基于风险分担的高速公路BOT项目特许定价研究
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摘要
特许定价是BOT项目招标和特许经营协议谈判的核心问题，在项目融资业界和理论研究中都得到广泛的关注。然而实践中不乏存在由于特许定价失当导致的失败项目，理论上也缺乏能够保证政府和私人部门利益均衡的特许定价方法。在倡导私人主导融资的基础设施投资体制改革的环境下，如何有效解决政府和私人部门之间合作定价的问题，已经成为确保BOT项目顺利运作的关键。
本研究以高速公路BOT项目为研究对象，围绕特许定价，提出三个需要解决的关键问题，包括影响特许定价的关键风险识别问题，关键风险分担程度的确定问题，基础特许价格的确定和价格调整方法的设计问题。
论文对BOT项目风险识别、风险分担以及特许定价的相关研究进行系统的文献回顾，结果发现现有理论研究成果尚不能解决高速公路BOT项目的特许定价问题，其局限性主要表现在未考虑特许定价和风险分担之间的联系，并且忽略了风险对价格水平的影响。
首先，为了识别影响特许价格的关键风险，本研究提出七个关键风险假设，通过设计调查问卷，统计分析数据，并使用结构方程模型进行估计，完成对假设的检验。结果表明完工风险对中国高速公路BOT项目特许定价影响程度最大，属于一级风险；不可抗力风险、法律风险和市场风险影响程度较大，属于二级风险；政治风险、经营风险和金融风险的影响程度最低，属于三级风险，在特许定价中可以不予考虑。
其次，针对识别后的关键风险，在对现有关键风险分担研究结果进行统计分析的基础上，确定出关键风险在政府和私人部门之间分担的格局；然后在假定双方风险信息对称的前提下，将关键风险引入社会福利和私人利润两个博弈支付函数中，利用二人合作博弈模型的纳什积函数映射，求解出风险分担的纳什谈判解，得到一个处于均衡稳定状态下的风险分担比例，为基础特许价格的制定以及调整机制的设计提供量化的依据。
再次，分析了固定特许期和弹性特许期下基础特许价格的形成机制，将固定特许期下的特许定价划分为两种定价模式。在定价“模式一”中，根据不同的风险偏好水平，将投标人区分为风险喜好型、风险厌恶型和风险中立型三种，并针对每种投标人的定价目标分别建立了相应的随机规划模型，来求解基础特许价格；然后设计了以投资额、特许价格和政府承担风险为参数的三维组合评标方法，政府选定组合投标报价秩和最低的投标人为第一中标候选人，中标特许价格即为最终的基础特许价格。
在定价“模式二”和弹性特许期的定价中，假设政府具有中立的风险偏好，以社会福利最大化为目标，满足私人利润水平为约束条件，通过建立机会约束规划模型，确定出基础特许价格。
然后，确定出特许价格调整所依据的关键风险，提出高速公路BOT项目特许价格调整所遵循的四个原则：包括综合考虑风险影响的原则、激励效率提高的原则、保证合理回报的原则、分阶段调整的原则。研究认为特许价格调整的周期必须与风险分担周期相对应，并要考虑价格调整延误风险的影响。
根据项目实际利润和均衡点的相对位置关系，设计出价格调整时四种前期损益结转的方法，以达到激励项目公司提高效率，并保证其获得合理回报的目的。以原有特许价格能否在一定置信水平上满足未来净现值不小于最低水平为调整条件，确定出定价“模式一”和“模式二”下不同的特许价格调整方法。
最后，参考襄荆高速公路BOT项目的基础数据，通过对关键风险的概率分布假设，使用Crystal Ball 7.22软件作为随机模拟分析的工具，对特许定价的随机规划模型进行验证。数值模拟的结果表明，本研究所建立的基础特许价格模型和调整方法，能够在风险估计和合理分担的基础上，确定出满足政府和项目公司定价目标的特许价格。
Concession pricing is a critical issue in BOT project auction and concession contract negotiation, which has been paid extensive attention to by project financing practitioners and researchers. However, there exist some aborted projects due to improper concession prices. And also there is lack of pricing methods to assure benefit balance between governments and private sectors. Under the situation of promoting private initiative finance in the reform of infrastructure investment in China, effective cooperative pricing between governments and private sectors has become key to assure successful operation of BOT projects.
Taken BOT expressway projects as research objects, three critical issues relating to concession pricing have been put forward, including identification of key risks influencing concession pricing, determination of key risk allocation scale, calculation of base concession price and arrangement of price adjustment.
Literature about risk identification, risk allocation and concession pricing has been reviewed. The results indicate that existing researches have not solved the problem of concession pricing yet. The main limitations are the disconnection of concession pricing and risk allocation, and neglecting the risk influence to pricing.
