中国企业家人力资本:形成. 定价和配置. 天津大学出版社. 2000
[50] 王斌. 企业职工持股制度国际比较. 经济管理出版社. 2000.7
[51] 王刚. 如何在中国实施期权. 世界经理人文摘. 2000.11
[52] 王巍. 李曙光. MBO 管理者收购—从经理到股东. 中国人民大学出版社. 1999.12
[53] 片庭浩久. 管理层收购(张碧清译). 中信出版社. 2001
[54] 金雪军, 杨晓兰. 转型国家的管理者收购――以俄罗斯及东欧国家为例. 外国经济与管理. 2002.6
[2] Corey Rosen, An Overview of ESOPs, Stock Options ,and Employee Ownership/the National Center for Employee Ownership(NECO)
[3] Richard Lambert,Joseph McDonald Professor of Accounting Graduate school of Business, Stock Options: Controversial in Larger Firms
[4] Manohar Singh, Wallace N. Davidson, 2001, “Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms”, Journal of Banking & Finance
[5] Claire E. Crutchley, Marlin R. H. Jesen, John S. Jennie E. Raymond ,1999, “Agency problems and the simultaneity of financial decision making-the role of institutional ownership”, Internatianal Review of Financial Analysis
[6] Jensen, M.And W.Mecking, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial economics. 1976
[7] Jensen, Michael. Agency costs of free cash flow. Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review. 1986(76):323-329
[8] Lowenstein. Management buy-outs[J]. Columbia Law Review. 1986(85):35-68
[9] Smith, Abbie J.. Corporate ownership structure and performance: The case of management buyout[J]. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990.27:143-164
[10] Demsetz, Fama. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983(26):375-390
[11] Richard Harris, Donald Siegel, Mike Wright. Assessing the Impact of Management Buyouts on Economics Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United Kingdom. Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics. 2001(304):1-29
[12] M. Wright. , S. Thompson, K. Robbie, etc. Management Buy-outs in the Short and Long Term. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 1995.22:461-483
[13] Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Donald Siegel. The effect of leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990(27):165-194
[14] Kaplan, Steven. The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989(24):217-254
[15] Lichtenberg, Frank R. , Donald Siegel. The Effect of Ownership Changes on the Employment and Wages of Central Other Personnel. Journal of Law and Economics. 1990(33):383-408
[16] DeAngelo, H DeAngelo, L Rice. Going Private: Minority Freeze outs and Stockholder Wealth[J]. Journal of Law and Economics. 1984(26):307-401
[17] 威斯通等. 兼并. 重组与公司控制. 东北财经大学出版社. 2000
[18] Morck, R., Sheleifer, and R.W.Vishny, Alternative Mechanisms for Cororatecontrol, ms, University of Alberta, February. 1988
[19] Hermalin,Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, Financial Management 20. 1991
[20] Demsetz, H. and Lehn, the structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93:1155~1157
[21] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H. (1976), ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3:305~360
[22] Stulz, R.M. (1988),‘Managerial control of voting rights: financing policies and the market for corporate control’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20:25~54
[23] McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. (1990), Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27:595~612
[24] 朱小斌. 民营化浪潮中的 MBO. 投资研究. 2001.11
[25] 王志勇. 中国企业走近 MBO. 商业研究. 2002.12
[26] 刘兵, 张世英. 企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析. 系统工程理论与实践. 2000.6
[27] 贺小刚. 管理层收购:国外现状、研究及其在中国的发展. 改革. 2002.4
[28] 贺慈浩, 张小蒂. MBO:我国中小企业体制改革的一种可借鉴的模式. 商业研究. 2000.10
[29] 陈江波. MBO 一种有效的长期激励机制. 财经理论与实践. 2002.2
[30] 易宪容. 交易行为与合约选择. 经济科学出版社. 1998.6
[31] 廖成林, 宋福林. 国有中小企业管理者收购探讨. 技术经济与管理研究. 2001.3
[32] 陈晓. 陈小悦. 刘钊. A 股赢余报告的有用性研究—来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据. 经济研究. 1999.6
[33] 于东智. 论代理成本的控制――兼议我国公司治理结构的完善. 烟台大学学报. 2001.7
[34] 张剑文. 企业家激励理论基础与实现路径. 国泰君安证券通讯. 1999.8
[35] 张剑文. 经理融资收购的理论分析. 国泰君安证券通讯. 1999.7
[36] 刘云鹏. 产权问题与我国公司治理结构的选择. 经济导刊. 1999.3
[37] 段文斌. 公司中的委托—代理和治理结构. 中国工业经济. 1998.2
[38] 皇泰岩, 郑江淮. 企业家行为的制度分析. 中国工业经济. 1998.2
[39] 吴东辉, 胡冰冰. 转轨经济下国有企业的代理与管理报酬契约. 会计研究. 1999.9
[40] 袁国良, 王怀芳. 上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题. AMT 网站. 1999
[41] 李甬. 四通变局. 财经. 1999.7
[42] 中国企业家协会. 经营者收入分配制度. 企业管理出版社. 2000.7
[43] 吴叔平. 虞俊健者. 上海远东出版社. 2000.11
[44] 张昕海. 于东科等. 股权激励. 机械工业出版社. 2000.10
[45] 沈晗耀, 魏德俊. 经营者持股操作指南. 华东理工大学出版社. 2000.10
[46] 胡俞越. 经理层革命. 中国财政经济出版社. 2000.11
[47] 皇钟苏, 高晓博. 经理激励与股票期权. 中华工商联和出版社. 2001.1
[48] 叶旭全. 股票期权制理论与实务指南. 企业管理出版社. 2000.12
[49] 焦斌龙. 中国企业家人力资本:形成. 定价和配置. 天津大学出版社. 2000
[50] 王斌. 企业职工持股制度国际比较. 经济管理出版社. 2000.7
[51] 王刚. 如何在中国实施期权. 世界经理人文摘. 2000.11
[52] 王巍. 李曙光. MBO 管理者收购—从经理到股东. 中国人民大学出版社. 1999.12
[53] 片庭浩久. 管理层收购(张碧清译). 中信出版社. 2001
[54] 金雪军, 杨晓兰. 转型国家的管理者收购――以俄罗斯及东欧国家为例. 外国经济与管理. 2002.6