基于官员晋升的中国财政分权绩效研究：理论和政策
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摘要
新中国成立近60年,改革开放30年,中央与地方之间的财政关系经历了多次调整、放权,取得了丰硕的成果,也出现了一些特殊的现象。在享受改革成果之余,特别是在这样一个特殊时点上,如果能采用科学的研究方法对过去几十年以来的改革实践进行理论层面总结,不仅能对以往改革成果科学评价,更能对随后的改革实践提供理论上的借鉴。
本文观察到与中国财政分权紧密相关的两个现象：与大多数财政分权并不成功的国家相比,中国的经济增长却表现出了几十年的稳定高增长,但同时也表现出许多负面问题,如粗放型增长、重复建设、诸侯割据、收入不平等、环境恶化等问题(简称“强增长、弱发展”)。本文选择地方政府官员受到政治晋升合约约束的视角,基于市场关联(market interlinkage)理论构建一个模型。模型的核心是分析财政分权合约和政治晋升合约同时约束下地方政府官员的行为选择。模型认为,财政分权约束下,参与晋升合约的官员会更加努力发展具有强信号特征的经济领域,即当存在晋升合约时,中国的财政分权促进经济增长。这样的结论得到实证检验的进一步支持。突破现有的财政分权与经济增长关系研究的思路,本文选择1995-2006年的全国27个省份的面板数据,重点考察政治晋升制度安排(或合约)约束下财政分权制度安排的经济增长绩效。以省长和省委书记具有中央背景或者是中央下派的特征具体量化中央政府通过晋升合约影响地方官员的程度。计量结果显示政治晋升程度与财政分权的交互项系数符号为正,即官员晋升合约有利于促进财政分权绩效提高。
基于理论分析和实证检验,本文对过去改革政策进行梳理和评价,对未来改革提出政策建议。回顾和评价建国以来中央与地方之间财政关系变化的效果,提出“集权——分权”式改革陷入周期性怪圈的观点。今后的改革方向包括几方面的思路。第一,现阶段保持财政分权与官员晋升合约的关联特征不变,即不能分离财政分权对官员的激励效应和晋升合约带来的约束效应。第二,优化官员晋升考核机制,缓解多任务特征带来的弊端。第三,发挥体制外公民监督的约束力量。第四,进一步完善市场经济体系,缩小政府官员配置资源的范围,约束政府行为。第五,进一步完善法律制度建设,从根本上优化政治制度,最终替代来自政治晋升合约对官员的约束效应。
本文的研究是一次大胆的尝试。不仅仅表现在将主流经济学忽视的制度相关性论题纳入到研究视野,更表现在从中国改革的实践进程中提炼、抽象出符合中国国情的特殊约束条件。将二者有机结合在一起,提出的理论框架和核心概念将有助于主流经济学本土化的进程,也有助于提升中国改革实践经验的理论价值。当然,由于本文的工作具有一定探索性,仍存在放松部分假定、模型进一步扩展等诸多不足。
全文共分9章。第1章是导论。第2章是文献综述,通过对目前有关中国财政分权绩效研究分类梳理和评价,得出现有研究的不足,为我们的研究提供清晰的指向。第3、第4章是对财政分权和官员晋升合约性质的详细研究,为本文核心模型构建提供基础性研究。第五部分为全文核心部分,借鉴关联合约模型,将分权合约和晋升合约同时纳入地方政府官员行为分析框架,得出当存在晋升合约时中国的财政分权促进经济增长的假说。第6章是计量实证部分,通过国内27个省1994-2006年的面板数据进一步论证上述假说。第7、8章是应用部分,也是政策分析部分,第7章分析过去集分式改革的利弊,第8章基于现有的改革难点提出下一步改革的思路。最后是全文的结论部分。
It has been nearly 60 years since New China was founded and 30 years since reform and opening up. Fiscal relations between central and local governments, which experienced a number of adjustments and decentralization, have achieved fruitful results and also produced some special phenomena. Apart from enjoying the results of the reform especially in such a particular point in time, if we could make a summary of the reformation practice over the past few decades with scientific research methodology at a theoretical level, we will not only give a scientific evaluation on the previous results of the reform, but also provide a theoretical reference for the practice of reform in the future.