First of all, in order to identify key risks influencing concession pricing, seven assumptions about key risk influencing degree to pricing have been made. The assumptions have been verified by developing a structural equation model and analyzing statistical data collected through questionnaire survey. It finds that completion risks have the greatest influence to concession pricing in BOT expressway projects of China, which are classified the first-order risks. Force majeure risks, legislation risks and market risks have the greater influence to concession pricing, which are classified the second-order risks. Sovereignty risks, operation risks and finance risks have the least influence to concession pricing, which are classified the third-order risks and can be neglected in pricing.
Secondly, the responsibilities of bearing key risks have been allocated between governments and private sectors, through summarizing the statistical results of key risk allocation given by other researchers. Under the assumption of symmetrical risk information between both parties, introducing risk influences into social welfare function and profit function, two-person cooperative games model can be established. Using Nash Product mapping, Nash negotiation solution to risk allocation can be achieved. The results of the games model can be references to concession base price decision and adjustment mechanism design.
Thirdly, fixed-term and flexible-term base concession pricing mechanisms have been analyzed. Two pricing modes have been classified in fixed-term base concession pricing. In pricing modeⅠ, bidders can be classified into three types according to risk preference degree, namely risk fancy, risk aversive and risk neutral bidders. In order to calculate base concession price, stochastic programming models have been developed according to pricing goals pursued by different risk preference degree bidders. Adopting auction with 3-dimentional bids of investment, concession price and risks born by governments, governments select the bidder with the lowest total rank of 3-dimentional bids as the first candidate to negotiate, whose concession price offer is the final base price.
In concession pricing modeⅡand flexible-term pricing, it is assumed that governments have neutral risk preference. Governments determine base concession price level by solving the stochastic programming model with the goal of maximizing social benefit under the constraint of profit demanded by private sectors.
Then the key risks to adjust price have been confirmed. Four principles to adjust concession price are presented in BOT expressway projects, including the principle of systematically taking into account risk influence, the principle of promoting efficiency improvement, the principle of keeping reasonable return, the principle of adjusting price periodically. It is suggested that price adjustment period should be corresponding to the risk allocation period, and adjustment delay risk should be considered when making decisions.
According to the relationship between the actual profit and balance point, four methods to deal with profit and loss of previous period have been designed, to achieve the goals of promoting the project company to improve efficiency, and assuring the company to obtain reasonable return. The adjustment condition is that future net present value should not be less than minimum value demand by the project company at the given confidence level. And price adjustment methods have also been developed for pricing modeⅠandⅡ.
Finally, using the data of Xiang-jing expressway BOT project, making probability distribution assumptions of key risks, applying Crystal Ball 7.22 software as the simulation tool, stochastic programming models of concession pricing have been verified and illustrated. The simulation results show that the models of concession pricing and adjustment can produce satisfying prices for governments and private sectors based on risk evaluation and reasonable allocation.
本研究以高速公路BOT项目为研究对象，围绕特许定价，提出三个需要解决的关键问题，包括影响特许定价的关键风险识别问题，关键风险分担程度的确定问题，基础特许价格的确定和价格调整方法的设计问题。
论文对BOT项目风险识别、风险分担以及特许定价的相关研究进行系统的文献回顾，结果发现现有理论研究成果尚不能解决高速公路BOT项目的特许定价问题，其局限性主要表现在未考虑特许定价和风险分担之间的联系，并且忽略了风险对价格水平的影响。
首先，为了识别影响特许价格的关键风险，本研究提出七个关键风险假设，通过设计调查问卷，统计分析数据，并使用结构方程模型进行估计，完成对假设的检验。结果表明完工风险对中国高速公路BOT项目特许定价影响程度最大，属于一级风险；不可抗力风险、法律风险和市场风险影响程度较大，属于二级风险；政治风险、经营风险和金融风险的影响程度最低，属于三级风险，在特许定价中可以不予考虑。
其次，针对识别后的关键风险，在对现有关键风险分担研究结果进行统计分析的基础上，确定出关键风险在政府和私人部门之间分担的格局；然后在假定双方风险信息对称的前提下，将关键风险引入社会福利和私人利润两个博弈支付函数中，利用二人合作博弈模型的纳什积函数映射，求解出风险分担的纳什谈判解，得到一个处于均衡稳定状态下的风险分担比例，为基础特许价格的制定以及调整机制的设计提供量化的依据。
再次，分析了固定特许期和弹性特许期下基础特许价格的形成机制，将固定特许期下的特许定价划分为两种定价模式。在定价“模式一”中，根据不同的风险偏好水平，将投标人区分为风险喜好型、风险厌恶型和风险中立型三种，并针对每种投标人的定价目标分别建立了相应的随机规划模型，来求解基础特许价格；然后设计了以投资额、特许价格和政府承担风险为参数的三维组合评标方法，政府选定组合投标报价秩和最低的投标人为第一中标候选人，中标特许价格即为最终的基础特许价格。
在定价“模式二”和弹性特许期的定价中，假设政府具有中立的风险偏好，以社会福利最大化为目标，满足私人利润水平为约束条件，通过建立机会约束规划模型，确定出基础特许价格。
然后，确定出特许价格调整所依据的关键风险，提出高速公路BOT项目特许价格调整所遵循的四个原则：包括综合考虑风险影响的原则、激励效率提高的原则、保证合理回报的原则、分阶段调整的原则。研究认为特许价格调整的周期必须与风险分担周期相对应，并要考虑价格调整延误风险的影响。
根据项目实际利润和均衡点的相对位置关系，设计出价格调整时四种前期损益结转的方法，以达到激励项目公司提高效率，并保证其获得合理回报的目的。以原有特许价格能否在一定置信水平上满足未来净现值不小于最低水平为调整条件，确定出定价“模式一”和“模式二”下不同的特许价格调整方法。
最后，参考襄荆高速公路BOT项目的基础数据，通过对关键风险的概率分布假设，使用Crystal Ball 7.22软件作为随机模拟分析的工具，对特许定价的随机规划模型进行验证。数值模拟的结果表明，本研究所建立的基础特许价格模型和调整方法，能够在风险估计和合理分担的基础上，确定出满足政府和项目公司定价目标的特许价格。