Two phenomena are closely related to China's fiscal decentralization observed by this thesis:Compared to the majority of less successful fiscal decentralization coutries, China's economic growth has shown the stability of high growth for decades and also many negative issues, such as the extensive growth, repeated construction, independent regime, income inequality, environmental degradation and so on (Referred to as "strong growth, weak development"). This thesis constructs a model based on the theory of market interlinkage in a perspective that local government officials are restricted by political promotion contract. The core of the model is to analyse local government officials' behavior choices under the simultaneous restrictions of fiscal decentralization contract and political promotion contract. The model holds the view that officials involved in the promotion contract will give more efforts to develop the economic sphere of a strong signal characteristic in the constraints of fiscal decentralization. That is, when there is promotion contract China's fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth. This conclusion is further supported by empirical tests. The positive researches break through the existing ideas of relationship research on fiscal decentralization and economic growth, use panel data of 27 provinces from 1995 to 2006 and highlight the study of economic growth performance under the institutional arrangements for fiscal decentralization and the restrictions of political promotion system. Focus on the characteristic of governor of a province or secretary of a provincial Party committee with the background of the central government or the faction of the central government, the extent of central government affects the local officials through the promotion contract is concretely quantified. Measurement results show that the coefficient of the interactive options between the political promotion's degree and fiscal decentralization is positive. That is, political promotion contract is conductive to motivate the improvement of fiscal decentralization performance.
Based on theoretical analysis and empirical tests, this thesis proposes policy recommendations. At first the thesis reviews and evaluates the effect of changes in fiscal relations between central and local governments since the founding of New China, proposing that "centralization-decentralization" reform fell into a periodic cycle. The direction of future reform includes several aspects of thinking. First, at the present stage to maintain the associative feature of fiscal decentralization and political promotion contract remain unchanged. That is, the incentive effects of the fiscal decentralization.acting on officials and the constraint effects of the political promotion contract can not be separated. Second, optimizes the official promotion evaluation mechanism and alleviate the evils of multi-tasking features. Third, develops the monitoring power of citizens outside the system. Fourth, further improves the market economy system, narrows the range of officials' allocation of resources and restrains government actions. Fifth, further improves the legal system construction, fundamentally optimizes the political system and eventually replace the constraint effects of the political promotion contract acting on officials.
This study is a bold attempt not only in bringing system related topics which are neglected by mainstream economics into the research vision, but also in refining and abstracting the special constraints suitable for China's national conditions from the practice of China's reform process. To combine the two together, the theoretical framework and the core concept proposed will contribute to the process of localization of mainstream economics and the improvement of theoretical value of China's reform practice experience.
The second part is a literature review. It comes from the deficiencies of existing studies by the classified collation and evaluation of performance study on China's current fiscal decentralization and provides a clear direction for our researches. The third and fourth part are detailed study on properties of fiscal decentralization and political promotion contract, providing the basic research for the construction of the core model in this thesis. The fifth part is the core part. It learns associated contract model, take decentralization contract and promotion contract simultaneously into the analysis framework of local government officials' behavior and come to the hypothesis that when there is promotion contract China's fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth. Part Six is a positive part of the measurement and gives further demonstration of the above-mentioned hypothesis with panel data of domestic 27 provinces from 1994 to 2006. Part 7 and part 8 are parts of application as well as policy analysis. Part 7 analyses the pros and cons of the past "centralization-decentralization" reform. Part 8 proposes the next ideas based on the existing difficulties in the reform. Finally, it's the conclusions of the whole thesis.