Concession pricing is a critical issue in BOT project auction and concession contract negotiation, which has been paid extensive attention to by project financing practitioners and researchers. However, there exist some aborted projects due to improper concession prices. And also there is lack of pricing methods to assure benefit balance between governments and private sectors. Under the situation of promoting private initiative finance in the reform of infrastructure investment in China, effective cooperative pricing between governments and private sectors has become key to assure successful operation of BOT projects.
Taken BOT expressway projects as research objects, three critical issues relating to concession pricing have been put forward, including identification of key risks influencing concession pricing, determination of key risk allocation scale, calculation of base concession price and arrangement of price adjustment.
Literature about risk identification, risk allocation and concession pricing has been reviewed. The results indicate that existing researches have not solved the problem of concession pricing yet. The main limitations are the disconnection of concession pricing and risk allocation, and neglecting the risk influence to pricing.
First of all, in order to identify key risks influencing concession pricing, seven assumptions about key risk influencing degree to pricing have been made. The assumptions have been verified by developing a structural equation model and analyzing statistical data collected through questionnaire survey. It finds that completion risks have the greatest influence to concession pricing in BOT expressway projects of China, which are classified the first-order risks. Force majeure risks, legislation risks and market risks have the greater influence to concession pricing, which are classified the second-order risks. Sovereignty risks, operation risks and finance risks have the least influence to concession pricing, which are classified the third-order risks and can be neglected in pricing.
Secondly, the responsibilities of bearing key risks have been allocated between governments and private sectors, through summarizing the statistical results of key risk allocation given by other researchers. Under the assumption of symmetrical risk information between both parties, introducing risk influences into social welfare function and profit function, two-person cooperative games model can be established. Using Nash Product mapping, Nash negotiation solution to risk allocation can be achieved. The results of the games model can be references to concession base price decision and adjustment mechanism design.
Thirdly, fixed-term and flexible-term base concession pricing mechanisms have been analyzed. Two pricing modes have been classified in fixed-term base concession pricing. In pricing modeⅠ, bidders can be classified into three types according to risk preference degree, namely risk fancy, risk aversive and risk neutral bidders. In order to calculate base concession price, stochastic programming models have been developed according to pricing goals pursued by different risk preference degree bidders. Adopting auction with 3-dimentional bids of investment, concession price and risks born by governments, governments select the bidder with the lowest total rank of 3-dimentional bids as the first candidate to negotiate, whose concession price offer is the final base price.
In concession pricing modeⅡand flexible-term pricing, it is assumed that governments have neutral risk preference. Governments determine base concession price level by solving the stochastic programming model with the goal of maximizing social benefit under the constraint of profit demanded by private sectors.
Then the key risks to adjust price have been confirmed. Four principles to adjust concession price are presented in BOT expressway projects, including the principle of systematically taking into account risk influence, the principle of promoting efficiency improvement, the principle of keeping reasonable return, the principle of adjusting price periodically. It is suggested that price adjustment period should be corresponding to the risk allocation period, and adjustment delay risk should be considered when making decisions.
According to the relationship between the actual profit and balance point, four methods to deal with profit and loss of previous period have been designed, to achieve the goals of promoting the project company to improve efficiency, and assuring the company to obtain reasonable return. The adjustment condition is that future net present value should not be less than minimum value demand by the project company at the given confidence level. And price adjustment methods have also been developed for pricing modeⅠandⅡ.
Finally, using the data of Xiang-jing expressway BOT project, making probability distribution assumptions of key risks, applying Crystal Ball 7.22 software as the simulation tool, stochastic programming models of concession pricing have been verified and illustrated. The simulation results show that the models of concession pricing and adjustment can produce satisfying prices for governments and private sectors based on risk evaluation and reasonable allocation.
引文
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