本文观察到与中国财政分权紧密相关的两个现象：与大多数财政分权并不成功的国家相比,中国的经济增长却表现出了几十年的稳定高增长,但同时也表现出许多负面问题,如粗放型增长、重复建设、诸侯割据、收入不平等、环境恶化等问题(简称“强增长、弱发展”)。本文选择地方政府官员受到政治晋升合约约束的视角,基于市场关联(market interlinkage)理论构建一个模型。模型的核心是分析财政分权合约和政治晋升合约同时约束下地方政府官员的行为选择。模型认为,财政分权约束下,参与晋升合约的官员会更加努力发展具有强信号特征的经济领域,即当存在晋升合约时,中国的财政分权促进经济增长。这样的结论得到实证检验的进一步支持。突破现有的财政分权与经济增长关系研究的思路,本文选择1995-2006年的全国27个省份的面板数据,重点考察政治晋升制度安排(或合约)约束下财政分权制度安排的经济增长绩效。以省长和省委书记具有中央背景或者是中央下派的特征具体量化中央政府通过晋升合约影响地方官员的程度。计量结果显示政治晋升程度与财政分权的交互项系数符号为正,即官员晋升合约有利于促进财政分权绩效提高。
基于理论分析和实证检验,本文对过去改革政策进行梳理和评价,对未来改革提出政策建议。回顾和评价建国以来中央与地方之间财政关系变化的效果,提出“集权——分权”式改革陷入周期性怪圈的观点。今后的改革方向包括几方面的思路。第一,现阶段保持财政分权与官员晋升合约的关联特征不变,即不能分离财政分权对官员的激励效应和晋升合约带来的约束效应。第二,优化官员晋升考核机制,缓解多任务特征带来的弊端。第三,发挥体制外公民监督的约束力量。第四,进一步完善市场经济体系,缩小政府官员配置资源的范围,约束政府行为。第五,进一步完善法律制度建设,从根本上优化政治制度,最终替代来自政治晋升合约对官员的约束效应。
本文的研究是一次大胆的尝试。不仅仅表现在将主流经济学忽视的制度相关性论题纳入到研究视野,更表现在从中国改革的实践进程中提炼、抽象出符合中国国情的特殊约束条件。将二者有机结合在一起,提出的理论框架和核心概念将有助于主流经济学本土化的进程,也有助于提升中国改革实践经验的理论价值。当然,由于本文的工作具有一定探索性,仍存在放松部分假定、模型进一步扩展等诸多不足。
全文共分9章。第1章是导论。第2章是文献综述,通过对目前有关中国财政分权绩效研究分类梳理和评价,得出现有研究的不足,为我们的研究提供清晰的指向。第3、第4章是对财政分权和官员晋升合约性质的详细研究,为本文核心模型构建提供基础性研究。第五部分为全文核心部分,借鉴关联合约模型,将分权合约和晋升合约同时纳入地方政府官员行为分析框架,得出当存在晋升合约时中国的财政分权促进经济增长的假说。第6章是计量实证部分,通过国内27个省1994-2006年的面板数据进一步论证上述假说。第7、8章是应用部分,也是政策分析部分,第7章分析过去集分式改革的利弊,第8章基于现有的改革难点提出下一步改革的思路。最后是全文的结论部分。
It has been nearly 60 years since New China was founded and 30 years since reform and opening up. Fiscal relations between central and local governments, which experienced a number of adjustments and decentralization, have achieved fruitful results and also produced some special phenomena. Apart from enjoying the results of the reform especially in such a particular point in time, if we could make a summary of the reformation practice over the past few decades with scientific research methodology at a theoretical level, we will not only give a scientific evaluation on the previous results of the reform, but also provide a theoretical reference for the practice of reform in the future.
Two phenomena are closely related to China's fiscal decentralization observed by this thesis:Compared to the majority of less successful fiscal decentralization coutries, China's economic growth has shown the stability of high growth for decades and also many negative issues, such as the extensive growth, repeated construction, independent regime, income inequality, environmental degradation and so on (Referred to as "strong growth, weak development"). This thesis constructs a model based on the theory of market interlinkage in a perspective that local government officials are restricted by political promotion contract. The core of the model is to analyse local government officials' behavior choices under the simultaneous restrictions of fiscal decentralization contract and political promotion contract. The model holds the view that officials involved in the promotion contract will give more efforts to develop the economic sphere of a strong signal characteristic in the constraints of fiscal decentralization. That is, when there is promotion contract China's fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth. This conclusion is further supported by empirical tests. The positive researches break through the existing ideas of relationship research on fiscal decentralization and economic growth, use panel data of 27 provinces from 1995 to 2006 and highlight the study of economic growth performance under the institutional arrangements for fiscal decentralization and the restrictions of political promotion system. Focus on the characteristic of governor of a province or secretary of a provincial Party committee with the background of the central government or the faction of the central government, the extent of central government affects the local officials through the promotion contract is concretely quantified. Measurement results show that the coefficient of the interactive options between the political promotion's degree and fiscal decentralization is positive. That is, political promotion contract is conductive to motivate the improvement of fiscal decentralization performance.
Based on theoretical analysis and empirical tests, this thesis proposes policy recommendations. At first the thesis reviews and evaluates the effect of changes in fiscal relations between central and local governments since the founding of New China, proposing that "centralization-decentralization" reform fell into a periodic cycle. The direction of future reform includes several aspects of thinking. First, at the present stage to maintain the associative feature of fiscal decentralization and political promotion contract remain unchanged. That is, the incentive effects of the fiscal decentralization.acting on officials and the constraint effects of the political promotion contract can not be separated. Second, optimizes the official promotion evaluation mechanism and alleviate the evils of multi-tasking features. Third, develops the monitoring power of citizens outside the system. Fourth, further improves the market economy system, narrows the range of officials' allocation of resources and restrains government actions. Fifth, further improves the legal system construction, fundamentally optimizes the political system and eventually replace the constraint effects of the political promotion contract acting on officials.
This study is a bold attempt not only in bringing system related topics which are neglected by mainstream economics into the research vision, but also in refining and abstracting the special constraints suitable for China's national conditions from the practice of China's reform process. To combine the two together, the theoretical framework and the core concept proposed will contribute to the process of localization of mainstream economics and the improvement of theoretical value of China's reform practice experience.
The second part is a literature review. It comes from the deficiencies of existing studies by the classified collation and evaluation of performance study on China's current fiscal decentralization and provides a clear direction for our researches. The third and fourth part are detailed study on properties of fiscal decentralization and political promotion contract, providing the basic research for the construction of the core model in this thesis. The fifth part is the core part. It learns associated contract model, take decentralization contract and promotion contract simultaneously into the analysis framework of local government officials' behavior and come to the hypothesis that when there is promotion contract China's fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth. Part Six is a positive part of the measurement and gives further demonstration of the above-mentioned hypothesis with panel data of domestic 27 provinces from 1994 to 2006. Part 7 and part 8 are parts of application as well as policy analysis. Part 7 analyses the pros and cons of the past "centralization-decentralization" reform. Part 8 proposes the next ideas based on the existing difficulties in the reform. Finally, it's the conclusions of the whole thesis.
引文
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②中共七大通过的《党章》规定：在政府、工会、农会、合作社及其他群众组织的领导机关中,凡有担任负责工作的党员三人以上者,即成立党组。党组的任务,是在各该组织的领导机关中指导党员为加强党的影响,实现党的政策而工作。
③《中国共产党组织史资料》(第九卷下),第3页。
④《中国共产党组织史资料》(第九卷下),第9页。
①转引自傅勇.中国式分权、地方财政模式与公共物品供给——理论与实证研究[D].复旦大学,2007,(5).
②参加这些班次培训的学员全部来自该省,以党政部门为主,也有来自高校和企业的县处级以上干部；除了“市厅班”和“乡镇班”的学员分别为司局级和正科级外,其他各班次均为县处级。问卷匿名填写,以班级为单位集中发放,学员填写后再集中回收。共发出问卷680份,回收有效问卷571份。
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②中共七大通过的《党章》规定：在政府、工会、农会、合作社及其他群众组织的领导机关中,凡有担任负责工作的党员三人以上者,即成立党组。党组的任务,是在各该组织的领导机关中指导党员为加强党的影响,实现党的政策而工作。
③《中国共产党组织史资料》(第九卷下),第3页。
④《中国共产党组织史资料》(第九卷下),第9页。
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②参加这些班次培训的学员全部来自该省,以党政部门为主,也有来自高校和企业的县处级以上干部；除了“市厅班”和“乡镇班”的学员分别为司局级和正科级外,其他各班次均为县处级。问卷匿名填写,以班级为单位集中发放,学员填写后再集中回收。共发出问卷680份,回收有效问卷571份。
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